Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stephen Lowery, a heavy equipment operator in the logging industry, filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, Galen Kuykendall Logging, and its surety, Associated Loggers Exchange. Lowery claimed that his work caused a new occupational disease at the L3-4 level of his spine, distinct from his previous L5-S1 injury. Kuykendall Logging argued that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a continuation of his prior degenerative disease, which began in 1992.The Idaho Industrial Commission initially found that Lowery failed to prove his L3-4 injury resulted from an accident but concluded it was a compensable occupational disease. The Commission determined that Lowery's L3-4 condition arose independently from his previous L5-S1 issues and was aggravated by his work as a shovel logger. The Commission awarded Lowery medical and time loss benefits but denied permanent partial impairment or disability benefits. Kuykendall Logging filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Lowery's occupational disease manifested while he was employed by another company, Evergreen Timber.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence, including expert opinions that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a new occupational disease caused by his work. The Court also agreed that Lowery's occupational disease manifested on or after June 19, 2019, while he was employed by Kuykendall Logging. The Court found that Lowery complied with the notice and limitation requirements and that the Nelson doctrine did not preclude his recovery. Finally, the Court held that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction and holding a second hearing to determine Lowery's last injurious exposure. View "Lowery v. Kuykendall" on Justia Law

Four former employees of Litster Frost Injury Lawyers (LFIL) filed a lawsuit against LFIL and its former sole shareholder, Martha Frost, for unpaid wages and breach of an employment agreement. They claimed LFIL owed them compensation in the form of wages, bonuses, profit sharing, and other expenses incurred while employed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LFIL, concluding that the employees' claims were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 45-614 and that the employment agreement was an unenforceable "agreement to agree."The employees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the provisions of the employment agreement were not severable or enforceable and that the court should have supplied a "reasonable time" for performance. LFIL cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for attorney fees following summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the employees' breach of contract claims because the employment agreement was unenforceable. The court found that the agreement's essential terms were too indefinite and subject to future negotiations. However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding Sarah's reimbursement claim, finding that issues of material fact existed as to whether her claim fell within Idaho's Wage Claim Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all other claims.The Supreme Court also reversed the district court's decision on attorney fees, holding that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Attorney fees on appeal were awarded to LFIL for the time spent responding to certain claims, and costs were awarded to LFIL. View "Litster v. Litster Frost Injury Lawyers PLLC" on Justia Law

Nattalia Castell was employed as a senior accountant for Money Metals Exchange, LLC. She was discharged after allegedly mishandling an Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) notice regarding her boyfriend's unemployment benefits application. Castell applied for unemployment benefits, but an IDOL appeals examiner excluded her boyfriend from testifying, denied her request to reopen the hearing to read a statement, and found that she was terminated for employment-related misconduct, making her ineligible for benefits.Castell appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which denied her request to reopen the hearing and affirmed the appeals examiner's decision. The Commission found that Castell's actions constituted misconduct, as she failed to disclose a conflict of interest and mishandled the notice. Castell then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the appeals examiner did not err in excluding the boyfriend's testimony or in denying Castell's request to reopen the hearing. The Court also found that the Commission's determination that Castell was discharged for employment-related misconduct was supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court concluded that Castell's actions disregarded a standard of behavior that Money Metals had a right to expect from its employees, and her claim of retaliation was not supported by evidence. View "Castell v. IDOL" on Justia Law

In 2018, Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting this claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading him to appeal.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho initially reviewed the case. The court found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course and scope of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. It concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions met the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court granted summary judgment to Crookham and denied Clover’s motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence and arguments that were deemed untimely and insufficient to alter the court’s original decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case on appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham engaged in conduct knowing that employee injury would result. The court found no evidence that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge of a significant risk posed by the drip tape lifter. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to subsequent remedial measures and denied Clover’s motion for reconsideration, concluding that the new evidence presented did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court awarded costs to Crookham as the prevailing party. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

