Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Doe was in prison when his son was born. The baby's mother was living with another man, and gave the boy the boyfriend's surname. The baby was abused while in her care; the Department of Health and Welfare took the child into custody. The boyfriend was listed as the putative father in a Child Protective Act (CPA) proceeding; after a DNA test, Doe was substituted as the putative father. Prior to the test, Doe had no prior contact with the child. The Department requested termination of Doe's and the biological mother's parental rights. The mother voluntarily consented to the termination. The Department submitted a new petition, requesting for the first time an "Order of Non-Establishment of Parental Rights." The Department averred that Doe was "not the 'parent' of [Son] as [he had] failed to assert any parental rights to [Son] either by statute or by timely establishing some relationship to [Son]." The magistrate judge entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Nonestablishment of Paternity. Doe timely appealed. He raised two issues: (1) whether under Idaho Code he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights; and (2) whether his due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court concluded that Doe did not show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights, or that his due process rights were violated. View "Doe v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare" on Justia Law

The State Board of Dentistry fined Plaintiff-Appellant Lon Peckham, DMD for failing to adequately inform a patient prior to performing a procedure, and for publishing misleading material on his website. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court's affirming of the Board's final Order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support findings that Plaintiff failed to inform a patient prior to performing a procedure or for publishing misleading material. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court. View "Peckham, DMD v. State Bd of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Albar, Inc. owned a convenience store, gas station and marina on the Pen Orielle River. In 2003, one of its three underground storage tanks leaked gasoline into the surrounding soil. The tanks were insured through the State's Petroleum Storage Tank Fund. Albar ultimately entered into a consent agreement with the State Department of Environmental Quality to remediate the property and any impacted adjacent properties. In 2005, Albar put the businesses up for sale. Albar made a disclosure regarding the 2003 leak, but that statement would later be found false. JLZ Enterprises was interested in purchasing the property, and relied on the false disclosure. In 2007, JLZ Enterprises sued Albar to recover damages for fraud and breach of contract; to rescind the contract; and to recover damages for negligence against the real estate agent and the broker. The matter was tried to the district court. After hearing the evidence, the court declined to rescind the real estate contract, but found that Albar had breached the contract. The court entered a judgment forclosing the deed of trust on the property and ordering its sale. Albar appealed the grant of JLZ's motion to disallow its costs and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's decision finding Albar breached the contract was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that it was not an error for the court to disallow Albar's costs and fees. View "Echo Vanderwal v. Albar" on Justia Law

Appellant Alpine Village appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of McCall. Alpine sued the City to enforce Ordinance 819 (found to be unconstitutional in a separate proceeding), and argued that the City unlawfully took its property in violation of the federal and state constitutions. Finding that the district court did not err in its finding that Alpine's state law claims were barred for failing to bring them according to the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and that the federal claims were not ripe for adjudication, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Alpine Village v. City of McCall" on Justia Law

