Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal from Custer County relates to proposed repairs and improvements to the City of Challis’ (the City) water distribution system. In 2013, the City initiated a judicial confirmation proceeding seeking approval to incur $3.2 million in debt without a public vote. The Consent of the Governed Caucus (the Caucus) challenged the constitutionality of the City’s request based upon Article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court granted the City’s request and the Caucus appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that the district court erred in failing to apply the legal standard for determining what constituted a "necessary" expense under the Idaho Constitution (Article III), articulated in recent case law. As such, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding the project "necessary" under the tests articulated by case law. The Court therefore reversed the district court's judgment in Challis' favor, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Felicity Haynes was arrested by a state trooper for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed a district court order affirming the orders of the magistrate court, arguing the magistrate court erred in: (1) granting a continuance to the State due to the unavailability of a witness; (2) refusing to appoint a separate judge to hear a request for funds for the defense; (3) denying a motion in limine to exclude the results of a breath test on the ground that procedures for administering the test had not been properly adopted by the Idaho State Police; and (4) finding defendant’s consent to the breath test was invalid because it was obtained by the threat of a monetary penalty and loss of her driver’s license for one year. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "Idaho v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryann Lemmons was convicted by jury on two counts of trafficking in methamphetamine by delivering methamphetamine and two counts of trafficking in methamphetamine by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine. The charges arose from two instances in which Defendant, with the assistance of a co-conspirator, agreed to, and then delivered methamphetamine to a confidential informant. The actual weight of the methamphetamine delivered was less than 28 grams. However, the confidential informant testified that in each transaction Defendant represented that she was delivering an ounce of methamphetamine. In addition, the confidential informant testified that Defendant, through the co-conspirator, had agreed to sell one and one-half ounces of methamphetamine, but when the transaction occurred he was told that Defendant could only obtain one ounce and would provide the half ounce later. Before Defendant was sentenced, she moved for a judgment of acquittal on the counts relating to trafficking on the ground that there was insufficient evidence admitted during the trial to show that one ounce equaled 28 grams or more. After briefing and argument, the district court granted a new trial with respect to the jury questions of whether the person who sold or delivered the methamphetamine represented that it weighed 28 grams or more and with respect to the two charges of trafficking by conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine. The State then filed a notice of appeal. The following day, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, asking for judgments of acquittal rather than a new trial. After briefing and argument, the district court granted judgments of acquittal as to the charges of trafficking by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine and as to the issue of whether the person who sold or delivered the methamphetamine had represented that it weighed 28 grams or more. Defendant then filed a notice of cross-appeal. The Supreme Court, after review, concluded the district court's order granting the motion for reconsideration was void. Furthermore, the Court found that testimony that Defendant represented that the weight of the drug was one ounce was, as a matter of law, testimony that Defendant represented the weight was more than 28 grams (an ounce equals slightly more than 28 grams). "A witness need not testify in the wording of a criminal statute in order to prove a violation of that statute as long as the witness’s testimony shows a violation of the statute. It is the substance of the testimony, not the particular words used, that is material." The Court found the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support conviction on trafficking. The Court reversed the grant of a new trial and remanded this case for sentencing on all trafficking charges. View "Idaho v. Lemmons" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Herrera appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. At the time of the shooting, Herrera and his girlfriend Stefanie Cormack had been dating for three to four months and were living together in Herrera’s parents’ house. For some time leading up to the shooting, Herrera was in possession of two of his father’s handguns. On December 24, 2011, Herrera was out late and arrived home before dawn on Christmas morning, having used both methamphetamine and marijuana that morning. Herrera testified that when he arrived home he went to sleep for a few hours and woke up at roughly 10:00 a.m. When Herrera and Stefanie woke up Christmas morning, they began arguing about Facebook messages Stefanie had exchanged with other men and the fact that Herrera did not want to go to Stefanie’s mother’s house for Christmas. Herrera testified the gun that killed Stefanie was in the drawer of a nightstand next to his bed the morning of the shooting. He testified that during the course of their argument, Stefanie was packing her things to go to her mother’s house and that he was handling the gun. Herrera claimed that Stefanie was packing to go to her mother’s house only to celebrate Christmas, but the State’s theory was that she was packing to leave Herrera and end the relationship. He gave varying accounts of what exactly caused the gun to discharge. Although Herrera testified he did not remember the gun coming into