Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A magistrate court terminated Appellant Jane Doe’s (“Mother”) parental rights to her nine-year-old child (“Child”) for neglect. Mother argued on appeal of that termination: (1) the magistrate court’s finding of neglect is not supported by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the magistrate court should have rejected the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“IDHW”) petition to terminate parental rights because IDHW had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Child; (3) the magistrate court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of findings from a prior proceeding; and (4) the magistrate court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of IDHW’s efforts to determine whether the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to Child. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2015-21)" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Kesting obtained a judgment against Respondent James Kesting for breach of an alimony/spousal support agreement entered into during their divorce. When that judgment was returned without recovery, the magistrate judge issued a Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). The subsequent judgment was intended to allow recovery of the unpaid spousal support and associated attorney fees from James’ pension plan. James appealed to the district court, which reversed. The district court concluded that the QDRO was not valid because the spousal support agreement was not merged into the divorce decree and, therefore, the QDRO was not issued pursuant to the State’s domestic relations law as required under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Linda appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, "disagree[ing] with the district court’s narrow view of domestic relations law. [...] The policies underlying ERISA’s anti-assignment provisions would not be furthered by allowing a person to avoid his or her support obligation because that obligation was agreed to between the parties. [...] Regardless of whether a support obligation was created by court order or provided for by agreement, it was not Congress’s intent that ERISA be used as a tool for a person to evade his or her familial support obligations." View "Kesting v. Kesting" on Justia Law

Parties Rebecca Foreman and Stanley Sweet shared custody of Child. Prior to this modification proceeding, Sweet had primary physical custody of Child and Foreman had custodial time on alternating weekends and holidays. Foreman filed a petition to modify the child custody order seeking primary physical custody, which the magistrate court granted following trial. Sweet moved to amend the judgment or for a new trial and also moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Sweet moved for a direct permissive appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded this appeal was premature because the magistrate court had not ruled on Sweet’s motion for a new trial. It was procedurally improper for Sweet to move for reconsideration of the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions under I.R.F.L.P. 503(b). However, Sweet had previously sought to introduce new evidence under the correct procedural mechanism, a motion for new trial. In his motion for a new trial under I.R.F.L.P. 807(A)(4), Sweet asked the magistrate to conduct a new trial on the issue of Child’s wishes, including an in camera interview of Child. Those wishes included Child’s concerns regarding Foreman’s new living arrangements. The Court denied Sweet’s request to conduct an in camera interview. However, the record does not indicate that the court ever ruled on Sweet’s motion for a new trial. View "Sweet v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Appellant the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes intervened in the adoption proceedings of a minor child (Child). While the adoption itself was not at issue on appeal, disputes that arose during the adoption proceedings were. Respondents Jane and John Doe (Does) initiated adoption proceedings for Child after the rights of Child’s parents were terminated. Because Child might have qualified for protection under the laws protecting an Indian child’s welfare, the Tribes were given notice and intervened in the adoption proceeding. The trial court appointed an independent attorney for the child whose costs were to be split by the Tribes and the Does. Discovery disputes arose during the proceedings, and the trial court issued sanctions against the Tribes. The trial court found the facts before it insufficient to establish that Child was an Indian child, and thus concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not govern the proceeding. Despite this conclusion, the court applied the ICWA’s placement preferences out of concern for Child’s best interests. The Does prevailed in the adoption, and the court granted them attorney fees as the prevailing party. The Tribes contested the discovery rulings, sanctions, failure to find Child an Indian child, and the grant of attorney fees against them, claiming sovereign immunity and a misapplication of the law. The Idaho Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the trial court’s failure to find that Child was an Indian child because it concluded any error was harmless. However, the Court found that trial court’s order compelling discovery was an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order preventing the Tribes from processing or filing any enrollment for tribal membership on behalf of Child was also an abuse of discretion. Further, the additional order granting attorney fees in the Does’ favor as the prevailing party violated the Tribes’ sovereign immunity. The Court reversed on these latter issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "John Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes" on Justia Law