Samuel Hickman was electrocuted while working on a construction site when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Hickman and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against Boomers, LLC, its owner Michael Landon, and employee Colter James Johnson, alleging negligence and recklessness. Boomers moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Hickman argued that the accident fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The district court granted summary judgment for Boomers and denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration.The district court applied the 2020 amended version of Idaho Code section 72-209(3), which clarified the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception, and concluded that Boomers did not intend to harm Hickman or have actual knowledge that injury was substantially likely. Hickman appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and the standard from Gomez v. Crookham Co., which interpreted the exception to include conscious disregard of knowledge that an injury would result.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the pre-amendment version of section 72-209(3) and the Gomez standard should apply. The court found that the additional evidence submitted by Hickman in his motion for reconsideration created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johnson consciously disregarded the known risk of injury from the power lines. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hickman v. Boomers, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Nelson, a car salesman, sustained a back injury on March 29, 2018, while working for Dependable Auto Sales. He experienced significant back pain the following day, leading to a diagnosis of acute back pain with left radiculopathy. Nelson filed a worker’s compensation claim and underwent various treatments and evaluations. Medical opinions varied, with some attributing his back issues to preexisting conditions and obesity, while others recognized a work-related aggravation. Nelson also had a history of preexisting injuries, including knee surgeries and osteoarthritis.Nelson settled his worker’s compensation claim with his employer in September 2019 and subsequently filed a claim against the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for total and permanent disability benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission denied his claim, finding that Nelson failed to prove he was totally and permanently disabled or that he suffered a permanent impairment due to the work-related accident. The Commission’s decision was influenced by its determination that Nelson was not a credible witness, citing inconsistencies in his testimony and a prior conviction for insurance fraud.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the Commission’s credibility determination, despite some errors in the Commission’s findings. The Court upheld the Commission’s conclusion that Nelson was not totally and permanently disabled, as the evidence indicated that there was still a labor market for him, even under the most restrictive limitations. The Court did not address the alternative finding regarding permanent impairment. View "Nelson v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Thomas E. Hennig, Jr., who was discharged from his job at Money Metals Exchange, L.L.C. after making a controversial comment on the company's instant messaging system. Hennig referred to himself as his employer’s “good little Nazi” in a joke about enforcing the company’s time clock rules. After his termination, Hennig applied for unemployment benefits, but his application was denied by the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) on the grounds that he was discharged for misconduct connected with his employment. Hennig appealed this decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which upheld the IDOL's decision.Hennig then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, arguing that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by competent and substantial evidence. He contended that his use of the term "Nazi" was not objectively unprofessional and that the company had tolerated racist remarks from another employee. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the Commission had failed to properly analyze whether the company's expectations of Hennig's behavior were objectively reasonable, given evidence that it had tolerated racist comments from another co-worker and then promoted him to a supervisory position. The court also found that the Commission had failed to consider Hennig's claim that the company had encouraged his unorthodox humor. View "Hennig v. Money Metals Exchange" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Christine Coray after she was injured at her workplace, Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center. Following her injury, Coray's physician recommended back surgery. However, after an independent medical examination (IME) requested by her employer and its surety, they denied liability for the surgery and ongoing benefits, arguing that Coray had recovered from the workplace injury and that the surgery was necessitated by preexisting conditions. After undergoing surgery outside of the workers' compensation system, her employer requested a second IME by a different physician. Coray refused and sought a declaratory ruling from the Idaho Industrial Commission on whether the employer must use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury.The Idaho Industrial Commission ruled that the employer or surety is not required to use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury under Idaho Code section 72-433. However, it also held that each request for an IME is subject to a reasonableness standard, and the burden of proof for establishing reasonableness falls on the employer. Coray appealed this interpretation, while the employer cross-appealed the Commission's conclusion that it bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of a second IME.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission's decision. It held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 72-433 does not prohibit an employer or surety from using different physicians to perform multiple examinations of a single injury. The court also affirmed the Commission's ruling that the employer bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its requested IME, including its choice of physician, if raised by the employee. View "Coray v. Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a decision by the Idaho Industrial Commission that required an employer and its insurance company to pay the full amount of a medical invoice for an employee's workers' compensation claim, even though the employee's medical expenses were fully covered by Medicaid. The employee, Nickole Thompson, worked at Burley Inn, whose workers' compensation insurer was Milford Casualty Insurance Company. After Thompson suffered a work-related injury, Burley Inn and Milford denied her workers' compensation claim for a hip replacement surgery. Thompson underwent the surgery anyway, with Medicaid covering the cost.Thompson later filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, which found the hip replacement surgery was connected to her work injury and awarded her medical benefits based on the full invoice amount for the surgery. Burley Inn and Milford appealed the decision, arguing that the "full invoice" rule should not apply when Medicaid has already covered the medical expenses.The state Supreme Court, however, upheld the Commission's decision, asserting that excluding Medicaid recipients from the full invoice rule could encourage employers to deny workers' compensation claims of workers they suspect of being Medicaid recipients. The court also noted that the full invoice rule was consistent with Idaho's workers' compensation law and was intended to prevent employers from denying legitimate claims. The Court also concluded that the employer and insurer had standing to bring the appeal and that Thompson was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Thompson v. Burley Inn, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho was tasked with answering a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The question centered on the appropriate point of accrual for wage discrimination claims under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) and the Idaho Equal Pay Act (IEPA). Plaintiff Lori S. Blasch accused her former employer, HP Inc., of wage discrimination and retaliation under the IHRA and the IEPA.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the one-year limitation period for IHRA claims begins when the pay-setting decision is made and communicated to the employee. As for IEPA claims, the court determined that they are subject to the four-year statute of limitations outlined in Idaho Code section 5-224. Furthermore, the limitation period for IEPA claims begins to run when the employee receives each discriminatory paycheck. The court made these decisions after reviewing the language of the relevant statutes and considering previous court decisions, legislative intent, and public policy. View "Blasch v. HP, Inc." on Justia Law