Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, John Wyman first visited Julie L. Scott, P.A., to address a lesion he had discovered on his left heel. P.A. Scott diagnosed the lesion as an infected wart, prescribed antibiotic ointment, and instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for January 5, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. John returned to see P.A. Scott on April 19, 2012, because his lesion did not improve. Still believing the lesion was an infected wart, P.A. Scott froze it off during that appointment. She again instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for May 10, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. He never again returned to see P.A. Scott. John’s lesion, however, failed to improve. It would later be diagnosed as a stage IIIC malignant melanoma tumor, and not a wart. Nearly two years after the date of the biopsy, on August 28, 2014, the Wymans filed a pre-litigation screening application with the Idaho State Board of Medicine. On September 5, 2014, the Wymans lodged a complaint in district court, alleging medical malpractice claims against P.A. Scott and her employer, Center for Lifetime Health, LLC, for their alleged failure to perform a biopsy that would have revealed cancer. In the following medical malpractice suit against Scott, her employer and the hospital, the district court concluded a two-year statute of limitations barred the Wymans' claims. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wyman v. Eck" on Justia Law

Gordon Paving Company, Inc., Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, “Gordon Paving”), Brandon Hansen, an individual, Brian Hansen, an individual, Carol Hansen GPC Nevada Trust, Craig Hansen GPC Nevada Trust, Canyon Equipment and Truck Service, Inc., and Doe Entities owned by Brian, Brandon, and Craig Hansen (collectively “Guarantors”) appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to set aside default in a breach of personal guarantee action brought by AgStar Financial Services, ACA (“AgStar”). Between 2007 and 2008, Gordon Paving borrowed $10 million from AgStar. In addition to real and personal property collateral, the indebtedness was secured by separate guarantee agreements executed by Guarantors. By 2012, Gordon Paving had defaulted and AgStar sued for foreclosure. A year later, the district court entered a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Gordon Paving. AgStar purchased the real property collateral at a foreclosure sale. AgStar moved for entry of a deficiency judgment for the difference between the unpaid judgment as of the time of the sale and its credit bids for the real property. The district court denied AgStar’s motion for a deficiency judgment, finding that the reasonable value of the properties that AgStar purchased by credit bids was nearly two million dollars greater than Gordon Paving’s indebtedness. In an Opinion issued in early 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Gordon Paving’s indebtedness to AgStar had been fully satisfied and discharged. AgStar brought the present action against Guarantors, bringing a number of theories, including breach of personal guarantee. The district court ultimately entered a judgment against Guarantors on the cause of action based on breach of their personal guarantees. AgStar agreed to dismiss the other claims with prejudice because the judgment on the guarantees represented the total remaining amount due on Gordon Paving’s indebtedness. AgStar moved for an award of attorney fees and costs, which was granted. Guarantors timely appealed, but finding no error in defaulting the Guarantors, and in the award of fees and costs, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Agstar Financial v. Gordon Paving Co, Inc." on Justia Law

AgStar Financial Services, ACA (AgStar) appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., Gordon Paving Company, Inc., and Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, Gordon Paving), following a deficiency proceeding. Gordon Paving’s cross-appeal asserted that the district court erred in three respects: (1) by permitting AgStar to sell personal property serving as collateral for Gordon Paving’s debt to AgStar after the district court determined that AgStar was not entitled to a deficiency judgment; (2) by awarding AgStar post-judgment attorney fees; and (3) allowing AgStar’s claim of exemption to a royalty check. AgStar moved the district court for an order directing Gordon Paving to transfer the titles of various vehicles that Gordon Paving had pledged as collateral for certain bond obligations to AgStar, and for a comfort order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral at auction. Gordon Paving opposed AgStar’s motion, arguing that because the district court had already determined that AgStar had received real property worth more than the debt owed under the foreclosure judgment and denied AgStar a deficiency judgment, AgStar was estopped from selling any further collateral because Gordon Paving’s debt was extinguished. Gordon Paving moved for an award of attorney fees, asserting that, as the prevailing party in the deficiency proceeding, it was entitled to attorney fees. AgStar opposed Gordon Paving’s request for attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney fees without first determining the prevailing party in the entire action; (2) the district court did not err when it held a bond agreement did not bar Gordon Paving from being awarded attorney fees; (3) the district court erred when it allowed AgStar to continue to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment. The Court did not reach the issue of the district court’s award of post-judgment attorney fees to AgStar because Gordon Paving did not support its claim with sufficient argument or authority. As such, the Court reversed the district court’s order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment; vacated the judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to Gordon Paving; and remanded for the district court to determine attorney fee and cost issues and for further proceedings. View "Agstar Financial v. NW Sand & Gravel" on Justia Law

