Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shortly before midnight on November 14, 2012, Boise Police Officer Ryan Thueson began following Nathan David Neal in a patrol car. Thueson observed Neal drive his pickup onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the “fog line”). Thueson continued to follow Neal until, about one mile further west, he saw Neal again drive onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway. According to Officer Thueson’s original report, at the time he observed Neal drive onto the fog line twice. Thueson learned later that there was no fog line and the line actually marked a bicycle lane. Thueson stopped Neal after he turned right. This traffic stop led to Neal’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was not ticketed for any traffic violations. Neal moved to suppress, claiming the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. The State argued the officer observed both a misdemeanor (Boise City Code section 10-10-17, which prohibited driving on a bicycle lane) and an infraction (Idaho Code section 49-637, which required drivers to maintain a single lane of travel), and that these observations justified the stop. The State also argued that observing these two instances of driving onto the line on the right, close to midnight, gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which also justified the stop. After a hearing and reviewing briefs, the magistrate granted Neal’s motion to suppress. The magistrate held there was no traffic violation justifying the stop because Neal did not cross the line and enter another lane. The magistrate also held that driving onto an alleged fog line two times did not create a driving pattern outside the broad range of normal driving behavior, so the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of DUI. Finally, the magistrate found there was no evidence the officer’s observations occurred in Boise, so there was no violation of Boise City Code. The State appealed, and the district court reversed, ultimately concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion that both “the statute and ordinance were violated by Mr. Neal’s driving upon the fog line and upon the bike lane marker.” Neal appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that driving on, but not across, an alleged fog line on the roadway violated the state statute requirement that a vehicle remain within its lane. The Supreme Court granted Neal’s petition for review, and held that driving onto but not across the line marking the right edge of the road did not violate Idaho Code section 49-637. Therefore the officer’s stop of Neal was not justified. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court reversing the magistrate’s granting of Neal’s motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Neal" on Justia Law

This case was the sixth appeal considered by the Idaho Supreme Court following petitioner-appellant Timothy Dunlap’s guilty plea to first-degree murder. The district court summarily dismissed Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. Dunlap raised several substantive claims for post-conviction relief. For each claim, he advanced a corresponding claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After review and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. View "Dunlap v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The State appealed the magistrate court's dismissal of the State's motion for contempt brought against Luis Juarez for failing to make payments ordered in a juvenile proceeding. In 2002, Juarez admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he had been an adult. Much time passed and the court entered several orders directing Juarez to pay fees and restitution in varying sums. Eventually, on October 6, 2005, the magistrate court entered its Amended Financial Judgment and Order directing Juarez to pay restitution. Juarez failed to pay, and would fail to appear twice, resulting in bench warrants for his arrest being issued both times. By the second time Juarez came before the magistrate judge, he was over 26-years old, and outside of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that now that Juarez had been brought in for an adult felony charge, it could no longer hear the contempt proceedings for failing to pay restitution. The district court reasoned that contempt was not available to compel payment of a restitution obligation arising from a proceeding under the JCA because the magistrate court's jurisdiction was conveyed by operation of Idaho Code section 20-505 and withdrawn by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding: (1) the magistrate court had jurisdiction over a charge of misdemeanor contempt under Idaho Code section 18-1801 (and if the offender was under eighteen years of age at the time of the criminal contempt, and the juvenile court exercises its discretion to treat the offense under the JCA, then Idaho Code section 20-507 would operate to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction as the proceedings would arise out of the JCA); (2) based on the State's own affidavit, the alleged crime was committed more than four years before these proceedings were commenced; (3) although this action was processed as a criminal case, no complaint was ever filed; (4) despite the lack of a complaint and without a finding of probable cause, the magistrate court issued warrants which resulted in Juarez's arrest; (5) the court's written "Statement of Rights and Explanation of Procedures for Contempt of Court" erroneously advised Juarez that the State bore the burden of proving the contempt "by a preponderance of the evidence;" (6) the court erroneously advised Juarez of the potential penalties upon conviction for misdemeanor contempt (18-1801 did not prescribe the penalty for misdemeanor contempt); (7) the magistrate court did not appear to recognize that Juarez had a right to a jury trial for misdemeanor contempt; and (8) Juarez appeared before the court without counsel, and Juarez discussed his case with the prosecutor without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's order dismissing the State's motions for contempt. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Jesse Riendeau was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol by a Coeur d’Alene police officer. The officer transported him to the jail, where the officer asked that Riendeau submit to a breath test for alcohol concentration. He did, and the two tests showed an alcohol concentration in excess of the statutory limit. Riendeau was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. Riendeau filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test on the ground that the breath test constituted a search and that his consent to that search was obtained unconstitutionally by the threat of a civil penalty of $250 and a one-year suspension of his driving privileges and by the false statement that he was required by law to submit to the breath test. On May 6, 2013, he filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from evidence the result of the breath test because the State Police’s change of the word “must” to “should” in its standard operating procedures resulted in there being no standards to ensure the reliability of the test results. After an evidentiary hearing, briefing, and argument, the magistrate court denied both motions. Riendeau then pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to a conditional plea agreement which provided that he would enter a conditional plea of guilty, that he could appeal the orders denying his motions, and that if he prevailed on appeal he could withdraw his guilty plea. The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Riendeau. He then appealed to the district court, and it affirmed the magistrate court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Riendeau" on Justia Law

Andrew Garcia admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he were an adult. He was ordered to pay court costs of $20.00. After Garcia admitted to committing another offense and a probation violation, he was ordered to pay court costs, probation fees, and community service fees. On May 10, 2010, Garcia admitted to committing another offense and was once again ordered to pay court costs and probation supervision fees. After he failed to make those payments, the State filed a motion for contempt. The magistrate court dismissed the motion, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction because Garcia was then over twenty-one and juvenile court jurisdiction was terminated by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The State appealed and the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s order. The State appealed the decision of the district court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court possessed the inherent power to adjudicate Garcia's alleged contempt, and incorrectly dismissed the State's motion for contempt for lack of jurisdiction. The district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Shannon McKean (a/k/ "McKeam) appealed after she was convicted by jury on five counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance. McKean argued the district court erred by determining that a substance known as "AM-2201" was a controlled substance under the version of Idaho Code section 37-2705(d)(30) then in effect. Furthermore, McKean argued that the district court erred by excluding laboratory reports relating to the products McKean was charged with possessing and delivering. These reports stated that test samples of the products did not show the presence of illegal synthetic cannabinoids. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. McKean" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Felicity Haynes was arrested by a state trooper for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed a district court order affirming the orders of the magistrate court, arguing the magistrate court erred in: (1) granting a continuance to the State due to the unavailability of a witness; (2) refusing to appoint a separate judge to hear a request for funds for the defense; (3) denying a motion in limine to exclude the results of a breath test on the ground that procedures for administering the test had not been properly adopted by the Idaho State Police; and (4) finding defendant’s consent to the breath test was invalid because it was obtained by the threat of a monetary penalty and loss of her driver’s license for one year. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "Idaho v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryann Lemmons was convicted by jury on two counts of trafficking in methamphetamine by delivering methamphetamine and two counts of trafficking in methamphetamine by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine. The charges arose from two instances in which Defendant, with the assistance of a co-conspirator, agreed to, and then delivered methamphetamine to a confidential informant. The actual weight of the methamphetamine delivered was less than 28 grams. However, the confidential informant testified that in each transaction Defendant represented that she was delivering an ounce of methamphetamine. In addition, the confidential informant testified that Defendant, through the co-conspirator, had agreed to sell one and one-half ounces of methamphetamine, but when the transaction occurred he was told that Defendant could only obtain one ounce and would provide the half ounce later. Before Defendant was sentenced, she moved for a judgment of acquittal on the counts relating to trafficking on the ground that there was insufficient evidence admitted during the trial to show that one ounce equaled 28 grams or more. After briefing and argument, the district court granted a new trial with respect to the jury questions of whether the person who sold or delivered the methamphetamine represented that it weighed 28 grams or more and with respect to the two