Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Matthew Hanson was convicted of aggravated assault. At the sentencing phase, he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and declined to participate in the preparation of the presentence investigation (PSI) report. Defendant later moved the court to order a presentence psychological evaluation. The district court ruled that unless Defendant agreed to participate in the PSI, his motion would be denied on the ground that a defendant may not selectively invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to different aspects of a single subject. Defendant again declined to participate, and the court denied his motion. Defendant's attorney subsequently requested a competency evaluation, which was also denied. Defendant was sentenced to five years, with three years fixed. He then moved for reconsideration of his sentence, which motion the district court denied. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his requests for a psychological evaluation and for a competency evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's request for a competency evaluation. However, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's request for a psychological evaluation because: (1) the record showed Defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing; and (2) it incorrectly held that Defendant could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with regard to the PSI but waive the privilege in order to obtain a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Hanson " on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Simona Manzanares appealed the judgment entered after she pled guilty under a conditional plea agreement. She pled guilty to recruiting a criminal gang member in exchange for the dismissal of a charge for providing a firearm to a criminal gang member. On appeal, Defendant argued that the "Recruiting Provision" (I.C. 18-8504(1)(a)) was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and as applied for encroaching on the First Amendment right to free association; that the "Firearm Provision" (I.C. 18-8505) was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied for punishing her "expressive conduct," and unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied for failing to adequately define "gang member," as well as being unconstitutional under the Second Amendment of the federal and under Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution. Defendant raised additional constitutional claims, and argued that the evidence presented against her at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to support the charges she faced. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that the "Recruiting" and "Firearm" provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad nor were they unconstitutional as they applied to Defendant. As such, the Court upheld Defendant's conviction pursuant to her conditional plea agreement. View "Idaho v. Manzanares " on Justia Law

In March 2009, the City of Nampa issued a request for proposals regarding obtaining services to prosecute city misdemeanors and infractions. Former Canyon County prosecuting attorney John Bujak desired to contract with Nampa to perform those services. The Canyon County commissioners unanimously adopted a proposal pursuant to permit him to do so. Plaintiff-Appellant Bob Henry filed three public records requests with the county clerk asking for information regarding the contract with Nampa, including "invoices, etc sent to Nampa by county for prosecuting svc." and "an accounting of where those funds are being deposited + how they are being dispursed [sic] to Canyon County." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the requested records were public records, but that the City could not be required to produce them because it was not the public official who refused to disclose the records. View "Henry v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Daniel Johnson petitioned the district court for an exemption from sex offender registration requirements. The district court determined that the 2009 amendments to the Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA) precluded such exemption and therefore denied his petition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court’s application of SORA was unconstitutional. Because Defendant filed his petition in his already-dismissed criminal case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Court therefore vacated the district court’s decision. View "Idaho v. Johnson " on Justia Law

Defendant John Joseph Delling appealed his conviction based on his conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. Defendant was initially charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of David Boss and Brad Morse. These counts were later amended to second-degree murder. Shortly after being charged, Defendant's counsel motioned for a mental health evaluation to determine whether Defendant was fit to proceed and able to aid in his own defense. Defendant requested that the Supreme Court reconsider and overrule its decision in "State v. Searcy" (798 P.2d 914 (1990)), to find that Idaho's abolition of the insanity defense was unconstitutional. Defendant also asserted that the district court abused its discretion and imposed excessive sentences. Upon careful review of the applicable legal authority and the arguments presented in Defendant's appellate brief, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant had not provided any argument that showed the precedential cases to be wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust. By looking at each argument individually, none of Defendant's constitutional rights were infringed by the abolition of the insanity defense. Furthermore, the Court also found that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. View "Idaho v. Delling " on Justia Law

Defendant John Schulz appealed his conviction of felony domestic battery and the attempted strangulation of his fifteen-year-old daughter. Both charges required the state to prove that the daughter was Defendant's "household member" as defined by the applicable statute. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the fact that she did not fall within that definition. Because the Supreme Court found that the definition of "household member" plainly limited the application to "intimate partners" and thus, did not extend to a child living with her father, the Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Schulz " on Justia Law

Defendant Torey Adamcik appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In 2007, a jury convicted him for the stabbing death of Cassie Jo Stoddart. Defendant raised multiple issues on appeal, among them, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, Defendant alleged multiple errors at trial prejudiced him from receiving a fair trial. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the jury was provided with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and that the trial court did not err in its rulings at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. View "Idaho v. Adamcik " on Justia Law

This appeal arose from Defendant Dean Clay Miller, Jr.'s conviction for burglary, assault with intent to commit robbery, possession of methamphetamine, and being a persistent violator. The Supreme Court reduced this case to two issues: (1) whether a persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the information to give a court subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether Defendant's sentence was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. Defendant pled guilty to to the charges against him, but on appeal argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State did not allege the persistent violator enhancement in the information. He also argued that if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction, the sentence was excessive in light of his mental health condition and other mitigating factors. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Defendant, and did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced him. View "Idaho v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant Ora Carson was convicted of the murder of his three-month-old son and was sentenced to a fixed life sentence based upon the jury’s finding that he exhibited utter disregard for human life. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s ruling barring impeachment evidence of the child’s mother, statements made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument, and the jury instruction defining “utter disregard.” Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the challenged comments: "[b]y the challenged comments, the prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion regarding the credibility of Mother. Defendant had testified that Mother killed Baby. The prosecutor was merely arguing that Mother’s conduct, as shown by the evidence, was inconsistent with that allegation. The prosecutor and defense counsel are free to argue the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, even if the evidence argued indicates that a witness is or is not truthful." With regard to the jury instructions given by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not present "any logical argument" that the jury would not have understood the meaning of "utter disregard." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Idaho v. Carson" on Justia Law

This case involved a custody dispute between Charles Hernandez, the biological father of two minor children, and Janice Ausburn, the children's maternal grandmother. In 2001, the children's mother Kerri left the children with her mother Janice because she was struggling with drug addiction. The children continued to live with Janice and she raised them without physical help from Charles or Kerri. Charles had no physical contact with the children between November 2002 and early 2008. Kerri continued to struggle with personal issues and had nothing to do with the children after turning them over to Janice. Despite acting as the children's primary custodian, Janice never petitioned a court for guardianship. In 2008, Charles and Kerri stipulated to a change in the custody arrangement, whereby Charles would have sole physical custody of the children and Kerri would have visitation each summer. The court entered a modification order based on the stipulation. The court was unaware that the children were actually residing with Janice when it entered the order. Janice was not made aware of either the stipulation or the order. Janice found out about the plan and kept the boys home from school on the day Charles was to take them. Janice then filed a separate action for custody. In the subsequent proceeding, the court considered whether Charles or Janice should be the children's primary custodian. The court ultimately granted Charles sole legal custody and Charles and Janice shared physical custody, with Charles having primary custody and Janice having custody for six weeks during the summers. The court based its decision largely on a court-ordered assessment prepared by a third-party evaluator. Charles appealed the magistrate court's decision to the district court. He did not challenge the magistrate judge's factual findings but, rather, argued the award of limited custodial rights to Janice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hernandez v. Ausburn " on Justia Law