Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Casey Moyer entered into an agreement with Doug Lasher Construction, Inc. for the construction and purchase of a new home, which was substantially completed in November 2014. Over the next six-and-a-half years, Moyer repeatedly informed Lasher Construction about issues with the home, particularly water leakage, and received assurances that the issues would be fixed. However, the problems persisted, and Moyer and Caitlin Bower filed suit against Lasher Construction in November 2021, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Lasher Construction, ruling that all claims were time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-241(b) and 5-216, which require that claims arising out of a contract for the construction of real property be brought within five years of the final completion of construction. The court also found that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations provided by Idaho Code section 48-619. The court rejected the homeowners' arguments for equitable estoppel and the repair doctrine, concluding that they failed to show that Lasher Construction prevented them from pursuing their claims within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court reaffirmed that the repair doctrine is not available in Idaho and upheld the district court's conclusion that the homeowners failed to establish the elements of equitable estoppel. The court also agreed that the text messages and the July 2, 2021, response to the NORA demand did not constitute enforceable independent contracts. Lasher Construction was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Moyer v. Lasher Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Tony Heath and Melissa Lish, neighbors in Chubbuck, Idaho, had a dispute after Heath parked two vehicles near Lish’s driveway. Lish, after Heath refused to move the vehicles, obtained a no parking sign from Denny’s Wrecker and had the vehicles towed. Denny’s refused to release the vehicles without payment. Heath sued Lish and Denny’s for civil trespass and conversion. The magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of Lish and Denny’s and awarded attorney fees to Denny’s. Heath appealed, and the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decisions.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding Denny’s summary judgment, holding that Denny’s actions were lawful under Idaho Code section 49-1806(1) and that Denny’s reasonably relied on Lish’s representations. The court found that Denny’s had no duty to verify the property line beyond Lish’s information and that Heath’s vehicles were towed lawfully. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to reduce Denny’s attorney fee award, finding that the magistrate court did not need to address every factor in writing.However, the court reversed the district court’s decision regarding Lish’s summary judgment. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether there was boundary by acquiescence or boundary by agreement. The court noted that the declarations from previous property owners and the removal of part of the driveway by Lish’s husband raised questions about the boundary’s location and whether there was an agreement or acquiescence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Heath’s trespass and conversion claims against Lish.The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal to any party, noting that the issues raised were not pursued frivolously or without foundation. View "Heath v. Denny's Wrecker Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Ginger Collins, acting on behalf of her mother Jean Mace, sought to invalidate the sale of Jean’s home, which was sold by her sister Judy Mace without Ginger’s knowledge. Jean and her husband had transferred the property to Judy, who lived with them and acted as their caretaker. After Jean was moved to an assisted living facility and Judy was diagnosed with cancer, Judy created a revocable trust and transferred the property to it. Shortly before her death, Judy sold the property to Deborah and Raymond Luther. Ginger, believing the property was held in trust for Jean’s benefit, filed suit to evict the Luthers and invalidate the sale.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Boundary County, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Scott Mace (Judy’s cousin and trustee) and the Luthers, dismissing Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court ruled that the deed transferring the property to Judy was unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to establish a resulting trust. Ginger’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the court also denied Scott Mace’s request for attorney fees under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA).The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence to support Ginger’s resulting trust claim. The court emphasized that extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish a resulting trust, as it can reveal the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court declined to address the public policy argument and denied attorney fees on appeal for both parties. View "Mace v. Luther" on Justia Law

Daniel Genho and Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC had a dispute over payment for construction work Genho performed at Riverdale Resort. Genho was not a registered contractor at the start of the project but became registered midway through. Riverdale refused to pay Genho and prevented him from retrieving his tools and materials. Genho filed a Mechanic’s and Materialmen’s Lien and sued for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, conversion, and to foreclose on the lien.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho granted Riverdale’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim but denied it on the other claims. The court found that there were two separate transactions: one before and one after Genho became a registered contractor. The court allowed the jury to consider the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, conversion, and lien foreclosure claims. The jury found in favor of Genho, awarding him $295,568, which was later reduced to $68,681. The district court also awarded attorney fees to Genho.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that equitable remedies are available under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) for work performed after a contractor becomes registered, provided the work is severable from the unregistered work. The court affirmed the denial of a directed verdict on the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and lien foreclosure claims but reversed the award of attorney fees for the conversion claim, as it was not based on a commercial transaction. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees for the foreclosure action under Idaho Code section 45-513. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. The judgment was vacated and remanded for modification consistent with the opinion. View "Genho v. Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC" on Justia Law

Steven Chase appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The claim arose from a failed real estate transaction between Steven’s mother, Audrey Chase, and Streamline Builders, LLC, owned by Richard Swoboda, for the construction of a home. Steven was involved in the transaction, assisting his mother by communicating with Swoboda and realtors, and inspecting the home. The sale did not close due to disagreements over holdback amounts for uncompleted items. Following the failed closing, Streamline and Swoboda sued Steven for tortious interference.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Kootenai County. At the close of Streamline and Swoboda’s evidence, Steven moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of wrongful interference. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found in favor of Streamline and Swoboda, awarding $20,000 in damages. Steven appealed, contending the district court erred in denying his motion because he acted as his mother’s agent and could not be liable for tortious interference.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Steven failed to preserve his agency argument for appeal, as he did not present it to the district court in support of his motion for a directed verdict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Steven’s argument on appeal differed from his argument at trial, where he focused on the lack of improper motive rather than his agency status. The court also awarded attorney fees on appeal to Streamline and Swoboda, finding Steven’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. View "Streamline Builders, LLC v. Chase" on Justia Law

