Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal centered around the Idaho Department of Water Resources' (“IDWR”) denial of Application 83160, brought by Jeffrey and Chana Duffin (“Duffin”), to transfer the licensed ground water right 35-7667 to a different parcel of land. During the appeal of this case, 3G AG LLC (“the LLC”) “purchased from Duffin the property where water right 35-7667 - the water right subject to Transfer No. 8316 which is the subject of this appeal - is located.” As a result of the transfer of ownership, the LLC sought to substitute itself for Duffin. Because there was no objection to the substitution, it was allowed. IDWR denied the transfer because, among other reasons, approving it would cause an “enlargement” in the use of water as proscribed by Idaho Code section 42-222(1). On judicial review, the district court agreed with the denial and affirmed. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "3G AG LLC v. IDWR" on Justia Law

S Bar Ranch owned approximately 3000 acres of land in rural Elmore County, Idaho. S Bar purchased the land in 2015. There were very few structures on S Bar’s property, save for an airplane hangar that included a five-hundred square-foot apartment. S Bar’s address was listed in Sun Valley, Idaho, and its principal, Chris Stephens, used the property for recreational purposes. Cat Creek Energy, LLC, an Idaho company managed by John Faulkner, owned and managed more than 23,000 acres of land in Elmore County near Anderson Ranch reservoir. Faulkner, on behalf of his other companies, leased land to Cat Creek to develop the project at issue in this dispute. In late 2014 and early 2015, Cat Creek began the process of obtaining conditional use permits (“CUPs”) for a proposed alternative energy development (“the project”) in Elmore County. As initially proposed, the project had five components: a 50,000 acre-foot reservoir with hydroelectric turbines, up to 39 wind turbines, approximately 174,000 photovoltaic solar panels, electrical transmission lines, and an onsite power substation. Cat Creek sought to build the project on approximately 23,000 acres of land that it had leased near Anderson Ranch Reservoir. In 2019, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, affirming the Board’s decisions with respect to the CUPs. The district court found that S Bar only had standing to challenge the CUPs relating to wind turbines, electric transmission lines, and the on-site substation. The district court also reiterated its prior oral ruling that a 2017 CUP Order was a final agency action and that S Bar’s petition for judicial review of that order was untimely. With regard to the development agreement and a 2018 CUP Amendment, the district court concluded that the Board did not err in a manner specified by Idaho Code section 67-5279 and that S Bar had not shown that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. S Bar appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Cat Creek. View "S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

Miguel and Janice Aizpitarte sued their neighbors Michael and Laura Minear to quiet title to what they contended was an established easement for an access driveway, and sought a declaratory judgment to recognize their right to an implied easement by prior use. The Aizpitartes also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Minears from blocking access to the drive(10) Wilkins (way. The Aizpitartes moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded the Aizpitartes had an implied easement by prior use of the driveway crossing the Minear property to the Aizpitarte property. The Minears appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them because there were genuine issues of material fact in the record. They also argue the scope of the easement recognized by the district court was too broad. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Aizpitarte v. Minear" on Justia Law

After a 21-year career as a firefighter with the City of Pocatello, Richard Nelson was diagnosed with leukemia. Nelson brought a workers’ compensation claim against the City. The Industrial Commission determined that the City failed to rebut a statutory presumption of causation with substantial and competent evidence. The City appealed, arguing there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Nelson’s cancer was caused by his employment. The City also argued Idaho Code section 72-438(14)(b) unconstitutionally discriminated between the employers of firefighters who had cancer and the employers of other employees who claim to have contracted an occupational disease. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Nelson v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a family dispute concerning ownership interests in Nelsen Farms, LLC (“LLC”). The LLC, as originally established, included equal ownership for two of the Nelsen’s sons, Jack S. and Jonathan. However, in 2015, Jack H. Nelsen (“Jack H.”) and Joan Nelsen modified their estate plans and decided to pass their interests in the LLC to Jonathan via an inter vivos transfer, rather than through their wills. In August 2017, members of the LLC held a special meeting, during which the transfer of the membership interest to Jonathan was approved. The next month, Jack S., his wife and son, and Jack S.’s sister Janice Lehman, filed a complaint against Jack H., Joan and Jonathan alleging Jack H. and Joan were incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity to modify their 2015 wills and to make the 2017 inter vivos conveyance. Appellants also alleged Jonathan unduly influenced Jack H. and Joan to obtain the estate modification. Appellants amended their complaint in October 2017, adding a claim for dissolution of the LLC. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all of Appellants’ claims. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects save one: dissolution of the LLC. To this, the Court held that when the district court granted dissolution on summary judgment, Jack S. was ipso facto deprived of his membership interest and relegated to the status of economic interest holder, without the right to petition for dissolution since, under the statute, only members could do so. Jack S. was reinstated as a member of the LLC, and had the right to seek dissolution upon remand. View "Nelsen v. Nelsen" on Justia Law

