Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the State of Idaho, Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC ("Yellowstone") owned a rental property in the City of Rigby that was extensively damaged after BorTek Utilities and Construction, LLC bored through a lateral sewer line connected to the rental property. The City of Rigby had failed to mark the service lateral sewer pipe connected to the rental property prior to the excavation. Yellowstone sued the City of Rigby for both negligence per se and common law negligence for failing to mark the service lateral. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Rigby, determining that Yellowstone did not have standing under the Idaho Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, and even if it did, it failed to prove the City breached any duty owed to it.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Rigby. The court found that while the Act does not explicitly provide a private right of action for "end users" like Yellowstone, it does impose a duty on the City to mark underground sewer lines in a public right-of-way, which it did not do. The court also held that whether the City breached this duty by failing to maintain records of the location of service laterals, failing to adequately mark service laterals, or failing to take other precautions to protect customers’ service laterals within the public right of way are questions of fact for a jury to decide. Thus, the court concluded that the City of Rigby owed Yellowstone a duty to act as a reasonable manager of its property under the circumstances. View "Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC v. City of Rigby" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho was required to interpret aspects of Idaho’s mechanic’s lien statutes. Datum Construction, LLC, was the general contractor for a commercial construction project, and subcontracted part of the work to Elmore Welding and Steel, who rented equipment from RE Investment Co., LLC, dba Pro Rentals & Sales. Elmore Welding and Steel failed to pay Pro Rentals for the equipment rental, resulting in Pro Rentals filing a mechanic's lien. Datum then purchased a bond and petitioned the district court to release the lien. Pro Rentals did not oppose this petition and the district court released the lien. Datum argued that Pro Rentals had failed to begin proceedings to enforce its claim of lien within six months. The district court granted Datum’s motion to release the bond. Pro Rentals appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled in favor of Pro Rentals, determining that the district court had erred in applying a six-month statute of limitations from the mechanic’s lien statutes to a bond action. The court held that the bond replaced the lien, and the six-month period to enforce a lien was not applicable once the lien was released. The court determined that the appropriate statute of limitations for an action against the bond was two years under Idaho Code section 5-219. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s decision to release the bond. View "Datum Construction, LLC v. Re Investment Co." on Justia Law

The case revolved around a disagreement over a parking agreement related to a property owned by Midtown Ventures, LLC ("Midtown"). In 1999, restaurant owners Thomas and Teresa Capone ("the Capones") agreed with the Idaho Youth Ranch to allow the Capones’ customers to park in the Idaho Youth Ranch’s adjoining lot. In 2008, a group of nonprofit organizations, including the Capones and the Idaho Youth Ranch, signed an agreement to relocate the parking area to accommodate a proposed workforce housing project. However, the 2008 Agreement was not finalized, and the project was eventually abandoned. In 2018, Midtown purchased the Idaho Youth Ranch property and attempted to enforce the 2008 Agreement to relocate the parking area, but was unsuccessful. Midtown then sued the Capones for breach of contract and specific performance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Capones, concluding that Midtown lacked standing to challenge the 2008 Agreement and that the agreement was unenforceable. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the 2008 Agreement was merely an "agreement to agree" and not an enforceable contract. The court also held that Midtown had standing to bring the suit as a property owner, but failed to show that the 2008 Agreement was a valid or enforceable contract. It also found that Midtown waived its challenge to the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its argument that the district court erred in denying the equitable remedy of promissory estoppel. The Court concluded that the Capones are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone" on Justia Law

The holders of the second priority mortgage, Ray and Susan Montierth brought a foreclosure action against the holders of the first priority mortgage, Hendrik Dorssers and Justice Prevails, LLC, (collectively “Dorssers”), and a variety of other parties with an interest in the real property. In their pleadings, Dorssers asserted that their priority interest as the holder of the first priority mortgage still prevailed over all other encumbrances. In Dorssers view, a payment made by the debtor—years after the statute of limitations had run on the mortgage—revived the previously stale claim to foreclose their first priority mortgage and reinitiated the statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-238. However, on summary judgment the district court concluded that Idaho Code section 5-238 only applied when the payment was made prior to the lapse of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment to the Montierths after finding that no payment had been made by the obligor prior to the lapse of the statute of limitations and concluding that Dorssers’ mortgage was unenforceable as a matter of law. The district court subsequently denied Dorssers’ motion for reconsideration and objection to the proposed judgment. Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in favor of the Montierths, which specifically stated: “[t]hat the [Montierths’] lien interest is superior in time to all other parties’ liens, except the mortgage of Hendrik Dorssers and Justice Prevails, LLC, which is time barred and therefor [sic], unenforceable.” On appeal, Dorssers argue the district court erred: (1) in concluding that the partial payments did not extend the statute of limitations for enforcement of the first priority mortgage under Idaho Code section 5-238; (2) in the alternative, in concluding that a junior lien holder could quiet title to a senior lien holder; and (3) in issuing an order to quash the lis pendens they recorded after the appeal was filed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court erred in its determinations: (1) to revive the statute of limitations the payment must have been made prior to the lapse of the statute of limitations; (2) the “transfer of money” was not a payment in recognition of the debt as a matter of law; and (3) the payment was not made by an obligor as a matter of law. In addition, the Court found the district court erred in striking the lis pendens. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Montierth v. Dorssers" on Justia Law

