Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Bell was employed by Sears from September 25, 2012, to May 16, 2013. During that period, Bell regularly filed for unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of Labor (DOL). He received benefits for each week beginning with the week ending on Sept. 29, 2012, through the week ending on March 23, 2013. On March 26, 2013, the DOL discovered discrepancies between the weekly gross wages reported by Bell in his unemployment filings and the gross wages reported to the DOL by Sears. Based on the information provided by Bell, the DOL determined that Bell willfully misstated his gross wages for nineteen weeks in which he received benefits and that he was ineligible for benefits for nine weeks in which he claimed to have worked part-time hours despite working at least forty hours. Bell was disqualified from receiving benefits for fifty-two weeks, ordered to repay benefits he received for the relevant periods, and ordered to pay penalties for willfully misrepresenting his gross wages and the hours he worked in particular weeks. Bell appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission's holding that he willfully made false statements or willfully failed to report material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits. Because the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Charles Bell v. Idaho Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Idaho's Bureau of Occupational Licenses (Bureau) investigated and initiated disciplinary proceedings against petitioner-appellant Timothy Williams after it received complaints that he had engaged in various forms of professional misconduct as a licensed real estate appraiser. Ultimately, Idaho's Board of Real Estate Appraisers (Board) revoked Williams' license, imposed $4,000 in fines, and required Williams to pay the Board's attorney fees and costs. The district court, acting in an appellate capacity, affirmed the Board's decision to revoke Williams' license and to impose fines, but reversed the Board's order that Williams pay its attorney fees and costs. Williams appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Williams v. Idaho State Board of Real Estate Appraisers" on Justia Law

Cable One, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. In 2005, Cable One received business income from four types of activities in Idaho: cable television services, internet access services, advertising services, and cable modem leasing. In its Idaho income tax return for that year, it included revenues earned from all of those activities except revenues from providing internet access services to Idaho customers. It excluded those revenues on the ground that providing such services to customers in Idaho constituted Arizona sales, although it also excluded such revenues from its 2005 Arizona income tax return on the ground that they came from Idaho sales. In 2008, the Idaho Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency determination asserting a tax and interest deficiency on Cable One for the 2005 tax year. Cable One petitioned for redetermination, which the Tax Commission denied. Cable One then filed a complaint in the district court, which tried the matter de novo, and ruled in favor of the Tax Commission. Cable One then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cable One, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

John Doe was the biological father of T.C. Doe was a juvenile when T.C. was born. Doe paid Mother a total of $52.00 in child support, despite a court order requiring him to pay Mother child support of $253.00 per month. Doe owed approximately eight thousand dollars in unpaid child support. Doe never provided T.C. or Mother with any alternate form of support such as clothing, diapers, or food. During T.C.’s life, Doe was regularly incarcerated and had no contact with T.C. for months at a time; including a substantial period of time that the child protection proceedings were ongoing. Doe has been unable to maintain employment or a home and typically resides in the homes of various girlfriends. Doe was addicted to methamphetamine and, when not in custody, he used methamphetamine. Doe had an extensive criminal record and has been a defendant in more than forty criminal matters. A petition was filed under the Child Protective Act (CPA) asking a magistrate court to place T.C under the supervision of the Department. The same day, the magistrate court ordered the removal of T.C. on the basis that continuation in the home would be contrary to T.C.’s welfare. The magistrate court placed T.C. in the care of the Department of Child Services. Doe learned of the Department’s petition when his aunt informed him of the proceedings. His parental rights to T.C. were ultimately terminated on grounds that the trial court found Doe neglected T.C., and that it was in the child's best interests to have Doe's parental rights terminated. Doe appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Health & Welfare v. John Doe (13-29)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) court decision on whether Idaho law required a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill,"under priority, space vacated for flood control. The SRBA court concluded that a remark was not necessary because a storage water right that is filled cannot refill under priority before affected junior appropriators satisfy their water rights once. The court declined to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled. Seven Magic Valley irrigation districts and canal companies (collectively the "Surface Water Coalition") appealed this decision in Docket No. 40974. The Boise Project Board appealed this decision in Docket No. 40975. Because both cases appealed the same decision of the SRBA court and had significant overlap, the Supreme Court addressed them together in this opinion, and held that the SRBA court abused its discretion in designating the question of whether Idaho law required remark as Basin-Wide Issue 17. The SRBA court did not abuse its discretion by declining to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled or in stating that such a determination was within the Director's discretion. View "In re: SRBA" on Justia Law