Roger Gordon brought an action against Shannon Hedrick to establish custody and a parenting time schedule for M.H., a minor child. Gordon and Hedrick were in a relationship that began sometime in early 2010 and lasted approximately three years. The two were never married. Hedrick became pregnant around the time that the relationship began. In November of 2010, Hedrick gave birth to M.H. The following day Gordon signed a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (VAP) affidavit attesting that he was the biological father of M.H. Hedrick also signed the VAP, which stated Gordon “is the biological father of this child” and “I acknowledge that the man named above is the biological father of my child. I consent to the recording of his name, date, and place of birth on the birth certificate of the above-described child.” Following M.H.’s birth, Gordon, Hedrick, and M.H. lived together until Gordon and Hedrick’s relationship ended on February 28, 2013; the next day Gordon filed a complaint to establish custody of M.H. and a parenting time schedule. Hedrick answered and counterclaimed for legal and physical custody of M.H. As part of her counterclaim, Hedrick alleged Gordon “frequently stated he doubts he is the child’s parent. Genetic testing of the parties and child should be done to confirm parentage before entry of further orders.” Gordon denied this allegation. The magistrate court granted Hedrick’s motion and ordered genetic testing, the results of which showed there was a 0.00% probability that Gordon was M.H.’s biological father. Based on the test results, Hedrick moved for summary judgment, asking the magistrate court to dismiss Gordon’s complaint and strike his name from M.H.’s birth certificate. At a hearing on the motion, Gordon argued that he was a de facto custodian under the De Facto Custodian Act. Hedrick responded that Gordon could not be a de facto custodian because he was not related to M.H. within the third degree of blood relation. The magistrate court entered its order dismissing the action, changing M.H.’s name, and directing that Gordon’s name be removed from the birth certificate. Gordon moved for reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that Hedrick could not demonstrate a “mutual mistake of fact” which the district court found was required to rescind a VAP under Idaho Code section 7-1106(2). Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gordon v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The minor at issue here, H.T., was the child of John Doe II and Jane Doe. John Doe II and Jane Doe were married around March of 2002 and were divorced early the following summer. H.T. was born in 2002. John Doe II was incarcerated in 2003, when H.T. was about sixteen months old. John Doe II would be eligible for parole in December, 2028. In 2005, Jane Doe met John Doe I. They married in 2008. John Doe I was employed by the United States Air Force and has been with the Air Force for the past eighteen years. Jane Doe also served in the Air Force. H.T. resided with John Doe I and Jane Doe, who were stationed overseas. John Doe II appealed the termination of his parental rights to H.T. The magistrate court terminated John Doe II’s parental rights and allowed John Doe I to adopt H.T. John Doe II argued that John Doe I lacked standing to petition for termination of his parental rights and the magistrate court’s decisions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. “The fundamental divergence between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and written decision require us to vacate the order terminating John Doe II’s parental rights. Our decision today is not intended to suggest that there is no basis for terminating John Doe II’s parental rights or that John Doe I should not be permitted to adopt H.T. Instead, this decision is entirely driven by a fundamental failure by the trial judge to fulfill his duties in such a case.” The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded for the magistrate to prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "John Doe I v. John Doe II" on Justia Law

Father appealed a magistrate court's judgment terminating his parental rights to Child. Mother brought a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. Following trial, the court granted Mother’s petition, finding that termination was justified based on Father’s prolonged incarceration and inability to discharge his parental responsibilities and was in Child’s best interest. Father appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the magistrate court’s determination of the issues. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the magistrate court's determination, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jane Doe (2015-03) v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Jessica and Eric Kawamura married in Las Vegas. They concealed their marriage from their families for one year before having a “marriage” ceremony, which was attended by family members. During the course of their marriage, Jessica and Eric lived in three homes. The magistrate court presiding over the parties' divorce concluded that the residence located in Pocatello was Eric’s separate property. The district court reversed, holding that the magistrate court improperly considered parol evidence to reach its conclusion. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to the extent that it reversed the magistrate court’s determination of the character of the property. "The Gwen [Pocatello] home was purchased during the course of the marriage. Thus, it was presumptively community property. The community was liable to repay the loan from Eric’s parents. The community was the source of the funds used to make payment on the loan. Eric and Jessica were named as grantees in the deed to the Gwen Home, a fact that they acknowledged at the time of its acquisition by their initials on the deed. The only evidence favoring Eric’s claim that the Gwen Home was Eric’s separate property is the fact that his separate property was the source of the down payment on the home. This single fact is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the Gwen Home was community property." View "Kawamura v. Kawamura" on Justia Law

Appellant Monica Garner, and respondent Christopher Garner had two children prior to their divorce in 2010. They were both represented by counsel in that action and entered into a stipulation addressing the terms of their divorce, including child custody and child support. Under the terms of that stipulation, Appellant was awarded primary physical custody of the children, and Respondent agreed to pay a total of $50 a month in child support. The magistrate court did not hold a hearing regarding the stipulation. The magistrate entered a judgment granting Appellant and Respondent a divorce under the terms of the stipulation. Neither party objected, moved for clarification or reconsideration, or appealed the judgment. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion to modify the judgment, seeking an increase in the monthly child support payment to $608.71, to conform with the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. Respondent moved to dismiss the motion on the grounds that there had not been a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting a modification. The magistrate court heard oral argument on Respondent’s motion to dismiss, noting that both parties were currently represented by counsel and had been represented by counsel when the parties divorced. Ruling that there was no material change in circumstances, the magistrate dismissed Appellant’s motion and awarded Respondent attorney’s fees. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision in all respects. The district court also awarded Respondent attorney’s fees and costs for the appeal. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s ruling. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The fact that the parties were represented by counsel when they entered into the agreement did not change the fact that the judgment originally entered in this case called for a significant, unsubstantiated deviation from the statutory child support guidelines: "This was a virtual forfeiture of child support. There is no explanation for this deviation except in hindsight during this litigation rather than the proper findings and conclusions called for in statute and rule. Neither the original judgment nor the district court’s ruling on the motion to modify support protects the welfare of the children. No facts were ever elicited in this case to rebut the statutory or Guidelines presumption. The required procedure was not followed, and no reasons were given as to why the Guidelines were not followed. There seemed to be no inquiry here as to why such a drastic deviation from the Guidelines was justified." View "Garner v. Garner" on Justia Law

Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. Robinson was a licensed masters social worker. Briley was a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor. In both reports in the two cases, Robinson's evaluations (as Colafranceschi's claim suggested) "did not cast him in a positive light." The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colafranceschi v. Briley" on Justia Law