contact with Stefanie’s forehead, testimony from the emergency room physician who first examined Stefanie and from the county medical examiner strongly evidenced that the gun was pressed against Stefanie’s forehead when it fired. By all accounts, Herrera was extremely upset after the fatal shot was fired. The jury was instructed on second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Herrera was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with twenty-two years fixed. He timely appealed. Herrera argues (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice, and (2) improper testimony from a number of witnesses unfairly prejudiced his case. Upon review of the trial court record, taking Herrera's second argument first, the Supreme Court concluded that indeed certain testimony offered at trial suggesting he was abusive was highly prejudicial in light of the other evidence offered. "Even more concerning is the rather transparent violation of the limitations imposed by the district court on the testimony of [certain] witnesses." As such, the Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In June 2012, Junior Hillbroom was charged with attempted strangulation and domestic violence in Case No. CR-2012-2908. Several days later, the magistrate court issued a no contact order, which prohibited Hillbroom from contacting the victim. The expiration date of the no contact order was left blank. In July, the district court heard oral argument on the victim’s motion to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. In August 2012, at the preliminary hearing on Case No. CR-2012-2908, the magistrate court heard a second request by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The magistrate court denied the motion to dismiss the no contact order, but it modified the order to allow certain third party contact. This order to modify also left the expiration date blank. It stated in relevant part: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the No Contact Order previously issued herein be: Modified as follows, and will be in effect until 11:59 p.m. on , 20__ , or upon dismissal of the case.” In September, the district court heard oral argument on another motion by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. The reason for this appeal to the Supreme Court was that Hillbroom was charged with a misdemeanor for violating the no contact order. He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the no contact order was invalid and therefore the State could not prove an essential element of the crime. The magistrate court denied his motion, and the jury convicted Hillbroom as charged. Hillbroom appealed. The district court sitting in its capacity as an intermediate appellate court affirmed the magistrate court’s order denying the motion. Hillbroom appealed again, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order. Hillbroom then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Finding no reversible error in the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hilbroom" on Justia Law

An information was filed charging Marvin Orellana-Castro with unlawful sexual contact with his two stepdaughters. He was charged with two counts of lewd conduct and two counts of sexual abuse regarding the older girl, who was thirteen and fourteen years old at the time of the alleged crimes, and he was charged with two counts of sexual abuse with respect to the younger girl, who was eleven and twelve years of age at the time of the alleged crimes. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to sever the charges regarding the younger girl from the charges regarding the older girl on the grounds that they occurred at different times and places, were totally unrelated, and were not part of a common scheme or plan. The district court held that there was sufficient evidence to show that the alleged sex abuse crimes regarding the two girls were all part of a common scheme or plan because the two girls were very close in age, both girls alleged abuse that occurred in the family home, and the alleged abuse all occurred during the period of 2010 to 2011. The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of the older girl and of two counts of sexual abuse of the younger girl. It was unable to reach a verdict on the two counts of lewd conduct regarding the older girl. The district court sentenced Defendant on the four counts of which he was convicted, and Defendant timely appealed. Because the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion to try the charges regarding each stepdaughter separately and because the State failed to show that such error was harmless, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Orellana-Castro" on Justia Law

In October 2012, an Ada County Sheriff’s officer stopped a vehicle for failing to maintain its lane. The officer identified the driver as defendant Alesha Green, and it was subsequently discovered that Green was driving with an invalid driver’s license, which Green admitted to knowing. The officer testified at Green’s preliminary hearing that he had no reason to believe Green was someone other than who she identified herself to be, nor did the officer have reason to believe Green would not appear for court. Although driving without a valid license in violation of Idaho Code section 49-301 was a misdemeanor offense, it was not an arrestable offense unless certain conditions are met. Those conditions were not met here. Nonetheless, the officer arrested Green. The resulting search of Green’s person produced alleged drugs and drug paraphernalia. Additionally, a large amount of cash was discovered during the search of Green’s vehicle. Once transported to the Ada County Jail, Green made incriminating statements and gave consent to search her hotel room, where police found a digital scale and small plastic bags. Green was charged with a number of drug-related offenses under two different case numbers. The State appealed the district court’s order granting a motion to suppress evidence. The Supreme Court reversed: "[a]s stated at the outset, we recently reiterated that in order for the Idaho Constitution’s interpretation to deviate from the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there