Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting a new trial on plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and its denial of defendants' request for attorney fees at trial. Plaintiffs Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed purchased a home from Robert and Jorja Shippen via warranty deed. After the basement of the home flooded, the Goodspeeds filed suit against the Shippens, alleging breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The district court denied a request for a jury instruction on the requirements for disclaiming the implied warranty of habitability and the case went to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Shippens, and the Goodspeeds moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing the disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability in the purchase and sale agreement was ineffective because it was not conspicuous. The district court granted a new trial after determining it had excluded the disclaimer instruction based upon its incorrect belief that the Goodspeeds had actual knowledge of the disclaimer. View "Goodspeed v. Shippen" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a district court's judgment to condemn an easement across the appellants' real property for an irrigation pipeline. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court's holding that there was a reasonable necessity required for condemnation of the easement in question. The Court vacated a portion of the judgment as it pertained to Defendants-Appellants Donald and Carolyn Cain's counterclaim and the award of a perpetual easement across their property, but the Court affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Telford Lands v. Cain" on Justia Law

The Bank of Commerce filed suit to foreclose on two mortgages against properties under development by Jefferson Enterprises, LLC. Jefferson raised a variety of counterclaims. Ultimately the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, ordering the foreclosures. Jefferson raised numerous issues on appeal, but finding no error or abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Ent" on Justia Law

Albar, Inc. owned a convenience store, gas station and marina on the Pen Orielle River. In 2003, one of its three underground storage tanks leaked gasoline into the surrounding soil. The tanks were insured through the State's Petroleum Storage Tank Fund. Albar ultimately entered into a consent agreement with the State Department of Environmental Quality to remediate the property and any impacted adjacent properties. In 2005, Albar put the businesses up for sale. Albar made a disclosure regarding the 2003 leak, but that statement would later be found false. JLZ Enterprises was interested in purchasing the property, and relied on the false disclosure. In 2007, JLZ Enterprises sued Albar to recover damages for fraud and breach of contract; to rescind the contract; and to recover damages for negligence against the real estate agent and the broker. The matter was tried to the district court. After hearing the evidence, the court declined to rescind the real estate contract, but found that Albar had breached the contract. The court entered a judgment forclosing the deed of trust on the property and ordering its sale. Albar appealed the grant of JLZ's motion to disallow its costs and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's decision finding Albar breached the contract was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that it was not an error for the court to disallow Albar's costs and fees. View "Echo Vanderwal v. Albar" on Justia Law

Appellants Tommy and Erin Dorsey contended that they were conveyed beachfront property when they bought "Lot 1." Respondents, who own the other lots in the subdivision, contended that the property was dedicated to the use and benefit of the entire subdivision. The district court agreed with Respondents. Plaintiffs appealed. But after a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Ross v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Alva Garrett owned an 80-acre parcel of property in Middleton. He sold most of the property to pay off debt. Alva owned the property in his name, but in 1990, executed a quitclaim deed to himself and his wife Thelma. In 2006, Alva executed a second quitclaim deed to his son, Plaintiff Jack Garrett. Alva gave the 2006 deed to Jack's brother John with instructions not to record it until Alva died. Alva died in 2008, and the deed was recorded. Jack then sued his stepmother Thelma to partition the property. After a bench trial, the court ruled that the 1990 deed re-characterized the property from separate to community property, invalidating the 2006 deed. Jack appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Garrett v. Garrett" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a boundary line dispute between neighboring property owners in Clearwater County. Jimmy and Susan Sims brought suit against Eugene and Elda Daker, claiming a fence line between their properties constituted a boundary by agreement. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the Simses. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in determining that the fence line constituted a boundary by agreement. Upon review, the Court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the fence line constituted a boundary by agreement, and accordingly affirmed the district court's judgment quieting title in favor of the Simses. View "Sims v. Daker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Peter Kaseburg was a littoral owner on Lake Pend Oreille who held an encroachment permit for a series of decaying wooden pilings that were driven into the lakebed in the 1930s. With the exception of a single piling that a neighboring marina uses to anchor one of its docks, the pilings never had any known navigational purpose. Petitioner applied to the Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) for a permit to replace ten of the wooden pilings with steel pilings, but failed to specify any navigational purpose for this proposal. The IDL considered the application a request for a nonnavigational encroachment permit and denied it after receiving several objections. While a final decision was still pending on the first permit application, Petitioner filed a second application for a permit to install a mobile dock system and mooring buoy. The IDL considered the second application a request for a permit for a navigational encroachment extending beyond the line of navigability. Again, the IDL received many objections and denied the application. Petitioner then sought judicial review, which reversed the IDL. The court held that all pilings were navigational encroachments as a matter of law, regardless of whether they have ever been used to aid navigation. The district court set aside both denials. The IDL appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court with respect to the first application, but affirmed the district court with respect to the second. View "Idaho Bd of Land Comm v. Kaseburg" on Justia Law

Subdivision developers Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively Buckskin) brought suit against Valley County seeking recovery of monies paid to the County for road development, and declaratory relief from payment of any further monies. The district court granted summary judgment to the County and Buckskin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a governing board may lawfully make a voluntary agreement with a land developer for the funding and construction of new infrastructure. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the County. View "Buckskin Prop v. Valley County" on Justia Law