Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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Gooding County appealed the district court’s decision reversing the Gooding County Board of Commissioners’s (BOCC) decision affirming the denial of a third-party medical indigency application. In 2013, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) submitted a third-party medical indigency application to the Department of Health and Welfare on behalf of a patient who had been hospitalized at its facility since July 27, 2013. The County Clerk denied the application on the basis that it was untimely filed, and the BOCC affirmed. The Hospital appealed that decision to the Gooding County district court, which reversed the decision and remanded for further proceedings. Gooding County then appealed to this Court. On appeal, Gooding County argued that the district court erred when it held that the date of admission is excluded when calculating an application’s deadline under Idaho Code section 31-3505(3). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "St. Alphonsus RMC v. Gooding County" on Justia Law

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This appeal from Custer County relates to proposed repairs and improvements to the City of Challis’ (the City) water distribution system. In 2013, the City initiated a judicial confirmation proceeding seeking approval to incur $3.2 million in debt without a public vote. The Consent of the Governed Caucus (the Caucus) challenged the constitutionality of the City’s request based upon Article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court granted the City’s request and the Caucus appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that the district court erred in failing to apply the legal standard for determining what constituted a "necessary" expense under the Idaho Constitution (Article III), articulated in recent case law. As such, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding the project "necessary" under the tests articulated by case law. The Court therefore reversed the district court's judgment in Challis' favor, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus" on Justia Law

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The State appealed a district court judgment denying the its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case arose from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris" on Justia Law

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Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. Robinson was a licensed masters social worker. Briley was a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor. In both reports in the two cases, Robinson's evaluations (as Colafranceschi's claim suggested) "did not cast him in a positive light." The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colafranceschi v. Briley" on Justia Law

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This case consolidated two appeals from district court. The first case arose from the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board’s decision to terminate A.T. “Sandy” Podsaid’s guide license in late 2008, under the terms of a settlement agreement between Podsaid and the Board. The second case arose from the Board’s decision to treat Podsaid’s 2009 guide license renewal application as a new license application. Podsaid appealed both of the Board’s decisions to the district court, which affirmed both decisions, remanding the second case back to the Board. In the first appeal, the district court entered an order affirming the Board’s decision to terminate Podsaid’s 2008 license on December 31, 2008. In the second appeal, the district court determined that the Board properly treated Podsaid’s application as a new license application but remanded the case to the Board because the Board had not yet issued a final decision. Podsaid appealed both district court’s decisions to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court dismissed the first case as moot. As to the second case, it affirmed the district court’s decision that the Board properly treated the 2009–10 license application as a new application and remanded the case back to the Board for final agency action. View "Podsaid v. Idaho Outfitters & Guides Licensing" on Justia Law

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TracFone Wireless, Inc. was a non-facilities-based commercial mobile radio service provider (a pure wireless reseller) that provided prepaid wireless telecommunications services. It desired to be designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC), which would permit TracFone to provide wireless telecommunications services to qualified low-income consumers and to receive money from the Universal Service Fund to subsidize such services. In 2004, TracFone filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission asking that it forbear from the statutory requirement that an ETC must provide services, at least in part, over its own facilities. The Commission granted the forbearance, subject to specific conditions, including the requirement that TracFone "must have direct contact with the customer." In 2010, TracFone filed a petition with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC) seeking designation as an ETC, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 214(e)(2). The PUC initially denied the petition on the ground that it would not serve the public interest because TracFone was not paying the fees required by the Idaho Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and the Idaho Emergency Communications Act. TracFone appealed to the Supreme Court. But while that appeal was pending, the PUC staff and TracFone agreed to a settlement under which TracFone would pay the fee required by the Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and it would file a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether it was required to pay the fee required by the Emergency Communications Act. The PUC accepted the stipulation and issued an order approving it on May 18, 2012. In June of that same year, TracFone filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho Emergency Communications Commission (collectively "State") seeking a determination that TracFone was not required to remit an emergency communication fee. The district court's judgment simply stated who prevailed. In its memorandum decision, the court stated, "Section 31-4802(13)(d) applies to Tracfone [sic], making it a ‘telecommunications provider' and thus subject to the Act's fee-collection duty." Assuming that was its intended declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. View "Tracfone Wireless v. Idaho" on Justia Law