Christina Greenfield appealed an order designating her as a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d). The order, issued by then Administrative District Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer, prohibits Greenfield from filing any new pro se litigation in Idaho without court permission. Greenfield had filed a civil suit for damages in Kootenai County related to the sale of her home and her eviction, naming several defendants. During this lawsuit, the defendants moved to designate Greenfield as a vexatious litigant, which the ADJ granted.In the lower court, Greenfield had previously sued her neighbors and her former attorney, both cases resulting in adverse judgments against her. She also declared bankruptcy, leading to the sale of her home. Greenfield filed another lawsuit against the new owners of her home and others, which led to the motion to declare her a vexatious litigant. The ADJ found that Greenfield had maintained at least three pro se litigations in the past seven years that were decided adversely to her and issued a Prefiling Order. Greenfield responded to the proposed order, but the ADJ issued an Amended Prefiling Order, finalizing the vexatious litigant designation.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The Court held that the ADJ did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify herself, as there was no evidence of personal bias. The Court also found that the ADJ followed the proper procedures under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59, providing Greenfield with adequate notice and opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Greenfield was afforded due process and that the ADJ’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence, confirming that Greenfield had maintained multiple litigations that were adversely determined against her. View "Greenfield v. Meyer" on Justia Law

TCR, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability corporation, filed a lawsuit against Teton County, Idaho, after the County refused to record a Condominium Plat for property within a planned unit development (PUD) owned by TCR. TCR sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the lot had already been approved for condominium development, and also alleged breach of a 1996 settlement agreement between the County and TCR’s predecessor. The district court granted TCR’s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory and injunctive relief claim, ordering the County to record the Condominium Plat, but granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.The district court found that the County had previously approved amendments to the PUD Plat in 2018 and 2019, allowing TCR to build sixteen standalone condominiums on Lot 12B. The County’s refusal to record the Condominium Plat was based on an alleged site plan from 1995, which the district court found inadmissible. The district court concluded that the County had no legal basis to refuse the recording and enjoined the County from preventing TCR’s attempts to record the Plat.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to grant TCR’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that the County had no valid reason to refuse the recording. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County on the breach of contract claim, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the County breached the 1996 Settlement Agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue.The Supreme Court also found that the district court erred in denying TCR’s second motion to enforce, which sought to compel the County to issue building permits after the Condominium Plat was recorded. The Court awarded TCR its attorney fees and costs on appeal, concluding that the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

Catherine Sullivan, trustee of the Catherine Sullivan Family Trust of 2000, owns residential property adjacent to Megan Gruver's equestrian facility, Silver Bell Ranch, in Blaine County, Idaho. Gruver was issued a conditional use permit (CUP) in 2019 to operate the facility, which Sullivan did not appeal. In 2021, Gruver sought modifications to the CUP to hold three events per year, board additional horses, and hire more staff. Sullivan objected, citing concerns about noise, traffic, and property devaluation, but the Blaine County Board of Commissioners approved the modified CUP with conditions.Sullivan appealed the Board's decision to the district court, arguing that the Board erred in categorizing Silver Bell Ranch as an "Outdoor Recreational Facility" rather than an "Agricultural Business" and that the modifications would prejudice her substantial rights. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Sullivan failed to show how the modifications prejudiced her substantial rights and that her arguments regarding the categorization of the facility were time-barred because she did not appeal the 2019 CUP.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that Sullivan's arguments regarding the categorization of Silver Bell Ranch were time-barred and that she failed to establish prejudice to her substantial rights under Idaho Code section 67-5279(4). The Court also found that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding Sullivan's arguments related to prejudice that were raised for the first time in her reply brief. Blaine County was awarded attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), while Gruver was not entitled to attorney fees as she was not an adverse party to Blaine County. Both Blaine County and Gruver were awarded costs on appeal. View "Sullivan v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

Kerry Angelos filed a defamation lawsuit against Greg and Susan Schatzel, alleging they created a website that published defamatory comments about him. During the lawsuit, Angelos faced financial difficulties, leading to his interests in the lawsuit being auctioned at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a preexisting judgment. Greg Schatzel purchased Angelos’s interests and substituted himself as the plaintiff, subsequently dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Angelos appealed, arguing that his defamation claims were personal and could not be deemed “property” subject to execution under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted Schatzel’s motion to substitute as the plaintiff and denied a motion by another creditor, Pacific Global Investment, Inc. (PGI), to intervene. The court found no legal basis to support Angelos’s contention that the sheriff’s sale was invalid or that substituting Schatzel violated public policy. Consequently, the court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that defamation claims are personal and not assignable under Idaho law, referencing the precedent set in MacLeod v. Stelle. The court concluded that Angelos’s defamation claims could not be subject to execution as “other property” under Idaho Code section 11-201. The court vacated the district court’s order granting Schatzel’s motion to substitute and the judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. The case was remanded to determine which of Angelos’s remaining claims, if any, were properly transferred to Schatzel through the sheriff’s sale. The court also denied Schatzel’s request for attorney fees, awarding costs to Angelos as the prevailing party. View "Angelos v. Schatzel" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law