In 2010, Idaho Power entered into two Firm Energy Sales Agreements, one with New Energy Two, LLC, and the other with New Energy Three, LLC, under which Idaho Power agreed to purchase electricity from them that was to be generated by the use of biogas. The agreement with New Energy Two stated that the project would be operational on October 1, 2012, and the agreement with New Energy Three stated that the project would be operational on December 1, 2012. Both contracts were submitted for approval to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, and were both approved on July 1, 2010. Each of the agreements contained a force majeure clause. By written notice, New Energy Two and New Energy Three informed Idaho Power that they were claiming the occurrence of a force majeure event, which was ongoing proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission. New Energy asserted that until those proceedings were finally resolved "the entire circumstance of continued viability of all renewable energy projects in Idaho is undecided"and that as a consequence "renewable energy project lenders are unwilling to lend in Idaho pending the outcome of these proceedings."Idaho Power filed petitions with the Commission against New Energy Two and New Energy Three seeking declaratory judgments that no force majeure event, as that term was defined in the agreements, had occurred and that Idaho Power could terminate both agreements for the failure of the projects to be operational by the specified dates. New Energy filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the ground that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to interpret or enforce contracts. After briefing from both parties, the Commission denied New Energy's motion to dismiss. The Commission's order was an interlocutory order that is not appealable as a matter of right. New Energy filed a motion with the Supreme Court requesting a permissive appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, and the Court granted the motion. New Energy then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl H. Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney, and he was. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying "A"Ranch, Inc., and others, and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. In early 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them in their individual capacities. Substitution counsel entered appearances for the county commissioners in both cases. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. During the hearing, Lewies contended that substitution counsel should have been disqualified from representing the commissioners and that a deputy prosecutor should represent them. Ultimately the trial court entered a written order affirming its preliminary rulings. After several hearings, the court entered its memorandum decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees in the sum of $1,185.00 against Mr. Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Lewies appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Lewies v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Kevin Hope injured his right shoulder in 2003 while he was working for Empro Professional Services. He argued to the Industrial Commission that the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable for part of his income benefits because he was totally and permanently disabled due to pre-existing back and shoulder injuries that combined with his 2003 shoulder injury. If Hope's total and permanent disability resulted from the combined effects of his 2003 shoulder injury and impairments that pre-existed that injury, then ISIF was liable for the portion of income benefits caused by the pre-existing injuries. Hope appealed the Commission's order that ISIF was not liable for any of Hope's benefits. The Commission found that Hope was totally and permanently disabled, but had failed to prove that his disability was a result of pre-existing back and shoulder impairments combined with his last shoulder injury. Hope argued that the Commission's decision was based on errors of law and fact. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Hope v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

In August 2006, Nagel Beverage Company approached the Youth Ranch and the Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, Inc., about the sale of the real property. Nagel was looking to sell the property as part of a 1031 exchange and offered it to the Youth Ranch for $1,136,000 below the appraised value as a noncash donation. The Youth Ranch wanted to purchase the property and began to explore financing options with Key Bank. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied an application for a property tax exemption that the Youth Ranch and Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC asked for resulting from the donation. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals affirmed that decision. The Youth Ranch and the LLC appealed. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the property was not exempt from taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

Joseph Talbot worked at Desert View Care Center as a nurse and was discharged due to a Facebook post that Desert View found violated its Social and Electronic Media Conduct Policy. Talbot applied for unemployment benefits, and an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner awarded him benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that Talbot engaged in employment-related misconduct. Talbot appealed, arguing that Desert View never communicated its Social Media Policy to him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Talbot v. Desert View Care Center" on Justia Law