Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michelle McIntosh appealed her conviction and resulting sentence after she was found guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. This case arose out of three separate purchases of methamphetamine by an undercover police officer from McIntosh. The jury found McIntosh guilty of all charges, and the court subsequently sentenced McIntosh to a total unified term of ten years, with four years fixed. McIntosh timely appealed. McIntosh made two arguments on appeal: (1) her conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver should have been vacated because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the charge; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified term of ten years, with four years fixed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed McIntosh's conviction and sentence. View "Idaho v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

The State appealed following the conviction of defendant Benito Razo-Chavez for one count of possession of oxycodone. The State did not not challenge the outcome of the case and did not seek to overturn the verdict or sentence; rather, the State challenged the propriety of the district court’s jury instruction regarding the elements of possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c). Specifically, the instructions given to the jury by the district court stated the mens rea element of possession of a controlled substance as “the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone.” The State argued that this instruction was improper and should have stated the mens rea element as “the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was a controlled substance.” The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal: if the district court committed error, the Court held such error was harmless. View "Idaho v. Razo-Chavez" on Justia Law

Larry Severson was convicted in 2004 of one count of first-degree murder and one count of poisoning food or medicine. Those convictions were upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal. In this post-conviction proceeding, Severson appealed the district court’s summary dismissal on res judicata grounds of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to allegedly improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument. The appeal was heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which reversed the holding that res judicata applied. The State petitioned for review, arguing that the summary dismissal should have been affirmed because Severson failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance. The State argued at the district court that Severson failed to meet his burden of proof, but the court did not consider whether Severson adequately raised a genuine issue of material fact. Although the Supreme Court could have taken it upon itself to decide that matter on the record presented, it concluded the better course of action was to remand for the district court to consider this question. "This approach also gives the district court the opportunity to address any claims Severson may present regarding appellate counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal those statements which the dissent noted but which the majority did not address." The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s summary dismissal of Severson’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded for further proceedings. View "Severson v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Hasan Icanovic appealed a district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief brought on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Icanovic argued that his attorney’s advice offered in connection with his consideration and acceptance of a plea bargain was deficient and that but for this advice he would not have pled guilty to felony domestic battery. At issue was his attorney’s advice regarding the immigration-related consequences of his guilty plea. Finding that Icanovic did not meet his burden of proof for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Icanovic’s petition for post-conviction relief. View "Icanovic v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On October 23, 2012, the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. On September 3, 2013, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the Criminal Case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel in the Criminal Case advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court in this case dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the Criminal Case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, the only issue he raised relating to the denial of post-conviction relief was whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and so it affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Ryan Rawlings went into a Wal-Mart store to steal various items. He selected a large tote, placed it in a shopping cart, filled the tote with small items of merchandise, and covered them with the tote’s lid. He also selected a combination floor lamp and table and placed it in a cart. He then pushed the cart through the self-checkout line without paying for the merchandise, hoping that a cart containing two items that were too large to bag would not attract attention. However, a loss prevention officer had observed Rawlings’s actions. The loss prevention officer called law enforcement. When a sheriff’s deputy arrived, he talked with Rawlings after giving him Miranda rights. The Deputy asked Rawlings whether he had previously committed thefts like this, and Rawlings answered that he had back in Ohio. He stated that he had always been able to take items from Wal-Mart stores in the past without getting caught. Rawlings was charged with petit theft, a misdemeanor, and burglary, a felony. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony, and he was bound over to answer in the district court. Prior to trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the grounds that the statute, as applied to Rawlings, violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The motion was denied. Prior to trial, the Prosecutor served and filed a notice of the State’s intent to present evidence of Rawlings’s statement regarding his prior thefts, and Rawlings filed and served a motion in limine seeking to exclude that evidence. The evidence was ruled admissible. During a conference in chambers on the morning of the trial, Mr. Logsdon unsuccessfully re-argued the motion in limine. Then the Prosecutor orally moved to dismiss the petit theft charge, and the district court granted the motion. The burglary charge was tried to the jury, which found Rawlings guilty of burglary. He then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

In January of 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two counts of robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his previous involvement with various government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred when it did not “sua sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . .” The Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins’ judgment of conviction and remanded the case so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing in late 2010. Two experts had evaluated Hawkins and determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of 2008. Hawkins appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court’s 2010 retroactive determination that he was competent to stand trial in 2008 violated his due process rights. He also argued that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself pro se. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. A year later, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this civil action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the underlying case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, challenging whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

In 1992, Todd Rich was indicted for felony rape, allegedly committed between November 1991 and January 1992; he pled guilty on August 19, 1992; and on October 23, 1992, the district court sentenced him to six years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction. The district court retained jurisdiction for 120 days, and ultimately suspended the remainder of Rich’s sentence and placed him on probation. Rich successfully completed his probation on or about March 2, 2004. The following day, Rich filed a motion asking the district court in his criminal case for relief pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2604(2), which was granted. The district court reduced Rich’s charge to a misdemeanor. The order reducing the charge stated that “the Judgment is hereby deemed a misdemeanor conviction, thereby restoring [Rich] to his civil rights.” At some point, Rich moved to Pennsylvania. He apparently applied for permission to possess a firearm in Pennsylvania. His request was denied by an administrative law judge who ordered: “It appearing that under Idaho law, I.C. 18-310(2), final discharge for a conviction of rape does not restore the right to ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm, the determination of the Pennsylvania State Police that Todd Rich is prohibited under the Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa. C.S. 6101 et seq., is upheld.” Rich filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he “may lawfully purchase, own, possess or have under his custody or control a firearm under the laws of the State of Idaho.” The State responded by contending that Rich had no standing to seek such relief. The district court dismissed the case on two alternative grounds: (1) Rich did not have standing because no real, substantial, and concrete controversy then existed; and (2) “Idaho Code 18-310(3) provides the mechanism for the restoration of civil rights is through application to the commission of pardons and parole, not through the District Court.” The district court entered a judgment dismissing this action with prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rich v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jorge Lopez-Orozco was convicted by jury on three counts of first degree murder. The district imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in finding that his brother was unavailable as a witness at trial and allowing the brother’s preliminary hearing testimony to be read into evidence; and (2) the court erred in allowing the brother’s unsworn written statement to law enforcement to also be read into evidence. Finding neither of these contentions to warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Lopez-Orozco" on Justia Law