Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Supreme Court granted a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision in this case. Irwin Adams appealed a district court’s decision summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition, which the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. Adams argued on appeal that the district court erroneously: (1) weighed the State’s accident reconstruction expert’s trial testimony against Adams’s accident reconstruction expert’s affidavits; (2) reached its own conclusions as to purported flaws in Adams’s accident reconstruction expert’s conclusions; and (3) wrongfully determined that even if Adams’s accident reconstruction expert’s testimony would have been presented at trial, it would not have changed the outcome of the case. Adams also argued that the district court erred when it dismissed the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence that Adams’s vehicle was incapable of going the speeds the State alleged during trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Adams v. Idaho" on Justia Law

A jury found Azad Haji Abdullah guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. The case proceeded to sentencing and the jury found two aggravating circumstances. The jury also found that all the mitigating circumstances when weighed against each aggravating circumstance individually were not sufficiently compelling to make the death penalty unjust. The district court subsequently entered judgments of conviction and sentenced Abdullah to death for first-degree murder and to a total of eighty years imprisonment for the remaining five convictions. Abdullah sought post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Abdullah’s petition for post-conviction relief in its entirety. Abdullah appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, the sentences, and the order denying post-conviction relief. View "Georgia v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

In 2011, Corey Thiel was charged with felony domestic battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Thiel pled guilty to an amended charge of misdemeanor domestic battery and was placed on supervised probation. Approximately one week after entry of this guilty plea, Thiel was charged with a misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order for an incident that occurred while the battery charge was pending. Thiel pled guilty to violating the no-contact order, and the magistrate court imposed suspended jail time and two years of unsupervised probation, while crediting time served. Under the terms of his probation, Thiel was required to comply with the terms of supervised probation established in the underlying battery case. Less than two months thereafter, on May 2, 2012, the State moved for the court to issue a bench warrant for Thiel’s arrest based on probation violations. At a hearing on the State’s motion, Thiel admitted the violations. The court reinstated Thiel on probation. Approximately four months thereafter, the State moved for a second set of probation violations, alleging that Thiel failed to maintain contact with his assigned probation officer and also failed to provide documentation that he had completed the required domestic violence treatment. At a hearing on the State’s motion, Thiel admitted the violations. The court revoked Thiel’s probation and imposed his original sentence of 356 days, with a credit of 67 days. Fifty-five days before his sentence was to end, the Ada County Sheriff’s Office submitted a letter to the magistrate court recommending that Thiel be granted early release. The magistrate court denied the Sheriff’s request. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of statutory interpretation: Idaho Code section 20-621 authorizes commutation of county jail sentences for good behavior, making county inmates with good records while incarcerated eligible for five (5) days off for each and every month of their sentence. A prisoner’s eligibility, however, was conditioned upon receiving a recommendation from the supervising county sheriff. The primary issue presented here was whether the statute vested the magistrate court with the discretion to reject a recommendation from a sheriff. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the statute vested no discretion with the magistrate judge. View "Idaho v. Thiel" on Justia Law

William Wolfe appealed the Idaho County district court’s decisions denying: (1) his motion for a hearing on his motion for reconsideration of his I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence; and (2) his successive Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Specifically, Wolfe argued the district court denied his motions based on two erroneous conclusions: that the subject matter jurisdiction issue had been previously adjudicated and that Wolfe could not file a successive Rule 35 motion. Wolfe argued that if the district court had properly considered the merits of his motions, the district court would have found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Wolfe’s original criminal proceedings. Accordingly, Wolfe petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence, or alternatively, to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. After careful consideration of the district court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible errors, and affirmed the district court’s decisions denying Wolfe’s motion for a hearing and his successive Rule 35 motion. View "Idaho v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a district court’s denial of Dameniel Owens’s motion for credit for time served. The district court specified that Owens would only receive credit for his prejudgment time served in a county jail on one of his eight counts of issuing a check without funds. Owens argued that Idaho Code section 18-309 plainly and unambiguously required the district court to credit his prejudgment time served to each of his eight counts. Owens further argued that the Supreme Court should have overruled "Idaho v. Hoch," (630 P.2d 143 (1981)), because in that case the Court improperly went beyond the statute’s plain meaning to hold that the legislature intended a defendant could not receive credit for each separate crime. The Supreme Court indeed overruled "Hoch," vacated the district court’s order denying Owens’s motion for credit for time served, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Owens" on Justia Law

