Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several descendants and heirs of Edith Little each own separate parcels of real property in Teton County, Idaho, which were divided and conveyed to Edith’s three children after dissolution of a family partnership in 1993. The deeds for these parcels included restrictive language limiting the owners’ ability to sell, trade, convey, or encumber the properties during their lifetimes or the lifetimes of their living heirs, except that conveyances were allowed only to their siblings, nephews, and nieces—not to their own spouses, children, or grandchildren. Despite the restrictions, over the years, owners conveyed their parcels to spouses and lineal descendants.Plaintiffs, who are current owners of two of the parcels, brought suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Teton County seeking to quiet title and obtain a declaratory judgment that the deed restrictions were unreasonable restraints on alienation and void as against public policy. The defendants, also family members, argued the restrictions were enforceable. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the Idaho statutes had abrogated the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and upholding the restrictions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation remains in effect in Idaho and was not abrogated by Idaho Code sections 55-111 or 55-111A. The Court further determined that the restrictions in these deeds are unreasonable because they do not effectively preserve the properties within the immediate family and unduly hinder the owners’ ability to use or benefit from their land. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed its summary judgment order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs as the prevailing party. View "Smallwood v. Little" on Justia Law

Taylor L. Wood, her husband, and her son received medical care from physicians employed by Intermountain Emergency Physicians, PLLC (IEP). The resulting medical debt was assigned to Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS) for collection. After Wood’s attorneys alleged violations of state law, the Woods and IEP entered into a settlement that discharged the debt and provided payment to the Woods. Nevertheless, MRS later sued Wood to collect the same debt. Wood responded by counterclaiming and bringing IEP into the case as a third-party defendant, relying on the settlement agreement. MRS dismissed its complaint upon learning of the prior settlement, and all claims were eventually dismissed by the court.After judgment was entered, both sides sought a determination of the prevailing party and an award of attorney fees. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, found that Wood was the prevailing party over MRS and ordered MRS to pay Wood’s costs and attorney fees, concluding that MRS’s complaint was frivolous due to lack of proper investigation and communication regarding the settlement. MRS and IEP filed a first motion for reconsideration of the fees order, which was denied. They then filed a second motion for reconsideration, also denied, and subsequently appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order awarding costs and attorney fees to Wood because MRS and IEP’s notice of appeal from that order was untimely under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). The court did have jurisdiction to review the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, but because MRS and IEP failed to provide argument or authority on that issue, they waived it. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the second motion for reconsideration. View "Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Wood" on Justia Law

The case centers on a dispute between a former employee and his employer regarding an alleged agreement to transfer company stock. The plaintiff, who had worked for the employer for many years and was promoted several times, claimed that he was promised a portion of stock if he remained employed through a specific date. This promise was allegedly memorialized in a 2018 letter from one of the company’s owners. After the plaintiff fulfilled his employment commitment but did not receive the stock, he sued the company and several individuals for promissory estoppel, fraud, and breach of contract.Previously, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment to two individual defendants, dismissing them from the suit. The plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants proceeded to a bench trial. After trial, the district court found in favor of the company and its owner on all counts, concluding there was no enforceable contract due to the absence of an essential term—price—and insufficient evidence of fraud. The court also awarded attorney fees to both the company and the owner.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the breach of contract and fraud claims, agreeing that the 2018 letter did not create an enforceable contract and that there was no clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The Supreme Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the owner but vacated the fee award to the company, finding the company’s initial fee request procedurally deficient. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment consistent with these findings. Attorney fees and costs on appeal were awarded to the owner, but not to the company. View "York v. Kemper Northwest, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the rezoning of 145 acres of farmland in Canyon County, Idaho for light industrial use. The property owners, the Judith A. Gross Trust and Douglas Gross, sought the rezoning to facilitate future industrial development. The Canyon County Development Services Department and Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, and the Canyon County Board of County Commissioners ultimately approved the rezoning with conditions, including restrictions on certain uses. Three local businessmen and their agricultural business objected, arguing the rezoning would harm their agribusiness interests by reducing available farmland and impacting crop isolation.After the Board declined to reconsider its approval, the petitioners filed for judicial review in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, Canyon County. They claimed standing as “affected persons” under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), asserting concrete adverse impacts on their businesses. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to establish “constitutional” standing under the traditional three-part test—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—and declined to consider whether the petitioners met LLUPA’s “affected person” standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the applicable standing inquiry for judicial review under LLUPA is the “affected person” standard set forth in Idaho Code section 67-6521, rather than the traditional federal three-part test. The Court clarified that Idaho’s standing doctrine is a “self-imposed constraint” and subject to legislative definition. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the petition for review and remanded for consideration of standing under the LLUPA standard. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the petitioners. View "Crookham v. County of Canyon" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Corey Raber and Michael Robert Raber married in Texas and later moved to Idaho, where their only child was born. After marital difficulties, Mother filed for divorce in Idaho in 2022. Initially, Child lived with Mother in Coeur d’Alene, while Father had weekend visitation. Mother resumed part-time legal work and began traveling with Child to Texas. A temporary custody schedule was modified in June 2023 to a week-on/week-off rotation, resulting in Child regularly traveling between Idaho and Texas. Following an evaluation by a psychologist recommending Mother be allowed to relocate to Texas with primary custody, the magistrate court proposed two alternative custody schedules depending on Mother’s residence, ultimately finalizing custody without articulating a best-interests-of-the-child analysis.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho previously vacated the magistrate court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the magistrate court to exercise discretion regarding the scope of proceedings. On remand, Judge Anna Eckhart declined to consider new evidence or hold a new trial, instead relying on previous records and issuing findings that prioritized Child’s remaining in Idaho and continuing a week-on/week-off schedule if Mother returned to Idaho. If Mother remained in Texas, the court applied the psychologist’s recommended visitation schedule for Father, granting Mother one long weekend per month. Judge Katherine Murdock later entered judgment memorializing this custody and child support order after Judge Eckhart’s retirement. Mother appealed, challenging the custody determination and child support calculation.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Idaho found the magistrate court abused its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous factual finding regarding Child’s residence and by conducting an incomplete best-interests-of-the-child analysis. The court also found error in the child support calculation and its lack of supporting analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial before a different magistrate judge, instructing the court to consider all relevant evidence and properly analyze the child’s best interests. View "Raber v. Raber" on Justia Law

