Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a dispute between two competing creditors, DAFCO, LLC, and New Phase Investments, LLC. DAFCO appealed the district court's determination on summary judgment that DAFCO's deed of trust, although first recorded, was void under I.C. 32-912 because it encumbered community real property but was not signed by both spouses. Because I.C. 32-912 was enacted for the protection of the community rather than third-party creditors, the Supreme Court found that New Phase could not invoke that statute to void DAFCO's competing encumbrance. Accordingly, the Court reversed: the district court erred in declaring DAFCO's trust deed void under that statute at New Phase's request. View "New Phase Investments v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

Defendants Jay and Theresa Knowlton appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants Tapadeera, LLC and Cary Hamilton (d/b/a C&J Construction) on their claim that Defendants prevented Plaintiffs from performing a settlement agreement to resolve a lawsuit between the parties. Tapadeera owned a parcel of property that had been platted as one lot. Tapadeera sold the property as two parcels -a two-acre parcel and a six-acre parcel purchased apparently under a real estate contract. The purchasers had a modular home placed on the two-acre parcel, but they failed to make the payments due in both transactions. As a result, the lender foreclosed on the two-acre parcel, and Tapadeera regained title to the six-acre parcel. Defendants desired both parcels to construct a home. They purchased the two-acre parcel from the bank, and contracted with Tapadeera to purchase the six-acre parcel. After making several payments under the contract, Mr. Knowlton contacted Cary Hamilton, Tapadeera's president, to determine the amount necessary to pay the contract in full. Mrs. Knowlton recorded the deed, and the Knowltons stopped payment on the check when they discovered that they could not obtain a building permit for the six-acre parcel because it had been wrongly divided from the two-acre parcel. For over four years, neither party took any action regarding this transaction. Eventually the parties sought to finish the deal, and it headed to court. Mr. Hamilton agreed to fix the subdivision problem and the Knowltons agreed to pay the balance owing. However, when notice of the subdivision was mailed to adjacent and affected property owners, the Knowltons were omitted from the notice. They learned of the hearing regarding the subdivision after it was over; they gave notice that they were withdrawing their subdivision application. The court held that the county's approval of the subdivision application was a condition precedent to the Knowltons' obligation to pay the balance, but that they had wrongfully prevented performance of that condition by withdrawing the subdivision application. The Knowltons moved for reconsideration which was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "This case illustrates the time and expense that can be wasted when the parties fail to exercise common sense to resolve an issue. Clearly, Tapadeera should have had the lot subdivided in connection with the first sale. When the issue arose after the sale of the six-acre parcel to the Knowltons, the parties should have met and agreed to the resolution they reached six years later. Once they did so, they both should have been reasonable in doing whatever was necessary to effectuate the replatting of the lot." View "Tapadeera v. Knowlton" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a dispute between Silver Eagle Mining Co. (Silver Eagle) and the State of Idaho (State) regarding ownership of property in Shoshone County on which Silver Eagle had located sixteen mining claims. After Silver Eagle filed an action against the State to quiet title in the mining claims, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on the ground of claim preclusion because the Department of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) had previously found Silver Eagle's mining claims void ab initio. Silver Eagle appealed, arguing that claim preclusion did not apply because the IBLA decision did not address the same claim as Silver Eagle's action against the State. Additionally, Silver Eagle contended that the State was collaterally estopped from asserting title to the subject property and asked the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and enter judgment in its favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that res judicata indeed precluded Silver Eagle from relitigating its interest in the subject mining claims. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Silver Eagle Mining Co v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Paul Trunell and Bill Lomu appealed a district court's ruling against them in their request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged the existence of a public road across Defendant Verna Fergel's property, and that she denied access to the road causing damage to Plaintiffs. The district court held that Defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value, and that she did not have actual or constructive notice of the public nature of the road when she purchased the property. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the "bona fide purchaser for value" defense was not available to Defendant as it would have constituted an abandonment of the road in contravention to Idaho law. The Court therefore reversed the district court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trunnell v. Fergel" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a condemnation action brought by the Idaho Transportation Board (ITB) against HI Boise, LLC. ITB sought to acquire a strip of land as part of a project to improve the I-84/Vista Avenue Interchange in Boise. ITB offered HI Boise the condemned property's appraised value of $38,177, but HI Boise filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, claiming damages of $7.5 million for additional lost rights of access and visibility. HI Boise appeals the district court's summary dismissal of those claims. Because the Supreme Court found that neither claim involved a compensable taking, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was the third appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a 2002 real estate transaction between Thomas and Colleen Birch-Maile and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. Attorney and Real Estate Broker Thomas Maile advised the Trust to reject an offer to sell certain trust property. Months later, Mr. Maile submitted an earnest money agreement for the same property. The prospective buyers, collectively the Taylors, sued the Mailes and Berkshire Investments, LLC (the company that the Mailes formed and to whom they assigned rights to the property) for professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties. The Mailes filed suit seeking to set aside a 2006 judgment against them, which the Court affirmed in the second appeal. The district court determined on summary judgment that the 2006 judgment was res judicata with regard to the issues raised in the Mailes' complaint. At trial the jury awarded damages against the Mailes on the Taylors' counterclaim. The Mailes appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed: the district court was correct in summarily dismissing the Mailes' lawsuit and denying their motion for JNOV. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney to two of the prospective buyers. View "Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the approval of a permit application for a Livestock Confinement Operation (LCO), also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners. The Board approved the application after a remand by the district court of the Board's decision previously denying the permit. Several individuals and organizations opposed to the LCO because of the potential harms to the neighboring farms and to the Minidoka National Historic Site petitioned the district court for review of the Board's decision. The district court affirmed the Board's approval of the permit, finding in the process that four of the organizations concerned with the effects on the Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the district court's decision, asking the Supreme Court to find that these parties had standing to challenge the permit approval, that the Board's procedure for presenting evidence before the Board violated procedural due process rights, and that the Board failed to follow all of the county's relevant zoning ordinances when it approved the application. The issue central to the Court's opinion pertained to standing of all the appellant-organizations, the Board's procedure for presenting evidence throughout the LCO permit application process, the constitutionality of the "one mile rule" of Idaho Code section 67-6529, and the application of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinances. The Court concluded that the Board properly applied its zoning ordinance to the LCO permit application process, that I.C. 67-6529 was not unconstitutional, and that the public was afforded appropriate due process prior to, and during the LCO permit application hearing. View "Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County" on Justia Law

