Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) purchased Russell Hafer’s home at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. FNMA filed an eviction suit when Russell and his wife, Sandra, refused to vacate. The Hafers claimed that the foreclosure sale was invalid because their loan servicer, American Home Mortgage Services, Inc.(now known as Homeward Residential, Inc.), agreed to modify the terms of Russell’s loan just prior to instituting foreclosure proceedings. They claimed that Russell was therefore not in default at the time of the sale. The Hafers filed a third-party complaint against Homeward, stating eleven causes of action and asking the district court to quiet title in Russell. FNMA and Homeward filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no agreement to modify the loan terms because Russell did not sign and return a permanent loan modification agreement to Homeward by the specified deadline. The district court granted the motion in favor of FNMA and partially granted the motion in favor of Homeward, holding that there was no agreement between Homeward and Russell modifying Russell’s loan because no Homeward representative signed an agreement. The Hafers appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in considering the question whether an agreement had to be signed by a Homeward representative when that issue was not raised in the joint motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the district court erred substantively in concluding that there was no agreement to modify Russell’s loan absent a signature from a Homeward representative. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the Hafers' first, third, and fourth causes of action against Homeward, as well as granting FNMA's claim for possession. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Hafer" on Justia Law

Virgil Adams appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Association, Inc. Adams purchased a townhouse, subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (1980 Declaration) that did not specifically restrict an owner’s ability to lease his or her unit. Subsequently, the Association amended the 1980 Declaration to provide that an owner could not rent a unit for a period of less than six months. Adams argued the amendment constituted an invalid restraint on the free use of his land and that he did not have notice of the possibility of such a restriction under the general provision allowing “amendment” in the 1980 Declaration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's Association, Inc." on Justia Law

James and Barbara Hilliard (Vendors) owned a farm in Owyhee County with approximately 3,000 acres of farmable land. They executed written leases of the best farm ground to various farmers who grew row crops. They orally leased to John Clark other portions of the farm, on which he raised hay and grain crops. In 2009 and 2010, Vendors leased the row crop portion of the farm to Lance Funk Farms, LLC. Because of his health, on John Clark became unable to continue farming, and Vendors orally leased to his son Jay P. Clark, Vendors’ attorney, those parts of the farm not leased for growing row crops. According to Vendors, in January 2010 Jay Clark fraudulently obtained a written document purporting to give him a one-year lease of the entire farm with an option to extend the lease for a period of ten years. He then recorded the document in the records of the county recorder, and in June 2010 his father recorded a document claiming to have a 10% interest in the farm. These recordings created clouds on the Vendors’ title to the farm. In November 2010, Vendors contracted to sell their farm to Murphy Land Company, LLC (Purchaser). Jay Clark told Purchaser that he would only vacate the farm upon payment to him of $2,000,000 and payment to his father of $950,000. Because of the two clouds on the title and the refusal of Jay Clark to vacate the property, the parties entered into an amendment to their contract which stated, among other things, that $3,000,000 of the sale price would be held in trust to “be available to the extent determined by a court of competent jurisdiction of the purchaser’s damage, if any, for loss or delay of possession of real estate purchased herein.” The sale closed on December 30, 2010. In early 2011, Vendors sued Jay and John Clark, and obtained a judgment declaring Jay Clark’s purported lease null and void and ordering that John Clark’s recorded claim to ownership of a 10% interest in the farm be expunged from the county records. Then Purchaser filed a lawsuit to have Jay Clark removed from the farm. Clark fought that lawsuit, including filing for bankruptcy protection after Purchaser was granted summary judgment in its action to remove him from the farm. As a result, Purchaser did not obtain possession of the farm until May 2012. In 2013, Vendors filed this action for a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to a $3,000,000 being held in trust. Purchaser filed a counterclaim seeking that sum for the damages it incurred due to the delay in being able to obtain possession of the farm. The district court granted summary judgment to the purchaser after holding that the material portions of the affidavits filed by the vendors in opposition to summary judgment were inadmissible. Finding no error with that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Hilliard v. Murphy Land Co." on Justia Law

