Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tyler Ray Carter pleaded guilty to aggravated battery on a correctional officer and was sentenced to fifteen years with five years fixed. He appealed the sentence arguing the district court failed to order a separate psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, and also violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by using pre-trial competency evaluations in making its sentencing determination. Carter did not object to either the use of the competency evaluations or the court?s failure to order a psychological evaluation at trial. The Court of Appeals applied the "manifest disregard" standard to review Carter's claim that the court erred by failing to order a new psychological evaluation, and vacated the sentence. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review. The State argued that the fundamental error standard applied to all of Carter's unobjected-to evaulations. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the State's argument and affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Idaho v. Carter" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Native Wholesale Supply Company's (NWS) cigarette sales to Warpath, Inc. NWS is an Indian retailer organized under the tribal laws of the Sac and Fox Nation. It operates on the Seneca reservation in New York. Warpath is an Idaho corporation that operates on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. The State of Idaho brought suit against NWS for acting as a cigarette wholesaler without a permit and for selling cigarettes that are unlawful for sale in Idaho. The district court enjoined NWS from selling wholesale cigarettes in Idaho without a wholesale permit and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $214,200. NWS appealed that decision, arguing the State did not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The Court found that NWS's sales to Warpath were exempt from Idaho taxation, and NWS was not required to obtain a wholesale permit. Furthermore, the State had subject matter over NWS's importation of non-compliant cigarettes into the State of Idaho, and that the State could validly exercise personal jurisdiction over NWS. View "Idaho Tax Commission v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

John Doe was in prison when his son was born. The baby's mother was living with another man, and gave the boy the boyfriend's surname. The baby was abused while in her care; the Department of Health and Welfare took the child into custody. The boyfriend was listed as the putative father in a Child Protective Act (CPA) proceeding; after a DNA test, Doe was substituted as the putative father. Prior to the test, Doe had no prior contact with the child. The Department requested termination of Doe's and the biological mother's parental rights. The mother voluntarily consented to the termination. The Department submitted a new petition, requesting for the first time an "Order of Non-Establishment of Parental Rights." The Department averred that Doe was "not the 'parent' of [Son] as [he had] failed to assert any parental rights to [Son] either by statute or by timely establishing some relationship to [Son]." The magistrate judge entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Nonestablishment of Paternity. Doe timely appealed. He raised two issues: (1) whether under Idaho Code he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights; and (2) whether his due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court concluded that Doe did not show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights, or that his due process rights were violated. View "Doe v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare" on Justia Law

Defendant Preston Joy was charged with felony domestic battery, sexual penetration by a foreign object, and second-degree kidnapping in connection with an altercation with his wife. A jury convicted defendant of domestic battery, acquitted on the sexual penetration charge, and was unable to reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge. He then entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal all of the district court’s pre-trial, trial, and post-trial rulings. Defendant argued on appeal that evidence of prior misconduct was erroneously admitted, that the district court made other errors in admitting evidence, and that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Idaho v. Joy" on Justia Law

The State Board of Dentistry fined Plaintiff-Appellant Lon Peckham, DMD for failing to adequately inform a patient prior to performing a procedure, and for publishing misleading material on his website. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court's affirming of the Board's final Order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support findings that Plaintiff failed to inform a patient prior to performing a procedure or for publishing misleading material. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court. View "Peckham, DMD v. State Bd of Dentistry" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a district court's judgment to condemn an easement across the appellants' real property for an irrigation pipeline. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court's holding that there was a reasonable necessity required for condemnation of the easement in question. The Court vacated a portion of the judgment as it pertained to Defendants-Appellants Donald and Carolyn Cain's counterclaim and the award of a perpetual easement across their property, but the Court affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Telford Lands v. Cain" on Justia Law

Appellant Alpine Village appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of McCall. Alpine sued the City to enforce Ordinance 819 (found to be unconstitutional in a separate proceeding), and argued that the City unlawfully took its property in violation of the federal and state constitutions. Finding that the district court did not err in its finding that Alpine's state law claims were barred for failing to bring them according to the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and that the federal claims were not ripe for adjudication, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Alpine Village v. City of McCall" on Justia Law

Alva Garrett owned an 80-acre parcel of property in Middleton. He sold most of the property to pay off debt. Alva owned the property in his name, but in 1990, executed a quitclaim deed to himself and his wife Thelma. In 2006, Alva executed a second quitclaim deed to his son, Plaintiff Jack Garrett. Alva gave the 2006 deed to Jack's brother John with instructions not to record it until Alva died. Alva died in 2008, and the deed was recorded. Jack then sued his stepmother Thelma to partition the property. After a bench trial, the court ruled that the 1990 deed re-characterized the property from separate to community property, invalidating the 2006 deed. Jack appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Garrett v. Garrett" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas R. Taylor filed this action seeking to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1001, he then filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel four days later. The panel appointed regarding the alleged malpractice in this case conducted its proceedings and then issued its report on April 19, 2011. Although Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2011, he did not attempt to serve the summons and complaint upon any of the Defendants within six months after filing the complaint as mandated by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 16, 2011, defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss this action as to it for the failure of Plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint upon it within the six-month period. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the district court to stay this lawsuit "nunc pro tunc from January 24, 2011, to April 19, 2011, or, alternatively, to extend [Plaintiff's] deadline for serving all Defendants to this lawsuit from July 19, 2011, to October 12, 2011." The district court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motions and granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Because the partial judgment was not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the remaining defendants, the Supreme Court then issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed. Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of appeal timely appealing both the initial judgment and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: if there is not good cause for the failure to serve a defendant with the summons and complaint within six months after the complaint was filed, Rule 4(a)(2) states that "the action shall be dismissed as to the defendant without prejudice." Had Plaintiff served the Defendants before the prelitigation screening panel had completed its work, the worst that could have happened is that the district court would have stayed the court proceedings until after the panel had completed its work and for thirty days thereafter. Even if Plaintiff had thought he should wait until thirty days after the panel issued its report before serving the Defendants with a summons and complaint, he had from May 19, 2011, until July 20, 2011 to do so, but did not even attempt service during that time. View "Taylor v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law