Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ora Carson was convicted of the murder of his three-month-old son and was sentenced to a fixed life sentence based upon the jury’s finding that he exhibited utter disregard for human life. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s ruling barring impeachment evidence of the child’s mother, statements made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument, and the jury instruction defining “utter disregard.” Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the challenged comments: "[b]y the challenged comments, the prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion regarding the credibility of Mother. Defendant had testified that Mother killed Baby. The prosecutor was merely arguing that Mother’s conduct, as shown by the evidence, was inconsistent with that allegation. The prosecutor and defense counsel are free to argue the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, even if the evidence argued indicates that a witness is or is not truthful." With regard to the jury instructions given by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not present "any logical argument" that the jury would not have understood the meaning of "utter disregard." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Idaho v. Carson" on Justia Law

This case involved a custody dispute between Charles Hernandez, the biological father of two minor children, and Janice Ausburn, the children's maternal grandmother. In 2001, the children's mother Kerri left the children with her mother Janice because she was struggling with drug addiction. The children continued to live with Janice and she raised them without physical help from Charles or Kerri. Charles had no physical contact with the children between November 2002 and early 2008. Kerri continued to struggle with personal issues and had nothing to do with the children after turning them over to Janice. Despite acting as the children's primary custodian, Janice never petitioned a court for guardianship. In 2008, Charles and Kerri stipulated to a change in the custody arrangement, whereby Charles would have sole physical custody of the children and Kerri would have visitation each summer. The court entered a modification order based on the stipulation. The court was unaware that the children were actually residing with Janice when it entered the order. Janice was not made aware of either the stipulation or the order. Janice found out about the plan and kept the boys home from school on the day Charles was to take them. Janice then filed a separate action for custody. In the subsequent proceeding, the court considered whether Charles or Janice should be the children's primary custodian. The court ultimately granted Charles sole legal custody and Charles and Janice shared physical custody, with Charles having primary custody and Janice having custody for six weeks during the summers. The court based its decision largely on a court-ordered assessment prepared by a third-party evaluator. Charles appealed the magistrate court's decision to the district court. He did not challenge the magistrate judge's factual findings but, rather, argued the award of limited custodial rights to Janice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hernandez v. Ausburn " on Justia Law

Cassie Jo Stoddart was murdered in 2006. Defendant Brian Draper, who was sixteen years-old at the time of Stoddart’s murder, and Torey Adamcik, also a juvenile, were arrested and charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Both were tried as adults, and convicted during separate trials. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fixed life imprisonment for the murder charge and a life sentence with thirty years fixed for the conspiracy charge. Defendant raised seven issues on appeal: 1) the jury instructions for both murder and conspiracy relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes and violated his right to due process of law; 2) his fourth police interview should have been suppressed as his parents were not present at the interview; 3) the jury instructions and the district court’s failure to suppress the interview, even if individually harmless, cumulatively constitute reversible error; 4) the sentences should be vacated because the investigator’s presentence report was biased; 5) Defendant's fixed life sentence for murder violated the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions’ prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment; 6) the district court’s sentences constituted an abuse of discretion; and 7) the district court’s denial of Defendant's motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to modify his sentences constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court only found error in the jury instruction pertaining to Defendant's conspiracy charge, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Court vacated Defendant's conviction on conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge. View "Idaho v. Draper " on Justia Law