At the heart of this appeal was a judgment resolving a dispute between two neighbors. In 1994, defendants Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger built their home in the Park Wood Place subdivision in Post Falls, on a lot next to the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants operated a bed and breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of arborvitaes near the property line between their lot and the lot owned by Richardson. In 2005, plaintiff Christina Greenfield purchased the Richardson property. The following year, Plaintiff had an attorney write to the Defendants, stating that the operation of their bed and breakfast violated the subdivision’s protective covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s) and that the height of the arborvitaes violated the height restriction on fences contained in the CC&R’s and the height restriction on hedges contained in a city ordinance. Thereafter, the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants centered on the operation of Defendants’ bed and breakfast in their home and the height of their arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height of ten to twelve feet. In April, Defendants returned from a vacation and discovered that about four to six feet had been cut from ten of their arborvitaes; Plaintiff had her agent cut the trees. Plaintiff was charged criminally, but the charges were later dismissed. Over a period of about eighteen months, there were fourteen incidents of paint being splashed or poured on improvements to their property, with the last incident occurring about four months before the jury trial in this case. In September 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging four claims against Defendants: (1) a declaratory judgment that Defendants were violating the CC&R’s by operating the bed and breakfast and allowing their arborvitaes to grow higher than five feet (obstructing a pedestrian easement across their property); (2) the plants and trees on Defendants’ property that blocked her view of the Spokane River constituted a nuisance; (3) Defendants had agreed to maintain their foliage along the common boundary line at a height of six feet and Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height when they grew taller; and (4) Defendants breached their agreement with her and made false and defamatory statements about her to law enforcement, which negligently caused her emotional distress. The trial court found that Defendants did not violate the subdivision CC&R’s by operating a bed and breakfast from their home or by having arborvitaes higher than six feet, and awarded them a judgment totaling $168,755.37 against the plaintiff for her conduct that caused them emotional distress. Plaintiff appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and award attorney fees on appeal. View "Greenfield v. Wurmlinger" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on respondents Daryl and Linda Mullinix's right to use appellant Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co.'s pipeline to convey water from Joe Creek. Both parties had water rights pursuant to partial decrees from the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) to obtain water from Joe Creek. The parties also entered into a private Settlement Agreement, which required that Mullinix's point of diversion was below Killgore's point of diversion on Joe Creek. After the parties entered into this Agreement, Mullinix filed a complaint against Killgore seeking to use Killgore's pipeline to convey water. Killgore counterclaimed. After a bench trial, the district court ordered that Mullinix could use Killgore's pipeline, but Mullinix had to install a weir below Killgore's weir to satisfy the point of diversion clause in the Agreement. The water from Mullinix's weir would then join Killgore's pipeline to reach Mullinix's property. After the district court issued its order, Killgore prevented Mullinix from obtaining an easement on the property of a nonparty to install the weir. As a result, the district court ordered that Mullinix could forgo the separate point of diversion and instead install a tap on Killgore's pipeline as it crossed Mullinix's property. Killgore appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Court vacated the district court's order that Mullinix pay an annual water delivery fee to Killgore. In all other respects, the district court's second amended final judgment was affirmed. View "Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Duane Mueller filed this action against Carolyn Hill, Kevin Thompson, Philomena Keys, and Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC (a company owned by Kevin Thompson and Philomena Keys), to recover damages for trespass after construction debris landed on his property from his neighbor Kevin Thompson's adjoining property. Kevin Thompson had caused cap rock to be installed on the portion of a driveway that was adjacent to the common boundary, replaced an existing culvert, and added a rock catch basin in order to address the problem of water runoff flowing onto the Mueller property. In an attempt to return the Mueller property to its pre-2008 condition, he also hired a company to remove material that had been dumped onto the Mueller property when building a roadway in 2008. In March 2013, the matter was tried to the district court without a jury, and it awarded Mr. Mueller damages for trespass plus court costs and attorney fees. The Defendants then timely appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment except for $1,000 of the damages awarded, and remanded the case for the entry of an amended judgment. View "Mueller v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Board of Tax Appeals' (the BTA) denied appellant Jayo Development, Inc.'s application for a business inventory property tax exemption. In 2012, Jayo Development applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-602W(4), claiming that the property qualified as site improvements held by a land developer. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied the application. Subsequently, the BTA and the district court both affirmed the denial. On appeal, Jayo Development argued: (1) that the plain language of the statute entitled it to the exemption;, (2) that the district court erred in relying on IDAPA 35.01.03.620 in denying Jayo Development the tax exemption; and (3) that the 2013 amendment of Idaho Code section 63-602W(4) clarified the legislature's intent and supports its interpretation of the statute. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Thomas and Rebecca Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Stanley. In 2012, the City provided notice to the Arnolds (and other interested parties) of the date and time for three public hearings and a regular city council meeting, all scheduled to take place on August 9, 2012. The first of the three public hearings was noticed to begin at 5:00 p.m. and was for the purpose of receiving public comment on proposed Ordinance 189, the ordinance that the Arnolds alleged affected their property rights. The second and third hearings were noticed to begin at 5:15 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., respectively (and were for the purpose of public comment on matters not at issue here). The regular city council meeting was noticed to begin at 6:00 p.m. The first two meetings were held at their scheduled times. The third meeting began five minutes early, at 5:25 p.m., and concluded at 5:29 p.m. The regular city council meeting, scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m., commenced at 5:31 p.m. and adjourned at 6:55 p.m. Prior to the start of the 6:00 p.m. meeting, the City did not amend the notices it had provided or otherwise notify the public that the meetings would begin earlier than scheduled. The early start time of the 6:00 p.m. meeting and the City's failure to provide amended notice of the earlier start time were the issues presented in this appeal to the Supreme Court: it was at the 6:00 p.m. meeting that the mayor and city council deliberated toward a decision on Ordinance 189, eventually voting to adopt the ordinance. Although the Arnolds were fully aware of the agenda items to be discussed at the various meetings, at no time from the outset of the first meeting at 5:03 p.m. until the final meeting adjourned at 6:55 p.m. did they attend the meeting; the Arnolds conceded at oral argument that they had no intention of attending the meeting. Following adoption of Ordinance 189, the Arnolds filed an action against the City under Idaho Code section 67-2347(6), seeking to have the ordinance declared null and void because the City held the 6:00 p.m. meeting in violation of Idaho's open meeting law by starting the meeting early and failing to provide notice of the earlier start time. The district court held the Arnolds lacked standing to bring an enforcement action because the plain language of Section 67-2347(6) allows standing for such an action only to one who is actually affected by a violation of the open meeting law, instead of being affected only by a substantive action taken at the meeting. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on this basis. The Arnolds appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: because a plain reading of the statute contradicted the Arnolds' argument, and because they did not even claim to have been actually harmed by the 6:00 p.m. meeting's early start time, the Court found that their appeal was brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "Arnold v. City of Stanley" on Justia Law

