Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involved a traffic stop of Shawna Rae Pendleton in October 2021 due to expired vehicle registration. Officer Miller and his drug dog, Edo, were called to conduct a free-air sniff around Pendleton’s vehicle. During the sniff, Edo closely investigated the vehicle doors and briefly touched the exterior handle of at least one door with the tip of his nose before alerting to the presence of illegal drugs. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine, marijuana, alprazolam, and drug paraphernalia, resulting in Pendleton’s arrest and charges for possession offenses.Pendleton moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Edo’s brief contact with her vehicle constituted a trespass, transforming the sniff into an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Ada County agreed with Pendleton, relying on State v. Dorff and finding that Edo’s contact amounted to intermeddling and a trespass for the purpose of obtaining information. The court granted the motion to suppress. The State appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, determining the contact was not trespassory and that Edo’s alert prior to contact provided probable cause for the search. Pendleton petitioned for review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that Edo’s momentary and minimal contact with the vehicle did not rise to the level of intermeddling and therefore was not trespassory. The Court concluded that such brief contact did not meaningfully interfere with Pendleton’s possessory interest in the vehicle. Absent a trespass, the sniff did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The district court’s order suppressing the evidence was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pendleton " on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in Boise, Idaho, after police discovered an outstanding warrant during a citation for disorderly conduct. Upon searching his person, law enforcement found methamphetamine, marijuana, and a metal tube believed to be drug paraphernalia in his pockets. At the time, the defendant was homeless and wearing multiple jackets, which he claimed to have obtained from a homeless shelter. He was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.Before trial in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, the judge ruled that the defendant could not present evidence about where he obtained his jacket, reasoning under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 that such evidence would be more prejudicial than probative because it might elicit jury sympathy due to his homeless status. At trial, after the State’s case, the district court dismissed the marijuana charge. The defendant testified that he was unaware of the methamphetamine in his jacket but complied with the court’s exclusion order. The jury convicted him of possession of methamphetamine and acquitted him of possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a seven-year unified sentence and appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule 403.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case, applying de novo review of relevance and abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings. It held that excluding evidence about the jacket’s origin prevented the defendant from presenting highly probative evidence related to his knowledge, an essential element of the offense. The Court found the district court failed to properly balance probative value versus unfair prejudice under Rule 403 and determined the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Hardt" on Justia Law

A motorist was injured after colliding with a cow on Interstate 84 in Elmore County, Idaho. The cow belonged to a local rancher, and the land adjacent to the collision site was managed by a grazing association. The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) maintained fencing and cattle guards along the highway, and there was a livestock culvert nearby which had been gated for years. On the day of the incident, livestock were herded through this culvert, and the following day, a hole was discovered in the fencing near the site.The injured motorist filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Elmore County, asserting negligence against the rancher, the grazing association, and ITD. He argued that the defendants failed to warn motorists and breached duties related to fencing and livestock management. The rancher and association sought summary judgment based on immunity under Idaho’s open range law, while ITD sought summary judgment on the grounds that it owed no duty to prohibit livestock from entering the highway or to warn motorists, and claimed immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, and subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider for procedural noncompliance and, alternatively, on the merits.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho conducted de novo review. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the rancher and grazing association were immune under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because the collision occurred on open range, rejecting arguments that the presence of fencing precluded immunity or that federal law preempted Idaho’s statutes. The Court also held that ITD owed no tort duty to the plaintiff to maintain fencing or warn of livestock, and that no special relationship or assumption of duty existed. The summary judgment rulings for all defendants were affirmed. View "Ludwig v. Howard, ITD" on Justia Law

A couple began constructing a residential barndominium and lived in an RV on their property in Sandpoint, Idaho. After a heavy snowstorm caused the collapse of the partially constructed dwelling and damaged utility connections to their RV, they made claims under their State Farm homeowner’s insurance policy for structural losses, personal property damage, demolition and outbuilding losses, additional living expenses (ALE), and alleged unreasonable delays. State Farm paid over $120,000 but denied further claims, citing lack of required documentation and inventories.The couple filed suit in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and negligent adjustment. State Farm moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs failed to substantiate their losses and did not incur ALE as defined under the policy. The district court struck several exhibits as inadmissible hearsay, including a letter from a medical expert and a timeline of events, and granted summary judgment to State Farm. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not complied with policy conditions, failed to substantiate their claimed losses, and that their claims were fairly debatable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of evidence as inadmissible hearsay and lack of personal knowledge. It held that the plaintiffs did not establish entitlement to ALE, failed to substantiate structural and personal property losses, and provided insufficient evidence of bad faith or negligent adjustment. The judgment of the district court was affirmed, with State Farm awarded costs on appeal. View "Espinosa v. State Farm" on Justia Law

