Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Steven and Valerie Hruza sought to obtain a loan from Clearwater Mortgage (Clearwater). Clearwater requested Defendant-Respondent Wade Massey to perform an appraisal of their real property located in Caldwell. Massey owned co-defendant Capitol West Appraisals and is a professional appraiser licensed to practice in Idaho. Massey performed the appraisal and sent a Summary Appraisal Report to Clearwater indicating that market value of the property was $1,150,000. Clearwater decided to deny the Hruzas' loan application before considering the appraisal. Massey admitted that both he and Clearwater were aware that the appraisal contained errors. Clearwater's president and Massey agreed that Massey would not fix the errors and Clearwater would not pay Massey for the appraisal. The Hruzas submitted a subsequent loan application to Idahy Federal Credit Union (now known as Icon). Icon approved the loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hruzas' property. Icon sent a check to Capitol, and Capitol accepted payment. Plaintiff-Appellant CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. was the fidelity bond insurer for Icon. It paid Icon as a result of the Hruzas' default on their loan. As Icon's subrogee, CUMIS filed suit against Massey and Capitol, alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on Massey's conduct in preparing the appraisal. A central point of dispute between the parties was how Icon obtained the appraisal. CUMIS alleged that the Hruzas included the appraisal with their loan application, thus prompting Icon to pay Capitol for the appraisal. Massey suggested that Icon improperly obtained the appraisal, pointing to Icon's admission that it did not know how it obtained it and that Icon did not request a letter of assignment from Clearwater to use or rely on the appraisal. The district court concluded that CUMIS could not establish that Massey owed a legal duty to Icon, that Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers, and that CUMIS had no breach of contract claim. Therefore, the district court granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by CUMIS, with prejudice. Finding that there remained issues of material fact, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing CUMIS's complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey" on Justia Law

In 1999, Rick and Natalie Foeller entered into an agreement with Melaleuca of Canada, Inc., under which the Foellers would serve as independent marketing executives in exchange for monthly commission payments. In 2008, the Foellers breached this agreement but Melaleuca continued to pay them commissions because it was unaware of the breach. Upon learning of the breach, Melaleuca sued to recover the payments it had made to the Foellers after they breached. The district court granted Melaleuca’s motion for summary judgment, finding that under the forfeiture clause of its agreement with the Foellers, Melaleuca was simply excused from performing once the Foellers breached and ordered the Foellers to refund Melaleuca the commissions they received after their breach. The Foellers appealed, arguing that the district court erred because the forfeiture clause was an illegal penalty and Melaleuca was required to prove damages. Agreeing with the Foellers, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Melaleuca, Inc v. Foeller" on Justia Law

American West Enterprises appealed a district court's grant of summary judgement to Case New Holland, Inc. (CNH) in its effort to recover the cost of a remanufactured tractor engine CNH sold to a local seller that American West purchased. The district court dismissed American West's claim of implied warranty because there was no privity between American West and CNH. The district court also rejected American West's claims that it was an intended third party beneficiary of a contract between CNH and Pioneer and that Pioneer was an agent of CNH. American West appeals. The district court denied CNH's request for attorney fees and costs below. CNH cross-appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed all but the denial of attorney fees. The case was remanded to the district court for finding costs and fees in favor of CNH. View "American West Ent. v. CNH, LLC." on Justia Law