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Richard Pines, D.O. appealed the district court’s decision on a disciplinary order of the Idaho Board of Medicine. The Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Pines following reports that he had induced young men into sexual contact by saying he was required to give full-body massages to naked practice patients in order to be relicensed as a doctor of osteopathy. Following a hearing, the Board found Pines committed four counts of professional misconduct. It revoked Pines’ license and ordered that he pay costs and attorney fees. The district court affirmed the four counts of misconduct but vacated the award of costs and attorney fees. Pines appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Before the Supreme Court, Pines argued: (1) that he was disciplined for uncharged conduct, resulting in a violation of his due process rights; (2) that evidence in the record was insufficient to support certain alleged violations made against him; (3) that as applied, his due process rights were violated by the Board's conclusion that four individuals were Pines' patients. The Board argued that the district court erred in vacating the Board's order on attorney fees and costs. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that two of the "patients" were not, indeed, Pines' patients, and that Pines' due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the Board's decision on Counts I and II, but vacated the district court's decision on Counts III and V (which pertained to the two "patients"). The case was remanded for further proceedings, including additional consideration of the issue of costs and fees. View "Pines v. Idaho Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

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The State of Idaho appealed a district court judgment denying its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case stemmed from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

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Claimant Gina Poledna was employed by Thorne Research, Inc. (Employer). Her work required repetitive tasks, and over time she began experiencing pain in her wrists. She saw a physician who diagnosed her as having ganglion cysts in both wrists. Her physician stated that Claimant could return to work and recommended that she wear a brace. The physician saw Claimant again and noted that her pain “fairly well quieted down” and that she has “slight discomfort with excessive twisting . . . otherwise she can do what she wants.” Claimant’s wrist pain worsened, and she returned to her physician a few years later, who informed her that she had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and that her work caused the pain to get worse. After receiving that diagnosis, Claimant met with Employer and requested other work duties that did not require the repetitive motion of her current job. Employer told her that no other type of work was available. Claimant decided that she would quit her employment. She went on vacation on Thursday, December 19, 2013, and on December 30, 2013, she gave Employer a clinic note from her physician. Employer told Claimant that there were no light duty positions available. Claimant decided not to return to work with Employer, so her last day of employment was December 18, 2013. Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. She appealed to an appeals examiner. In a report prepared by Claimant's physician, the physician stated that he did not advise Claimant to “[t]ake time off from work,” to “[c]hange occupations,” to “[m]ove to another area,” or to “[d]iscontinue working.” He further stated that the only limitation of which he advised her regarding the kind, amount, conditions, or place of her work was that she was to wear a brace at work. Finally, he stated that Claimant could work full time. During the hearing, Claimant admitted that her physician never told her that she needed to quit her job. The appeals examiner issued a decision denying Claimant unemployment benefits because “there is no evidence in the record to suggest her medical condition made work impossible,” which Claimant was required to prove in order to establish that she quit work with good cause connected to her employment. Claimant the appealed to the Industrial Commission, which later upheld the appeals examiner’s decision not to reopen the hearing, and it concluded that Claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause because she failed to prove that her job was unsuitable due to her medical condition. The Commission found that the medical records from Claimant’s treating physician were more credible than Claimant’s assertions. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Poledna v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law

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Elmore County’s decided to terminate employee, plaintiff-appellant Cherri Nix, without providing her a pre-termination hearing pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP). Nix filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Elmore County violated the ECPP and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her employment without giving her a pre-termination hearing. The district court granted Elmore County’s summary judgment motion on the basis that Nix was an at-will employee subject to termination at any time and for any reason, and that Nix failed to show a contractual relationship with Elmore County that would entitle her to a pre-termination hearing. Nix appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nix v. Elmore County" on Justia Law