Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Thomas Strong and Brian Hawk appealed a district court's order dismissing their case pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failing to prosecute, and 40(c) for unjustified inaction for over six months. The case arose out of neuron simulator implant procedures, in which both appellant alleged he received an inappropriate amount of anesthesia from respondents, causing complications after the surgeries. Initially, in 2006, appellants commenced their claims by filing a prelitigation screening with the State Board of Medicine. Several months later, Hawk filed for bankruptcy. The district court stayed the medical malpractice claim until the bankruptcy proceedings had concluded. In 2007, respondents sent appellate counsel a stipulation to bifurcate the case so that Strong's case could proceed. Appellants' counsel did not agree to the bifurcation. Hawk's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2010, respondents moved to lift the stay and dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Appellants noted that Hawk had not disclosed the present underlying cause of action during his bankruptcy proceedings. The district court granted Appellants sixty days to rectify the bankruptcy matters. Appellants then requested the bankruptcy court to reopen the case and the district court again stayed its proceedings pending the resolution of the disclosure issue in the bankruptcy schedules. In 2013, the bankruptcy trustee ultimately determined that the action was of no value to the bankruptcy estate and reclosed the case. In 2014, respondents filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. Because there was no showing of actual demonstrated prejudice, the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b) was reversed, but the dismissal under Rule 40(c) was affirmed. View "Strong v. Intermountain Anesthesia" on Justia Law

Appellant the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes intervened in the adoption proceedings of a minor child (Child). While the adoption itself was not at issue on appeal, disputes that arose during the adoption proceedings were. Respondents Jane and John Doe (Does) initiated adoption proceedings for Child after the rights of Child’s parents were terminated. Because Child might have qualified for protection under the laws protecting an Indian child’s welfare, the Tribes were given notice and intervened in the adoption proceeding. The trial court appointed an independent attorney for the child whose costs were to be split by the Tribes and the Does. Discovery disputes arose during the proceedings, and the trial court issued sanctions against the Tribes. The trial court found the facts before it insufficient to establish that Child was an Indian child, and thus concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not govern the proceeding. Despite this conclusion, the court applied the ICWA’s placement preferences out of concern for Child’s best interests. The Does prevailed in the adoption, and the court granted them attorney fees as the prevailing party. The Tribes contested the discovery rulings, sanctions, failure to find Child an Indian child, and the grant of attorney fees against them, claiming sovereign immunity and a misapplication of the law. The Idaho Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the trial court’s failure to find that Child was an Indian child because it concluded any error was harmless. However, the Court found that trial court’s order compelling discovery was an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order preventing the Tribes from processing or filing any enrollment for tribal membership on behalf of Child was also an abuse of discretion. Further, the additional order granting attorney fees in the Does’ favor as the prevailing party violated the Tribes’ sovereign immunity. The Court reversed on these latter issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "John Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes" on Justia Law

Appellant Alesa Easterling brought this medical malpractice suit against Respondent Eric Kendall, M.D., alleging that Kendall was negligent in failing to diagnose her with a carotid artery dissection, and that such misdiagnosis delayed her treatment and resulted in her suffering permanent neurological damage. At trial, the district court granted Kendall’s motion for a directed verdict. The district court concluded that Easterling failed to prove a medical malpractice claim because she failed to present expert testimony to show that Kendall’s misdiagnosis was the proximate cause of her injuries. Easterling appealed, contending that expert testimony was not required under Idaho law to prove proximate cause in a medical malpractice action. Additionally, Easterling appealed the district court’s orders excluding opinion testimony from Easterling’s retained expert and treating physicians on the issue of causation and denying her motion to present rebuttal opinion testimony on causation in her case in chief. Kendall requested attorney fees on appeal. As to Easterling's claims of error on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. The Court found Kendall was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Easterling v. Kendall, M.D." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a transfer of real property located in Cassia County. Appellants-buyers Robert and Becky Humphries accused Respondents-sellers Eileen Becker, her son, Allen Becker, and daughter-in-law, Jane Becker of: (1) fraud though misrepresenting, concealing, and/or failing to disclose material information with regards to (a) the sources of water to the Property and (b) the Property’s sprinkler/irrigation system; and (2) violating the Idaho Condition Disclosure Act. The district court entered an order granting the Beckers' motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) The Humphries had pled fraud with sufficient particularity with regards to statements in the MLS Listing and Disclosure Form; (2) the Beckers did not make any false representations in either the MLS Listing or the Disclosure Form; (3) any duty that the Beckers may have had to disclose the existence of a Farm Well was satisfied by the Joint Well Use Agreement; (3) the representation in the MLS Listing that the sprinkler system was automatic could not serve as the basis for fraud; and (4) the Disclosure Form did not violate the Disclosure Act. The Humphries unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Eileen Becker, and upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Allen and Jane. The Court upheld the grant of attorney's fees and costs to Allen and Jane, and granted them fees on appeal. The Court vacated the grant of fees as to Eileen, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Humphries v. Becker" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. A year later, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this civil action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the underlying case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, challenging whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

