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Linda Dunn appealed a district court’s judgment affirming the Idaho State Tax Commission’s deficiency determination. The Commission issued a deficiency against Linda after determining that her one-half community interest in her husband’s, Barry Dunn (“Husband”), out-of-state earnings should have been included as Idaho taxable income for 2000–01, 2003–05, and 2007–10 (the “Taxable Years”). Linda was married to Husband during the Taxable Years. During the Taxable Years, Husband lived primarily in Texas, employed by a Texas offshore drilling company. All of the earnings at issue were earned by Husband personally as a wage earner in Texas, Alaska, or Washington and were directly deposited into his bank account in Tomball, Texas. Husband never worked or was domiciled in Idaho during the Taxable Years. Throughout the Taxable Years, Linda temporarily lived with Husband at his work location, but always returned to Idaho to operate a horse farm. She was a resident of Idaho for all of the Taxable Years. Linda and Husband’s tax filing status was “married filing jointly.” Linda relied on Texas law for her argument that her interest in Husband’s earnings were immune from Idaho income tax. The Commission maintained Linda, as an Idaho resident, was taxed on all income she received during the Taxable Years while domiciled in Idaho, even if that income was derived from Texas. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s affirmance of the Commission’s decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dunn v. Idaho Tax Commission" on Justia Law

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John Doe I (“Father”) appealed a magistrate court’s order terminating his parental rights to Jane Doe I (“Child”). Father argued the court erred in concluding he neglected Child because Jane Doe (“Mother”) prevented Father from supporting or contacting Child. Father also argued the magistrate court, in analyzing the best interest of Child, impermissibly compared Father’s relationship to John Doe II (“Stepfather”) without considering Mother’s actions. Despite Mother’s unwillingness to provide her or Child’s contact information, the evidence demonstrated that Father had several opportunities to play a role in Child’s life, but his attempts to do so inevitably lost traction. Child’s relationship with Stepfather was only one factor that was considered by the magistrate court in determining that termination was in the best interest of Child. The magistrate court also considered that Father had not paid child support, or made a substantial effort to contact Child since 2012. The Idaho Supreme Court found it was appropriate for the magistrate court to consider these factors when it analyzed whether termination was in the best interest of Child, and affirmed that court's decision in all respects. View "Doe II v. Doe I" on Justia Law

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Trevor Lee appealed a district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. As part of his plea agreement, Lee reserved the right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. The district court concluded the pat-down frisk was reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), but the officer exceeded the scope of the frisk by opening the containers found in Lee’s pocket. However, the district court concluded the search of the containers was permissible as a search incident to Lee’s arrest because, prior to the search, the officer had probable cause to arrest Lee for driving without privileges and the search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. The court of appeals agreed and affirmed the district court’s denial of Lee’s motion to suppress. The Idaho Supreme Court found after review: (1) the district court correctly concluded that the frisk was justified under Terry but that the arresting officer exceeded the scope of a permissible frisk when he opened the containers found on Lee; and (2) the district court therefore erred in concluding the search of Lee's person was a permissible search incident to arrest. The Court vacated the conviction, reversed the district court’s denial of Lee’s motion to suppress, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Lee" on Justia Law

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This is an easement dispute between two adjoining landowners and a claim to quiet title. Plaintiffs Bedard and Musser, and Boise Hollow Land Holdings, RLLP (collectively, Boise Hollow) filed suit against Boise City seeking a declaration that they: (1) hold an access easement over part of Quail Hollow Golf Course pursuant to a recorded Permanent Easement Agreement; and (2) were entitled to expand the easement area to comply with certain requirements of the Ada County Highway District so that it can be dedicated as a public road. The district court rejected Boise Hollow’s position on summary judgment, finding that the agreement did not create an easement because the entity which purported to grant the easement across the golf course property had only a leasehold interest at the time the agreement was signed. Moreover, the same party owned both the land where the easement was located (the servient estate) and the land to which the easement was appurtenant (the dominant estate). The district court further found that any access that was granted by the lessor under the agreement terminated when the leasehold was terminated by an express agreement. The district court entered judgment in favor of Boise City. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Bedard & Musser v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