HJ Grathol ("Grathol") appealed a district court judgment awarding Grathol $675,000 in just compensation from the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"). ITD acted to condemn 16.314 acres to improve U.S. Highway 95. Those 16.314 acres were part of 56.8 acres that Grathol owned in Athol. After a bench trial, the district court held that just compensation would be based on the value of the 56.8 acre parcel. The court also held the property remaining after the condemnation suffered no severance damages. Grathol argued on appeal that the district court applied the wrong law and should have instead based just compensation on a 30 acre parcel. Grathol also argued that the district court ignored Grathol's severance damage evidence and improperly excluded testimony about damages from a proposed frontage road. Furthermore, Grathol appealed the district court's award of costs and discretionary fees to ITD, arguing that condemnors were not entitled to costs and that the court did not find ITD's discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found only that the district court erred in its award of attorney fees. The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for recalculation. View "Dept of Transportation v. HJ Grathol" on Justia Law

Respondents Alan and Marilyn Golub obtained a judgment against appellants and recorded the judgment. Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (KHD), owned a parcel of real property in the county and therefore the judgment constituted a lien against its property. KHD claimed to have executed a deed of trust on the property in favor of Kirk-Scott, Ltd. (KS), several years before Golubs acquired their lien. Golubs filed an action for declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling that their judgment lien had priority over KS’ unrecorded deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment to Golubs, finding that their lien had priority. KHD and the other appellants appealed that decision. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Development" on Justia Law