Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married in Oregon in 1996. Baird filed for divorce in Idaho in 2004. The magistrate court entered a partial decree at the request of the parties, granting the divorce in 2005. The decree included a certificate in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 54(b) certifying the decree as a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken. Neither party ever appealed from the certified judgment. The magistrate court conducted a subsequent trial regarding the division of property and debts, and issued its amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in 2007. After several post-trial motions, the magistrate court entered an amended order in 2012, settling property and debt issues. Sallaz filed a notice of appeal to the district court a few months later. Then Baird filed for Chapter 7 relief in bankruptcy. The filing of the bankruptcy petition stayed the appeal in the district court until Sallaz received permission from the bankruptcy court to pursue the appeal. Jeremy Gugino, the bankruptcy trustee, intervened in the appeal as a real party in interest. While the appeal from the magistrate's division was pending before the district court sitting in its capacity as the intermediate appellate court, Sallaz filed an independent action in Ada County asserting for the first time that the Oregon marriage was invalid. The bankruptcy trustee intervened and filed a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that it was an impermissible collateral attack on the magistrate court's property settlement order. Sallaz then requested that the district court, as the intermediate appellate court, remand the case to the magistrate division to determine the validity of the marriage. The district court held that Sallaz's challenge to the validity of the marriage was untimely, that Sallaz had impermissibly raised an issue for the first time on appeal, and that Sallaz was estopped by his inconsistent positions from challenging the parties' marriage. Sallaz requested that the Supreme Court to remand the case to the magistrate court for a determination regarding the validity of the marriage. The Supreme Court denied Sallaz's motion. Sallaz then appealed the district court's intermediate appellate decision and continued to challenge the validity of the parties' marriage in Oregon. On the intermediate appeal in the district court Sallaz asserted that the marriage was invalid because the marriage ceremony allegedly was performed by an individual who was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, and (for the first time), that the marriage ceremony was invalid because no Oregon marriage license could be found of record. Under either theory, Sallaz argued that invalidity of the marriage deprived the magistrate court of subject matter jurisdiction to grant a decree of divorce. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that the magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the parties' marriage and divide the community property. View "Gugino v. Sallaz" on Justia Law

This was an expedited appeal by John Doe (“Father”) from an order terminating his parental rights over his minor child and granting Child’s stepfather’s (John Doe II) (“Stepfather”) Petition to Adopt Child. The magistrate court found that Father had abandoned Child and failed to maintain regular contact with and support the minor child without just cause. Father stopped having contact with Child in April 2007, after Mother changed her contact information. In 2012, Father brought a motion to modify child custody. In response, Mother and her new husband, Stepfather, sought termination of the Father’s parental rights, and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption of the minor child. The magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted Stepfather’s petition. Father appealed. The Supreme Court held after review that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it found that Father abandoned Child. Termination of Father’s parental rights was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Based on the facts of this case, termination of Father’s parental rights was premature. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights (father)" on Justia Law

There are five children involved in this case: C.C., M.R., G.C., M.C.C., and A.C.C. The children have four different fathers. This appeal is the culmination of several child protection actions involving their mother Jane Doe. The State petitioned to terminate Jane Doe's parental rights as to all children, and Jane Doe appealed the ultimate termination order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Thermination of Parental Rights (mother)" on Justia Law

In this case, the district court reversed the order of the magistrate court which granted a motion to renew a judgment for child support. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding that the motion to renew the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Peterson v. Dept of H&W" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a petition for adoption filed by Jane Doe, the long-time domestic partner of Jane Doe I. Jane Doe I is the legally recognized parent of the two children subject to the adoption: John Doe and John Doe I. The magistrate court dismissed on the grounds that "petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee's parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person's biological or adopted child." The magistrate dismissed the petition "sua sponte, without any motion or opposition to the Petition, without prior notice to any of the affected parties, without inviting legal briefing, without any apparent consideration of the Pre-Adoptive Home Study and without hearing." A Final Judgment was entered the same day. Jane Doe moved for reconsideration, but before a ruling on that motion was made, I.A.R. 12.2 compelled her to file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court violated Jane Doe's rights to due process by dismissing the petition without the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Furthermore, the Court found that Idaho's adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Adoption of John Doe" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights based on a Consent in Abeyance. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) filed a Petition for the Termination of Parental Rights after a prolonged child protection proceeding involving John Doe and his two children, S.M. and C.M. In the Consent, Doe agreed to the conditional termination of his parental rights in exchange for the magistrate court vacating the hearing set on the termination petition and having his children returned to his care on an extended home visit. Doe was subsequently arrested and the magistrate court entered a judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights to both children on the grounds that Doe had signed the Consent and failed to substantially comply with its terms. Doe appealed. The Supreme Court held that Idaho does not recognize conditional consent to the termination of parental rights, and a termination of parental rights based on conditional consent is invalid. The magistrate erred by involuntarily terminating Doe’s parental rights without a showing by clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "RE: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

A magistrate court dismissed a petition filed by the maternal grandmother of a child born out of wedlock in which the grandmother sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and to adopt the child. After the magistrate court entered an order granting the petition, the biological father intervened and successfully moved to set aside the order. The grandmother’s petition was ultimately dismissed, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "Jane Doe (13-23) v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Rita Turner petitioned the magistrate court for a protection order for her and her son against her then-husband Robert Turner. The magistrate court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that bodily harm might result to Rita and her son and issued a 90-day order. Robert appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Robert then appealed that decision. Because Robert failed to develop an argument, offered scarce citation to authority, and ignored the aspects of the law unfavorable to him, the Supreme Court concluded he brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. View "Turner v. Turner" on Justia Law

Mother Jane (2013-14) Doe appealed the termination of her parental relationship with her son JLS. Mother left JLS in the care of family members, who then placed JLS with Mr. and Mrs. Doe. The Does petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. Following trial, the magistrate court granted that petition. Finding that the magistrate court's decision was supported by substantial, competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights. View "John Doe V. Jane Doe (2013-14)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a divorce and custody dispute between Christopher Hopper and Suzanne Swinnerton. In 2005, Christopher filed suit on his own behalf, as well as that of his son and parents, against his wife, Suzanne, her parents, her Montana attorney, and other individuals, alleging a variety of tort claims. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. Christopher appealed on behalf of all Appellants. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hopper v. Hopper" on Justia Law