Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two consolidated cases involved fathers incarcerated in Idaho whose parental rights were terminated in private proceedings initiated by the mothers of their children. In each case, a county public defender was initially appointed to represent the indigent father at the trial level. After the 2025 enactment of Senate Bill 1181, which altered the state’s indigent defense system, the counties argued they were no longer responsible for providing counsel in private termination cases, and the new State Public Defender (SPD) asserted it was not statutorily required to represent parents in such cases. The trial courts ultimately appointed counsel at county expense. After judgments terminating parental rights were entered and appeals were filed, questions arose as to whether the fathers were entitled to counsel and appellate costs at public expense, and if so, who was responsible for providing and funding these services.Previously, Idaho law categorically provided indigent parents in termination proceedings the right to appointed counsel, with counties typically responsible for payment. Senate Bill 1181, effective July 1, 2025, limited the right to counsel to cases where it is “constitutionally required” and made clear that the SPD’s obligation to provide indigent defense did not extend to private termination cases. It also barred counties from being required to fund indigent defense in such cases. With these statutory changes, the Idaho Supreme Court confronted the resulting gap in representation.The Idaho Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clauses of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions, indigent parents in private termination cases may be constitutionally entitled to counsel at public expense, including on appeal, but this right is not automatic and must be determined case by case. The Court further held that, after the legislative changes, no state agency or county can be required to provide such representation, though they may do so voluntarily. However, all indigent parents appealing termination orders are constitutionally entitled to records and transcripts at public expense, and if not otherwise provided, those costs must be paid from the county district court fund. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children experienced escalating marital difficulties after relocating from California to Idaho for the wife’s job. As tensions increased, the wife unilaterally left Idaho with the children and moved to her family’s home in Florida, subsequently making multiple allegations of child abuse against the husband. Law enforcement and child protection agencies found all allegations unsubstantiated. The wife then filed for divorce and sought a court order allowing her to permanently relocate with the children to Florida. The husband opposed relocation, asserting that the children were thriving in Idaho and that their best interests would be served by remaining there.The Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho presided over a three-day trial, during which both parties presented evidence and expert testimony, including a Parenting Time Evaluation. The evaluator found both parents fit and recommended joint custody, but ultimately opined that relocation to Florida would benefit the children, particularly due to the wife’s family support network. The magistrate court found that, although the decision was close, the wife had met her burden to show that relocation was in the children’s best interests. The court awarded joint legal and physical custody, permitted relocation, and structured a custody schedule that anticipated both parents would ultimately reside in Florida.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the magistrate court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court properly applied Idaho law and the statutory best interests factors, made supported factual findings, and exercised reasoned judgment. The Supreme Court rejected the husband’s arguments that the magistrate court relied on erroneous findings or improper legal standards. The Court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the wife, finding the appeal largely asked for reweighing of evidence. View "Bickerstaff v. Bickerstaff" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether a party established a prescriptive easement over a dirt and gravel road, known as the M-1 Road, which crosses a large tract of privately owned timberland in northern Idaho. The appellant acquired three lots in a subdivision by Spirit Lake in 1999, and accessed these lots using the M-1 Road, which traversed land owned by the respondent. This land, the Brickle Creek Unit, spans approximately 20,000 acres and was primarily used for forestry, with only logging roads as improvements. The appellant and their predecessors used the road for various purposes, including construction and recreation, alongside other property owners and the general public. In 2016, the respondent installed a gate and began requiring permits for road access, which the appellant refused to obtain.The case was initially heard by the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, which granted summary judgment to the appellant, finding a prescriptive easement existed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. After remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that although the appellant’s use of the road was open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted, it was presumptively permissive due to the wild, unenclosed, and unimproved character of the land. The court ruled the use did not become adverse until 2016, when access was restricted and the appellant refused to sign a usage agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that the land’s wild and unimproved nature created a presumption of permissive use, which the appellant failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence of adverse, non-permissive use for the statutory period. The Court also found no actual or imputed knowledge of adverse use by the landowner prior to 2016. The denial of the prescriptive easement was upheld. View "Spirit Lake Cabins v. Inland Empire" on Justia Law

