Monitor Finance, L.C., and First Capital Funding, L.C., (collectively referred to as the Beneficiaries) were the holders of a deed of trust, which encumbered the real property claimed to be owned in fee simple by Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC (Wildlife LLC). Prior to this judicial foreclosure action being brought, Wildlife LLC filed suit against the Beneficiaries seeking to quiet title to the real property. In that previous action, Wildlife LLC alleged that the Beneficiaries no longer retained an interest in the property because the debt underlying the promissory note had been paid in full. By stipulation of the parties, that quiet title action was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Subsequently, the Beneficiaries initiated this action to foreclose the deed of trust based on their contention that the debt created by the promissory note had not been paid and was in default. The Beneficiaries moved the district court for summary judgment, contending that Wildlife LLC’s affirmative defenses and counterclaim were barred by res judicata because the previous quiet title action brought by Wildlife LLC had been dismissed on its merits. The district judge granted the Beneficiaries’ motion and denied Wildlife LLC’s motion to reconsider. In doing so, the district court summarily dismissed Wildlife LLC’s counterclaim and affirmative defenses. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the Beneficiaries. Wildlife LLC appealed, claiming, among other things, that the district court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata. The Idaho Supreme Court diagreed, finding Wildlife LLC's affirmative defenses and counterclaim were correctly barred by res judicata. View "Monitor Finance v. Wildlife Ridge Estates" on Justia Law

This case was brought by the North Idaho Building Contractors Association, Termac Construction, Inc., and other class members (collectively, “NIBCA”), to declare a sewer connection/capitalization fee the City of Hayden enacted in 2007 to be an impermissible tax. The action was originally dismissed on the City’s motion for summary judgment; but, on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the record did not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the 2007 Cap Fee complied with controlling Idaho statutes and case law. On remand, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court found that the 2007 Cap Fee was an impermissible tax and taking of property without just compensation in violation of federal takings law. In doing so, the district court refused to consider expert evidence propounded by the City which opined that the 2007 Cap Fee complied with the applicable Idaho legal standards and was reasonable. The district court subsequently ruled on stipulated facts that NIBCA was entitled to damages in the amount paid above $774 per connection, together with interest, costs, and attorney fees. The City appealed the district court’s refusal to consider its evidence and NIBCA cross-appealed the award of damages. The Idaho Supreme Court again vacated the judgment because the district court improperly refused to consider the City’s evidence on remand. View "No ID Bldg Cont Assoc v. City of Hayden" on Justia Law

Kiki Leslie Tidwell appealed an Idaho Public Utility Commission order denying her request for intervenor funding. The underlying administrative proceeding involved an application by the Idaho Power Company for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to construct a high-voltage electric transmission line in Blaine County. The Commission granted Tidwell’s petition to intervene in December 2016. In September 2017, Tidwell submitted a request for intervenor funding, which the Commission denied as untimely. Tidwell filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Commission also denied. Finding the Commission's denial of Tidwell's petition for reconsideration not "unreasonable, unlawful, erroneous or not in conformity with the law," the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Power and IPUC v. Tidwell" on Justia Law

Acting pro se, James McDay appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Idaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (“BCI”)’s denial of McDay’s request to have two criminal cases expunged from his record. In 2005, McDay was arrested for driving under the influence. On the same day, the prosecuting attorney filed a case against McDay; the magistrate court ultimately issued an order finding probable cause. On August 3, 2005, the case was dismissed. In 2009, McDay was arrested for: (1) driving without privileges; (2) failure to provide proof of insurance; and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia. The next day, the prosecuting attorney filed a case against McDay; the magistrate court ultimately issued an order finding probable cause on all three charges. The charges were subsequently reduced or dismissed on May 6, 2009. In 2016, McDay sought to have both criminal cases expunged. BCI denied the request, determining they were ineligible for expungement. He took his grievance to the district court, which found McDay’s failure to follow procedural rules was fatal to his appeal; namely, McDay failed to provide the district court with an agency record for review. McDay timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which affirmed the district court: "McDay fails to present any cogent argument or authority to achieve such a remedy. [. . .] Because McDay’s arguments lack citations to the record, citations of applicable authority, and comprehensible argument, this Court will not consider them on appeal." View "Idaho v. McDay" on Justia Law

Jane Doe (“Mother”) appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor children, Jane Doe II (“T.T.”) and John Doe II (“D.T.”). The magistrate court found: (1) Mother had neglected her children; (2) Mother had abandoned her children; and (3) termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Because each of these findings was supported by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court granted Guardians’ request for termination. The trial court entered a final judgment to that effect on May 11, 2018. The Idaho Supreme Court determined: (1) Mother waived the issues of neglect and abandonment on appeal for failing to support them with argument; and (2) the trial court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best interests is supported by substantial, competent evidence. View "John and Jane Doe I v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

Nearly two years after their car was rear-ended by the Guthmillers, the Crawfords filed a complaint seeking to recover against the Guthmillers. In the six months following the filing of the complaint, the Crawfords attempted to effect service on the Guthmillers at the address the Crawfords found on various internet websites. On the last day of the six-month window to effect service of process, the Crawfords filed a motion seeking to extend the time to effect service for ninety days or to serve by publication. The district court determined the Crawfords had not shown good cause for failing to serve the Guthmillers within the allowed six-month time frame. Thus, the district court entered judgment dismissing the Crawfords’ claims without prejudice. The Crawfords timely appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crawford v. Guthmiller" on Justia Law