charges of trafficking by conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine. The State then filed a notice of appeal. The following day, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, asking for judgments of acquittal rather than a new trial. After briefing and argument, the district court granted judgments of acquittal as to the charges of trafficking by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine and as to the issue of whether the person who sold or delivered the methamphetamine had represented that it weighed 28 grams or more. Defendant then filed a notice of cross-appeal. The Supreme Court, after review, concluded the district court's order granting the motion for reconsideration was void. Furthermore, the Court found that testimony that Defendant represented that the weight of the drug was one ounce was, as a matter of law, testimony that Defendant represented the weight was more than 28 grams (an ounce equals slightly more than 28 grams). "A witness need not testify in the wording of a criminal statute in order to prove a violation of that statute as long as the witness’s testimony shows a violation of the statute. It is the substance of the testimony, not the particular words used, that is material." The Court found the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support conviction on trafficking. The Court reversed the grant of a new trial and remanded this case for sentencing on all trafficking charges. View "Idaho v. Lemmons" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Herrera appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. At the time of the shooting, Herrera and his girlfriend Stefanie Cormack had been dating for three to four months and were living together in Herrera’s parents’ house. For some time leading up to the shooting, Herrera was in possession of two of his father’s handguns. On December 24, 2011, Herrera was out late and arrived home before dawn on Christmas morning, having used both methamphetamine and marijuana that morning. Herrera testified that when he arrived home he went to sleep for a few hours and woke up at roughly 10:00 a.m. When Herrera and Stefanie woke up Christmas morning, they began arguing about Facebook messages Stefanie had exchanged with other men and the fact that Herrera did not want to go to Stefanie’s mother’s house for Christmas. Herrera testified the gun that killed Stefanie was in the drawer of a nightstand next to his bed the morning of the shooting. He testified that during the course of their argument, Stefanie was packing her things to go to her mother’s house and that he was handling the gun. Herrera claimed that Stefanie was packing to go to her mother’s house only to celebrate Christmas, but the State’s theory was that she was packing to leave Herrera and end the relationship. He gave varying accounts of what exactly caused the gun to discharge. Although Herrera testified he did not remember the gun coming into contact with Stefanie’s forehead, testimony from the emergency room physician who first examined Stefanie and from the county medical examiner strongly evidenced that the gun was pressed against Stefanie’s forehead when it fired. By all accounts, Herrera was extremely upset after the fatal shot was fired. The jury was instructed on second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Herrera was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with twenty-two years fixed. He timely appealed. Herrera argues (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice, and (2) improper testimony from a number of witnesses unfairly prejudiced his case. Upon review of the trial court record, taking Herrera's second argument first, the Supreme Court concluded that indeed certain testimony offered at trial suggesting he was abusive was highly prejudicial in light of the other evidence offered. "Even more concerning is the rather transparent violation of the limitations imposed by the district court on the testimony of [certain] witnesses." As such, the Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In June 2012, Junior Hillbroom was charged with attempted strangulation and domestic violence in Case No. CR-2012-2908. Several days later, the magistrate court issued a no contact order, which prohibited Hillbroom from contacting the victim. The expiration date of the no contact order was left blank. In July, the district court heard oral argument on the victim’s motion to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. In August 2012, at the preliminary hearing on Case No. CR-2012-2908, the magistrate court heard a second request by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The magistrate court denied the motion to dismiss the no contact order, but it modified the order to allow certain third party contact. This order to modify also left the expiration date blank. It stated in relevant part: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the No Contact Order previously issued herein be: Modified as follows, and will be in effect until 11:59 p.m. on , 20__ , or upon dismissal of the case.” In September, the district court heard oral argument on another motion by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. The reason for this appeal to the Supreme Court was that Hillbroom was charged with a misdemeanor for violating the no contact order. He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the no contact order was invalid and therefore the State could not prove an essential element of the crime. The magistrate court denied his motion, and the jury convicted Hillbroom as charged. Hillbroom appealed. The district court sitting in its capacity as an intermediate appellate court affirmed the magistrate court’s order denying the motion. Hillbroom appealed again, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order. Hillbroom then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Finding no reversible error in the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hilbroom" on Justia Law