HJ Grathol is a California general partnership that owed real estate in Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for development. The Idaho Transportation board later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. Grathol contended that the Board failed to negotiate for the sixteen acres in good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of two roads which were believed to have significantly increased the property's value. Grathol also asserted that the Board failed to file its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with Idaho law before moving for early possession of the property pursuant to a "quick take" provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board indeed did negotiate in good faith for the subject property, and filed its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with the applicable statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the "quick take" provision in question was satisfied. View "Idaho Transportation Board V. HJ Grathol" on Justia Law

In 2008, Pioneer Irrigation District filed suit against the City of Caldwell seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the removal of urban stormwater discharge conduits constructed by the City without Pioneer's authorization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer. The court held that Pioneer held exclusive interests in its irrigation easements and rights-of-way such that Pioneer could maintain trespass claims against the City. The court also held that I.C. 42-1209 granted Pioneer the power to remove encroachments constructed without its permission that it deemed to unreasonably or materially interfere with its easements and rights-of-way. The district court held that review of certain decisions by the irrigation district would be limited to whether they were arbitrary and capricious or reached in an unreasonable manner. The City moved for permissive appeal, which motion the district court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, except for its holding that irrigation easements and rights-of-way were exclusive interests. View "Pioneer Irrigation v. City of Caldwell" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action brought by Stonebrook Construction, LLC against Chase Home Finance, LLC where it sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The district court granted Chase's motion for summary judgment, holding that Stonebrook was precluded from placing a lien against the subject property because it did not properly register under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) Stonebrook appealed, arguing that Chase lacked standing to assert this defense and was not within the class intended to be protected by the ICRA. Alternatively, Stonebrook contended that the good-faith registration of one member of the LLC constituted actual or substantial compliance with the requirements of the ICRA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed: "the plain language of the Act unambiguously indicates that the Legislature intended to require all limited liability companies engaged in the business of construction to register as contractors and to preclude those that do not register from enforcing mechanic's liens. Although the result for Stonebrook is harsh, it is the result the Legislature intended. [The Court was] not at liberty to disregard this legislative determination as to the most effective means of protecting the public." Thus, the Court declined to vacate the district court’s decision. View "Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law