This case arose from Defendant Diego Morales Peregrina’s conviction on two counts of aggravated battery and two firearm enhancements; one for each battery. Peregrina argued on appeal of his sentence that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s "implicit" finding that the crimes arose out of divisible courses of conduct, and that even if there was, the State had the burden to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that no instruction was requested by either Peregrina or the State regarding I.C. 19-2520E, which states that when two crimes "arise out of the same indivisible course of conduct," the defendant "may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." The district court sentenced Peregrina as follows: ten years fixed for the first count of aggravated battery; ten years fixed for the second count of aggravated battery consecutive to the first count; ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the first count; and ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the second count, both consecutive to the previous counts. Peregrina was also sentenced to five years fixed for his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, to run concurrent with the other sentences, with credit for two hundred days served. The Supreme Court found that the State's failure to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Peregrina " on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Flegel was indicted by a grand jury for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen in violation of Idaho Code section 18-1508. Defendant pled not guilty and was tried by a jury. The district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of Lewd Conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct, but could not reach a verdict on the Sexual Abuse charge. Without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended indictment charging Defendant with Sexual Abuse. Defendant was tried by a jury on that charge and found guilty, to which he appealed. The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals. It held that the indictment was properly amended because evidence admitted during Defendant's first trial supported the included offense of Sexual Abuse; and that the district court erred in failing to tailor the jury instruction on Sexual Abuse to eliminate the risk that the jury in the second trial would find Defendant guilty of conduct for which he was acquitted in the first trial. Because it concluded that such error was not harmless, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the Sexual Abuse crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Idaho v. Flegel " on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court's grant of post-conviction relief to Defendant Trevor Booth. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder for the shooting death of Leonard Kellum in 2005. Prior to trial, the prosecutor handling Defendant's case informed Defendant and his counsel that the prosecution intended to request that the trial court provide a special verdict form for the jury if Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Specifically, the verdict form would instruct the jury to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances existed. Defendant's attorney interpreted the applicable statute to mean that if the jury were to find any aggravating circumstances, the court would be required to impose a fixed life sentence. Defense counsel prepared a memorandum to Defendant outlining his understanding of the potential penalties. The memorandum went on to explain what Defendant's options were with regard to entering a plea agreement with the State. Defendant eventually pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence with thirty years fixed. Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and in the handling of the plea agreement. The district court concluded that Defendant's counsel erroneously advised him regarding the potential sentence and with regard to the special verdict form. The court withdrew the guilty plea and set the case for a jury trial. The State appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that Defendant met his burden of demonstrating his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Booth v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Hansen appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He contended that a probationer living in an RV on Defendant's property lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the common areas in Defendant's home. Defendant asserted that the drugs discovered during that search should have been suppressed, along with additional evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant the State later obtained. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since the officers in this case reasonably believed the probationer had apparent authority to consent to the search, the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was properly decided. View "Idaho v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In 2007, a mother walked in on her child and Defendant Jonathan Folk "just playing." She would later learn that Defendant had placed his mouth on the child's penis. The State charged Defendant with lewd conduct. Defendant would be later tried by a jury, found guilty and sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant appealed. Principal among his arguments was that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the postponement of trial at the defendant's request waived the protection of the speedy trial statute, even if the trial was rescheduled within the proscribed period. The Court found that Defendant's request indeed waives protection of the statute. However, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction on errors by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Idaho v. Folk " on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court's judgment granting Defendant Trevor Booth's petition for post conviction relief on the grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2005, Defendant was accused of the shooting death of Leonard Kellum. Defendant was subsequently charged for first-degree murder. The State declined to seek the death penalty in this case. Defendant's attorney prepared a memorandum outlining his understanding of the potential penalties he would face. The attorney discussed the nuances of the statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. Defendant then entered into a plea agreement with the State, agreeing to plead guilty first-degree murder. After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, Defendant filed for post-conviction relief. The court concluded that Defendant's attorney erroneously advised Defendant of the consequences of his plea agreement. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant's attorney was deficient, and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Defendant post-conviction relief. View "Booth v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Stan Hawkins appealed a decision by the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners that granted his neighbors Dale and Mary Meyers variances to replace aging homes on two parcels of their land. The parcels in question were originally zoned as agriculture, and each contained homes built before the 1940s. People living on the Meyers' land regularly used a road over Mr. Hawkins' land for access. Bonneville County enacted its zoning ordinance in 1959, after the homes on the Meyers' land were built and occupied. The ordinance required dwellings to have frontage along a county-approved road. No easement was ever granted across Mr. Hawkins' land, nor was a public road officially designated to the Meyers' property. The Meyers filed for variances in 2007 believing that they needed to comply with the frontage requirement. At a hearing, the Commissioners found that the Meyers' did not need variances because their property had been "grandfathered in" so that the frontage requirement did not apply. However, the Commissioners granted the variance anyway. A trial court dismissed Mr. Hawkins' petition for review, holding that he did not have standing to file a petition for judicial review, and he did not show that the County had prejudiced any of his substantial rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Hawkins had standing to pursue his petition for judicial review. However, the Court dismissed his petition because he did not show any prejudice to his substantial rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Hawkins' petition. View "Hawkins v. Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Commissioners " on Justia Law