Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petrus Family Trust and Edmond Petrus, Jr., individually and as trustee of the Petrus Family Trust (collectively, Petrus) sued Chris Kirk d/b/a Kirk Enterprises (Kirk) and several other parties for claims arising from Petrus’s purchase of a home Kirk built in McCall. Kirk moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion in Kirk’s favor. The district court also awarded attorney fees to Kirk under Idaho Code section 12-121, apportioning the award so as to award Kirk fees only insofar as Kirk was required to defend against a frivolous claim. Petrus appealed. As relevant here, Kirk moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that: (1) Petrus’s conspiracy-to-defraud claim was unsupported; and (2) Petrus’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim was untimely under Idaho Code section 5-241(b). Petrus responded that the breach of implied warranty of habitability claim was timely under section 5-241(a) because it arose in tort, not in contract, and did not address the conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The district held a hearing on Kirk’s summary judgment motion, at which Petrus conceded summary judgment for Kirk was proper on the conspiracy-to-defraud claim, leaving only the breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim. The district court then granted summary judgment to Kirk, concluding Petrus’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim arose in contract and was therefore untimely under section 5-241(b). Even if Petrus’s claim arose in tort, the district court concluded it would be barred by the economic loss rule. Petrus timely moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied the motion after concluding Petrus had not offered any new argument or evidence that would warrant a different result. Thereafter, the district court awarded attorney fees to Kirk under Idaho Code section 12-121, apportioning the award so as to award fees to Kirk only insofar as he was required to defend against Petrus’s conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court was correct that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability arose in contract, making Petrus’s claim untimely. "This conclusion, however, is not to say that a home buyer is left without a tort remedy when a builder negligently constructs a home and causes tort damages. In that scenario, an appropriate tort claim may be asserted, and our ruling today does not foreclose that claim." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of Kirk and appointment of attorney fees. View "Petrus Family Trust v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Donald Frizzell (“Frizzell”) appealed the dismissal of his complaint. Frizzell and defendants Edwin and Darlene DeYoung (collectively, the “DeYoungs”), were parties to an existing trust, with Edwin serving as trustee and Frizzell and Darlene as beneficiaries. The parties entered into an agreement pursuant to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA agreement”). The TEDRA agreement was designed to modify the existing trust terms and also resolve issues related to Edwin’s administration of the trust in his role as trustee. Two years after the TEDRA agreement was filed with the district court, Frizzell filed suit against the DeYoungs alleging Edwin was breaching the TEDRA agreement and his fiduciary duties. The district court granted the DeYoungs’ motion to dismiss based on provisions in the TEDRA agreement that purported to hold Edwin harmless for any actions taken in his role as trustee. The district court also stated Frizzell was bound by the TEDRA agreement to pursue nonjudicial dispute resolution, rather than file a lawsuit for Edwin’s breach of duty. Frizzell appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in dismissing the complaint because the parties were not able to waive future claims for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. Frizzell was not prohibited by TERDA or the agreement from seeking judicial action based on Edwin's alleged breaches of the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing Frizzell’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Frizzell v. DeYoung" on Justia Law

Appellant Jadwiga Melton (“Jadwiga”), challenged a district court’s determination that Respondent Heinz Alt (“Heinz”), filed a timely claim against the Estate of Robert Ernest Melton (“Robert”) and Hedwig Melton (“Hedy”). Hedy died in 2008, and in 2010 Robert married Jadwiga. In 2013, Robert died. Jadwiga commenced joint probate proceedings for both Hedy and Robert, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-111, because Hedy’s will was never probated. Heinz filed a creditor claim against the estate for approximately to the penny $102,574.50, alleging that he loaned money to Hedy and Robert to build a home and in exchange they agreed to execute wills that would leave their estate to him. Jadwiga filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Hedy was the only one who signed the promissory note and Heinz failed to bring a claim within three years of Hedy’s death. The magistrate court determined that, because Heinz failed to bring the claim against Hedy’s estate within three years of her death, his claim was barred by Idaho Code section 15-3-803. Heinz appealed and the district court reversed the magistrate court, holding that Heinz’s claim was timely, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-111, because Heinz brought his creditor claim within three years of Robert’s death. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred when it construed the statutory language of 15-3-111 because the statute was not ambiguous. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Melton v. Alt" on Justia Law

Dwight Randy Green, Kathy Lefor, and Gary Green (collectively, “Siblings”), appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of their lawsuit against James Green (“James”). Siblings brought this action to challenge the Sixth Amendment to the Ralph Maurice and Jeanne Green Revocable Inter Vivos Trust (“the Trust”), alleging it was the product of undue influence. The Trust was amended from an equal distribution between all of Ralph and Jeanne Green’s children to a 100% distribution to James to the exclusion of the Siblings. The district court granted summary judgment after determining that Siblings had failed to show a genuine issue of material fact which would support a finding of undue influence. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Green v. Green" on Justia Law

