Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Vernon was a homeowner in default on his home loan. ReconTrust, the holder of Plaintiff's deed of trust, initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on the deed. Upon receiving notice of the trustee's sale, Plaintiff sued ReconTrust, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and Bank of New York Mellon. He alleged that none of the defendants had standing to initiate the foreclosure. Bank of New York moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the claims that it complied with the statutory requirements to foreclose, and that standing was not a requirement for nonjudicial foreclosures. The district court granted the motion, and Plaintiff appealed. He argued that before a party may initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure it must affirmatively show it has standing by having an interest to both the deed of trust and the promissory note. Finding that a trustee was not required to prove it had standing before foreclosing on a deed of trust, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. View "Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Burns Holdings, LLC, desired to construct a concrete batch plant in Teton County near the City of Driggs. Burns Holdings applied to the county for a zoning change from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 (light industrial), and the county approved the zoning change on the conditions that Burns Holdings and the county execute a development agreement, that the zoning will revert back to C-3 if the project does not come to fruition, and that Burns Holdings pay the impact area application fee. The city planning and zoning department approved the conditional use permit to increase the height limitation on Burns Holdings’s property to 75 feet. The matter was then sent to the county for its approval. The county scheduled a public hearing. At that hearing, there was confusion as to whether the matter being considered was an appeal from the decision of the city planning and zoning department or a decision for the county to make, and whether the county even had jurisdiction to make the decision because of the terms of an "area of city impact" agreement. The county commissioners ultimately decided that the decision of the city department was merely a recommendation and that the county had the responsibility to decide the CUP application. The CUP was ultimately denied, and Burns Holding appealed. The issue on appeal was the district court's decision that upheld the denial of the conditional use permit. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the zoning requirements could be waived only by variance, not by a conditional use permit. View "Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

n 2007, Plaintiff-Respondent Leslie Benz entered into a contract to purchase a townhouse that was to be constructed. The contract required her to make three nonrefundable payments of earnest money, which were to be applied to the purchase price. The property's seller sought a construction loan from Defendant-Appellant D.L. Evans Bank. As security for the loan, the seller executed a deed of trust granting the Bank a lien in the property upon which the townhouse would be constructed. The townhouse was substantially completed when Plaintiff was notified that the seller had filed for bankruptcy. The seller failed to pay construction expenses, and as a result, the closing did not occur as scheduled. Numerous mechanics' and materialmen's liens were filed against the property. Plaintiff negotiated with the seller in an attempt to clear the title and purchase the townhouse. Negotiations broke down, Plaintiff notified the seller that she was rescinding the contract, and demanded the return of the earnest money she paid. When the earnest money was not refunded, Plaintiff sued. The trial court held that Plaintiff's lien which was created in connection with the rescinded contract had priority over a deed of trust that the Bank had in the property. The Supreme Court reversed part of the trial court's judgment that awarded accrued interest from the earnest money, but affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Plaintiff. View "Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case contended that the district court erred when it determined that an unnamed road in their subdivision was public by common law dedication. Appellants are property owners in Division III of the Sawtelle Mountain Subdivision of Fremont County, Idaho. The Sawtelle Subdivision plat was created and recorded in 1994. Although the C-shaped road does not intrude on any lots in the subdivision, the disputed road straddles two lots, one of which belongs to Appellants Joni Kepler-Fleenor and Kistin Fleenor, and the other of which belongs to Blue Sky Management, LLC. According to Appellants, heavy construction traffic heading into and out of the Stonegate Subdivision was bothersome and was damaging the disputed road. The owners of the road lots installed a berm and a gate to block traffic on the disputed road in 2005, but the County removed it in 2009, believing the disputed road to be public. Because the subdivision plat unambiguously dedicated the road, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County " on Justia Law

Greenbriar Estates Homeowner’s Association and developer Asbury Park, LLC asserted conflicting interests in a Greenbriar Estates subdivision lot upon which Asbury Park constructed storage facilities. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Asbury Park. Greenbriar HOA appealed and asserted that the district court erred by rejecting the HOA's common law dedication and fraud claims, as well as by refusing to apply the Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the HOA's common law dedication claim because Asbury Park did not make a clear and unequivocal offer to dedicate the lot at issue to the HOA. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's decision that granted partial summary judgment to Asbury Park. View "Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners’ Association, Inc. " on Justia Law

Appellants Ismael Chavez and Dolores Mercado (collectively Chavez) appealed the district court's granting their petition for judicial review, claiming that their original complaint should not have been converted into a petition for judicial review. Canyon County cross-appealed the district court's decision that the flat fee included on the County's notice of pending issue of tax deed was in violation of I.C. 63-1005(4)(d) requiring an itemized statement. In 2009, Chavez filed a class action complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and damages. Chavez alleged that Canyon County had violated a requirement in Idaho Code section 63-1005(4)(d) for an itemized statement of all costs and fees in its notice prior to an issuance of treasurer's tax deeds on two parcels of land they owned. In its Notice of Pending Issue of Tax Deed on the two parcels, the County charged a $500 flat fee for administration costs. In 2010, upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court denied the motion and found Chavez had failed to follow the proper procedures. The court allowed Chavez fourteen days to file the required Petition for Judicial Review. In its review, the Supreme Court held that the district court improperly converted Chavez's declaratory action into a petition for judicial review and was without jurisdiction to rule on the petition for judicial review. Furthermore, the Court declared the notices of pending issue of tax deed to be deficient and void and the corresponding fee was found as moot. View "Chavez v. Canyon County " on Justia Law

