Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a district court judgment denying the its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case arose from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris" on Justia Law

Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. Robinson was a licensed masters social worker. Briley was a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor. In both reports in the two cases, Robinson's evaluations (as Colafranceschi's claim suggested) "did not cast him in a positive light." The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colafranceschi v. Briley" on Justia Law

This case consolidated two appeals from district court. The first case arose from the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board’s decision to terminate A.T. “Sandy” Podsaid’s guide license in late 2008, under the terms of a settlement agreement between Podsaid and the Board. The second case arose from the Board’s decision to treat Podsaid’s 2009 guide license renewal application as a new license application. Podsaid appealed both of the Board’s decisions to the district court, which affirmed both decisions, remanding the second case back to the Board. In the first appeal, the district court entered an order affirming the Board’s decision to terminate Podsaid’s 2008 license on December 31, 2008. In the second appeal, the district court determined that the Board properly treated Podsaid’s application as a new license application but remanded the case to the Board because the Board had not yet issued a final decision. Podsaid appealed both district court’s decisions to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court dismissed the first case as moot. As to the second case, it affirmed the district court’s decision that the Board properly treated the 2009–10 license application as a new application and remanded the case back to the Board for final agency action. View "Podsaid v. Idaho Outfitters & Guides Licensing" on Justia Law

TracFone Wireless, Inc. was a non-facilities-based commercial mobile radio service provider (a pure wireless reseller) that provided prepaid wireless telecommunications services. It desired to be designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC), which would permit TracFone to provide wireless telecommunications services to qualified low-income consumers and to receive money from the Universal Service Fund to subsidize such services. In 2004, TracFone filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission asking that it forbear from the statutory requirement that an ETC must provide services, at least in part, over its own facilities. The Commission granted the forbearance, subject to specific conditions, including the requirement that TracFone "must have direct contact with the customer." In 2010, TracFone filed a petition with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC) seeking designation as an ETC, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 214(e)(2). The PUC initially denied the petition on the ground that it would not serve the public interest because TracFone was not paying the fees required by the Idaho Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and the Idaho Emergency Communications Act. TracFone appealed to the Supreme Court. But while that appeal was pending, the PUC staff and TracFone agreed to a settlement under which TracFone would pay the fee required by the Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and it would file a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether it was required to pay the fee required by the Emergency Communications Act. The PUC accepted the stipulation and issued an order approving it on May 18, 2012. In June of that same year, TracFone filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho Emergency Communications Commission (collectively "State") seeking a determination that TracFone was not required to remit an emergency communication fee. The district court's judgment simply stated who prevailed. In its memorandum decision, the court stated, "Section 31-4802(13)(d) applies to Tracfone [sic], making it a ‘telecommunications provider' and thus subject to the Act's fee-collection duty." Assuming that was its intended declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. View "Tracfone Wireless v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Richard Pines, D.O. appealed the district court’s decision on a disciplinary order of the Idaho Board of Medicine. The Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Pines following reports that he had induced young men into sexual contact by saying he was required to give full-body massages to naked practice patients in order to be relicensed as a doctor of osteopathy. Following a hearing, the Board found Pines committed four counts of professional misconduct. It revoked Pines’ license and ordered that he pay costs and attorney fees. The district court affirmed the four counts of misconduct but vacated the award of costs and attorney fees. Pines appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Before the Supreme Court, Pines argued: (1) that he was disciplined for uncharged conduct, resulting in a violation of his due process rights; (2) that evidence in the record was insufficient to support certain alleged violations made against him; (3) that as applied, his due process rights were violated by the Board's conclusion that four individuals were Pines' patients. The Board argued that the district court erred in vacating the Board's order on attorney fees and costs. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that two of the "patients" were not, indeed, Pines' patients, and that Pines' due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the Board's decision on Counts I and II, but vacated the district court's decision on Counts III and V (which pertained to the two "patients"). The case was remanded for further proceedings, including additional consideration of the issue of costs and fees. View "Pines v. Idaho Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

