Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Legislature established the Community Partner Grant Program in 2021, using funds from the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on school-aged children. The funds were to be used exclusively for in-person educational and enrichment activities for children aged 5 to 13. In 2023, the Idaho Attorney General received information suggesting that some grant recipients had misused the funds to serve children under the age of five. Consequently, the Attorney General issued civil investigative demands (CIDs) to 34 grant recipients, requesting documentation related to the grant program. The recipients did not comply and instead sought a preliminary injunction in district court to set aside the CIDs.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied the preliminary injunction for 15 grant recipients, requiring them to respond to the CIDs, but granted it for 19 others, concluding that the Attorney General had not shown sufficient reason to believe these recipients had misused the funds. The court also reviewed two declarations in camera and provided redacted versions to the recipients' counsel.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that both the Idaho Charitable Assets Protection Act (ICAPA) and the Idaho Charitable Solicitation Act (ICSA) applied to the grant funds, giving the Attorney General authority to issue CIDs. The court determined that the "reason to believe" standard, not probable cause, was sufficient for issuing CIDs. The court found that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction to the 19 recipients and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the CID issued to Elizabeth Oppenheimer was overly broad and violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association, requiring the district court to reconsider this CID. The court declined to award attorney fees to either party. View "Children's Home Society v. Labrador" on Justia Law

Several local taxing districts within Kootenai County, Idaho, including East Side Highway District, Post Falls Highway District, Worley Highway District, the City of Coeur d’Alene, and the City of Post Falls, filed claims against Kootenai County and its Treasurer, Steven Matheson. The dispute arose when Matheson decided that the County would retain all late charges and interest from delinquent property taxes to cover collection costs, rather than distributing a proportionate share to the taxing districts. The taxing districts argued that they were entitled to their share of these funds.The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho ruled in favor of the taxing districts, granting their motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. The court determined that Idaho Code sections 63-1015 and 63-1007(1) required the County to distribute the late charges and interest proportionately to the taxing districts. The court also awarded attorney fees to the taxing districts under Idaho Code section 12-117(4).The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the statutory language was unambiguous and required the County to apportion late charges and interest among the taxing districts in the same manner as property taxes. The Court also upheld the award of attorney fees to the taxing districts, noting that Idaho Code section 12-117(4) mandates such an award in cases involving adverse governmental entities. The Supreme Court awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the taxing districts. View "East Side Hwy Dist v. Kootenai County" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation and application of Idaho Code section 63-602G, which governs the homestead property tax exemption. In 2020, the Idaho Legislature amended the statute to remove the April 15 application deadline and added that the exemption "shall be effective upon the date of the application." The Idaho State Tax Commission issued guidance stating that the exemption should not be prorated based on the application date, which was supported by an Attorney General Opinion. However, Latah and Lincoln Counties disagreed and prorated the exemption based on the application date.The Counties petitioned for judicial review in their respective district courts, which were consolidated. The district court ruled in favor of the Counties, determining that the Tax Commission exceeded its authority and that the statute was ambiguous, allowing for proration based on legislative intent. The Tax Commission appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 63-602G requires the retroactive application of the homestead exemption to January 1 of the tax year during which the application was submitted, regardless of the application submission date. The Court found that the statute was unambiguous and that the exemption applies to the entire tax year, not prorated based on the application date.The Court also determined that the Tax Commission did not exceed its statutory authority when it issued the May 2022 Order directing the Counties to apply the full homestead exemption. The Court concluded that the Tax Commission's order was within its constitutional and statutory powers to ensure uniformity and compliance with property tax laws.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's order, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for entry of an order affirming the Tax Commission’s May 2022 Order. View "Latah County v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Mark Radford and the State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands (collectively, "the State") were involved in a contract dispute over the State's easement on Radford's property. The State used the easement to access and manage state endowment lands leased for grazing. Historically, the State accessed the easement through the Hallo Property, which Radford purchased in 2020, subsequently revoking the State's access. Radford claimed that an email from the State indicated the easement was no longer needed, leading him to file a lawsuit alleging the State breached the termination clause of the easement agreement by not providing a statement confirming termination.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the State, determining that the termination clause gave the State sole and subjective power to decide whether the easement was necessary. The court found that the State had not made any determination that the easement was no longer needed, thus dismissing Radford's breach of contract claim. Radford appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State had no contractual duty to assess whether the easement was necessary for its granted purposes. The agreement's termination clause did not impose an obligation on the State to periodically reassess the easement's necessity. The court also rejected Radford's argument that the State's refusal to terminate the easement violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the State had not determined the easement was no longer needed. The court awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the State, concluding that Radford's appeal was unreasonably pursued. View "Radford v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

South Hill Meat Lockers Incorporated (South Hill) alleged that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) caused damage to its building during a road construction project on U.S. Highway 95 in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. South Hill claimed ITD was liable under seven different causes of action, including negligence and constitutional violations. ITD moved for summary judgment, asserting "plan or design immunity" under Idaho Code section 6-904(7). The district court initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment but later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing four of South Hill's claims. After a change in judges, the new judge granted ITD's motion for reconsideration, dismissing South Hill's complaint with prejudice.The district court's rulings were mixed. Judge Buchanan initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. However, she later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing several of South Hill's claims. Upon Judge Buchanan's retirement, Judge Berecz reconsidered and granted ITD's first motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of South Hill's claims.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the district court's judgment. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether ITD's change orders and the gas line relocation were meaningfully reviewed, which precluded summary judgment on the basis of plan or design immunity. The court also reversed the dismissal of South Hill's nuisance claim, holding that a nuisance claim for damages can persist even after the nuisance has abated. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on other claims, including the determination that Idaho Code section 55-310 does not impose strict liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "South Hill Meat Lockers Incorp. v. Idaho Transportation Dept." on Justia Law

