Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A plaintiff, seeking to secure retirement funds, sold an apartment complex in 2017 and was introduced to Ronald Hill, who represented himself as a financial advisor but was only licensed as an insurance producer. Hill persuaded the plaintiff to invest the sale proceeds in a product offered by Future Income Payments, LLC (FIP), and also to purchase an Indexed Universal Life (IUL) insurance policy, initially from Minnesota Life and later from Pacific Life. Hill proposed that the proceeds from the FIP investment would fund the premiums for the Pacific Life IUL policy. FIP was subsequently exposed as a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the plaintiff’s loss of the investment and inability to pay the insurance premiums.The plaintiff and other parties filed suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho, asserting claims including negligence against Hill and Pacific Life. By trial, only Hill and Pacific Life remained as defendants, with the plaintiff as the sole remaining claimant. The trial proceeded on a common law negligence claim. The jury found both Hill and Pacific Life negligent, determined Hill was acting as Pacific Life’s agent, and apportioned 60% of fault to Pacific Life and 40% to Hill. The district court entered judgments against Pacific Life, including joint and several liability with Hill for a portion of damages. Pacific Life appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of motions for directed verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and held that, under Idaho law, Pacific Life owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from pure economic loss absent an applicable exception to the economic loss rule. The Court further found insufficient evidence to establish Hill acted as Pacific Life’s agent when marketing the FIP investment. The Court vacated the judgments against Pacific Life and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Pacific Life. View "Shelstad v. Pacific Life Insurance" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by a jury in 2018 of one count of felony lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and two counts of felony sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, with a sentencing enhancement as a repeat sexual offender. He received a life sentence with a twenty-year fixed term for lewd conduct and two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for sexual abuse. Following his conviction, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, later supported by an amended affidavit. Central to his petition was the claim that his trial counsel failed to communicate his acceptance of a favorable plea offer from the State, resulting in the offer being withdrawn.The State responded with a motion for summary disposition, supported by an affidavit from the petitioner’s trial counsel, who stated that the petitioner had rejected the plea offer and instead proposed a counteroffer, which the State rejected. The district court granted the State’s motion, concluding that the petitioner had provided only conclusory allegations unsupported by admissible evidence. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, partly on the rationale that statements by post-conviction counsel at a hearing amounted to a concession regarding the lack of merit in the claim. The petitioner then sought review by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel’s statements did not constitute a binding concession and that the petitioner’s affidavit contained sufficient admissible, non-conclusory factual assertions to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court determined that summary disposition was improper in light of conflicting affidavits about whether the petitioner accepted the plea offer. The judgment of the district court was vacated, the order summarily dismissing the petition was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ennis v. State of Idaho" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of felony lewd conduct with a minor and two counts of felony sexual abuse of a child, resulting in substantial concurrent prison sentences. He later submitted a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel failed to communicate his acceptance of a plea offer from the State, which would have resulted in a considerably lighter sentence. The petitioner claimed in an affidavit that he instructed his trial counsel to accept the State’s offer, but the offer was withdrawn after counsel failed to convey his acceptance.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, granted the State’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the petition, concluding that the petitioner’s affidavit was conclusory and lacked admissible evidence. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment, relying in part on statements made by the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel at the summary disposition hearing, which were interpreted as a concession that the claim lacked merit. The petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision directly and held that the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel’s statements did not constitute a binding concession, and that the petitioner had presented sufficient admissible, non-conclusory evidence in his affidavit to create a genuine issue of material fact. The Court explained that the petitioner’s factual assertions regarding the plea offer and his instructions to counsel were within his personal knowledge and were not conclusory. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the order summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ennis v. State of Idaho" on Justia Law

