Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant-appellant Kevin Hope injured his right shoulder in 2003 while he was working for Empro Professional Services. He argued to the Industrial Commission that the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable for part of his income benefits because he was totally and permanently disabled due to pre-existing back and shoulder injuries that combined with his 2003 shoulder injury. If Hope's total and permanent disability resulted from the combined effects of his 2003 shoulder injury and impairments that pre-existed that injury, then ISIF was liable for the portion of income benefits caused by the pre-existing injuries. Hope appealed the Commission's order that ISIF was not liable for any of Hope's benefits. The Commission found that Hope was totally and permanently disabled, but had failed to prove that his disability was a result of pre-existing back and shoulder impairments combined with his last shoulder injury. Hope argued that the Commission's decision was based on errors of law and fact. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Hope v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

In August 2006, Nagel Beverage Company approached the Youth Ranch and the Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, Inc., about the sale of the real property. Nagel was looking to sell the property as part of a 1031 exchange and offered it to the Youth Ranch for $1,136,000 below the appraised value as a noncash donation. The Youth Ranch wanted to purchase the property and began to explore financing options with Key Bank. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied an application for a property tax exemption that the Youth Ranch and Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC asked for resulting from the donation. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals affirmed that decision. The Youth Ranch and the LLC appealed. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the property was not exempt from taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

Joseph Talbot worked at Desert View Care Center as a nurse and was discharged due to a Facebook post that Desert View found violated its Social and Electronic Media Conduct Policy. Talbot applied for unemployment benefits, and an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner awarded him benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that Talbot engaged in employment-related misconduct. Talbot appealed, arguing that Desert View never communicated its Social Media Policy to him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Talbot v. Desert View Care Center" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a district court decision affirming the approval of a subdivision by the Board of County Commissioners of Clearwater County. In approving the subdivision, the Board approved three variances granted by the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission with respect to the road providing access to the subdivision. A portion of the access road crossed over land owned by Edward and Donilee Shinn, who opposed the variances and petitioned the district court for judicial review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board erred when it failed to make the approval of the variance application expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the Shinns' substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision. View "Shinn v. Bd of Co Comm Clearwater Co" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the November general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying “A” Ranch, Inc., and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. On January 7, 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. On the same day, Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In his supporting affidavit, Lewies stated that he would be sworn in as prosecuting attorney on January 14, 2013, at which time he would have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. At another hearing, the issue of attorney fees against Lewies was discussed. After the parties argued that issue, the court entered a final decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees against Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1). Lewies timely appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Flying "A" Ranch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm. of Fremont" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was an order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission holding that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the force majeure clauses in the Appellants' contracts with Idaho Power Company excused them from their contractual obligations to have their power generation facilities constructed and in operation by specified dates in order to sell electricity to Idaho Power. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two & IPUC" on Justia Law

Claimant DeAnne Muchow began working for Varsity Contractors in, 2011 as a human resources assistant. During her employment, she had an ongoing conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor. The director decided to have a meeting with claimant and her supervisor in an effort to resolve the conflict. During the meeting, the claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had documentation outlining their complaints. The director told them to get their documentation and bring it back to his office. Claimant asked for time to better prepare her papers, but the director denied that request because he was leaving the next day on a business trip. He did give claimant a few minutes to look over her papers. She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documents. She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office. The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder. He told her not to shred them, but she continued to the shredder and shredded them. The director then discharged her for insubordination. Claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. She appealed, an appeals examiner held an evidentiary hearing by telephone. He later issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and reversed the ruling that claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination. The basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents belonged to claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was having with a coworker. The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner. However, the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner: the held that the director requested the documents because they pertained to a conflict between two employees that he was attempting to resolve; that he had a reasonable expectation that his order not to shred the documents would be obeyed; and that the claimant chose to disregard the director’s order and shredded the documents. The commission concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc" on Justia Law

Ada County Highway District (ACHD) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Terrie Rowley. This case arose from a dispute in the ownership of a ten-foot-wide walkway in a Boise subdivision and arose after Rowley sought an injunction to remove a shed her neighbor placed on that walkway. The district court held that: (1) the subdivision plats showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally dedicated the walkway to the public; and (2) ACHD owned the walkway. ACHD appealed, arguing no evidence in the record showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally intended a public dedication and no statutory provision authorized ACHD to own the walkway. Rowley contended that the original developers clearly intended a public dedication as the walkway was a public street’s corridor extension. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with ACHD's argument, finding that the district court erred in holding the subdivision's original owners demonstrated clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the walkway to the public. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of ACHD. View "Rowley v. ACHD" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the Mountain Home School District No. 193 appealed the district court’s denial of the its request for attorney fees. This case arose when School District employee Terri Sanders claimed that the Board breached its contract with her by hiring a candidate less qualified than her for a teaching position that Sanders had also applied for. After a jury found the Board did not breach its contract, the district court held the Board was not entitled to attorney fees because Sanders presented a legitimate issue for trial. The court also held that because I.C. 12-117 was the exclusive source of attorney fees for a school district, I.C. 12-120(3) could not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that attorney fees under I.C. 12-117 were not exclusive. Because fees were available under I.C. 12-120(3), the Court remanded the case for the district court to enter the appropriate award of attorney fees under that statute. The Court also vacated the district court’s award of arbitration costs to the Board. Neither party received attorney fees on appeal. View "Sanders v. Bd of Trustees - Mt. Home School Dist 193" on Justia Law