Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal centered the competing security interests of appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company and respondent Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, & Toole, P.S. in real and personal property located in Post Falls, “Post Falls Landing” and the “Marina.” These properties were formerly owned by the Point at Post Falls, LLC and Post Falls Landing Marina, LLC (collectively, “The Point”). Witherspoon provided legal representation to The Point during the purchase. In 2005, The Point granted Witherspoon a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. Liberty and The Point entered into an agreement by which Liberty would loan The Point money in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of the loan, which was secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. As a condition to the Original Loan Agreement, Witherspoon entered into an agreement subordinating its Original Deed of Trust to Liberty’s Original Deed of Trust. Later on, Liberty agreed to extend additional funds to The Point. These funds were used to construct the Marina. By 2010, Witherspoon entered into the last of multiple amended subordination agreements with The Point. Unlike the prior subordination agreements, the Final Subordination Agreement did not include the “and any renewals or extensions thereof” language. The Final Subordination Agreement was recorded on September 3, 2010. Liberty foreclosed on The Point in August 2011 after The Point defaulted on one of the many loans. The trustee’s sale took place in November 2012, which resulted in the conveyance of the real property of Post Falls Landing to Liberty in exchange for a credit bid of $3,404,000.00. A few months later, Liberty filed an action against Witherspoon seeking a judicial declaration that the Marina was a fixture on Post Falls Landing real property, a judicial declaration that the trustee’s deed conveyed to Liberty all interest in the Marina, and entry of a decree quieting title to the Marina in Liberty’s name. Liberty’s appeal challenged five rulings by the district court: one at the summary judgment stage and four after the bench trial. The single issue from the summary judgment stage was whether the district court properly invoked judicial estoppel against Liberty. Of the four bench trial issues, three involved Liberty’s and Witherspoon’s competing security interests in Post Falls Landing and the effect of the Eighth LMA on those interests. The fifth issue was whether the Marina was personal property or a real property fixture to Post Falls Landing. Ultimately, the judgments of the district court were vacated by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, etc." on Justia Law

Charles and Gail Houpt appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank and First American Title Company (FATCO). In March 1993, the Houpts executed a promissory note to the American Bank of Commerce (Note). As security on the Note, the Houpts granted a deed of trust in the Property to American Bank of Commerce, as beneficiary, and FATCO, as Trustee (Deed of Trust). Over a period of time spanning from 1994 to 2004, American Bank of Commerce went through a series of mergers and transactions that resulted in Wells Fargo Bank obtaining the obligation owing under the Note and secured by the Deed of Trust. However, a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust designating Wells Fargo Bank as the beneficiary of such was not filed during this time. Starting in November 2007, the Houpts failed to make numerous payments on the Note and ceased all payments by the end of 2009. Consequently, Wells Fargo Bank directed FATCO to foreclose on the Property and on October 18, 2010, FATCO filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale listing American Bank of Commerce as the current beneficiary and setting the date of the sale for February 17, 2011. The day before the scheduled trustee’s sale, the Houpts filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A year later Wells Fargo Bank was granted stay relief by the bankruptcy court and resumed foreclosure on the Property. The Houpts filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction stating that: (1) Wells Fargo Bank was not the beneficiary or other real party in interest of the Deed of Trust, and as such, Wells Fargo improperly initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure; (2) the district court should grant a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale; and (3) Wells Fargo’s actions constituted wrongful foreclosure. Wells Fargo denied all claims made and argued that Wells Fargo Bank was the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust through merger and consolidation and, therefore, was exempted from having to record a written assignment of the Deed of Trust prior to exercising its power of sale. Notwithstanding this argument, Wells Fargo Bank obtained a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust from Wells Fargo Northwest on August 24, 2012, and recorded the assignment in 2012. The district court, noting that Wells Fargo had recorded its assignment of the Deed of Trust, denied the Houpts’ motion for preliminary injunction but left open the possibility that Wells Fargo had committed a wrongful foreclosure. Ultimately, the district court found that because no foreclosure sale had occurred, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. After denying Houpts’ request for reconsideration, the district court entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo and awarded attorney fees and costs. The Houpts appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, but remanded for a determination of what effect, if any, a SBA payment and the date of default had on the interest and balance due under the Note. Further, the Court vacated the district court’s grant of attorney fees and costs and remanded for a determination of costs and fees with specific instruction to exclude all costs and fees incurred by Wells Fargo before September 4, 2012. View "Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