The Watkins Company, LLC appealed the award of attorney fees to the Estate of Michael Storms (Storms) and Brownstone Companies, Inc. (Brownstone). Watkins brought this action in 2010 seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages resulting from a breach of contract. Watkins was granted a TRO which was secured by a $10,000 bond. Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed, seeking damages resulting from the TRO. After a seven day bench trial, Watkins was awarded $699.64 and Storms and Brownstone were awarded $17,015.88; however, Storms and Brownstone’s award was limited to the bond amount of $10,000. Storms and Brownstone requested that they be awarded attorney fees of $80,126.50. Following a hearing, the district court awarded Storms and Brownstone 90% of their requested attorney fees, finding that 10% of their attorney fees were incurred pursuing their counterclaim and were unrecoverable. Watkins argued on appeal that the district court’s finding that 90% of Storms and Brownstone’s attorney fees were attributable to defending the breach of contract claim was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Watkins Co. v. Estate of Michael Storms" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to quiet title in a strip of land that was 34.56 feet wide and 314.70 feet long. They alleged that they had satisfied the requirements for acquiring title to the property by adverse possession, which were set forth in Idaho Code section 5-210. At the time that the Plaintiffs went into possession of the strip of property, the required time for occupying adversely possessed property was five years. In 2006, an amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 increased the statutory time period for adverse possession to twenty years. When that amendment became effective, the Plaintiffs had possessed the strip of land for four years and eight months. Guild Mortgage Company held a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust in the strip of land; Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc., was the trustee on the deed of trust; and Terry Lankford was the owner of the strip of land (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 2006 amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 applied, so the Plaintiffs had not possessed the property for the required statutory period. The district court agreed, and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schoorl v. Guild Mortgage Co" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Jessica Litster appealed a district court dismissal on summary judgment. The case concerned the enforceability of three promissory notes, which were prepared and issued by Jeremy to Jason Lee , Scott McNab, and a non-party, Rick Lee. In February 2009, Jeremy learned of an "investment opportunity" that required a minimum buy-in of $500,000. Jeremy and Jason solicited close friends and family to "invest" by transferring money to them, which would later be transferred to Jeremy's relative, Marc Jenson. Ultimately, the "investment" failed, and Plaintiffs and other "investors" looked to Jeremy for repayment. Jeremy made payments on these promissory notes. However, in July 2011, Jeremy stopped making payments because he learned that the Idaho Department of Finance had been notified regarding his investment solicitation activity. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Litsters in 2014, alleging three counts of breach of contract for failure to pay the amounts due according to the promissory notes. The Litsters answered asserting, inter alia, the affirmative defense that the notes were issued under duress. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment of the issues of breach of contract and duress. The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion. On the issue of duress, the district court found in Plaintiffs' favor under two different legal theories: (1) the Litsters failed to provide sufficient evidence of their claim for duress to create a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the district court noted that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Jeremy ratified the promissory notes by making payments thereon. It concluded that, in addition to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Litsters' "claim for duress fails because [Jeremy ] ratified the contracts by making payments on the [n]otes." The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment, finding that the Litsters failed to contest the alternate grounds upon which the summary judgment was granted. View "Lee v. Litster" on Justia Law

Geralyn Gallagher appealed when her lawsuit against the Best Western Cottontree Inn (the Hotel) and Snake River Peterson Properties LLC (Snake River) was dismissed. The district court held that the amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the original filing and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Snake River’s failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. Gallagher argued that the amended complaint should relate back to the date that she filed the original complaint. Gallagher argued that because complaints can be amended at any time, and because the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, the amended complaint related back to that time. The district court found that because Gallagher was amending her complaint to name a new defendant, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) applied. Snake River did not have notice of the suit within the statute of limitations, the district court held that the amended complaint could not relate back. The Supreme Court concluded the district court’s conclusion was correct. Gallagher also argued the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Snake River failed to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Secretary of State. The district court found that because Gallagher’s only search was of the Secretary of State’s database, Gallagher did not exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the proper party. The district court therefore declined to toll the statute of limitations. Although the Supreme Court found that the district court correctly dismissed Gallagher’s personal injury action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Court remanded this case in order to give the district court the opportunity to entertain a motion to amend the complaint to assert a cause of action against Snake River under Idaho Code section 53-509(2). View "Gallagher v. Best Wester Cottontree" on Justia Law

The Lincoln County Sheriff took three children into shelter care in 2013 on the ground that the children were endangered in their surroundings and that prompt removal was necessary to prevent serious physical or mental injury to the children. On the same day, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (“CPA”) and the magistrate court appointed a public defender to represent the children’s mother (Mother) and another public defender to represent the children’s father (Father). Two years later, the Department of Health and Welfare filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. The evidentiary hearing on that petition was held in 2016. On the morning of the first day of the hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that he would like the magistrate court to determine whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for Mother pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2007(5). The magistrate court denied the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Based upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the court found that the parental rights of Mother and of Father should have been terminated on the ground that they each had neglected the children and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court entered its judgment on June 21, 2016, and an amended judgment on July 21, 2016. Mother appealed, but Father did not. Finding that there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment denying a claim for contribution on equitable principles in an action by one co-guarantor against another co-guarantor. One of two independent grounds for the district court’s decision was not challenged on appeal, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court without addressing either ground. In his opening brief, plaintiff-appellant R. Gordon Schmidt did not state the basis for the trial court’s rulings, did not state the standard of review and, therefore, did not present any argument and authority showing how the court abused its discretion. Therefore, he waived those issues on appeal. More significantly, the district court based its ruling on two alternative grounds. Although Schmidt argued the Supreme Court should reweigh the equities as to the first ground addressed by the district court, he did not mention the second ground. "Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis." Therefore, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of either ground on appeal. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Huston" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment against a bail bondsman who revoked a bail bond for an illegal alien at the request of an agent of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The district court awarded damages in the amount of the bail bond premiums, and the appellants contended on appeal that they were entitled to additional damages. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Garcia v. Absolute Bail Bonds" on Justia Law