After the death of Laurel Kalinski in 2019, her estate consisted primarily of a house and a vehicle, with her daughter, Crystal, named as the personal representative. Crystal and her brother Nicholas, the sole heirs, initially agreed Crystal could keep the house by refinancing and paying Nicholas half the equity, using life insurance proceeds to pay estate debts and legal fees. They retained Murphy Law Office to represent the estate in the probate process. Disagreements emerged between the siblings regarding the value of the property and the amount Nicholas was to receive, leading Nicholas to hire separate counsel. Eventually, Crystal refinanced the house and transferred it to herself, prompting litigation between the siblings and later a settlement.The Estate, through Crystal, sued Murphy Law Office and its attorney, alleging negligence (legal malpractice), breach of contract, violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), and unjust enrichment. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted summary judgment for Murphy on all claims, striking the Estate’s expert affidavit as untimely and lacking foundation, and finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The court ruled that the unjust enrichment and ICPA claims were not independent of the malpractice claim and that there was insufficient evidence of unfair or deceptive acts under the ICPA. The Estate appealed only the unjust enrichment and ICPA rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that, under Idaho law, the Estate’s unjust enrichment claim could not proceed as an independent cause of action because it was based on the same allegations as the malpractice claim and did not establish any separate element. The Court also found the Estate failed to present evidence of any unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable conduct by the attorney sufficient to support a claim under the ICPA. Costs on appeal were awarded to Murphy, but attorney fees were denied. View "Estate of Kalinski v. Murphy Law Office PLLC" on Justia Law

A Washington corporation that operates as a holding company and files combined corporate tax returns in Idaho calculated its 2021 Idaho corporate income tax using a “blended rate.” This rate prorated Idaho’s former and newly reduced corporate tax rates across its fiscal year, which ran from October 1, 2020, to September 30, 2021. The company adopted this approach because the Idaho Legislature amended the relevant statute in 2021, lowering the corporate tax rate effective January 1, 2021, but left statutory language stating the new rate applied to all “taxable years commencing on and after January 1, 2001.” The Idaho State Tax Commission rejected the blended rate and instead applied the higher, pre-amendment rate to the company’s entire fiscal year.After the company’s administrative appeal was denied, it filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho, Ada County. The district court granted summary judgment for the taxpayer, concluding that the statutory text unambiguously required application of the lower, amended rate to all taxable years commencing on or after January 1, 2001, including the company’s 2021 fiscal year. The district court rejected the Tax Commission’s position that only tax years starting after January 1, 2021, should qualify for the new rate and denied the Commission’s cross-motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that, based on the statute’s plain language, the 6.5% corporate tax rate applied to all taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2001, and thus to the taxpayer’s entire 2021 fiscal year. The Court also found that subsequent legislative amendments did not render the 2021 statute ambiguous or retroactively curative. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and awarded costs on appeal to the taxpayer. View "WAFD, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

A Washington-based corporation utilized a fiscal year running from October 1, 2020, to September 30, 2021. In 2021, the Idaho Legislature amended the state’s corporate income tax statute to lower the tax rate from 6.925% to 6.5%. The statute stated that the new rate applied to all “taxable years commencing on and after January 1, 2001,” but the legislative act declared the effective date as January 1, 2021. The corporation, whose fiscal year straddled the effective date, applied a prorated, or “blended,” tax rate to its return and claimed a refund. The Idaho State Tax Commission instead applied the higher rate for the entire fiscal year and reduced the refund.After the Tax Commission upheld its administrative division’s decision, the corporation sought judicial review in Ada County district court. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the statute’s plain language was unambiguous and required application of the lower tax rate to any taxable year beginning on or after January 1, 2001. Because the corporation’s fiscal year began after that date, the court ruled that the 6.5% rate applied to the entire fiscal year and granted summary judgment for the corporation.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Court held that Idaho Code section 63-3025(1) unambiguously imposed the 6.5% tax rate for all taxable years commencing on or after January 1, 2001, and that the statute’s effective date did not alter the scope of its application. The Court rejected the Tax Commission’s arguments for ambiguity, proration, or reliance on subsequent statutory amendments as curative. The order granting summary judgment to the corporation was affirmed, entitling it to the full refund. View "WAFD, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old juvenile collided with a motorcyclist while making an illegal U-turn, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death. The State charged the juvenile with vehicular manslaughter under Idaho law, and the case proceeded under the Juvenile Corrections Act. At sentencing, the magistrate court considered a social history report, statements from the juvenile, her family, her pediatrician, and the victim’s family, as well as recommendations from a probation officer who suggested informal adjustment and mediation rather than detention. Despite these recommendations and evidence of the juvenile’s remorse, academic success, and lack of intentionality, the magistrate court imposed ninety days of detention (with forty-eight days suspended), 250 hours of community service, a three-year license suspension, three years of probation, counseling, and various fees.The juvenile appealed to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, arguing that the magistrate court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence inconsistent with the goals of the Juvenile Corrections Act—namely accountability, community protection, and competency development—and by failing to sufficiently justify each aspect of the disposition. The district court affirmed the sentence, concluding that it promoted the goal of accountability and fell within the magistrate court’s statutory discretion.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court properly analyzed the sentence under the Juvenile Corrections Act’s standards, not adult sentencing standards, and that the magistrate court acted within its discretion. The Court concluded that the magistrate court adequately explained and tailored the sentence to promote accountability, as permitted by statute, and did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

