Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Andy and Ronna Bond filed an action to be appointed guardians of two children who were at that time two and eight years of age. Mother Amber Round was initially represented by counsel, but counsel was permitted to withdraw and she did not file a timely notice of how she would proceed. Her default was entered on a few months later, and she filed a motion to set aside the default on the same day. The following day, she also filed a notice of appearance, informing the magistrate court that she would be representing herself. She claimed that she had moved and did not receive notice of her attorney’s withdrawal. The magistrate court held a hearing on Mother’s motion to set aside the default. The court found, considering the evidence presented and Mother’s credibility and demeanor, that service was properly made upon her. It therefore denied her motion to set aside the default. The magistrate court then appointed the Guardians on the ground that Mother and father Ty Round were unable to provide the children with a stable home environment. Father and Mother were later divorced. Mother appealed to the district court, and filed a petition to terminate the guardianship and a motion to allow for visitation. These motions were transferred to the magistrate division of the district court, where Mother's petition to terminate guardianship was denied, but she was allowed visitation. The Guardians appealed the grant of visitation and the magistrate court’s sua sponte denial of attorney fees to both parties without a hearing. The Supreme Court agreed that the magistrate court did not err in granting the mother visitation with her children, but on different grounds than asserted by the district court. The Court reversed the district court’s decision that the magistrate court did not err in denying an award of attorney fees sua sponte without the opportunity for a hearing. View "Re: Gurarianship: Bond v. Round" on Justia Law

"Mother" Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s judgment that terminated her parental rights to three of her children. The magistrate court concluded that the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and father John Doe neglected their children and that terminating parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother argued on appeal that IDHW did not show clear and convincing evidence, the court failed to properly consider her disability, and IDHW did not make reasonable efforts to help her comply with her case plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2014-17)" on Justia Law

Scott Avery Reed (Father) and Stephanie M. Reed (Mother) were married in 1993, and during their marriage they had three children. On December 22, 2009, Mother filed for divorce. They agreed that there were irreconcilable differences between them that justified terminating their marriage. The remaining issues were tried in the magistrate court on January 13 and 14, 2011. On appeal, Father raised multiple alleged errors. The Supreme Court vacated four parts of the decision pertaining to the division of property, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reed v. Reed" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a custody dispute between Jeffrey Biggers and Emily Suter over their two children. Emily remarried, and her husband worked in McCall. Emily made several attempts to modify custody, and each time she was unsuccessful. At trial, a magistrate judge held that last attempt, a permanent move to McCall, would have been a "material, permanent, and significant change" for the children and denied the request for modification. Neither party appealed this finding. At the conclusion of trial, the court found that it would be in the boys’ best interests to remain in the Emmett area. Consistent with this finding, the court ordered that Jeff and Emily have joint physical and legal custody, that Jeff have primary custody of the boys, and that Emily have visitation rights throughout the year and over the summer break. Emily appealed that ruling, but finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Suter v. Biggers" on Justia Law

John Doe was the biological father of T.C. Doe was a juvenile when T.C. was born. Doe paid Mother a total of $52.00 in child support, despite a court order requiring him to pay Mother child support of $253.00 per month. Doe owed approximately eight thousand dollars in unpaid child support. Doe never provided T.C. or Mother with any alternate form of support such as clothing, diapers, or food. During T.C.’s life, Doe was regularly incarcerated and had no contact with T.C. for months at a time; including a substantial period of time that the child protection proceedings were ongoing. Doe has been unable to maintain employment or a home and typically resides in the homes of various girlfriends. Doe was addicted to methamphetamine and, when not in custody, he used methamphetamine. Doe had an extensive criminal record and has been a defendant in more than forty criminal matters. A petition was filed under the Child Protective Act (CPA) asking a magistrate court to place T.C under the supervision of the Department. The same day, the magistrate court ordered the removal of T.C. on the basis that continuation in the home would be contrary to T.C.’s welfare. The magistrate court placed T.C. in the care of the Department of Child Services. Doe learned of the Department’s petition when his aunt informed him of the proceedings. His parental rights to T.C. were ultimately terminated on grounds that the trial court found Doe neglected T.C., and that it was in the child's best interests to have Doe's parental rights terminated. Doe appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Health & Welfare v. John Doe (13-29)" on Justia Law

The district court awarded attorneys fees to Lynn Urrutia against appellants Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte under Idaho Code section 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123, as well as sanctions against the appellants' attorney under Idaho Code section 12-123 and I.R.C.P. 11. These awards stemmed from the divorce of Lynn and Johnny Urrutia in 2007 and the divorce decree's division of the marital property. "'The most egregious conduct of defendants,' in the district court's opinion, was the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim, which 'states two causes of action against Lynn: (1) that the second lien has priority over Lynn's claims and (2) that Lynn as the owner of the property was unjustly enriched.' The judge noted that the Second Lien, with a priority date of 2008, could not conceivably be higher in priority than Lynn's deed of trust, which was recorded in 2007. He observed that the Appellants knew the $220,000 claimed in the Second Lien, like the First Lien, contained numerous items that did not constitute improvements to the arena property and were not lienable under the mechanic's lien statutes. And, even though the Appellants knew that the owner of record of the arena property was Sundance Arena, LLC, they sought personal recovery against Lynn under an unjust enrichment theory for improvements made to the property, which she did not own." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of fees and sanctions to Lynn Urrutia. View "Urrutia v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The magistrate court dismissed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological father of two children and to permit the children's stepfather to adopt them. The magistrate court dismissed the action on the ground that the petitioners had failed to prove that termination of the father's parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Termination of Parental Rights (Father)" on Justia Law