Ridgeline Medical, LLC provided medical services to David Lyon and sought to recover $777 in unpaid charges. Ridgeline sent a final billing statement to Lyon at his provided address, but Lyon did not receive it and did not pay. Ridgeline retained a law firm to collect the debt, which sent demand letters to the same address, also not received by Lyon. Subsequently, Ridgeline initiated a lawsuit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract and reported Lyon’s debt to a consumer reporting agency. Lyon responded by alleging Ridgeline’s actions violated the Idaho Patient Act (IPA) and counterclaimed for statutory penalties under the Act, asserting noncompliance with its procedural requirements.The Magistrate Court for Bonneville County initially found some IPA provisions unconstitutional, severed them, and dismissed Ridgeline’s complaint for noncompliance with the remaining requirements. It denied Lyon’s claim for statutory penalties, finding that provision violated the Eighth Amendment as applied. The Idaho Attorney General intervened to defend the Act’s constitutionality. After further briefing and argument, the magistrate court vacated its prior decision, held the IPA constitutional in full, dismissed Ridgeline’s complaint again, and awarded statutory penalties to Lyon. On intermediate appeal, the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District affirmed the magistrate court’s amended decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the magistrate court’s decision independently, with due regard for the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that the challenged IPA provisions regulate commercial speech and are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which they satisfy. The court found no violation of the First Amendment (speech or petition), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection or due process), or Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the IPA against Ridgeline’s constitutional challenges. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Ridgeline Medical, LLC v. Lyon" on Justia Law

An employee of a drywall supply company suffered a right ankle injury while carrying drywall sheets up a stairway in October 2019. The employer and its workers’ compensation insurer initially accepted the injury as compensable, providing medical care and temporary disability benefits. After an independent medical examination in January 2021 concluded the employee had reached maximum medical improvement, the insurer discontinued benefits. The employee continued to experience pain and pursued additional treatment, including surgery and further imaging, which ultimately revealed a recurrent tendon tear in the same ankle. Delays in authorizing necessary diagnostic procedures led to an 18-month gap before the recurrent tear was properly identified.Following the denial of benefits for additional treatment, the employee filed a workers’ compensation complaint with the Idaho Industrial Commission. The Commission held a bifurcated hearing addressing causation and entitlement to further medical care and temporary disability benefits. The Commission adopted its Referee’s findings, concluding that the employee had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the recurrent tendon tear was caused by the original workplace accident. The Commission reasoned that the recurrent tear was a new injury, not an aggravation of the original compensable injury, and denied the claim for continued benefits. The Commission also denied the employee’s motion for reconsideration, rejecting arguments regarding procedural due process and misapplication of the compensable consequences doctrine as explained in Sharp v. Thomas Brothers Plumbing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the Commission’s decision. The Court held that the Commission erred by failing to apply the compensable consequences doctrine correctly to determine causation between the initial compensable injury and the subsequent recurrent tendon tear. The Court found that there was a demonstrable causal connection and that the Commission had improperly required the claimant to negate all other possible causes. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the employee was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Miklos v. L&W Supply" on Justia Law