After the death of James Kenneth Slavens (Jim), James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens, Tanner Slavens, Twin G Holdings, LLC, and Jim’s Estate (Respondents) sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties’ rights in Twin G Holdings, LLC (Twin G), which Jim formed before he died. The district court determined that Jim's wife (and administrator of his estate) Melanie Slavens had no rights in Twin G and entered judgment that: (1) Jim’s three oldest children, James Adam, Alexa, and Tanner, each owned 33% of Twin G; (2) the Eldest Children were Twin G’s sole members; (3) James Adam was Twin G’s sole manager; and (4) Melanie was never a member or manager of Twin G. Melanie, both personally and as administrator, appealed. The trial court found that Jim formed Twin G for asset protection purposes. Twin G’s Articles of Organization listed Jim as Twin G’s managing member. Twin G’s Operating Agreement designated Jim and Johnny Slavens, Jim’s brother, as members, with Jim owning 1% and Johnny owning the remaining 99%. Johnny held a largely passive role in Twin G and testified he held the 99% ownership interest in Twin G for Jim’s benefit until Jim’s death and then for the Eldest Children’s benefit. Jim’s relationship with Johnny soured when real property recorded in Johnny’s name became involved in a lawsuit in spring 2011. Jim took efforts to remove Johnny from Twin G. Jim first sent to Johnny an “Addendum” to Twin G in 2011. If signed, the Addendum purported to transfer Johnny’s ownership interest. The Addendum recited that Johnny “desires to have no interest in Twin G” and, therefore, “has agreed to convey his entire interest to James K. Slavens and Melanie Slavens in such a way that they will share an equal interest in the property.” Johnny never signed the Addendum. After Jim died, Melanie opened a probate proceeding in Utah, where Jim was domiciled, and was appointed special administrator of Jim’s estate. Melanie then asserted rights in Twin G and filed the Amended Certificate with the Idaho Secretary of State. Johnny maintained he still had membership and ownership rights in Twin G, despite having executed the Amended Certificate. As Johnny explained, delivery of the Amended Certificate to Jim was conditional on Jim filing it with the Idaho Secretary of State, which Jim never did. Thus, in August 2013, Johnny executed transfer documents purporting to transfer and assign membership, management, and ownership rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children. With regard to the declaratory judgment action, Melanie moved to dismiss, which the district court denied. Respondents then moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court granted. Melanie filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnny's affidavit at trial under the Deadman Statutes, but that the trial court properly denied Melanie's motion to dismiss. View "Slavens v. Slavens" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal from the district court’s decision to affirm a magistrate court’s summary dismissal of the Estate of John Cornell’s claims involving the administration of a trust. John and his sister, Toni Johnson, were beneficiaries of their parents’ trust. When the time came to distribute the assets, Johnson refused, which led John to file a petition for the administration of the trust and removal of Johnson as trustee. Shortly after filing the petition, John committed suicide. Consequently, the magistrate court granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss John’s petition. Kareen Cornell, John’s surviving spouse, subsequently petitioned the magistrate court for administration of the trust and to remove Johnson as trustee. The magistrate court once again granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss, basing its decision on the trust distribution survivorship clause and on abatement of the claims. John’s Estate appealed, and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that its claims survived John’s death. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Cornell v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Sarah Chitwood was friends with Marjorie Ellmaker. In 2003, Chitwood contacted an attorney to draft a durable power of attorney, naming Ellmaker as her attorney-in-fact. She later had the attorney draft a will. At that time, Chitwood was 85 years old and a widow with no living children. She executed the will, which left a cake plate and glass horse to a married couple who were her friends, her cats to another friend, and the remainder of her estate to Ellmaker. In 2005, Chitwood wanted to sell part of the real property she owned in McCall. She was introduced to Calvin Tabor, a member in A1 Real Estate, LLC which was in the business of flipping houses and buying land to resell. He found a group of investors willing to purchase Chitwood's property. Chitwood entered into a written real estate contract to sell her property to "A1 REAL ESTATE LLC AND/OR AS ASSIGNED." An addendum to the real estate contract stated that Chitwood would finance $227,000 of the purchase price by two promissory notes from A1 Real Estate, LLC, one for $150,000 and the other for $77,000. The addendum also stated that the notes would be secured by A1 Real Estate, LLC and that upon default liens could be placed on the assets of that company. The original note listed "A1 Real Estate LLC" as the borrower, and Tabor signed it "as member of A1 Real Estate." Chitwood died in 2007. The attorney who had drafted her will prepared two affidavits of "Non-Probate" for Ellmaker to sign. In one affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood died leaving a last will and testament; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that upon her death Chitwood owned real property, which was described; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring the real property to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded that affidavit. In the other affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood had died; that she left a will which was not probated; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring Chitwood's interest in the real estate contract with A1 Real Estate LLC, the promissory note dated May 9, 2005, and "the Agreement dated 2007" to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded this affidavit too. Then in 2010, Ellmaker filed this action against Tabor and A1 Real Estate LLC. alleging that Tabor breached an oral contract to pay the note and that all defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, failed to pay the promissory note when due, and had been unjustly enriched. Tabor moved for summary judgment on the ground that he signed the promissory note as a member of A1 Real Estate, LLC and that he was not personally liable on the notes and did not guarantee payment of the note. On the same date, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ellmaker lacked standing to bring this action because the estate of Chitwood had not been probated, no personal representative had been appointed, and the three-year statute of limitations for instituting probate proceedings had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court refused to admit Chitwood's will into evidence and therefore held that Ellmaker had no legal basis for enforcing the promissory note. The court also granted Tabor's motion for summary judgment on all of the claims asserted against him. Ellmaker appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ellmaker v. Calvin Tabor" on Justia Law

