Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Kepler-Fleenor and several other property owners in Division III of the Sawtelle Mountain Subdivision challenged a district court's decision that an unnamed road in their subdivision was public by common law dedication. Although the road did not intrude on any lots in the subdivision, it straddled two lots, one of which belongs to Plaintiffs Joni Kepler-Fleenor and Kistin Fleenor, and the other of which belongs to Blue Sky Management, LLC. According to Plaintiffs, heavy construction traffic heading into and out of an adjoining subdivision was bothersome and was damaging the unnamed road. Plaintiffs installed a berm and a gate to block traffic on the road, but the County removed it believing the disputed road to be public. After the County removed the road obstructions, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a judgment to declare the road as private. The district court granted the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that the plat unambiguously showed the disputed road to be dedicated to public use. Because the subdivision plat unambiguously dedicated the road, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County " on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Brian Sopatyk sought judicial review of the Lemhi County Board of Commissioners' decision to validate Anderson Creek Road, which ran the length of his property. He contended the road never became public and, if so, was abandoned. He also maintained that the validation was an unconstitutional taking, that it was error for the road easement to be validated at fifty-feet wide, that one of the commissioners was biased against him, that the road illegally invades federal public lands, and that the Board of Commissioners failed to explain why the validation is in the public interest. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the validation decision, finding the road became public by legislative declaration in the late 1800s and was never abandoned. View "Sopatyk v. Lemhi County " on Justia Law

The City of Lewiston (City) enacted "Ordinance No. 4512" that created a stormwater utility and fee for the operation and maintenance of the its stormwater system. Five government entities (Entities) subject to the stormwater fee brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the fee was an unconstitutional tax requiring authorization by the Legislature. The Entities thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. The City filed its cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that the stormwater fee was authorized pursuant to the City’s police powers, the Revenue Bond Act, the Local Improvement District Code, and various other provisions of the Idaho Code. Relying primarily on "Brewster v. City of Pocatello," (768 P.2d 765 (1988)), and finding no legislative authorization for the stormwater fee, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Entities, holding that the stormwater fee was an unconstitutional tax. The City filed an appeal of the district court's decision. Because the Supreme Court concluded that stormwater fee was an unauthorized tax, it held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Entities. View "Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. #1 v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the City of Lewiston's rejection of a bid for a public works project on the grounds that the lowest bidder lacked sufficient experience for the project. In 2009, the City of Lewiston (City) advertised for bids to replace the irrigation system at the City golf course. Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. (Hillside) desired to bid on the project, but prior to doing so it sent a letter to City stating that if City insisted upon having qualifications other than a current Idaho public works license to bid on the project, the City must follow the Category B procedures set forth in the Idaho Code and pre-qualify the bidders. Hillside asked that the qualification of prior experience be removed. City’s attorney denied the request, stating that City’s specifications and bidding process complied with state law. Hillside and four others submitted bids for the project. City notified the bidders that Hillside Landscape Construction submitted the lowest bid but that the company lacked the required experience specified within the bid documents. City awarded the contract to Landscapes Unlimited, the next lowest bidder. Hillside filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. The district court held that City complied with the bidding statutes, vacated a temporary restraining order, denied the motion for an injunction then dismissed Hillside’s complaint. In its review, the Supreme Court found that because the City chose to follow the "Category A" procedures set forth in the Idaho Code rather than the Category B procedures, the district court erred in holding that City could reject the bid on that ground. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a petition for judicial review of the Camas County Board of Commissioners' (Board) decision to approve a preliminary subdivision plat. The district court held that the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law did not amount to a "reasoned statement" as required by I.C. 67-6535, and that the lack of a reasoned statement violated the petitioners' substantial right to due process. The district court also held that the Board erroneously interpreted a number of Camas County Ordinances. The district court awarded attorney fees to petitioners. The Board timely appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order vacating the Board's findings and conclusions but reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Jasso v. Camas County" on Justia Law

Respondent John Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment that terminated his parental rights to his three minor children. The magistrate court found that Respondent neglected his children by failing to provide them with proper parental care. The court found it to be in the children's best interests to terminate his parental rights because, though there was a bond between the father and children, the children needed a stable environment that the father could not provide. On appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the termination of his parental rights. Upon careful consideration of the magistrate court record, the Supreme Court found substantial and competent evidence that the judgment was in the best interest of the children. The Court affirmed the magistrate court's judgment. View "Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Randy Hoffer challenged the district court's dismissal of three of his five tort claims against the City of Boise (City). Of two in particular, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with a contract and defamation against the City because it held as a matter of law that under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), a governmental entity could not be held liable for the torts of its employees when a complainant alleges malice and/or criminal intent. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the ITCA indeed exempted governmental entities from liability for the intentional torts at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. View "Hoffer v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. and Defendants the Kootenai County Sheriff and Board of Commissioners entered into a settlement agreement setting forth procedures for how inmates at the county jail would be informed of and obtain bail bonds. Allied brought suit alleging several claims including breach of the settlement agreement. The district court dismissed Allied's claims. Principal among them was Allied's contention that the Sheriff wrongfully diverted Allied's potential customers away from Allied, toward credit card companies, with the intent to harm Allied's business. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Allied ran afoul of the technical pleading requirements of the legal authorities it used to support its claims. As such, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed Allied's claims against Defendants. View "Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai" on Justia Law

Appellant Lynnette Patterson argued that she was constructively discharged from her position with the Fraud Unit of the state Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) due to her complaints about an intra-office romance between her supervisor and a lateral employee. IDHW had a strict policy regarding romantic relationships between supervisors and employees. Ms. Patterson made multiple complaints regarding the relationship which she alleged resulted in her first negative performance review with the IDHW, culminating in a "constructive discharge." In 2007, she filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission (IHRC) then with the district court. The court granted summary judgment to the IDHW, finding that Ms. Patterson did not file her claim within a proscribed 180 day period following her initial complaint, and that she failed to demonstrate that her complaint was a "protected activity" in order to sustain her claim. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ms. Patterson argued that the district court erred in its determination. Upon consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the dismissal of Ms. Patterson's case. View "Patterson v. Dept. of Health & Welfare" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Stan Hawkins appealed a decision by the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners that granted his neighbors Dale and Mary Meyers variances to replace aging homes on two parcels of their land. The parcels in question were originally zoned as agriculture, and each contained homes built before the 1940s. People living on the Meyers' land regularly used a road over Mr. Hawkins' land for access. Bonneville County enacted its zoning ordinance in 1959, after the homes on the Meyers' land were built and occupied. The ordinance required dwellings to have frontage along a county-approved road. No easement was ever granted across Mr. Hawkins' land, nor was a public road officially designated to the Meyers' property. The Meyers filed for variances in 2007 believing that they needed to comply with the frontage requirement. At a hearing, the Commissioners found that the Meyers' did not need variances because their property had been "grandfathered in" so that the frontage requirement did not apply. However, the Commissioners granted the variance anyway. A trial court dismissed Mr. Hawkins' petition for review, holding that he did not have standing to file a petition for judicial review, and he did not show that the County had prejudiced any of his substantial rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Hawkins had standing to pursue his petition for judicial review. However, the Court dismissed his petition because he did not show any prejudice to his substantial rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Hawkins' petition. View "Hawkins v. Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Commissioners " on Justia Law