A parole commission issued an arrest warrant for an individual who had absconded. The warrant authorized various law enforcement officers to detain the individual. A Nampa City police officer located the individual in Caldwell, Idaho, and arrested him, despite being outside his jurisdiction and without satisfying any of the statutory exceptions for extraterritorial arrests. After the arrest, officers searched the individual’s vehicle and discovered narcotics and a stolen firearm, leading to charges including unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of drug paraphernalia.The matter was reviewed by the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that his arrest was unconstitutional under both federal and Idaho constitutional provisions due to the officer’s violation of Idaho Code section 67-2337(2). The district court denied the motion, concluding that the officer’s violation of the statute did not amount to a constitutional violation. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho granted review. The Court applied a bifurcated standard of review, examining factual findings for clear error and freely reviewing constitutional questions. The Court held that a violation of Idaho Code section 67-2337(2) by a peace officer does not constitute a constitutional violation requiring suppression of evidence, absent a showing that the Idaho Constitution, state precedent, or unique state interests demand a different analysis from federal law. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and the judgment of conviction. View "State v. Satterfield" on Justia Law

Snap, a Delaware corporation, sued Vertical Raise, an Idaho LLC, and an individual, alleging tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition. Liability was resolved in Snap’s favor on summary judgment. At trial, the jury awarded Snap $750,000 in unjust enrichment damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. However, the district court mistakenly entered judgment for $800,000, not $1,000,000. Snap sought an additur or new trial and discretionary costs. The district court granted both: costs were awarded, and the damages were increased via additur, but without giving Vertical Raise the option to accept or reject it.Vertical Raise appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, which in the prior case, Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical Raise, LLC, 173 Idaho 499, 544 P.3d 714 (2024), affirmed the costs award, reversed the grant of additur or new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter an amended judgment accordingly. After remand, Vertical Raise’s surety bond paid the judgment and costs, but not post-judgment interest. Disputes arose over whether interest accrued from the dates of the original and amended judgments, or only from the post-remand judgment.In the present appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred by awarding post-judgment interest starting from the entry dates of the original and amended judgments. The Court held that post-judgment interest accrues from the dates when the original and amended judgments were entered, not from the date of the post-remand judgment, even if later judgments modify the amount owed. The Third Amended Judgment was affirmed. The Court also awarded Snap its attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding Vertical Raise’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. Costs on appeal were awarded as a matter of course. View "SNAP! MOBILE v. VERTICAL RAISE" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the statements to be included on the November 3, 2026, Idaho general election ballot describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote on Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. After qualifying for the ballot, Idahoans United for Women and Families objected to the ballot statements jointly prepared by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, arguing they mischaracterized both the initiative and existing law, and failed to clearly and concisely convey the effect of each vote as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The challenged statements had already been distributed for printing and to county clerks, prompting Idahoans United to seek expedited judicial relief.Previously, in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador (Idahoans United I), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed related ballot materials for the same initiative, directing revisions to the short ballot title and fiscal impact statement, and later approving the revised materials. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, Idahoans United objected to the Yes/No Effect Statements, but Respondents declined to revise them. Unable to resolve the dispute, Idahoans United filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that the Yes/No Effect Statements failed to substantially comply with section 34-1810(1)(b) because they did not accurately and concisely convey the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote. The court prohibited use of the challenged statements and directed Respondents to prepare revised statements. Upon review, the court found the revised statements substantially complied with statutory requirements and allowed them to appear on the ballot. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no party was awarded costs or attorney fees. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane/Labrador" on Justia Law

A citizens’ group challenged the official ballot statements prepared by the Idaho Secretary of State and Attorney General for the 2026 general election, which would accompany Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. The group argued that the statements describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote were unclear, misleading, and exceeded the statutory authority given to the officials, as they characterized both the proposed law and existing Idaho law rather than simply stating the effect of each vote.Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court had considered similar issues regarding other ballot materials for the same initiative in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador, 175 Idaho 708, 570 P.3d 1137 (2025), where it directed revisions to the short ballot title and the fiscal impact statement to ensure substantial compliance with statutory requirements. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, the officials prepared the contested Yes/No Effect Statements and distributed them to county clerks. The group’s objections were not resolved through negotiation, leading to the current original action before the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that the group had standing under its relaxed standing doctrine, found it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and applied the standard of substantial compliance to the ballot statements. The court held that both the “yes” and “no” statements failed to clearly and concisely communicate the effect of a vote, as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, prohibited use of the challenged statements, and ordered the officials to prepare new, compliant statements by a set deadline. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no attorney fees were awarded. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane" on Justia Law