Defendant David Knutsen appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of four counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. Defendant argued on appeal that the term of the grand jury that indicted him had already expired, that the statute defining the crimes was unconstitutional, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and that his conviction should be for only one count because his conduct constituted one continuous act. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Idaho v. Knutsen" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Joseph Thomas, Jr. guilty of first degree murder for the strangulation death of his ex-wife, Beth Irby Thomas in 2011. A friend of Defendant testified that at about 12:30 a.m. the following day, Defendant came to the friend’s home and stated that he had strangled the decedent. After Defendant left, the friend called 911. The first police officer to arrive at the decedent’s home found her with a leather belt cinched tightly around her neck. The belt was Defendant’s, and he was standing outside her house when the police arrived. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that because the district court erroneously excluded evidence that could have corroborated the defendant’s version of what had occurred and the State did not show that such error was harmless, the Court vacated the jury verdict and the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2012, Idaho State Police stopped defendant-respondent Derek Arrotta for a traffic violation. At the end of the stop, defendant was issued a citation for misdemeanor driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress “based on violations of the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, right to remain silent, right to counsel, and related constitutional protections under the State of Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution,” but the motion did not identify what evidence he wanted to suppress or how his rights were allegedly violated. The parties agreed to postpone the matter until the United States Supreme Court decided "Missouri v. McNeely." After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in McNeely, the magistrate court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The trooper testified to the events and stated that he did not recall telling Defendant that he did not have a right to refuse the blood test. However, he also testified that he told Defendant that if he refused the breath test, the trooper would get a blood draw. Defendant testified that he refused the breath test, but not the blood test. He testified that at the hospital he asked if he could refuse the blood test, “but they pretty much said no.” When asked if the trooper told Defendant he could not refuse the blood draw, Defendant answered, “Yeah, something to that extent.” The magistrate court did not resolve the factual dispute regarding whether Defendant was told that he could not refuse the blood draw. Rather, it held that statutory implied consent was insufficient by itself to constitute consent to a search in the form of a blood draw; that express consent was required. Based upon that holding, the court granted Defendant’s motion and issued an order suppressing the blood test results. The State appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the suppression order, holding that statutory implied consent to a blood draw is revocable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Idaho v. Arrotta" on Justia Law

In 2012, a Post Falls police officer was searching for a gray truck with stolen Washington license plates. He located and began to follow the truck, and he confirmed that the license plate on it was stolen. The truck stopped in a parking lot in Post Falls, and the officer told the driver, later identified as defendant Dennis Halseth, to stay in the vehicle. Defendant drove away, with the officer in pursuit. Defendant was later stopped and arrested in Washington by a Washington state trooper. The trooper asked Defendant to complete voluntary field sobriety tests, and Defendant refused. The trooper then transported Defendant to a hospital in Spokane, Washington, to have his blood drawn for evidentiary testing. Despite defendant's protests, the hospital technician drew blood samples from each of defendant’s arms. No search warrant was obtained prior to the blood draws. The State of Idaho charged defendant with several crimes including driving while under the influence of alcohol, which would be a felony because of his prior convictions. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that he did not consent to the warrantless search. He did not contend that the trooper lacked probable cause to believe that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. In light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in "McNeely," the State did not argue that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream was an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search, nor did it argue that there were any other exigent circumstances justifying the search. The State argued that both Washington and Idaho had statutes providing that persons who drove on public roads impliedly consented to a test for alcohol concentration in their blood; and that Idaho case law held that there was no legal right to withdraw that implied consent; and that the implied consent included a blood draw. The district court granted the motion to suppress, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Halseth" on Justia Law

Defendant Juan Luis Sanchez-Castro was indicted, tried, and convicted of one count of conspiracy to traffic in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of trafficking in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine. For each crime, he was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with the first ten years fixed and the remaining five years indeterminate, and a fine of $25,000. The district court ordered that the prison sentence on the second charge run concurrently with the prison sentence on the first charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that the conspiracy charge and the trafficking charge were, under Idaho law, the same charge. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Sanchez-Castro" on Justia Law