Melvin Peterson died in 2007. Prior to his death, he owned some residential real property. In 2001, Peterson executed a Gift Deed of his real property to his daughter, Cathie Peterson, retaining for himself a life estate in the property. Shortly thereafter, he applied for Medicaid and began receiving Medicaid benefits in March 2003. At the time of his death, Melvin Peterson had received a total of $171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits. Cathie was appointed personal representative. IDHW filed a timely Claim Against Estate and later an Amended Claim Against Estate in the amount of $171,386.94. Cathie disallowed the claims without stating a reason. In response, IDHW filed a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim. After a hearing, the court granted IDHW's petition. After receiving no response to its claim against the estate, IDHW filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, setting forth its demand for payment of the value of Melvin Peterson's life estate. After a hearing, the magistrate court entered an order requiring payment of IDHW's claim. The Order held that the life estate was an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to add the life estate interest to the estate's inventory and assign it an appropriate value. However, the personal representative instead filed and was granted a motion to hire an appraiser to determine the fee simple value of the residential real property. After the personal representative failed to file an appraisal, IDHW filed various motions relative to the appraisal, sale of the property, and payment of its claim. The magistrate court granted IDHW's motions to compel appraisal, sale of the property, and payment of the Medicaid claim, which the personal representative subsequently appealed. The district court vacated the magistrate's Order and remanded the matter for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Shortly after the ruling on appeal was entered, Cathie Peterson sought permission from the magistrate court to sell the property, liquidate an escrow account, and pay counsel for the personal representative of the estate. On the same day, she also filed an Amended Personal Representative's Inventory assigning the life estate zero value. Attorney Brent Featherston filed a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance on behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually,"stating that he was seeking to vacate and dismiss all orders entered by the magistrate court regarding her real property. IDHW responded by filing a petition to remove Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the estate, which the magistrate court granted. Following a court trial, the magistrate court held that the life estate remainder interest was an estate asset of value for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement and that its value was to be determined in accordance with IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01. On appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate court. Cathie Peterson appealed. The Supreme Court found that both the magistrate court and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case and personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson individually, and that the entire residential property that Cathie Peterson received from her father was an asset of his estate and subject to Medicaid recovery. Thus, the district court erred to the extent it held that only the remainder interest in the estate was subject to Medicaid recovery. Furthermore, the Court held that Cathie Peterson failed to show that the district court's decision denying her claim for offsets was unsupported by the evidence. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Welfare appealed an order that disallowed its attempt to recover assets in a probate proceeding. The Department sought to recover assets of a dead Medicaid recipient for medical assistance payments made on the decedent's behalf from her widower. The magistrate court held that the Department could not reach the separate property of the decedent's spouse. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Department was permitted to seek recovery from the decedent's community property that was transmuted to her widow as his separate property. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

Ronald (Ron) and Dorothy Arnold appealed the district court's decision to grant a constructive trust property interest in favor of Ron's sister, Mary Snider (Toni) and her husband, Steve Snider. The property in question is a cabin and accompanying forest service permit for land located in Valley County. Toni and Ron's father built the cabin and willed it, along with the permit, to his wife, Bette Arnold. The district court imposed a constructive trust on the property in favor of the Sniders finding that Bette transferred the property to both the Arnolds and the Sniders in 1983. The Arnolds appealed the decision, arguing that the Sniders failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a constructive trust and the district court's finding that Bette intended to give the property to both parties was clearly erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the opinion of the district court. View "Snider v. Arnold" on Justia Law