Crystal Edgar and Brad Carr were the parents of D.C., born in 2003. Edgar and Carr were never married. Both Edgar and Carr have served in the Idaho National Guard since D.C.'s birth, resulting in custody disputes arising from the parties' deployments. Edgar's contempt convictions arose from Carr's allegation that Edgar committed two separate violations of the parties' Parenting Plan, which was incorporated into the magistrate court's Order for Entry of Stipulation for Decree Regarding Paternity, Child Custody and Child Support (the May 12 Order). The magistrate court heard Carr's contempt allegations, and found Edgar guilty on two counts. On Count I, the magistrate court sentenced Edgar to five days jail, suspended, a $5,000 fine, suspended, and placed her on two years unsupervised probation. On Count III, the magistrate court sentenced Edgar to three days in jail, to be served immediately. More than a month later, and after Edgar had completed serving her jail time, the magistrate court entered its Judgment of Contempt and found that Edgar "willfully violated the court order that specifically provided that decisions concerning which school [D.C.] would attend be made jointly by the parties." The magistrate court also concluded that Edgar "blatantly breached her obligation of good faith and fair dealing when she summarily denied [Carr's] last chance to see his son before being sent to a war zone where many fathers have not returned." Edgar appealed. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision and affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the magistrate court erred by convicting Edgar of contempt on a basis different from that which was alleged in Carr's affidavit and the district court erred in affirming that conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction. View "Carr v. Edgar" on Justia Law

Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married in Oregon in 1996. Baird filed for divorce in Idaho in 2004. The magistrate court entered a partial decree at the request of the parties, granting the divorce in 2005. The decree included a certificate in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 54(b) certifying the decree as a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken. Neither party ever appealed from the certified judgment. The magistrate court conducted a subsequent trial regarding the division of property and debts, and issued its amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in 2007. After several post-trial motions, the magistrate court entered an amended order in 2012, settling property and debt issues. Sallaz filed a notice of appeal to the district court a few months later. Then Baird filed for Chapter 7 relief in bankruptcy. The filing of the bankruptcy petition stayed the appeal in the district court until Sallaz received permission from the bankruptcy court to pursue the appeal. Jeremy Gugino, the bankruptcy trustee, intervened in the appeal as a real party in interest. While the appeal from the magistrate's division was pending before the district court sitting in its capacity as the intermediate appellate court, Sallaz filed an independent action in Ada County asserting for the first time that the Oregon marriage was invalid. The bankruptcy trustee intervened and filed a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that it was an impermissible collateral attack on the magistrate court's property settlement order. Sallaz then requested that the district court, as the intermediate appellate court, remand the case to the magistrate division to determine the validity of the marriage. The district court held that Sallaz's challenge to the validity of the marriage was untimely, that Sallaz had impermissibly raised an issue for the first time on appeal, and that Sallaz was estopped by his inconsistent positions from challenging the parties' marriage. Sallaz requested that the Supreme Court to remand the case to the magistrate court for a determination regarding the validity of the marriage. The Supreme Court denied Sallaz's motion. Sallaz then appealed the district court's intermediate appellate decision and continued to challenge the validity of the parties' marriage in Oregon. On the intermediate appeal in the district court Sallaz asserted that the marriage was invalid because the marriage ceremony allegedly was performed by an individual who was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, and (for the first time), that the marriage ceremony was invalid because no Oregon marriage license could be found of record. Under either theory, Sallaz argued that invalidity of the marriage deprived the magistrate court of subject matter jurisdiction to grant a decree of divorce. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that the magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the parties' marriage and divide the community property. View "Gugino v. Sallaz" on Justia Law

This was an expedited appeal by John Doe (“Father”) from an order terminating his parental rights over his minor child and granting Child’s stepfather’s (John Doe II) (“Stepfather”) Petition to Adopt Child. The magistrate court found that Father had abandoned Child and failed to maintain regular contact with and support the minor child without just cause. Father stopped having contact with Child in April 2007, after Mother changed her contact information. In 2012, Father brought a motion to modify child custody. In response, Mother and her new husband, Stepfather, sought termination of the Father’s parental rights, and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption of the minor child. The magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted Stepfather’s petition. Father appealed. The Supreme Court held after review that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it found that Father abandoned Child. Termination of Father’s parental rights was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Based on the facts of this case, termination of Father’s parental rights was premature. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights (father)" on Justia Law