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by the Fourth District Administrative District Judge (ADJ) in Idaho. This order prevents Smith from filing new litigation pro se in Idaho courts without obtaining prior permission from a judge. The determination arose from Smith's conduct in litigation concerning the administration of his mother Victoria H. Smith’s estate. Smith, a former attorney, was involved in contentious probate proceedings after his brother successfully challenged their mother's will, which had left the entire estate to Smith. The estate was subsequently administered as intestate, leading to multiple appeals and disciplinary actions against Smith by the Idaho State Bar.The district court found that Smith repeatedly filed frivolous and unmeritorious motions, including petitions to remove the personal representative (PR) and the PR’s counsel, motions to disqualify the district court judge, and objections to court orders. These actions were deemed to lack legal or factual basis and were intended to cause unnecessary delay. The PR of the estate moved to have Smith declared a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d)(3), which the district court supported, leading to the referral to the ADJ.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The court held that the ADJ did not abuse its discretion in declaring Smith a vexatious litigant. The ADJ acted within the legal standards set forth in Rule 59(d) and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. The court also found that Smith’s due process argument was not preserved for appeal as it was raised for the first time. The court declined to award attorney fees to the ADJ, concluding that Smith’s appeal, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous or unreasonable. View "Smith v. Hippler" on Justia Law

Nicholas Roddy Ramlow and Amanda Marie Mitchell share custody of their minor son. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over their child custody case since 2016. In 2020, a temporary order was issued for the child to attend Kindergarten at Winton Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The parents later entered into a custody agreement that did not specify the child's school. In 2021, Mitchell moved to Pinehurst, Idaho, and enrolled the child in Pinehurst Elementary without informing Ramlow, who was under a no-contact order. Ramlow discovered the change in 2023 and attempted to enroll the child in Bryan Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, but the school secretary, Miriam McBenge, refused without both parents' consent or a court order.Ramlow filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus in the district court to allow the child's enrollment in Coeur d'Alene. The district court dismissed the petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), citing the ongoing child custody case in the magistrate court. Ramlow argued that the district court erred in its dismissal. McBenge and Mitchell requested the district court's decision be affirmed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the magistrate court was better positioned to resolve the issue of the child's school enrollment due to its ongoing jurisdiction over the custody case. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion and followed the appropriate legal standards. The case was remanded to the district court to amend the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to Mitchell under Idaho Code section 12-121, as Ramlow's appeal was deemed frivolous and without foundation. View "Ramlow v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Elanore Vaughan purchased a ticket and signed an online liability waiver to go tubing at Eagle Island State Park, operated by Gateway Parks, LLC. The next day, Vaughan was injured when her tube went over an embankment and crashed into a flatbed trailer housing snowmaking equipment. Vaughan sued Gateway, alleging negligence and premises liability, claiming Gateway failed to maintain the tubing hill safely and created a hazard by placing the trailer at the end of the tubing run.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Gateway's motion to dismiss Vaughan's complaint. Gateway argued that Vaughan's claims were barred by the liability waiver she signed and the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers and Ski Area Operators Act. The district court found that while the Act applied, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the placement of the snowmaking equipment. The court also concluded that the liability waiver did not preclude Vaughan's claims. Gateway then sought and was granted permission to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the electronic liability waiver Vaughan signed precluded her claims against Gateway. The waiver explicitly acknowledged the risks of tubing, including collisions with manmade obstacles such as snowmaking equipment. The court determined that the waiver's language was broad enough to encompass Vaughan's accident and injuries. Consequently, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Gateway and dismiss Vaughan's complaint. The court also denied Gateway's request for attorney fees on appeal, as the gravamen of Vaughan's lawsuit was a tort, not a commercial transaction. View "Vaughan v. Gateway Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought to validate a portion of West Fork Pine Creek Road in Shoshone County, Idaho, which runs across private property and into public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management. The road is used by recreationalists to access an area known as "the Roller Coaster." Following disputes between local landowners and recreationalists, a petition was filed with the Shoshone County Board of Commissioners to validate the road. The Board denied the petition, citing concerns about environmental impacts, safety, and costs to taxpayers.The petitioners then sought judicial review in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, arguing that the Board erred in its decision. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Board's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Board's conclusions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that the Board erred in concluding that the 1909 meeting minutes did not establish the road as a public highway. However, the Court found no error in the Board's determination that validating the road was not in the public interest. The Court noted that the Board had considered various factors, including the availability of alternative access routes, the costs of surveying and maintaining the road, and the concerns of private property owners.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, holding that while the road was established as a public highway in 1909, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that validation was not in the public interest. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Jutila v. County of Shoshone" on Justia Law

Laura Milus, on behalf of herself and her minor son, D.L.J., filed a wrongful death action against Sun Valley Company after her husband died from colliding with snowmaking equipment while skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort. Milus claimed that Sun Valley breached its duties under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) and (6) by not properly marking the equipment and failing to post a notice about snowmaking operations.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley, concluding that the company met its duty under section 6-1103(2) by placing yellow padding on the equipment and had no duty under section 6-1103(6) because the equipment was not actively discharging snow. The court did not address Sun Valley's argument that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106, which states that skiers assume the risk of injury from plainly visible or marked snowmaking equipment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that ski area operators are held to an ordinarily prudent person standard of care when performing duties under the Ski Area Liability Act. The court found that Milus failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Sun Valley met this standard with the yellow padding. However, the court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Sun Valley posted the required notice under section 6-1103(6).Despite this, the court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106 because Mr. Milus assumed the risk of injury from the plainly marked snowmaking equipment. The court denied Sun Valley's request for attorney fees on appeal, as both parties prevailed on some arguments. View "Milus v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law