This dispute related to a strip of land that was part of a cell tower site located in the City of Coeur d’Alene. Sherman Storage, LLC sued Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC seeking to eject Global from that strip of land, and seeking contract damages and mesne profits. Sherman appealed the district court’s judgment in Global’s favor and its order that Sherman pay a substantial sum for Global’s attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after a review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman Storage v. Global Signal Acq." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a failed development project undertaken by BRN Development, Inc. in Coeur d’Alene. The project was for the development of a high-end 325-unit residential and golf course community on the west side of Lake Coeur d'Alene known as "Black Rock North." American Bank was the lender for this project. The Bank ultimately brought a foreclosure action against BRN. BRN brought a cross-claim against Taylor Engineering, Inc., alleging negligence for its role in the development. Taylor recorded a lien against the development. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank named BRN, Taylor, and any other entity claiming an interest in the development. Taylor made a demand on BRN for payment for services rendered. The demand stated that Taylor would "complete the necessary documents" and request the necessary signatures from the local government entities involved in the final PUD approval. Taylor advised BRN that "if the final subdivision approval is not completed and recorded by May 29, 2009, the PUD and preliminary plat approval will expire, the PUD and plat will not vest in the recorded ownership to the real property involved, and the property will revert to its prior zoning and density." This statement was erroneous; it was undisputed that the final plat did not need to be recorded by May 29 in order to vest the PUD. In BRN's cross-claim against Taylor, it alleged professional negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and failure to disclose based on the erroneous statement Taylor made in its demand letter. The district court separated the claims between Taylor and BRN from the remainder of the American Bank litigation and ultimately held that Taylor was not liable to BRN. BRN appealed. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the district court's judgment that BRN failed to meet its burden of proving its claims against Taylor, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "American Bank v. BRN Dev." on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) purchased Russell Hafer’s home at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. FNMA filed an eviction suit when Russell and his wife, Sandra, refused to vacate. The Hafers claimed that the foreclosure sale was invalid because their loan servicer, American Home Mortgage Services, Inc.(now known as Homeward Residential, Inc.), agreed to modify the terms of Russell’s loan just prior to instituting foreclosure proceedings. They claimed that Russell was therefore not in default at the time of the sale. The Hafers filed a third-party complaint against Homeward, stating eleven causes of action and asking the district court to quiet title in Russell. FNMA and Homeward filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no agreement to modify the loan terms because Russell did not sign and return a permanent loan modification agreement to Homeward by the specified deadline. The district court granted the motion in favor of FNMA and partially granted the motion in favor of Homeward, holding that there was no agreement between Homeward and Russell modifying Russell’s loan because no Homeward representative signed an agreement. The Hafers appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in considering the question whether an agreement had to be signed by a Homeward representative when that issue was not raised in the joint motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the district court erred substantively in concluding that there was no agreement to modify Russell’s loan absent a signature from a Homeward representative. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the Hafers' first, third, and fourth causes of action against Homeward, as well as granting FNMA's claim for possession. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Hafer" on Justia Law

Virgil Adams appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Association, Inc. Adams purchased a townhouse, subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (1980 Declaration) that did not specifically restrict an owner’s ability to lease his or her unit. Subsequently, the Association amended the 1980 Declaration to provide that an owner could not rent a unit for a period of less than six months. Adams argued the amendment constituted an invalid restraint on the free use of his land and that he did not have notice of the possibility of such a restriction under the general provision allowing “amendment” in the 1980 Declaration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's Association, Inc." on Justia Law