Lisa and Mark Weaver married in 2016, and had one minor child, A.W., born January 2017. In November 2020, The parties agreed between themselves to split physical custody of A.W. on a roughly 60/40 basis, with Mark having three out of every four weekends. Through court-ordered mediation, the parties resolved all issues relating to their divorce except for “physical custody, visitation, and child support.” Pertinent to this appeal, Mark argued a 50/50 split would be in A.W.’s best interest because it would allow A.W. to have more time with her father and give her more “stability and structure” compared to the temporary custody arrangements the parties had been using. Lisa’s major concern with Mark’s proposed arrangement was the time it would require A.W. to be in daycare when Lisa could provide care for A.W. at home. The magistrate court issued an oral ruling at the conclusion of trial that split physical custody of A.W. between the parties on a roughly 60/40 basis. The magistrate court indicated that its decision did not give either Lisa or Mark exactly what they wanted, but was what the magistrate court believed to be in A.W.’s best interest. Lisa moved the magistrate court for permission to appeal its custody order directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, which was granted. On appeal, Lisa argued the magistrate court abused its discretion in ordering a division of custody in which one parent had custody on almost every weekend. The Supreme Court concurred the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding Mark physical custody of A.W. on almost every weekend, finding the court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and misapplied relevant legal standards in failing to adequately consider the statutory factor concerning A.W.’s interactions and interrelationships with her parents once A.W. started school. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Weaver v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review concerned whether a prescriptive easement existed on a road accessing property owned by Shelley and Roger Cook near the Bingham and Bonneville County line. The Cooks’ property was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker, and stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Harker family (including the Cooks) claimed to have used what the parties called “Tower Road” to access their property for as long as the family can remember. Tower Road connected the Cook Property to a county road and ran through property owned by Jay and Shelli Van Orden. The Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens claiming a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ property via Tower Road. The district court ruled in the Van Ordens’ favor, holding that because the Cooks’ longstanding use of the land was not adverse, it did not have to address the remaining elements of a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in finding their family’s use of Tower Road was with implied permission and in not addressing the remaining elements. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting judgment to the Van Ordens without determining the relevant statutory period for determining adverse use. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a determination of the relevant statutory period for the claimed prescriptive easement and whether the evidence established adverse use during that time. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Curt and Dara Von Lossberg filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Police after their son, Bryan Von Lossberg, ended his life with an unlawfully purchased handgun. The Von Lossbergs alleged that this purchase stemmed from failures in Idaho’s electronic case management system to properly report his mental health status. The district court dismissed the Von Lossbergs’ claims for negligence and wrongful death, concluding that the government defendants were immune from tort liability under the immunity provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”). On appeal, the Von Lossbergs argued their case should not have been dismissed because: (1) the Brady Act’s immunity provision did not apply to the State of Idaho; and (2) the Brady Act’s immunity provision was not preserved by the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred that the Brady Act did not grant immunity to the State and its agencies. Accordingly, judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Von Lossberg v. Idaho" on Justia Law

In 2017, Ronald Van Hook was declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59; this declaration was upheld by he Idaho Supreme Court. In 2021, “on behalf of his minor son” G.V.H., Van Hook filed a 28-page “Request for Leave to File Habeas Corpus and Juvenile Post-Conviction Relief” (“the Filing Request”). In the Filing Request, Van Hook alleged eight sets of “complaints” and asserted that numerous fundamental rights had been violated. He further requested a hearing on the Filing Request. Without holding a hearing on the matter, the district court denied the request because: (1) Van Hook, as a non-lawyer, could not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by representing his son in a civil court proceeding; (2) the petition for writ of habeas corpus was without merit; and (3) Van Hook was attempting to re-litigate prior court decisions that had been finally decided against him. Van Hook appealed, and the Supreme Court entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, which stayed the proceedings, but allowed Van Hook time “to make application with the presiding district court judge permitting the notice of appeal to be filed, pursuant to I.C.A.R. 59(j).” The district court granted Van Hook permission to appeal “the narrow issue of whether [the district court’s] decision to deny Mr. Van Hook’s motion for leave to file litigation was arbitrary and capricious and/or in violation of his due process rights.” The Supreme Court withdrew its conditional order, allowing appeal on the narrow issue identified by the district court. As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court first determined the proper standard of review to apply when reviewing a presiding judge’s denial of a vexatious litigant’s request to file new litigation pursuant to Rule 59(i) was the same standard used when reviewing a district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6): “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” The Court found the district court did not err in denying Van Hook's request for leave to file new litigation, and his due process rights were not violated. View "Van Hook v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal concerned a dispute among stepsiblings over the remnant of their parents’ estates, which consisted of approximately 26 acres of real property in Canyon County, Idaho. Alva and Thelma Garrett married in 1976, creating a blended family consisting of Alva’s four children and Thelma’s three children. They later executed reciprocal wills which, upon the death of the first spouse, left all of their property to the survivor. They also signed a contract in which they agreed that upon the death of the surviving spouse, the survivor’s remaining property would be divided among the seven children in equal shares. When Alva died, Thelma created a living trust and conveyed certain real property into the name of the trust. Upon Thelma’s death, the real property in trust was distributed to Thelma’s daughter, Cynthia Swartz, and her husband, James Swartz. Thelma’s estate was never probated. Several years later, Alva’s Children sued the Swartzes, the trust, and “the Estate of Thelma V. Garrett”, alleging that Thelma had breached the terms of the will contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Swartzes, holding that Thelma’s conveyance of the real property to the trust did not breach the contract. The district court also awarded the Swartzes attorney fees. Alva’s Children timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Alva's children's claim was precluded by state law: "Although the merits of this case center on whether Thelma breached the Will Contract, we do not reach the merits of the breach of contract claim on appeal because we conclude that this case was brought in violation of Idaho Code section 15-3-104. Thus, we can affirm the district court’s decision on alternate grounds." View "Martin v. Garrett Living Trust" on Justia Law