In prior proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of The Golf Club at Black Rock (Golf Club) and its award of costs and attorney fees. This case was an appeal of the district court’s denial, upon remand, of Appellant’s Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. Appellant argued that the district court erred in ruling that the court did not have jurisdiction to award fees and costs on remand. The Supreme Court agreed with appellant and reversed. View "Sky Canyon Properties v. The Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC" on Justia Law

On August 13, 2013, the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) mailed two Determinations of Overpayment and an Eligibility Determination to Mitchell Kennedy at the address he had provided when filing for unemployment benefits. The Determinations informed Kennedy that he had the right to appeal, or protest, the Determinations and that the last day to do so was August 27, 2013. On August 21, 2013, Kennedy moved to a new residence. He changed his address with the U.S. Postal Service. Kennedy received the Determinations on August 24, 2013, three days before the deadline. He did not read them until either August 26 or 27. The Industrial Commission made no specific finding as to when Kennedy read the letters but did find that “Claimant did not closely review the Determination to realize the applicable appeal dates due to work and other personal priorities.” Kennedy faxed his protest to IDOL on August 29, 2013, two days after the deadline. In the transmission of that protest, Kennedy informed IDOL of his new address. The appeals examiner found that Kennedy’s request for an appeals hearing was not timely and therefore the examiner had no jurisdiction to hear Kennedy’s appeal. Kennedy appealed, and the Commission affirmed the examiner’s decision. Kennedy then requested reconsideration from the Commission. Finding that Kennedy had not presented any further argument on the relevant issues, the Commission denied the motion. Kennedy timely filed this appeal under Idaho Code section 72-1368(9) and Idaho Appellate Rules 11(d) and 14(b). But finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kennedy v. Hagadone Hospitality Co." on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a district court order awarding attorney fees to Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction (Debco) against the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) in a declaratory judgment action filed by ITD to determine rights of the parties with respect to a contract for highway construction services on a project in Twin Falls. The district court dismissed the action upon Debco’s motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and awarded attorney fees to Debco under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). On appeal ITD argued that the district court erred in determining that the declaratory judgment action qualified as a dispute involving a commercial transaction required for the application of Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Idaho Transportation v. Ascorp, Inc." on Justia Law

The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54-2512A, a law which allowed wagering on “historical” horse races. The Tribe alleged that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argued that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the Writ. View "Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the claims of several men who joined Boy Scout troops when they were children and were allegedly sexually abused by their scout leaders. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church) sponsored some of the troops at issue in this case. In 2013, Does I–IV filed a complaint (later amended) at the federal district court against Boy Scouts of America and the LDS Church (collectively, Respondents), alleging constructive fraud. The complaint alleged that Respondents knew that boys were in danger of being sexually abused by adult volunteers and that Respondents failed to disclose that danger. The complaint further alleged that Respondents not only remained silent about the dangers of pedophilic scoutmasters, but also affirmatively represented to the boys that each scout leader was a “great guy,” a “wonderful man,” or a “friend to whom you can always turn for advice.” Respondents subsequently moved to certify questions to the Idaho Supreme Court, challenging the constructive fraud claims on several grounds. The United States District Court certified two narrow questions to the Idaho Court regarding the statute of limitations that applied to a constructive fraud claim where the plaintiff alleged a breach of duty resulted in sexual abuse, and when a claim for constructive fraud related to childhood sex abuse accrued. The Idaho Supreme Court found that: (1) Idaho Code section 5-218(4)'s statute of limitations applied to constructive fraud cases; and (2) the "discovery rule" applied to constructive fraud claims for purposes of determining when the cause of action accrued. View "DOE(s) v. Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law