Darin Bergeman appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and Mohamed Elabed. This case arose from disposition of a home and acreage owned by Bergeman’s mother, Karen Hansen. In 1998, Ms. Hansen obtained a loan on the property that was secured by a deed of trust. The loan and deed of trust were eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association with SPS as the servicer for the loan. After Ms. Hansen died in 2006, Bergeman took possession of the property. Mortgage statements continued to be sent to the estate of Ms. Hansen and Bergeman made payments that were accepted and credited to the loan. However, Bergeman did not personally assume liability on the note. In March 2012, the executor of Ms. Hansen’s estate issued Bergeman an executor’s deed for the property. Around July 2015, apparently as a result of Bergeman’s incarceration, he stopped making payments on the loan. In September 2016, a Notice of Default was recorded. Although he alleges that he either made payments or made arrangements for others to make payments on the loan, Bergeman acknowledged the loan was in default. The Notice of Default was followed in October 2016 by a Trustee’s Notice of Sale that announced the foreclosure sale of the property. Notices of this sale were mailed to Ms. Hansen’s estate, the executor, Bergeman, and the current occupants of the property. During this same time, SPS continued to send monthly mortgage statements to the estate. At the foreclosure sale on February 23, 2017, Mohamed Elabed purchased the property. Bergeman sued SPS and Elabed alleging misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. SPS and Elabed moved to dismiss, which was granted. Finding that Bergeman failed to support his claims as a "general attack upon the decision of the district court," the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Bergeman v. Select Portfolio Svc" on Justia Law

A mother placed her twelve-year-old son in the care of his grandparents on a full time basis in August 2017. Three months later the father petitioned the magistrate court to modify custody to grant him residential custody of his son. Although both Mother and Grandparents petitioned the court to give Grandparents residential custody, the magistrate court, during a hearing on father’s motion for temporary custody, determined that Grandparents did not have standing. Ruling from the bench, the magistrate court determined that Idaho Code section 32-717(3) on its face violated the father’s constitutional rights because it placed Grandparents on the same footing as parents. The magistrate court also reasoned that the more specific time requirements set forth in the De Facto Custodian Act, Idaho Code sections 32-1701–32- 1705 governed. On a motion for reconsideration, the magistrate court, pursuant to Hernandez v. Hernandez, 265 P.3d 495 (2011), decided that Grandparents likely could not meet the requirements of Idaho Code section 32- 717(3), reasoning that “[t]he court doubts that a short period of residence pursuant to an impermanent permission by one parent is a ‘stable relationship.’” Mother and Grandparents appealed the magistrate court’s decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing the magistrate court’s decision was contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hernandez. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the magistrate’s order denying standing. The Court remanded with instructions to determine whether Child was living with Grandparents at the time they petitioned the court and whether a stable relationship existed between them. If yes, the Grandparents should be allowed to participate in the custody determination within the boundaries set forth in Hernandez. View "Overholser (Taylor) v. Overholser" on Justia Law

John Mullins challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Mullins and his wife, Tera, were arrested at the federal courthouse in Pocatello, Idaho after security officers found a vial of methamphetamine in Tera’s backpack. Prior to taking Mullins and Tera to jail, the couple’s personal effects, including the backpack, were placed into the Mullinses’ pickup that was in the parking lot pursuant to Tera’s instruction. A K-9 officer later ran his drug dog around the pickup, and the dog positively alerted to the presence of drugs in the pickup. The police obtained a search warrant for the pickup based on the dog sniff alert as well as the other evidence seized from the backpack. During the search, the police found methamphetamine in the pickup. Mullins moved to suppress the drug evidence found in the pickup claiming the warrant lacked probable cause because the police placed the backpack, which had previously contained methamphetamine, into the pickup. Thus, Mullins argued the dog would have alerted to the residual odor in the backpack rendering its sniff alert unreliable. The district court denied the motion, stating Mullins had not shown the police deliberately or recklessly omitted information from the affidavit to mislead the magistrate judge, and, that even without the dog sniff, there was sufficient evidence to issue the warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed denial of Mullins' motion. View "Idaho v. Mullins" on Justia Law

The family of Mrs. Francisca Gomez (the Gomezes) appealed a district court decision granting Crookham Company’s (Crookham) motion for summary judgment on all claims relating to Mrs. Gomez’s death. Crookham is a wholesale seed distributor located in Caldwell, Idaho. Mrs. Gomez was an employee of Crookham for more than thirty years before her death. In early 2015, Crookham decided that a new picking table was necessary to sort seeds more efficiently. A Crookham employee fabricated the new table and it was installed in the company’s “Scancore” room in late 2015. Although OSHA had previously cited Crookham for violating machine guard safety standards and lockout-tagout protocol with its former picking tables, the new picking table’s drive shaft was not fully guarded and Crookham did not perform the required lockout-tagout procedures while employees cleaned the table. While working in the Scanscore room, Mrs. Gomez was under the picking table attempting to clean it when the table’s exposed drive shaft caught her hair and pulled her into the machine. She died as a result of her injuries. OSHA subsequently investigated Crookham and issued “serious” violations to the company because it exposed its employees to the unguarded drive shaft without implementing lockout-tagout procedures. The district court held that Mrs. Gomez was working in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, that all of the Gomezes’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho worker’s compensation law, that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule provided by Idaho Code section 72-209(3) did not apply, and that the Gomezes’ product liability claims fail as a matter of law because Crookham is not a “manufacturer.” Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gomez v. Crookham" on Justia Law