Several parcels of land along the shore of Priest Lake, Idaho, were originally owned by William and Mary Taylor and later subdivided and conveyed to various parties, including the Byrds, the McCray Living Trust, and the Coffeys. The dispute centers on a strip of land between the parcels now owned by the Byrds and the Trust and the lake’s ordinary high water mark. The Byrds and the Trust argued their deeds conveyed property extending to the lake’s shoreline, and thus included littoral rights. The Coffeys contended the deeds did not reach the shoreline and that they held title to the disputed strip.After a prior administrative dispute over a dock permit, the Byrds and the Trust initiated quiet title and declaratory judgment actions in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Bonner County. The Coffeys counterclaimed, also seeking a declaration of ownership and alleging civil trespass. Following a bench trial, the district court found the deeds ambiguous, looked to extrinsic evidence, and concluded the deeds did not convey land up to the shoreline. The court awarded the disputed strip and littoral rights to the Coffeys, determined the Byrds and the Trust had trespassed, and awarded damages and attorney fees to the Coffeys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in its findings and in the legal standards applied. The Supreme Court held that while the district court correctly found the deeds ambiguous, it used the wrong burden of proof—a clear and convincing evidence standard—when deciding the parties’ competing declaratory judgment claims. The correct standard was a preponderance of the evidence. Because the district court did not analyze the evidence under the appropriate standard, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings using the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Byrd v. Coffey" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two parties over a residential lease agreement in Mountain Home, Idaho, which included an option to purchase the property after the underlying Wells Fargo mortgage was satisfied. The lessee paid $8,000 for the purchase option and began residing at the property. Eighteen months later, the lessee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the lessor as a creditor and rent as an expense but denying any legal or equitable interest in real property and failing to disclose the lease agreement or the purchase option in the bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy trustee closed the case without distributing any assets, and the lessee received a discharge of debts. Four years after discharge, the lessee attempted to exercise the purchase option, but the lessor refused.The lessee filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, seeking specific performance and declaratory relief, while the lessor counterclaimed for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court initially denied both motions, finding factual disputes, and declined to apply judicial estoppel. Upon reconsideration, the district court ruled for the lessor, holding that the lessee’s claims were barred by judicial estoppel and, in the alternative, that the lessee lacked standing because the undisclosed purchase option remained property of the bankruptcy estate. The district court denied the lessee’s request to stay the proceedings to reopen the bankruptcy case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the lessee lacked standing to enforce the purchase option. The court reasoned that the purchase option was property of the bankruptcy estate, was not properly disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules, and thus remained with the estate after the bankruptcy case closed. Only the bankruptcy trustee, not the lessee, had standing to enforce the option. Costs on appeal were awarded to the lessor. View "Conger v. Clark" on Justia Law

The case arose from a single incident in which the petitioner forcibly took a 2000 BMW from its owner at gunpoint during a high-speed chase through Idaho County. He was charged with multiple offenses, including grand theft of an automobile and armed robbery, both relating to the same act of taking the BMW. The petitioner pleaded guilty to several charges pursuant to a plea agreement, and the district court sentenced him to consecutive terms, including for both grand theft and armed robbery.After his conviction was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on direct appeal (where he did not raise a double jeopardy argument), the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in the District Court of the Second Judicial District. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a double jeopardy objection to being convicted and sentenced for both offenses stemming from the same conduct. The district court summarily dismissed his petition, concluding that the double jeopardy claim was both procedurally barred and, on the merits, that grand theft was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery under either the Blockburger test or Idaho’s pleading theory. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that, under the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy provision and Idaho’s pleading theory, grand theft as charged was a lesser included offense of the armed robbery charge because both counts were based on the same act of taking the same car from the same victim. The Court clarified that the pleading theory, not the strict elements (Blockburger) test, governs such double jeopardy claims under Idaho law. As a result, the Court vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s order granting summary disposition, and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the petitioner established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Sedillo v. State" on Justia Law