Defendants Robert and Margaret Harvey owned 220 acres of farmland near a section of irrigation canal owned by Plaintiff Lower Payette Ditch Company. The canal delivered water to approximately 490 landowners and 13,000 acres of irrigated farmland. Defendants pumped water from Plaintiff's canal to irrigate their farmland. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, alleging that Defendants' irrigation of their land on a bluff caused landslides in 2003 and 2006 which damaged the canal. As a result of the 2006 landslide, a neighboring landowner whose property was also damaged sued both Plaintiff and Defendants which resulted in a jury verdict, assigning 5% of the damages to Plaintiff and 95% to Defendants. Plaintiff and Defendants eventually settled their dispute, and the district court entered a judgment adopting the parties' stipulation. Defendants then sought an award of attorney fees, and Plaintiff objected. The district court granted the objection, holding that there was no clear prevailing party." On appeal to the Supreme Court the issue was whether the district court erred in finding there was no prevailing party. The Court found that Defendants failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in determining that there was no overall prevailing party, and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Lower Payette Ditch Co. v. Harvey " on Justia Law

Idaho Development, LLC (Idaho Development) advanced $1,100,000.00 to Teton View Golf Estates, LLC (Teton View), a joint venture made up of Idaho Development as a 33.3% owner and Rothchild Properties, LLC as a 66.7% owner. Teton View granted Idaho Development a promissory note secured by a deed of trust that specified a set monthly payment and stated that the entire amount was to be paid off in ninety days. Idaho Development filed an action to foreclose on the deed of trust after Teton View failed to satisfy the promissory note. DePatco, Inc., another lienholder on the property, filed a motion for summary judgment to recharacterize Idaho Development’s advance as a capital contribution, which was granted. Idaho Development appealed, arguing that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the entire $1,100,000 advance was intended to be a capital contribution. Idaho Development also appealed a subsequent summary judgment brought by ZBS, LLC, which relied on the recharacterization determination in holding that ZBS’ lien on the property had priority over Idaho Development’s lien. Upon review of the trial court's recharacterization of Idaho Development's lien, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the entire $1,100,000 was intended to be a capital contribution, the district court therefore improperly granted summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC " on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case stemmed from a 2005 real estate purchase and sales agreement (PSA) entered into between Pines Grazing Association as the seller, and J.C. Investments (owner of Flying Joseph Ranch) as the buyer of the Pines Ranch. Prior to closing, the parties learned that approximately 80 acres of what Pines had previously believed to be a portion of Pines Ranch was omitted from the ranch's legal description. Pines retained attorney Fred Snook to assist with the acquisition of the 80 acres. Mr. Snook determined that the 80 acres had been deeded to Lemhi County and that the County still owned the land. In light of this, the parties entered an addendum to the PSA whereby they would proceed with the original closing on the ranch while giving Pines time to try to acquire the 80 acres from Lemhi County in order to sell the 80 acres to Flying Joseph Ranch. The sale closed before the parties learned that Lemhi County could not sell the 80 acres privately; the land had to be sold at public auction. Pines sent Mr. Snook to the auction to bid on the 80 acres. The parties' agents cut a side deal whereby Pines would be paid not to bid on the 80 acres. Flying Joseph ultimately won the land at auction. Flying Joseph's agent faxed Pines' agent an agreement and release of all claims for the 80 acres. Pines refused to sign, believing that the agreement was not part of the oral agreement not to bid at the auction. Pines subsequently filed suit to enforce the terms of the oral contract. Among the issues brought before the Supreme Court were whether the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for JNOV on the grounds that the $20,000.00 offered to refrain from bidding constituted an unauthorized brokerage commission. Upon review, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the oral agreement not to bid at the auction because it was an illegal contract in violation of the Sherman Act. "As such, the parties are left as they are with respect to the oral agreement not to bid, and neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal or in the district court with respect to all issues related to the oral agreement not to bid." The Court upheld the jury's finding that Pines did not breach the grazing lease. View "Pines Grazing Association, Inc. v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kepler-Fleenor and several other property owners in Division III of the Sawtelle Mountain Subdivision challenged a district court's decision that an unnamed road in their subdivision was public by common law dedication. Although the road did not intrude on any lots in the subdivision, it straddled two lots, one of which belongs to Plaintiffs Joni Kepler-Fleenor and Kistin Fleenor, and the other of which belongs to Blue Sky Management, LLC. According to Plaintiffs, heavy construction traffic heading into and out of an adjoining subdivision was bothersome and was damaging the unnamed road. Plaintiffs installed a berm and a gate to block traffic on the road, but the County removed it believing the disputed road to be public. After the County removed the road obstructions, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a judgment to declare the road as private. The district court granted the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that the plat unambiguously showed the disputed road to be dedicated to public use. Because the subdivision plat unambiguously dedicated the road, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County " on Justia Law