In December 2019, Paul Hanks slipped and fell on a patch of ice after exiting a vehicle in the passenger unloading zone at the Boise Airport. Hanks sued defendants the City of Boise, Republic Parking System, LLC, and United Components, Inc. for negligence. Hanks argued that Defendants had a duty to maintain the airport facilities in a safe condition and that Defendants failed in that duty by not keeping the passenger unloading zone free of ice. Respondents the City of Boise and Republic Parking System, LLC moved for summary judgment, arguing they had met all legal duties owed to Hanks. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment. Finding that the district court did not err in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hanks v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second time before the Idaho Supreme Court. It involved the existence of a prescriptive easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook owned a parcel of land which was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr. The property stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.” Tower Road connected the Cooks’ property to a county road and had been used by the Cooks and their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, finding it was necessary for the district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for establishing a prescriptive easement. On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. The Van Ordens appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed into an adverse use, and the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kiki Leslie Tidwell (“Tidwell”) and the Madison Jean Tidwell Trust opposed an affordable housing project on land dedicated to Blaine County, Idaho for public use. Plaintiffs contended the Final Plat contemplated the land be held for open space and recreational use, but Blaine County contracted with ARCH Community Housing Trust (“ARCH”) and Blaine County Housing Authority (“BCHA”) to donate a parcel ("Parcel C") to BCHA to construct community housing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the County, ARCH, and BCHA (collectively “the County”) seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages to Tidwell under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ultimately dismissed Tidwell’s section 1983 claim, but the district court allowed Plaintiffs to pursue the remaining claims, despite the County’s contention that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the complaint. Following a series of unsuccessful dispositive motions seeking summary and partial summary judgment on both sides, the case proceeded to court trial, where Plaintiffs prevailed on both claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court denied Tidwell’s request for attorney fees. The County appealed, and Tidwell cross-appealed the dismissal of her section 1983 claim and both Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees. On appeal, the County again raised its standing argument, contending Plaintiffs had no particularized interest in the parcel and suffered no particularized injury. If Plaintiffs had standing, the County claimed the district court erred by concluding the Final Plat was ambiguous and by permitting extrinsic evidence, including testimony of what the parties intended to construct on the parcel when the land was transferred. The Plaintiffs cross-appealed, with Tidwell alleging the district court erred in dismissing her procedural and substantive due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Both Plaintiffs also contended the district court abused its discretion in denying their claim for attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims. Costs, but not attorney fees, were awarded on appeal to the County. View "Tidwell, et al. v. Blaine County, et al." on Justia Law

Kyle and Ashley Fickenwirth and Amy Lanning (“Lanning”) owned adjoining properties at the center of this dispute. The Fickenwirths owned a gravel driveway that ran along the backside of Lanning’s property. Lanning had previously maintained a decorative split-rail fence on her property. Until recently, there was a relatively small strip of grassy land between the Fickenwirths’ driveway and the split-rail fence in Lanning’s backyard. This dispute arose when Lanning removed the split-rail fence and erected a new fence running directly along the western side of the Fickenwirths’ driveway that more closely adhered to the boundaries described in the deed. The Fickenwirths brought suit to quiet title to the strip of land between the split-rail fence on Lanning’s property and their driveway based on the theories of adverse possession or, alternatively, boundary by agreement. The district court concluded that the Fickenwirths had failed to prove their claims regarding adverse possession and boundary by agreement at the location of the split-rail fence. However, the district court found that the Fickenwirths had proved a claim of boundary by agreement at the location of the new fence, near the side of the driveway, but leaving a small strip of grass between the driveway and the fence. Lanning appealed this determination, claiming there was never an agreement that the boundary line was at the location of the new fence. After review and finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Fickenwirth v. Lanning" on Justia Law

Between 2015 and 2019, BitterSweet Ranch and its managers (“BitterSweet”) leased three parcels of farmland from Frank Sullivan and two of his business entities, The Green Desert, LLC, and The Sullivan Limited Partnership (collectively, “Sullivan”). The parties signed three identical five-year leases (“the Leases”) involving three separate parcels of real property, each owned by one of the three Sullivan parties. The Leases specified that Sullivan was to be responsible for payment of the property taxes, but that those parties were to be reimbursed by BitterSweet, and that BitterSweet was to be responsible for bi-annual rent payments, utilities, and water assessments. For a variety of reasons, the parties purportedly orally agreed to modify the Leases to offset amounts owed to each other throughout the terms of the Leases. Shortly before the Leases were set to expire at the end of their five-year terms, Sullivan claimed that BitterSweet was in breach of the Leases for its alleged failure to make timely rent payments, to pay all property taxes, and to pay the water assessments pursuant to the terms of the Leases. Sullivan then filed three lawsuits (one for each of the Leases and in the names of each of the three parties) in district court. The district court ordered the cases consolidated and then granted summary judgment in favor of BitterSweet, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact had not been created as to whether BitterSweet had breached the Leases. Sullivan appealed the adverse order. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. BitterSweet Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

A large, dead tree near a mobile home rented by Tammy and Thomas Sankey fell and damaged the Sankeys’ vehicles, killed one of their cats and traumatized the other, and caused Tammy Sankey to experience emotional distress. Proceeding pro se, the Sankeys filed a small claims action against the owner of the mobile home park where they lived and the owner and managers of their mobile home. After losing in small claims court because they failed to prove on whose land the offending tree was located, the Sankeys filed for a trial de novo in magistrate court and paid for a land survey. The Sankeys submitted both documents attached to a joint declaration from them in opposition to motions for summary judgment filed by the owners and managers, along with a declaration from the Sankeys’ neighbor setting forth the neighbor’s lay testimony that the tree was located on the lot occupied by the Sankeys. The owners and managers of the mobile home and the mobile home park filed motions to strike the declaration from the neighbor as well as portions of the Sankeys’ declaration and the attached Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit. The magistrate court granted the motions, holding that no foundation had been laid for the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit and that they were inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate court also struck the declaration of the neighbor because her testimony about the location of the fallen tree was not based on her personal knowledge. Without admissible evidence of who owned the land where the fallen tree was located, the magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of the owners and managers. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Sankey v. Ivey" on Justia Law