Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal of a district court order affirming in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”). In response to a delivery call filed by Rangen, Inc., the Director had issued an order curtailing certain junior-priority ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”). The order provided that the junior-priority ground water users could avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan. The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) filed several mitigation plans for approval. The Director issued an order conditionally approving IGWA’s Fourth Mitigation Plan, which proposed leasing water from another surface water right holder and piping the water to the Rangen facility. Rangen petitioned for review. The district court upheld the Director’s order in significant part. Rangen appealed. Finding no reversible error with the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Mary Pandrea appealed a district court decision regarding the partition of approximately twenty-three acres of real property owned jointly by Pandrea and her sister. Pandrea argued on appeal that the partition greatly prejudiced her and thus that the district court improperly partitioned the property in kind rather than by sale. She appealed several district court decisions denying motions she made for reconsideration and to amend her complaint. Finding no grounds to reversed any of the district court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pandrea v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Appellant Bradley Morgan appealed declaratory judgment determining where to measure the sixteen-foot width of an easement held by Respondent New Sweden Irrigation District, which bordered an irrigation canal that ran the length of a piece of appellant's property. Appellant did not dispute the existence of New Sweden’s easement, but rather argued that: (1) the district court erred by denying appellant's request for a jury trial; (2) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit new evidence at trial; (3) the district court erred by failing to incorporate the holdings of a previous judgment identifying the boundaries of the easement, the access points to the easement, the encroachments on the easement, and the party responsible for removing those encroachments; and (4) the district court erred by failing to limit the removal of encroachments and the uses of the easement to that which was reasonable. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist" on Justia Law

Greg and Jessica Skinner appealed a judgment dismissing the Skinners’ claim of negligence against U.S. Bank Home Mortgage. U.S. Bank retained insurance funds received after the Skinners’ home was destroyed by fire and released a portion of the funds as the home was rebuilt. There were serious defects in the new construction that ultimately culminated in the project being abandoned. The Skinners claimed that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because U.S. Bank owed the Skinners a fiduciary duties regarding the disbursement of the insurance proceeds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a transfer of real property located in Cassia County. Appellants-buyers Robert and Becky Humphries accused Respondents-sellers Eileen Becker, her son, Allen Becker, and daughter-in-law, Jane Becker of: (1) fraud though misrepresenting, concealing, and/or failing to disclose material information with regards to (a) the sources of water to the Property and (b) the Property’s sprinkler/irrigation system; and (2) violating the Idaho Condition Disclosure Act. The district court entered an order granting the Beckers' motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) The Humphries had pled fraud with sufficient particularity with regards to statements in the MLS Listing and Disclosure Form; (2) the Beckers did not make any false representations in either the MLS Listing or the Disclosure Form; (3) any duty that the Beckers may have had to disclose the existence of a Farm Well was satisfied by the Joint Well Use Agreement; (3) the representation in the MLS Listing that the sprinkler system was automatic could not serve as the basis for fraud; and (4) the Disclosure Form did not violate the Disclosure Act. The Humphries unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Eileen Becker, and upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Allen and Jane. The Court upheld the grant of attorney's fees and costs to Allen and Jane, and granted them fees on appeal. The Court vacated the grant of fees as to Eileen, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Humphries v. Becker" on Justia Law

This appeal centered the competing security interests of appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company and respondent Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, & Toole, P.S. in real and personal property located in Post Falls, “Post Falls Landing” and the “Marina.” These properties were formerly owned by the Point at Post Falls, LLC and Post Falls Landing Marina, LLC (collectively, “The Point”). Witherspoon provided legal representation to The Point during the purchase. In 2005, The Point granted Witherspoon a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. Liberty and The Point entered into an agreement by which Liberty would loan The Point money in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of the loan, which was secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. As a condition to the Original Loan Agreement, Witherspoon entered into an agreement subordinating its Original Deed of Trust to Liberty’s Original Deed of Trust. Later on, Liberty agreed to extend additional funds to The Point. These funds were used to construct the Marina. By 2010, Witherspoon entered into the last of multiple amended subordination agreements with The Point. Unlike the prior subordination agreements, the Final Subordination Agreement did not include the “and any renewals or extensions thereof” language. The Final Subordination Agreement was recorded on September 3, 2010. Liberty foreclosed on The Point in August 2011 after The Point defaulted on one of the many loans. The trustee’s sale took place in November 2012, which resulted in the conveyance of the real property of Post Falls Landing to Liberty in exchange for a credit bid of $3,404,000.00. A few months later, Liberty filed an action against Witherspoon seeking a judicial declaration that the Marina was a fixture on Post Falls Landing real property, a judicial declaration that the trustee’s deed conveyed to Liberty all interest in the Marina, and entry of a decree quieting title to the Marina in Liberty’s name. Liberty’s appeal challenged five rulings by the district court: one at the summary judgment stage and four after the bench trial. The single issue from the summary judgment stage was whether the district court properly invoked judicial estoppel against Liberty. Of the four bench trial issues, three involved Liberty’s and Witherspoon’s competing security interests in Post Falls Landing and the effect of the Eighth LMA on those interests. The fifth issue was whether the Marina was personal property or a real property fixture to Post Falls Landing. Ultimately, the judgments of the district court were vacated by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, etc." on Justia Law

