Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Angela Johnson and Patrick Murphy met online and began dating in 2014. When Angela discovered she was pregnant, she left Boise and began living with Patrick in his home in Coeur d’Alene. After the birth of their son, the parties resided together for three and a half years. Angela, desiring to end what she considered an “unhealthy relationship,” moved to Boise with the son in 2018. Shortly thereafter, Angela filed a petition in Ada County for paternity, custody, visitation, and support. Following venue being changed to Kootenai County and a trial, the magistrate court awarded the parties joint legal custody and physical custody of the child, with Patrick receiving primary physical custody unless Angela moved back to Coeur d’Alene at which point she and Patrick would share physical custody equally. In an expedited appeal, Angela contended the magistrate court’s decision was an abuse of discretion and required reversal. Finding no such abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s child custody order. View "Johnson v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Jonathon Frantz appealed a district court’s award of attorney fees entered against him and his clients, jointly and severally, as a sanction for frivolous conduct. This appeal arose from an easement dispute among family members. The land at issue was split into multiple parcels: the Tracy Parcel, the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and the Osborn Parcel. Plaintiffs Brook Tracy and Travis Mathis owned the Tracy Parcel; Plaintiffs Gailord “Cowboy” Mathis, Brook Tracy, Laura Roll, and Rebecca Stafford owned the Mathis/Roll Parcel; and David and Naomi Osborn owned the Osborn Parcel. In 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Osborns. Frantz was Plaintiffs’ attorney. Plaintiffs claimed that more than thirty years ago they “constructed/placed a home” on the Tracy Parcel, “constructed/placed a cabin” on the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and “created a driveway” through the Osborn Parcel to access their respective properties. Plaintiffs also claimed that for more than thirty years they had openly and continuously used the driveway over the Osborn Parcel for access to the nearest public right-of-way, Highland Drive, which was the only reasonable way to reach their respective properties. Based on this use, Plaintiffs claimed that they had an easement by necessity, an easement by implication, or a prescriptive easement across the Osborn Parcel along the existing driveway. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought a judgment from the district court declaring their rights in the driveway. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction for two reasons: (1) “the allegations in the complaint and the motion contain[ed] gross exaggerations, if not falsehoods” and “the credibility of all of the plaintiffs” was questionable; and (2) Plaintiffs could not establish entitlement to the relief demanded because they came to the hearing unprepared to support the easement theories they advanced with any competent evidence. The Osborns moved for attorney fees, leaving it to the trial court's discretion to award Rule 11 sanctions "if the [c]ourt determines that this motion was pursued frivolously." On appeal, Frantz contended the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees against him personally because it: (1) failed to follow the procedural requirements set out in Idaho Code section 12-123; and (2) erroneously found that he engaged in frivolous conduct. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded this matter did not present a justiciable controversy because the judgment was satisfied and Frantz did not preserve his right to appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Frantz’s appeal because the issues before the Court were moot. View "Frantz v. Osborn" on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellant Chris Drakos loaned Respondent Garrett Sandow $200,000.00. A promissory note executed by Sandow on November 30, 2010, secured the loan. In 2018, after receiving no payments, Drakos filed a complaint seeking to collect on the Note. Sandow moved for summary judgment arguing that the statute of limitations barred the action. Drakos filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations did not apply based on the Note’s clear language. The district court granted summary judgment to Sandow. Drakos moved the district court to reconsider, which the district court denied. Drakos timely appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Sandow and in denying his motion for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Drakos v. Sandow" on Justia Law

Appellants-patients Nathaniel Valencia and Emily Williams were self-pay patients who received emergency medical services at Saint Alphonsus Medical Center—Nampa, Inc. (“Saint Alphonsus”) in 2015. During their respective visits, Patients agreed to pay for “all charges incurred” for services rendered to them. Patients were billed in accordance with Saint Alphonsus’ “chargemaster” rates. Patients sought declaratory relief requesting the district court to rule Saint Alphonsus was only entitled to bill and seek collection of the reasonable value of the treatment provided to self-pay patients. Saint Alphonsus moved the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(d). Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus, and Patients timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. St. Alphonsus Medical Center" on Justia Law

Jonathon Gregory appealed a district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Richard and Eileen Stallings (collectively, “the Stallings”) in a breach-of-contract action stemming from the parties’ oral agreement to develop real property in Rexburg, Idaho. The property was sold in December 2012. Gregory, believing the Stallings wrongfully withheld a portion of the proceeds, filed a complaint in September 2017. The district court granted the Stallings’ subsequent motion for summary judgment, concluding that Gregory’s cause of action was barred by Idaho Code section 5-217’s four-year statute of limitations. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Stallings because Gregory's cause of action was indeed barred by the statute of limitations in Idaho Code 5-217. Further, Gregory’s equitable-estoppel claim failed because he could not show that he pursued his claim in a reasonable amount of time. View "Gregory v. Stallings" on Justia Law

The Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust (“Trust”) brought a quiet title action against Charles Drake Cazier (“Drake”) and Land Renewal Management, Inc. (“LRM”) pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-401. Drake answered separately from LRM and asserted a counterclaim against the Trust. The Trust moved to dismiss Drake’s counterclaim under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then filed a motion for summary judgment against both defendants. LRM also filed a motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Trust’s cause of action against it. The district court granted summary judgment to the Trust and dismissed Drake’s counterclaim, awarding attorney fees against both defendants in the process. Drake and LRM appealed, arguing the district court erroneously dismissed Drake’s counterclaim and failed to properly dismiss LRM from the case. Drake and LRM also appealed the district court’s award of fees and costs, arguing several evidentiary errors and that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Trust and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. View "Cazier Revocable Trust v. Cazier" on Justia Law

Victor Bliss appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Minidoka Irrigation District (“MID”). Bliss filed a complaint against MID in April 2017, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) trespass; (4) declaratory relief; and (5) wrongful prosecution/infliction of extreme emotional distress. The complaint encompassed multiple events stemming from his decades-long relationship with MID. The district court granted MID’s motion for summary judgment on all claims, dismissing Bliss’s complaint for lack of notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, lack of standing, and failure to produce evidence. Bliss timely appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment. View "Bliss v. Minidoka Irrigation District" on Justia Law

Michael D. Ferguson was initially excluded as a beneficiary from his parents’ marital trust (the Original Trust). Years later, Michael's mother, Sybil Ferguson, essentially reversed Michael's exclusion by exercising a power of appointment in her will, designating Michael Ferguson as a beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust - a sub-trust of the Original Trust. When Sybil died, Michael petitioned the magistrate court for financial records, including records from the Original Trust, to determine whether he would receive his full share of the Survivor’s Trust. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the magistrate court denied in part and granted in part. Both parties appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision in part and reversed in part. The district court held that the magistrate court erred in concluding that Michael did not become a beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust until his mother’s death, concluding that he became a beneficiary the moment his mother named him as a beneficiary more than one year before her death. Further, the district court held that the magistrate court erred in refusing to apply the Original Trust’s no-contest provision, removing Michael as a beneficiary. The issues this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on: the fiduciary duties of a trustee who had discretion to spend the trust’s principal, the scope of records available to a trust beneficiary under Idaho Code section 15-7-303, and the enforceability of a trust instrument’s no-contest provision. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred: (1) in holding Sybil Ferguson did not owe Michael a fiduciary duty under the Trust Agreement; (2) in failing to address whether Michael was entitled to Original Trust allocation records pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-7-303; (3) in enforcing the forfeiture provision before addressing whether the Successor Trustees breached their fiduciary duties in administering the Survivor’s Trust; and (4) in failing to address the magistrate court's ruling denying Michael's motion to compel discovery. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ferguson v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a dispute between a homeowners’ association and the City of Eagle (“the City”) over the public’s right to use a parking lot located on land owned by a homeowners’ association. T.R. Company, LLC (“T.R.”) was the developer of a subdivision. In November 2002, the City held a public hearing on T.R.’s request for certain concessions from the City associated with the subdivision. The City argued that T.R. offered to dedicate an easement for public parking on Lot 35 at that hearing, and that the offer was accepted when, a few months later, the City approved T.R.’s design review application showing the specific location and design of the parking lot. Respondent Two Rivers Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. (“the Association”) argued that no dedication occurred because T.R.’s intent to dedicate was not clear and unequivocal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the district court’s decision on summary judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the City and to consider whether the City was entitled to any injunctive relief. View "City of Eagle v. Two Rivers Subdivision HOA" on Justia Law

A guardian ad litem (GAL) for two minor children appealed after a magistrate court determined the children should have been placed with their biological father in Mexico. Jane Doe I (Daughter) and John Doe II (Son) were removed from the care of their mother (Mother) along with another half-sibling on after a preliminary investigation revealed the children were homeless and living in a car. At the time Daughter and Son were taken into foster care, the specific whereabouts of their biological father, John Doe (Father), were unknown, other than that he had been deported to Mexico in December 2014. Father had last seen the children at that time. In addition, his paternity had not yet been established and he had not had any contact with his children since his deportation. A little more than a year after the proceedings had begun, Father’s paternity was established. Shortly after the Department filed an amended petition, it sought a case plan for Father. The Department also attempted to obtain a home study for Father but faced difficulty accomplishing this task because he lived in Mexico. The children’s GAL opposed placing the children with Father without more information about him and his living situation. Ultimately, the magistrate court ordered that the children be placed with Father as soon as possible without a home study being conducted, apparently relying on In re Doe, 281 P.3d 95 (2012). On motions to reconsider filed by the Department and the GAL, newly-discovered evidence was presented that Father was a registered sex offender who had previously pleaded guilty to failing to register as such. Nevertheless, the magistrate court denied the motions to reconsider. The GAL appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the magistrate court, holding that while it continued "to recognize that the biological parent’s presumption of fitness is and should be very strong. However, it is not irrefutable. . . . Where the legislature has unequivocally placed a duty on the court and the Department to consider its primary concern 'the health and safety of the child,' it is incumbent on a court to ensure that diligent investigation occurs regarding questions pertaining to children’s safety." View "IDHW & John Doe v. GAL & 4th Judicial District Casa" on Justia Law