James and Barbara Hilliard (Vendors) owned a farm in Owyhee County with approximately 3,000 acres of farmable land. They executed written leases of the best farm ground to various farmers who grew row crops. They orally leased to John Clark other portions of the farm, on which he raised hay and grain crops. In 2009 and 2010, Vendors leased the row crop portion of the farm to Lance Funk Farms, LLC. Because of his health, on John Clark became unable to continue farming, and Vendors orally leased to his son Jay P. Clark, Vendors’ attorney, those parts of the farm not leased for growing row crops. According to Vendors, in January 2010 Jay Clark fraudulently obtained a written document purporting to give him a one-year lease of the entire farm with an option to extend the lease for a period of ten years. He then recorded the document in the records of the county recorder, and in June 2010 his father recorded a document claiming to have a 10% interest in the farm. These recordings created clouds on the Vendors’ title to the farm. In November 2010, Vendors contracted to sell their farm to Murphy Land Company, LLC (Purchaser). Jay Clark told Purchaser that he would only vacate the farm upon payment to him of $2,000,000 and payment to his father of $950,000. Because of the two clouds on the title and the refusal of Jay Clark to vacate the property, the parties entered into an amendment to their contract which stated, among other things, that $3,000,000 of the sale price would be held in trust to “be available to the extent determined by a court of competent jurisdiction of the purchaser’s damage, if any, for loss or delay of possession of real estate purchased herein.” The sale closed on December 30, 2010. In early 2011, Vendors sued Jay and John Clark, and obtained a judgment declaring Jay Clark’s purported lease null and void and ordering that John Clark’s recorded claim to ownership of a 10% interest in the farm be expunged from the county records. Then Purchaser filed a lawsuit to have Jay Clark removed from the farm. Clark fought that lawsuit, including filing for bankruptcy protection after Purchaser was granted summary judgment in its action to remove him from the farm. As a result, Purchaser did not obtain possession of the farm until May 2012. In 2013, Vendors filed this action for a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to a $3,000,000 being held in trust. Purchaser filed a counterclaim seeking that sum for the damages it incurred due to the delay in being able to obtain possession of the farm. The district court granted summary judgment to the purchaser after holding that the material portions of the affidavits filed by the vendors in opposition to summary judgment were inadmissible. Finding no error with that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Hilliard v. Murphy Land Co." on Justia Law

At the heart of this appeal was a judgment resolving a dispute between two neighbors. In 1994, defendants Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger built their home in the Park Wood Place subdivision in Post Falls, on a lot next to the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants operated a bed and breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of arborvitaes near the property line between their lot and the lot owned by Richardson. In 2005, plaintiff Christina Greenfield purchased the Richardson property. The following year, Plaintiff had an attorney write to the Defendants, stating that the operation of their bed and breakfast violated the subdivision’s protective covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s) and that the height of the arborvitaes violated the height restriction on fences contained in the CC&R’s and the height restriction on hedges contained in a city ordinance. Thereafter, the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants centered on the operation of Defendants’ bed and breakfast in their home and the height of their arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height of ten to twelve feet. In April, Defendants returned from a vacation and discovered that about four to six feet had been cut from ten of their arborvitaes; Plaintiff had her agent cut the trees. Plaintiff was charged criminally, but the charges were later dismissed. Over a period of about eighteen months, there were fourteen incidents of paint being splashed or poured on improvements to their property, with the last incident occurring about four months before the jury trial in this case. In September 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging four claims against Defendants: (1) a declaratory judgment that Defendants were violating the CC&R’s by operating the bed and breakfast and allowing their arborvitaes to grow higher than five feet (obstructing a pedestrian easement across their property); (2) the plants and trees on Defendants’ property that blocked her view of the Spokane River constituted a nuisance; (3) Defendants had agreed to maintain their foliage along the common boundary line at a height of six feet and Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height when they grew taller; and (4) Defendants breached their agreement with her and made false and defamatory statements about her to law enforcement, which negligently caused her emotional distress. The trial court found that Defendants did not violate the subdivision CC&R’s by operating a bed and breakfast from their home or by having arborvitaes higher than six feet, and awarded them a judgment totaling $168,755.37 against the plaintiff for her conduct that caused them emotional distress. Plaintiff appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and award attorney fees on appeal. View "Greenfield v. Wurmlinger" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on respondents Daryl and Linda Mullinix's right to use appellant Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co.'s pipeline to convey water from Joe Creek. Both parties had water rights pursuant to partial decrees from the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) to obtain water from Joe Creek. The parties also entered into a private Settlement Agreement, which required that Mullinix's point of diversion was below Killgore's point of diversion on Joe Creek. After the parties entered into this Agreement, Mullinix filed a complaint against Killgore seeking to use Killgore's pipeline to convey water. Killgore counterclaimed. After a bench trial, the district court ordered that Mullinix could use Killgore's pipeline, but Mullinix had to install a weir below Killgore's weir to satisfy the point of diversion clause in the Agreement. The water from Mullinix's weir would then join Killgore's pipeline to reach Mullinix's property. After the district court issued its order, Killgore prevented Mullinix from obtaining an easement on the property of a nonparty to install the weir. As a result, the district court ordered that Mullinix could forgo the separate point of diversion and instead install a tap on Killgore's pipeline as it crossed Mullinix's property. Killgore appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Court vacated the district court's order that Mullinix pay an annual water delivery fee to Killgore. In all other respects, the district court's second amended final judgment was affirmed. View "Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co." on Justia Law