Crystal Homestead Estates, LLC (CHE) owns a parcel of land known as Crystal Farm in Bannock County, Idaho. The owners of two adjacent parcels to the south are Matthew and Laura Schiffman, and Michael and Leslie Schiffman. CHE claimed that Crystal Farm was landlocked and could only be accessed by two unimproved roads crossing the Schiffmans’ parcels. CHE filed suit to quiet title to easements over these roads, asserting theories of implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity, and prescriptive easement. The Schiffmans disputed that Crystal Farm was landlocked, challenged the existence of any easement, and made counterclaims, including a third-party complaint against a prior owner for breach of title warranties.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District granted summary judgment to CHE, quieting title to the easements based on implied easement by prior use. In doing so, the court struck the Schiffmans’ affidavits, relied on a declaration from a prior owner (Roger Johnson), and found the evidence of apparent continuous use sufficient. The court denied the Schiffmans’ motion for reconsideration, stating there was no new evidence or authority and no material factual dispute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho found that the district court erred by striking admissible portions of the Schiffmans’ affidavits and by relying on portions of Johnson’s declaration that lacked proper foundation and personal knowledge. The Supreme Court further concluded that CHE did not establish, as a matter of law, the required element of apparent continuous use long enough before severance to support an implied easement by prior use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The Schiffmans were awarded costs on appeal, but no attorney fees were granted. View "Crystal Homestead Estates v. That Piece of Property" on Justia Law

A married couple with eight children began divorce proceedings after a long marriage during which the husband was a successful ophthalmologist and the wife primarily cared for the children at home. During the proceedings, the wife initially sought spousal support, child support, and an equitable division of property, while the husband sought joint custody and an equitable property division. The parties agreed, through counsel and with court approval, to divide the husband's income and a business account temporarily, avoiding a child support calculation at that stage. Once custody was resolved, the parties entered into two successive arbitration agreements, under which the wife waived spousal support in exchange for arbitration of all remaining issues, including property division and child support. The arbitrator awarded the wife 60% of the marital assets and retroactive child support.After the arbitration, the husband challenged the award in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to refer divorce matters to arbitration and that the arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding retroactive child support and an unequal asset division. The magistrate court rejected these arguments and confirmed the award. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the magistrate court, holding that Idaho law permits arbitration of divorce issues and that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the agreement. The district court did, however, vacate part of the attorney fee award based on the arbitration award, but affirmed an award of appellate attorney fees to the wife, finding the husband's jurisdictional challenge was unreasonable.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that Idaho law permits courts to refer divorce actions to binding arbitration if the parties agree, and such referral does not divest the court of jurisdiction. The court also held that the arbitrator did not exceed authority in awarding retroactive child support and an unequal division of property. The case was remanded for consideration of appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 32-704(3). View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Two siblings disputed the administration of their late father’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in a storage company, Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS). The father had founded TPS and, over time, executed several amendments to its operating agreement, some before and some after he began suffering from dementia. After his death, one sibling, who was an attorney, became the personal representative of the estate, managed TPS, and executed additional amendments to the operating agreement that purported to transfer ownership and management control of TPS to herself, often with retroactive effect. The other sibling challenged these actions, claiming they diverted estate assets and breached fiduciary duties.Litigation took place in two venues: a magistrate court probate proceeding and a separate district court action under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). The courts and parties often treated the cases as consolidated, although no formal consolidation order was entered. The sibling challenging the amendments sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, and related relief. The magistrate court dismissed the claims against both the sister and TPS, and the district court upheld this dismissal, concluding that the claims should have been brought exclusively in the probate case and were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that claims for judicial determination of the estate’s assets and breach of fiduciary duty fell within TEDRA’s scope and could be brought as a separate civil action rather than exclusively in probate. The Court further found that the sister and TPS were necessary or proper parties to the TEDRA action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the magistrate and district courts, reversed the dismissal orders, and remanded for further proceedings. It also awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal to the appellant, to be paid personally by the sister. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law