Monsanto, through a wholly owned subsidiary, owns a quartzite mine near Soda Springs. Monsanto and Washington Group International, Inc. (WGI) contracted with each other for WGI to operate the mine. This agreement was memorialized in an agreement set to expire at the end of 2002. A by-product of WGI's operations was silica sand. Silicon International Ore, LLC (SIO) contacted Monsanto about acquiring the sand. SIO presented Monsanto with a proposed contract, but that contract was never executed. However, Monsanto and WGI executed an Addendum to the agreement that authorized WGI to construct and operate a processing facility for silica sand at the quartzite mine and to pay Monsanto royalties for silica that was sold by WGI to a third party. SIO and WGI executed a Master Agreement, under which WGI agreed to provide silica sand to SIO; SIO agreed to pay for the construction of the processing facility for the silica sand; SIO agreed to pay WGI to dry, screen, and bag the silica sand; SIO agreed to pay WGI an additional amount for processed sand; and WGI agreed to load the bagged silica sand onto SIO trucks. Shortly before the First Quarzite Agreement was set to expire, Monsanto and WGI executed a second Quarzite Agreement and addendum. The Second Addendum was almost identical to the First, but provided that WGI would pay Monsanto different amounts for sand based on several considerations and that the "[t]itle to the silica sand sold by SIO shall pass directly from [Monsanto] to SIO upon processing . . . subject to payment." WGI notified SIO that it would no longer be providing SIO with silica sand after the end of the year. After discussions with SIO, SIO was permitted to continue processing and bagging sand through April 29, 2008. SIO dismantled its operations in the quarry and removed its building and equipment. The following year, SIO sued Monsanto and WGI for damages for violating and interfering with an alleged verbal agreement to continue processing silica sand. SIO alleged that it and Monsanto entered into a verbal agreement separate and apart from the Master Agreement for the sale of silica sand. SIO asserted breach of the alleged verbal agreement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel. Monsanto denied SIO's claims and asserted the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense. Against WGI, SIO claimed that WGI breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied into the Master Agreement, and SIO alleged that WGI tortiously interfered with the alleged verbal agreement between SIO and Monsanto. Monsanto and WGI moved to dismiss, which were ultimately granted by the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Silicon Int'l v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Norman and Robin Riley appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Spiral Butte Development, LLC and Jim Horkley. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract against Spiral Butte and sought specific performance of the parties' Lease Option Agreement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Utah resident Elham Neilsen wanted to purchase a residence close to the city of Tyler in Smith County, Texas. He contacted Plaintiff-Appellant Holli Telford because he had heard that she knew how to acquire properties through tax or other distress sales and had contacts for obtaining financing for prospective buyers. Mr. Neilsen entered into an agreement with Plaintiff that she would bid on the property and sell it to him after she had obtained the warranty deed. Plaintiff submitted a bid, but did not obtain title to the property because, according to her, it was wrongfully redeemed by the prior owners after she had spent money improving it. She sought specific performance of the alleged contract with Smith County, Texas, or damages for breach of the alleged contract. Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice as to them and without prejudice as to the other defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded the for entry of a judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Telford v. Smith County" on Justia Law

Appellant Intermountain Real Properties, LLC, appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent Draw, LLC. Intermountain initially brought a cause of action, as an assignee of a materialmen's lien, against Draw and other defendants to recover payment on work paving a private drive a property development project. The district court granted summary judgment to Draw on the grounds that Intermountain failed to raise a material issue of fact as to Draw's liability on the contract. Specifically, the district court found that Intermountain's lien as it applied to Draw's property was void, and that Draw should have quiet title to its property. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Villages, LLC (collectively "Greystone") appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent City of McCall. Greystone's claims arose out of its development agreement with McCall. Greystone alleged it deeded nine lots to McCall in lieu of paying the required community housing fee, which was later declared unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. Greystone brought inverse condemnation claims against McCall alleging that the conveyance of the lots and the improvements made to those lots constituted an illegal taking under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. McCall moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hehr v. City of McCall" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from district court decisions regarding an uninsured motorist claim between Plaintiffs-Appellants Sam and Deva Ferrell and Defendant-Respondent United Financial Casualty Company (United Financial, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance Company). The parties underwent arbitration, and the Ferrells subsequently filed a petition that sought confirmation of the arbitration award and an award of costs and attorney fees. The district court ordered confirmation of the arbitration award and interest based upon an agreement of the parties. On the issue of attorney fees, the district court found that arbitration began five months prior to the amendment of I.C. 41-1839 which explicitly allowed attorney fees in arbitration, and therefore the statute as it existed did not provide for attorney fees in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

William Shapley appealed the district court’s dismissal of his breach of contract and negligence claims against Centurion Life Insurance Company and Wells Fargo Financial. Shapley and his wife applied for credit life insurance with Centurion on the same day they closed on a real estate loan with Wells Fargo. The Shapleys were provided with a notice of insurance underwriting practices. The application papers stated that the Shapleys would receive insurance coverage only if Centurion approved their application. Centurion never had a chance to have a phone interview with Mrs. Shapley (a requirement for the policy). The day after the Shapleys closed on their loan, Mrs. Shapley suffered a brain hemorrhage from which she died four days later. Mr. Shapley contacted Centurion the same day to claim benefits in connection with Mrs. Shapley’s passing. Centurion denied the claim because it never issued an insurance policy on Mrs. Shapley. Because the interview never took place, Centurion issued insurance solely to Mr. Shapley. Mr. Shapley argued on appeal that the district court's dismissal was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decisions, finding that while the district court incorrectly concluded that there must be a contract for estoppel to apply, the denial of Mr. Shapley’s motion to amend was appropriate because his estoppel claim was futile. View "Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins Co" on Justia Law