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Jane Doe II (“Grandmother”) raised her two young granddaughters, VG and CG. Grandmother met Jane Doe I (“Former Girlfriend”) soon after CG’s birth. Grandmother and Former Girlfriend were involved in a romantic relationship and moved to Idaho with the girls, where they all lived together for several months. Soon thereafter, Grandmother ended the relationship with Former Girlfriend. Former Girlfriend moved out of the home, but continued to care for the girls. Grandmother became legal guardian of both girls. In March 2013, Grandmother filed a petition to make Former Girlfriend a co-guardian because she thought it would ensure that the girls would remain together if something happened to her. About a year later, Grandmother and Former Girlfriend filed a joint petition to terminate the biological parents’ rights and co-adopt the girls. The written agreements to adopt that were prepared prior to the hearing were changed to reflect that Former Girlfriend would adopt CG and Grandmother would adopt VG. During the hearing on the matter, the petition to terminate the biological parents’ rights was granted, as were the separate adoptions. Police were called in to physically remove CG from Grandmother’s home; shortly thereafter, Former Girlfriend moved to terminate Grandmother’s guardianship. In late December 2016, Former Girlfriend filed a motion for summary judgment in this case seeking co-adoption of both girls and orders of guardianship or visitation based on the parties’ original petition for co-adoption. In response, Grandmother filed a motion to dismiss the petition, stating that she no longer wished to have the co-adoption go forward. The legal issues presented for the Idaho Supreme Court’s review of this matter were: (1) whether there was a basis for claiming legal error where a magistrate judge expresses a likely outcome of a motion, but does not actually hear the matter or enter an order; (2) whether an order vacating a final judgment is appealable under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a); and (3) whether a guardian gave sufficient legal consent to an adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding the trial court did not err in its decision with respect to the consent issue; with respect to the others, the Court determined it lacked jurisdiction for review. View "Jane Doe I v. Jane Doe II" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Jonathan Folk was convicted by jury on one felony count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years old. On appeal, Folk contended the district court made numerous evidentiary errors. Folk also argued that the district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error in his closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Folk" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court’s review centered on a judgment dismissing claims against an attorney and a law firm that he later joined based upon an opinion letter issued by the attorney in his capacity as corporate counsel regarding the legality of a stock redemption agreement. The Appellant challenged the grant of summary judgment to the Respondents (attorney and law firm) and the amount of attorney fees awarded to them. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims and the awards of attorney fees, and awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Taylor v. Riley" on Justia Law

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Darol Anderson appealed his convictions for felony domestic battery and misdemeanor domestic battery, arguing the district court erred when it admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of his alleged victim, Erica Messerly, after finding that she was unavailable to testify at his trial due to mental illness. Anderson also argued the district court abused its discretion when it allowed a responding officer to testify that the injuries that he had observed on Messerly’s person were consistent with her allegations against Anderson. Anderson contended the officer’s testimony constituted impermissible vouching for Messerly’s truthfulness. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court erred in admitting Messerly’s testimony from the preliminary hearing in this case because the State failed to establish Messerly was unavailable to testify. The Court affirmed the conviction in all other respects. View "Idaho v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a prescriptive easement across a parcel of land was extinguished by operation of former Idaho Code section 63-10091 when that parcel was sold by tax deed. The Owens purchased a small parcel of land (“the Orphan Parcel”) from Kootenai County after a tax sale. A dispute arose as to whether the Regans had the right to drive across the parcel. The Regans sued the Owens to reform the tax deed to include an express easement and to establish a prescriptive easement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Regans, finding the Owens’ deed contained a mutual mistake and should be reformed to reflect an express easement that the original grantors intended. The Owens appealed and the Supreme Court held that the deed should not be reformed, vacated a portion of the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Owens, finding that any prescriptive easement was extinguished by Idaho Code section 63-1009. The Regans appealed, but shortly after filing, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code section 63-1009. The new version of 63-1009 did not apply retroactively, and the Supreme Court determined the trial court was correct in finding any prescriptive easement was extinguished by the old law. View "Regan v. Owen" on Justia Law

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This case involved Arthur Watkins’ (Father) attempt to recover damages based on a default by his son, Arnold Douglas Watkins (Son or Doug), under a real estate installment contract. The question presented for the Idaho Supreme Court’s review was whether the complaint gave adequate notice of the election to accelerate the debt as required by Washington law. Son also brought a counterclaim for breach of a compensation agreement executed by a sibling acting on behalf of Father using a power of attorney. The compensation agreement purported to obligate Father to pay Son $3,000 per month for life. Father argued that the compensation agreement lacked consideration. The district court held a bench trial and ultimately found in favor of Father on his breach of contract claim and on the counterclaim brought against him. Son appealed. The Supreme Court found that the district court: (1) erred in concluding Father was not required to give notice of the acceleration; and (2) was correct in concluding the compensation agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration. View "Watkins v. Watkins" on Justia Law