must be clear precedent to that effect or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its Constitution that would compel such a result. [. . .] Although Green cites several Idaho cases, arguing that long-standing Idaho jurisprudence establishes that suppression is appropriate where there has been a statutory violation that impacts one’s constitutional rights, an examination of those cases reveals that Green’s position is without merit. Whether or not discussed by the Court in its respective decisions, each statute directly at issue in 'Rauch,' 'Mathews,' and 'Card' has a historical, pre-constitution source of the currently codified principles. Therefore, suppression in each of those cases was justified by a direct violation of principles inherent in the Idaho Constitution. There is no historical counterpart to Idaho Code section 49-1407 that was present at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the principles in that section limiting certain warrantless misdemeanor arrests to specific circumstances are constitutional in nature. Likewise, a violation of that statute is not a constitutional violation. Because there was no pre-constitution counterpart to Section 49-1407, a violation of this section is merely statutory in nature. And, because there was no constitutional violation in this case, suppression was inappropriate." View "Idaho v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kristi Hurles pled guilty to grand theft for embezzling from her employer, was sentenced to fourteen years with two years fixed, and was ordered to pay $204,174.61 in restitution. Hurles worked at a restaurant, primarily responsible for maintaining the books, but from time to time, Hurles waited tables and tended the bar. One of her duties as bartender was to sell and pay out on Idaho State Lottery pull-tabs. When the restaurant's owners noticed they were losing money on the lottery pull-tabs, they investigated and learned that Hurles’ payouts on the game were over 12% higher than the maximum possible payout for the game. A lottery investigator concluded that Hurles had inflated the amount of the payouts by approximately $10,000 over the course of a year and pocketed that amount. Hurles appealed her conviction, challenging the restitution order. The Court of Appeals reversed the restitution order in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the district court. The State sought review, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order requiring restitution in the amount of $10,000 for Hurles’ theft of lottery pull-tab monies. The Court reversed restitution ordered for attorney fees in the amount of $33,857.88 for the third-party lawsuits and a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, and the Court vacated the restitution order for ATM thefts in the amount of $145,440 and the remaining amount of attorney fees incurred by the owners. The case was remanded to the district court for determination of restitution relating to the ATM thefts and the owners’ fees incurred in determining and presenting their embezzlement losses. View "Idaho v. Hurles" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Moses Olivas, Jr. was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8311(1), the district court sentenced Olivas to a term of imprisonment of five years. The district court also revoked Olivas's probation on a prior conviction, executed the underlying sentence from that conviction, and retained jurisdiction. The district court ordered the underlying sentence and the five-year sentence for failing to register as a sex offender to run consecutively. Following the period of retained jurisdiction on the prior conviction, the district court suspended Olivas's underlying sentence and reinstated probation. The State appealed the district court's order suspending Olivas's sentence on the prior conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Olivas" on Justia Law

Daniel Ehrlick appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of a child and the failure to report the death to law enforcement. In the summer of 2009, the Ada County Sheriff's dispatch received an emergency call from Ehrlick reporting that R.M., the eight-year-old son of his live-in girlfriend, Melissa Jenkins, was missing. Ehrlick told dispatchers that R.M. was last seen at 7:00 p.m. on July 24, he had been searching for R.M. for several hours, and everyone was telling him that R.M. was at a birthday party. In the ensuing days, an extensive search was launched to find R.M. The searchers included members of several law enforcement agencies and dozens of citizen volunteers. R.M.'s body was found on August 3, 2009, floating face down in a canal. A large rock was stuffed into a closed cargo pocket of his pants. No evidence was offered as to how, or precisely when, R.M.'s body was placed in the canal. R.M.'s corpse exhibited extensive injuries, including multiple compression injuries to the abdomen and a blow to the head. Both the compression injuries and the head injury were potentially fatal wounds on their own, but would not have resulted in instantaneous death. The State's forensic pathologist testified that R.M.'s death was caused by blunt force trauma to the head and torso due to an assault. Investigators began to suspect Ehrlick and Jenkins were involved in R.M.'s disappearance. Investigators searched the couple's apartment and found a piece of paper taped to a wall which concealed a hole in the drywall. Investigators eventually had the section of drywall scanned in order to create a three dimensional plastic model that was introduced at trial. Investigators suspected that the hole was created when Ehrlick slammed R.M.'s head into the wall. A grand jury returned an indictment charging Ehrlick with first-degree murder and failure to report a death to law enforcement. After trial, a jury unanimously found Ehrlick guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced Ehrlick to two fixed consecutive life sentences. On appeal, Ehrlick argued that the trial court committed multiple errors in the admission of evidence and that the prosecution violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Ehrlick" on Justia Law