The State of Idaho appealed a district court judgment denying its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case stemmed from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant Gina Poledna was employed by Thorne Research, Inc. (Employer). Her work required repetitive tasks, and over time she began experiencing pain in her wrists. She saw a physician who diagnosed her as having ganglion cysts in both wrists. Her physician stated that Claimant could return to work and recommended that she wear a brace. The physician saw Claimant again and noted that her pain “fairly well quieted down” and that she has “slight discomfort with excessive twisting . . . otherwise she can do what she wants.” Claimant’s wrist pain worsened, and she returned to her physician a few years later, who informed her that she had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and that her work caused the pain to get worse. After receiving that diagnosis, Claimant met with Employer and requested other work duties that did not require the repetitive motion of her current job. Employer told her that no other type of work was available. Claimant decided that she would quit her employment. She went on vacation on Thursday, December 19, 2013, and on December 30, 2013, she gave Employer a clinic note from her physician. Employer told Claimant that there were no light duty positions available. Claimant decided not to return to work with Employer, so her last day of employment was December 18, 2013. Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. She appealed to an appeals examiner. In a report prepared by Claimant's physician, the physician stated that he did not advise Claimant to “[t]ake time off from work,” to “[c]hange occupations,” to “[m]ove to another area,” or to “[d]iscontinue working.” He further stated that the only limitation of which he advised her regarding the kind, amount, conditions, or place of her work was that she was to wear a brace at work. Finally, he stated that Claimant could work full time. During the hearing, Claimant admitted that her physician never told her that she needed to quit her job. The appeals examiner issued a decision denying Claimant unemployment benefits because “there is no evidence in the record to suggest her medical condition made work impossible,” which Claimant was required to prove in order to establish that she quit work with good cause connected to her employment. Claimant the appealed to the Industrial Commission, which later upheld the appeals examiner’s decision not to reopen the hearing, and it concluded that Claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause because she failed to prove that her job was unsuitable due to her medical condition. The Commission found that the medical records from Claimant’s treating physician were more credible than Claimant’s assertions. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Poledna v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law

Elmore County’s decided to terminate employee, plaintiff-appellant Cherri Nix, without providing her a pre-termination hearing pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP). Nix filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Elmore County violated the ECPP and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her employment without giving her a pre-termination hearing. The district court granted Elmore County’s summary judgment motion on the basis that Nix was an at-will employee subject to termination at any time and for any reason, and that Nix failed to show a contractual relationship with Elmore County that would entitle her to a pre-termination hearing. Nix appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nix v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stemmed from attempts by the Water Users’ Association of the Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc. (Association) to collect assessments from Big Wood Ranch, LLC (BWR) for maintenance performed by the Association on the Broadford Slough (Slough) and Rockwell Bypass (Bypass), which were conduits for the delivery of surface water to property owned by BWR and some of its neighbors. The Association claimed it has a statutory right to collect assessments for its maintenance of this water delivery system. BWR disputed that claim. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the Association was validly formed pursuant to Idaho Code section 42-1301, and, after a bench trial, found BWR owed payment for these outstanding assessments. BWR appealed, challenging the validity of the Association’s formation under the statute, as well as the court’s alternative contract and equity-based theories for granting judgment in favor of the Association. Upon review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the Association was not qualified to operate pursuant to Idaho Code section 42-1301; (2)the district court erred by alternatively granting judgment to the Association on unpled contract and equity-based theories; and (3) BWR was entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Big Wood Ranch v. Water Users' Assn. of the Broadford Slough & Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Hayden provided sewer service to the residents living in the City and to some persons living outside the City. To do so, the City entered into a joint powers agreement with the Hayden Area Regional Sewer Board, which operated a regional wastewater treatment plant serving the City and two other local entities. The City charged each customer it serves a bi-monthly fee, which covered a proportionate share of the operation and maintenance of the City's sewer collection system and of the operation and maintenance costs associated with the regional wastewater treatment facility. In addition to the bi-monthly fee, the City charged a one-time "sewer capitalization fee" for each new structure, whether residential or commercial, and for any addition to an existing commercial structure that would result in an increase in the volume of sewage generated. The capitalization fee was charged when a building permit is issued. In March 2006, the City contracted with an engineering company to update the City's sewer master plan. The engineering company submitted a capital improvement plan in which it recommended forty projects that would cost about $20 million in order to replace existing infrastructure and to construct new infrastructure so that the sewer system would reach the entire area of city impact and accommodate anticipated future population growth. In order to finance the project, the engineering company recommended that the part of the capitalization fee retained by the City be increased from $735 for one equivalent residence ("ER") to $2,280 for one ER. In 2010, the North Idaho Building Contractors Association filed suit to have the fee declared unlawful because it was an impermissible tax rather than a fee for services. The district court held that it was lawful and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. The City requested an award of attorney fees, which the court denied. The Contractors Association appealed the dismissal of its complaint, and the City cross-appealed the denial of an award of attorney fees. Because there was nothing in the record showing that as of June 7, 2007, the sum of $2,280 was the actual cost of providing sewer service to a customer connecting to the City sewer system and there was no showing that the amount of the fee was based upon any such calculation, the fee was not authorized by Idaho Code section 63-1311(1). The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in holding that it was. View "No. Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc. v. City of Hayden" on Justia Law