Katherine Harris sought workers' compensation benefits after falling and injuring herself at work in January of 2008. Following a hearing, the Idaho Industrial Commission decided that Harris was not entitled to disability or medical benefits after February 19, 2008. Harris appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the Commission record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission did not err in its conclusion that Harris was only entitled to benefits provided up to February 19, 2008. View "Harris v. Ind School Dist No 1" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Benjamin Morris appealed an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission that denied his motion to set aside a lump sum settlement agreement he made with his employer's surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance. Morris initiated his workers' compensation action after he suffered injuries while working construction for his employer, Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. Morris sustained a serious head injury on when a twenty-five pound rock thrown by a piece of heavy machinery struck him in the head. Morris initiated settlement discussions with Liberty Northwest Insurance, Hap Taylor & Sons' insurer. Liberty responded with a counter-offer—a single lump sum payment which Morris accepted "with the clear understanding this is a partial settlement and does not resolve the medical side." The parties executed a Stipulation and Agreement of Partial Lump Sum Discharge (LSSA) and submitted it to the Commission for approval. Approximately eighteen months later, on July 8, 2011, a Notice of Appearance was filed with the Commission whereby Morris substituted attorney Michael Walker with his then present counsel, attorney Starr Kelso. On the same day, Morris filed a motion to review the LSSA, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Kelso. Kelso's affidavit expressed concern that Morris may not have been "competent to testify" due to his injury—though, no credible evidence of incompetence was ever offered. Liberty filed an objection to Morris' motion to review. Ultimately, the Commission denied Morris' motion. Following the Commission's refusal to review the LSSA, Morris filed a Motion to Set Aside Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, seeking to void the LSSA on grounds of illegality and constructive fraud. The Commission issued an order denying Morris' motion to set the LSSA. Morris filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission did not err in denying Morris' request for a hearing on his fraud claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision to deny Morris' motion to set the LSSA. View "Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of summary judgments dismissing claims against Defendants Ada County, Deputy Jeremy Wroblewski, Kate Pape, and James Johnson in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action brought by Rita Hoagland on behalf of herself and the estate of her deceased son, Bradley Munroe ("Munroe"), claiming a violation of a Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care and safety while Munroe was detained at Ada County Jail where he committed suicide. Munroe had a history of incarceration at Ada County Jail ("ACJ"). During the evening of September 28, 2008, Munroe was arrested and charged with the armed robbery of a convenience store. Munroe was intoxicated and uncooperative. During booking, Munroe was screaming and being rowdy. Munroe took a string and wrapped it around his neck. Because of his bizarre behavior throughout the night, Munroe was placed in a holding cell for observation until he was sober. The next morning booking continued. At that time, Munroe requested protective custody. Munroe was placed in a cell by himself and a well-being check was scheduled to occur every thirty minutes. Later that evening during a well-being check, the performing deputy found Munroe hanging from his top bunk by a bed sheet. Munroe was pronounced dead later that evening. Among the issues on appeal were: whether the decedent's estate could assert a 42 U.S.C 1983 action for alleged violations of the decedent's constitutional rights; whether the parent had standing to assert a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for the death of her adult child while incarcerated; and whether the district court erred in awarding costs to Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court: (1) was affirmed in dismissing Hoagland's 1983 claim on behalf of Munroe's estate; (2) was reversed in finding that Hoagland had a 1983 cause of action for violations of her own constitutional rights; (3) was partially affirmed in its award of costs as a matter of right; (4) was reversed in its award of discretionary costs; and (5) was affirmed in denying attorney fees. The case was remanded for the reconsideration and entry of express findings regarding the district court's award of discretionary costs. View "Hoagland v. Ada County" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gordon Ravenscroft filed a Petition for Judicial Review against Boise County, its Board of Commissioners, and other individual defendants. The petition sought review of the Board's final decision terminating Ravenscroft's employment. The petition claimed Ravenscroft was denied his constitutional right to due process, the board acted outside the bounds of its authority, and his firing was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In response, the Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a county personnel determination. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the Board's decision to terminate Ravenscroft because the decision was an "action" under I.C. 31-1506. The Board then sought permission to appeal this decision, which the district court granted. The question in this case is whether the Board's decision to terminate Ravenscroft is subject to the judicial review provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act [IAPA]. The IAPA and its judicial review provisions do not apply to the actions of local governing bodies, unless expressly authorized by statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board's decision to terminate Ravenscroft was an "Act" under I.C. 31-1506, and that his at-will status did not change the scope of Ravenscroft's claim. "If the employment is at will, judicial review will not enable the court to change it to employment terminable only for cause." The Court affirmed the district court's determination that the Board's decision to terminate Ravenscroft was an action under 31-1506. View "Ravenscroft v. Boise County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Peter Kaseburg was a littoral owner on Lake Pend Oreille who held an encroachment permit for a series of decaying wooden pilings that were driven into the lakebed in the 1930s. With the exception of a single piling that a neighboring marina uses to anchor one of its docks, the pilings never had any known navigational purpose. Petitioner applied to the Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) for a permit to replace ten of the wooden pilings with steel pilings, but failed to specify any navigational purpose for this proposal. The IDL considered the application a request for a nonnavigational encroachment permit and denied it after receiving several objections. While a final decision was still pending on the first permit application, Petitioner filed a second application for a permit to install a mobile dock system and mooring buoy. The IDL considered the second application a request for a permit for a navigational encroachment extending beyond the line of navigability. Again, the IDL received many objections and denied the application. Petitioner then sought judicial review, which reversed the IDL. The court held that all pilings were navigational encroachments as a matter of law, regardless of whether they have ever been used to aid navigation. The district court set aside both denials. The IDL appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court with respect to the first application, but affirmed the district court with respect to the second. View "Idaho Bd of Land Comm v. Kaseburg" on Justia Law