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief.BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children.After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation between a man and his former girlfriend, the man was charged with attempted strangulation, a felony under Idaho law. The incident involved conflicting accounts: the alleged victim reported that the defendant choked her after an argument, while the defendant claimed she was the aggressor and he did not harm her. Police observed some injuries but did not initially see marks on her neck; however, follow-up photos taken more than a day later showed signs consistent with strangulation. The defendant was also charged with violating a no-contact order, and the State alleged he was a persistent violator due to prior felony convictions.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County. During the trial, the court, over the defendant's objections, instructed the jury on domestic battery with traumatic injury as a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation. The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted strangulation and violation of the no-contact order, but convicted him of domestic battery with traumatic injury and found him to be a persistent violator. The district court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the defendant had not preserved his objection regarding the lesser included offense and found no reversible or fundamental error.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho determined that the district court erred by instructing the jury on domestic battery with traumatic injury as a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation. The Supreme Court held that this error was not harmless, as it directly affected the deliberative process and outcome. The Court vacated the conviction for domestic battery with traumatic injury and the persistent violator finding, remanding the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the attempted strangulation charge. View "State v. Crombie" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on statements made by an attorney during a media interview concerning the fallout from a business partnership between two individuals, one of whom was accused of embezzlement and criminal wrongdoing. The attorney commented publicly about the circumstances that led to the criminal charges against his client and the civil dispute with his client’s business partner. After criminal charges against the client were dismissed, the business partner sued the attorney and his former law firm for defamation and defamation per se, specifically challenging statements in the interview that allegedly impugned his reputation and business fitness.Prior to trial, the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, granted summary judgment on ordinary defamation claims due to a lack of pleaded special damages and dismissed one defendant by stipulation. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on defamation per se claims. The plaintiff requested a jury instruction defining defamation per se to include statements imputing conduct incompatible with the plaintiff’s lawful business, trade, or profession. The district court declined, instructing the jury that defamation per se was limited to statements imputing criminal conduct punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpitude. The jury found for the defendants, and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in its jury instructions on defamation per se. The Court held that Idaho law does recognize statements imputing unfitness in the conduct of a person’s business, trade, or profession as a category of defamation per se. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on this category constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, denying attorney fees to the respondents. View "Taylor v. Davis" on Justia Law

A developer began constructing and selling duplex-style condominiums in Bonner County, Idaho, using a standard real estate purchase and sale agreement (PSA) form. The buyers, including a real estate agent and his wife, entered into PSAs for two units, planning to use them as personal and investment properties. The PSAs referenced detailed “Plans and Specifications” for the construction and finishes of the units, but no such documents were attached or ever created. Disputes later arose over the scope and quality of the promised finishes, especially after the developer communicated price increases and clarified the options for base and upgraded finishes. The buyers sued to enforce the contracts and sought specific performance, while the developer counterclaimed for a declaration that the PSAs were invalid due to indefiniteness.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, conducted a bench trial. It found that the PSAs for the disputed units were missing essential material terms, specifically the absent Plans and Specifications, which left the scope of work, finishes, and price adjustments undefined. The court concluded that no enforceable contract was formed and denied the buyers’ request for specific performance. The developer was ordered to return deposits but was deemed the prevailing party, entitling him to attorney fees and costs. The district court also conditioned a stay of its judgment pending appeal on the posting of an additional bond.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the PSAs were invalid and unenforceable because they omitted material terms necessary to define the contractual obligations. The buyers’ challenge to the additional bond was deemed moot given the disposition of the contract claims. The award of attorney fees to the developer was upheld, and the Supreme Court granted him attorney fees and costs for the appeal as the prevailing party. View "SCHUSTER v. MILBRATH" on Justia Law

This case stems from a fatal plane crash in which a pilot, Chelsea Brittney Infanger, collided with exhaust stacks owned by a processing plant near the Burley Municipal Airport in Idaho. The stacks, which extended over 100 feet high, were situated within the runway’s approach path and had been the subject of prior regulatory concern. The pilot’s parents brought a wrongful death suit, alleging that the Idaho Department of Transportation’s Division of Aeronautics negligently failed to regulate or mitigate the known risk posed by these stacks, arguing that various statutory, common law, special relationship, and contractual duties compelled the Division to act.After settlements with other defendants, the case proceeded against the Division in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. The Division moved for summary judgment, contending it owed no individualized duty to the deceased under the Airport Zoning Act, common law, or through a special relationship, and that it was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court agreed, holding that the Division’s statutory duties were general obligations to the public, not specific duties to individual aviators, and found no basis for liability under special relationship or contract theories. The court granted summary judgment to the Division, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the Airport Zoning Act did not create a tort duty to a particular class of persons, but rather imposed general obligations for public safety, and thus could not support a negligence per se claim. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not preserve or demonstrate the elements necessary for a special relationship or assumed duty sufficient to impose liability. The Court declined to award attorney fees, but granted costs to the Division. View "Infanger v. State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation" on Justia Law