A homeowners association in Fremont County, Idaho sought to enforce an amendment to its covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) prohibiting short-term rentals (less than thirty days) in a subdivision. The amendment was adopted in 2016 by a majority vote of property owners; however, the owners of one particular property at that time, C&L Lee, L.C., expressly voted against the restriction and did not provide written consent. After the amendment, the property was transferred multiple times, with each new deed referencing the CCRs, but none of the subsequent owners ever gave express written consent to the short-term rental restriction. In 2022, the HOA discovered the property was being advertised as a short-term rental and brought suit against the current owners, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment, focusing on the interpretation of Idaho Code section 55-3211. The district court found the statute unambiguously protected properties from newly added rental restrictions unless the property owner at the time of the restriction’s adoption expressly agreed in writing. Because no owner of the property, either at the time of the amendment or thereafter, had provided written consent, the court concluded the restriction did not encumber the property and could not be enforced against the current owners.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Idaho Code section 55-3211 prohibits a homeowners association from adding or enforcing rental restrictions unless the property owner at the time of the amendment consents in writing. The restriction did not bind the property or successors because consent was never given. Consequently, summary judgment for the homeowners was affirmed, and neither party was awarded attorney fees. Costs on appeal were awarded to the homeowners. View "North Henry's Lake v. Norton" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between neighboring property owners in Fremont County, Idaho, regarding roadway access rights along Bootjack Drive and Whitetail Lane near Henry’s Lake. Edward and Barbara Stasiewicz, who own an 80-acre landlocked parcel, along with other plaintiffs, sought to establish express, implied, and prescriptive easements over land owned by Henry’s Lake Village, LLC (HLV) and other defendants. The controversy intensified after the Stasiewiczes’ predecessors obtained deeds that included easements, followed by a default judgment in a quiet title action initiated by HLV against the predecessors, which purported to extinguish any easement rights. Subsequently, HLV granted the Stasiewiczes restrictive access easements over Bootjack Drive and Whitetail Lane.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Fremont County initially granted HLV’s motion to dismiss the Stasiewiczes’ express and prescriptive easement claims as moot due to the granted easements, but allowed the implied easement claim to proceed, requesting briefing on res judicata. After supplemental briefing, the district court denied motions to strike evidence, found the Stasiewiczes’ claims precluded by res judicata due to the prior quiet title judgment, and dismissed all remaining claims as moot, concluding the Stasiewiczes had already received the relief they sought.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court erred by raising the affirmative defense of res judicata sua sponte, as such defenses must be raised by parties, not the court. The Supreme Court also found the district court incorrectly dismissed the Stasiewiczes’ claims as moot, especially regarding Bootjack Drive, since the restrictive terms of the granted easements did not fully resolve the controversy. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the dismissal of the Stasiewiczes’ claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Stasiewicz v. South Henry's Lake" on Justia Law

After the death of Glenna Mae Wylie-Nelson, her Last Will and Testament devised her home and two lots to her son Leslie H. Wylie, but reserved a life estate for her husband, Larry T. Nelson. The Will also provided that if Larry and Leslie agreed to sell the property during Larry’s lifetime, Leslie would receive the first $40,000 from the sale and the remaining proceeds would be split equally. Larry claimed that community property funds were used for maintenance and improvements on the property during his 35-year marriage to Glenna Mae and sought compensation for the increase in property value attributable to these efforts.While Glenna Mae’s estate was being probated in the Magistrate Court of Bonner County, Larry filed a petition under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) in the District Court of the First Judicial District. He sought a judicial declaration of his rights in the property and compensation for his claimed community property interest. Respondents, including Leslie and the estate’s co-personal representatives, moved to dismiss the petition, arguing lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Larry attempted to amend his petition to clarify his claims and remove his request for partition by sale. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under TEDRA, denied leave to amend, and awarded attorney fees to the Respondents.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case de novo. It held that TEDRA provides district courts with broad subject matter jurisdiction over estate and trust matters, including Larry’s claims for declaratory relief regarding his interest in property passing at death. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed its orders denying leave to amend and awarding attorney fees, and remanded for further proceedings. Larry was awarded costs on appeal. View "Nelson v. Wylie" on Justia Law