Charles and Gail Houpt appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank and First American Title Company (FATCO). In March 1993, the Houpts executed a promissory note to the American Bank of Commerce (Note). As security on the Note, the Houpts granted a deed of trust in the Property to American Bank of Commerce, as beneficiary, and FATCO, as Trustee (Deed of Trust). Over a period of time spanning from 1994 to 2004, American Bank of Commerce went through a series of mergers and transactions that resulted in Wells Fargo Bank obtaining the obligation owing under the Note and secured by the Deed of Trust. However, a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust designating Wells Fargo Bank as the beneficiary of such was not filed during this time. Starting in November 2007, the Houpts failed to make numerous payments on the Note and ceased all payments by the end of 2009. Consequently, Wells Fargo Bank directed FATCO to foreclose on the Property and on October 18, 2010, FATCO filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale listing American Bank of Commerce as the current beneficiary and setting the date of the sale for February 17, 2011. The day before the scheduled trustee’s sale, the Houpts filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A year later Wells Fargo Bank was granted stay relief by the bankruptcy court and resumed foreclosure on the Property. The Houpts filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction stating that: (1) Wells Fargo Bank was not the beneficiary or other real party in interest of the Deed of Trust, and as such, Wells Fargo improperly initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure; (2) the district court should grant a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale; and (3) Wells Fargo’s actions constituted wrongful foreclosure. Wells Fargo denied all claims made and argued that Wells Fargo Bank was the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust through merger and consolidation and, therefore, was exempted from having to record a written assignment of the Deed of Trust prior to exercising its power of sale. Notwithstanding this argument, Wells Fargo Bank obtained a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust from Wells Fargo Northwest on August 24, 2012, and recorded the assignment in 2012. The district court, noting that Wells Fargo had recorded its assignment of the Deed of Trust, denied the Houpts’ motion for preliminary injunction but left open the possibility that Wells Fargo had committed a wrongful foreclosure. Ultimately, the district court found that because no foreclosure sale had occurred, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. After denying Houpts’ request for reconsideration, the district court entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo and awarded attorney fees and costs. The Houpts appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, but remanded for a determination of what effect, if any, a SBA payment and the date of default had on the interest and balance due under the Note. Further, the Court vacated the district court’s grant of attorney fees and costs and remanded for a determination of costs and fees with specific instruction to exclude all costs and fees incurred by Wells Fargo before September 4, 2012. View "Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

This dispute related to a strip of land that was part of a cell tower site located in the City of Coeur d’Alene. Sherman Storage, LLC sued Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC seeking to eject Global from that strip of land, and seeking contract damages and mesne profits. Sherman appealed the district court’s judgment in Global’s favor and its order that Sherman pay a substantial sum for Global’s attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after a review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman Storage v. Global Signal Acq." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a failed development project undertaken by BRN Development, Inc. in Coeur d’Alene. The project was for the development of a high-end 325-unit residential and golf course community on the west side of Lake Coeur d'Alene known as "Black Rock North." American Bank was the lender for this project. The Bank ultimately brought a foreclosure action against BRN. BRN brought a cross-claim against Taylor Engineering, Inc., alleging negligence for its role in the development. Taylor recorded a lien against the development. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank named BRN, Taylor, and any other entity claiming an interest in the development. Taylor made a demand on BRN for payment for services rendered. The demand stated that Taylor would "complete the necessary documents" and request the necessary signatures from the local government entities involved in the final PUD approval. Taylor advised BRN that "if the final subdivision approval is not completed and recorded by May 29, 2009, the PUD and preliminary plat approval will expire, the PUD and plat will not vest in the recorded ownership to the real property involved, and the property will revert to its prior zoning and density." This statement was erroneous; it was undisputed that the final plat did not need to be recorded by May 29 in order to vest the PUD. In BRN's cross-claim against Taylor, it alleged professional negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and failure to disclose based on the erroneous statement Taylor made in its demand letter. The district court separated the claims between Taylor and BRN from the remainder of the American Bank litigation and ultimately held that Taylor was not liable to BRN. BRN appealed. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the district court's judgment that BRN failed to meet its burden of proving its claims against Taylor, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "American Bank v. BRN Dev." on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law