Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Michael Boren applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to have an unimproved airstrip on his property recognized as a designated county airstrip. Gary Gadwa, Sarah Michael, and other concerned citizens opposed Boren’s application, but it was ultimately approved. Following the approval, Boren sued Gadwa, Michael, and others for defamation, defamation per se, conspiracy to commit defamation, and declaratory relief, alleging they made false statements about the airstrip and his use of it. Boren filed an amended complaint, and Gadwa and Michael moved to dismiss the claims, arguing their statements were protected by litigation privilege and constitutionally protected petitioning activity.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Boren’s claims, agreeing with Gadwa’s and Michael’s arguments. The court also denied Boren’s motion to file a second amended complaint, concluding it would be futile. Boren appealed the district court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Boren’s civil conspiracy claim and declaratory judgment claim. However, it reversed the dismissal of most of Boren’s defamation claims, finding that the applicability of the absolute and qualified litigation privileges was not evident on the face of the complaint. The court also held that neither the First Amendment nor the Idaho Constitution provides absolute protection for defamatory statements made in the course of protected petitioning activity. The court reversed the district court’s decision denying Boren’s motion to amend his complaint, as the amendment would not be futile. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand and did not award attorney fees to any party. View "Boren v. Gadwa" on Justia Law

The Idaho State Board of Education approved a proposal for the University of Idaho to purchase the University of Phoenix for $550 million, funded by a $685 million bond. This decision followed three closed-door executive sessions. Idaho Attorney General Raúl R. Labrador filed a suit to void the sale, alleging violations of the Idaho Open Meetings Law, which mandates that public policy formation be conducted openly. The district court dismissed the suit, finding no violations.The district court ruled that the Board's actions during the executive sessions were lawful under the exception in Idaho Code section 74-206(1)(e), which allows closed meetings for preliminary negotiations involving trade or commerce when in competition with other states. The court interpreted "preliminary negotiations" to include all negotiations before contracting and applied a "reasonable belief" standard to determine if the Board believed it was in competition with another governing body.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its broad interpretation of "preliminary negotiations" and the application of the "reasonable belief" standard. The Supreme Court held that "preliminary negotiations" should be narrowly construed to mean a phase of negotiations before final negotiations, and the statute requires actual competition, not just a reasonable belief of competition. The court vacated the district court's summary judgment, its judgment following the bench trial, and the award of attorney fees and costs to the Board. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code section 74-206(1)(e). View "Labrador v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

Steven Chase appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The claim arose from a failed real estate transaction between Steven’s mother, Audrey Chase, and Streamline Builders, LLC, owned by Richard Swoboda, for the construction of a home. Steven was involved in the transaction, assisting his mother by communicating with Swoboda and realtors, and inspecting the home. The sale did not close due to disagreements over holdback amounts for uncompleted items. Following the failed closing, Streamline and Swoboda sued Steven for tortious interference.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Kootenai County. At the close of Streamline and Swoboda’s evidence, Steven moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of wrongful interference. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found in favor of Streamline and Swoboda, awarding $20,000 in damages. Steven appealed, contending the district court erred in denying his motion because he acted as his mother’s agent and could not be liable for tortious interference.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Steven failed to preserve his agency argument for appeal, as he did not present it to the district court in support of his motion for a directed verdict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Steven’s argument on appeal differed from his argument at trial, where he focused on the lack of improper motive rather than his agency status. The court also awarded attorney fees on appeal to Streamline and Swoboda, finding Steven’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. View "Streamline Builders, LLC v. Chase" on Justia Law

Christina Greenfield appealed an order designating her as a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d). The order, issued by then Administrative District Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer, prohibits Greenfield from filing any new pro se litigation in Idaho without court permission. Greenfield had filed a civil suit for damages in Kootenai County related to the sale of her home and her eviction, naming several defendants. During this lawsuit, the defendants moved to designate Greenfield as a vexatious litigant, which the ADJ granted.In the lower court, Greenfield had previously sued her neighbors and her former attorney, both cases resulting in adverse judgments against her. She also declared bankruptcy, leading to the sale of her home. Greenfield filed another lawsuit against the new owners of her home and others, which led to the motion to declare her a vexatious litigant. The ADJ found that Greenfield had maintained at least three pro se litigations in the past seven years that were decided adversely to her and issued a Prefiling Order. Greenfield responded to the proposed order, but the ADJ issued an Amended Prefiling Order, finalizing the vexatious litigant designation.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The Court held that the ADJ did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify herself, as there was no evidence of personal bias. The Court also found that the ADJ followed the proper procedures under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59, providing Greenfield with adequate notice and opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Greenfield was afforded due process and that the ADJ’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence, confirming that Greenfield had maintained multiple litigations that were adversely determined against her. View "Greenfield v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Four former employees of Litster Frost Injury Lawyers (LFIL) filed a lawsuit against LFIL and its former sole shareholder, Martha Frost, for unpaid wages and breach of an employment agreement. They claimed LFIL owed them compensation in the form of wages, bonuses, profit sharing, and other expenses incurred while employed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LFIL, concluding that the employees' claims were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 45-614 and that the employment agreement was an unenforceable "agreement to agree."The employees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the provisions of the employment agreement were not severable or enforceable and that the court should have supplied a "reasonable time" for performance. LFIL cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for attorney fees following summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the employees' breach of contract claims because the employment agreement was unenforceable. The court found that the agreement's essential terms were too indefinite and subject to future negotiations. However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding Sarah's reimbursement claim, finding that issues of material fact existed as to whether her claim fell within Idaho's Wage Claim Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all other claims.The Supreme Court also reversed the district court's decision on attorney fees, holding that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Attorney fees on appeal were awarded to LFIL for the time spent responding to certain claims, and costs were awarded to LFIL. View "Litster v. Litster Frost Injury Lawyers PLLC" on Justia Law

Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil protection order against Nicholas Ramlow in October 2020, alleging that he was stalking her by tracking her movements and placing a tracking device on her car. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Due to COVID-19 mask mandates, Ramlow was denied entry to the courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, leading to the hearing being rescheduled. At the rescheduled hearing, Ramlow was again absent, and the magistrate court issued a one-year protection order requiring him to attend a 52-week domestic violence course and review hearings.Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the district court. The protection order was extended but expired before the district court heard the appeal. The district court requested supplemental briefing on mootness and ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Ramlow appealed the district court's decision, arguing that his appeal still presented justiciable issues and fell within exceptions to the mootness doctrine.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the appeal was moot because the protection order had expired, and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the issues were too fact-specific to be capable of repetition yet evading review, there were no collateral legal consequences, and the case did not raise issues of substantial public interest. The court also declined to vacate the expired protection order and denied attorney fees to both parties, awarding costs to Mitchell as the prevailing party. View "Mitchell v. Ramlow" on Justia Law

The case involves the Schrivers, who sought damages after their cat, Gypsy, died following a veterinary procedure and was subjected to an unauthorized necropsy by Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore Animal Hospital. The Schrivers claimed non-economic damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship, arguing that the emotional bond between pet and owner should be compensable. They also sought economic damages based on the pet's value to them.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore on several claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court denied the Schrivers' claim for emotional distress damages related to trespass to chattels/conversion but allowed the "value to owner" measure of economic damages for the loss of Gypsy.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the denial of emotional distress damages for trespass to chattels/conversion, agreeing that such damages are limited to independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that veterinarians do not have a duty to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the unauthorized necropsy, finding that a jury should decide if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court affirmed the use of the "value to owner" measure of damages, excluding sentimental value.The case was remanded for further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Schrivers were awarded costs on appeal, but attorney fees were not granted to Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore, as the primary issue of liability remains unresolved. View "Schriver v. Raptosh" on Justia Law

Roberta Evans underwent a total hip replacement surgery performed by Dr. Mark B. Wright at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. Post-surgery, Evans experienced persistent pain and discomfort, which led her to seek a second opinion. Another doctor confirmed that her hip bone socket was abnormally anteverted, and subsequent revision surgery revealed a periprosthetic joint infection. Evans filed a lawsuit against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, alleging negligence in their follow-up care and treatment.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Evans’s case, ruling that her claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). The court found that Evans’s surgical complications were objectively ascertainable by March 4, 2019, indicating that some damage was present. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Evans’s medical malpractice claim was time-barred, as the statute of limitations began when her symptoms indicated some damage, which was before April 6, 2019. The court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Evans’s complaint and that her equitable estoppel argument was without merit. The court denied attorney fees to both parties but awarded costs to Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s as the prevailing parties. View "Evans v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kerry Angelos filed a defamation lawsuit against Greg and Susan Schatzel, alleging they created a website that published defamatory comments about him. During the lawsuit, Angelos faced financial difficulties, leading to his interests in the lawsuit being auctioned at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a preexisting judgment. Greg Schatzel purchased Angelos’s interests and substituted himself as the plaintiff, subsequently dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Angelos appealed, arguing that his defamation claims were personal and could not be deemed “property” subject to execution under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted Schatzel’s motion to substitute as the plaintiff and denied a motion by another creditor, Pacific Global Investment, Inc. (PGI), to intervene. The court found no legal basis to support Angelos’s contention that the sheriff’s sale was invalid or that substituting Schatzel violated public policy. Consequently, the court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that defamation claims are personal and not assignable under Idaho law, referencing the precedent set in MacLeod v. Stelle. The court concluded that Angelos’s defamation claims could not be subject to execution as “other property” under Idaho Code section 11-201. The court vacated the district court’s order granting Schatzel’s motion to substitute and the judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. The case was remanded to determine which of Angelos’s remaining claims, if any, were properly transferred to Schatzel through the sheriff’s sale. The court also denied Schatzel’s request for attorney fees, awarding costs to Angelos as the prevailing party. View "Angelos v. Schatzel" on Justia Law