Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After review of the documents and affidavits proffered in support of Plaintiff Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC’s (“PRA”) position, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded they did not contain adequate foundation and were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. PRA sued Defendant Lloyd MacDonald for an amount owed on a Citibank credit card account. MacDonald filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that PRA did not have standing to bring this action because it could not prove that the debt had been assigned by Citibank to PRA. MacDonald objected to the evidence PRA submitted to support its position, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and lacked adequate foundation. The magistrate court overruled MacDonald’s objections and granted summary judgment in favor of PRA. MacDonald appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. The Supreme Court found that even the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule could not be used to admit some of the documents. The decision to grant summary judgment in favor of PRA was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Portfolio Recovery Assoc v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err when it found that the Church did not have a special relationship with Henrie such that it had an affirmative duty to control or protect him, nor was there any issue of fact as to whether the Church had a general duty to prevent Henrie's injury. This case arose out of injuries suffered by Bryan Henrie while he was participating in a community service event organized by the Mormon Helping Hands (“Helping Hands”), a priesthood-directed program run by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”). Henrie argued on appeal that the district court erred when it dismissed his tort claim on summary judgment. Henrie was assigned to work with a crew felling burned trees and rolling or throwing the wood down an embankment on the property to be hauled away later. Later that day, Henrie was attempting to throw a tree stump down the embankment when it caught on his smock. He was pulled down the embankment by the stump, severely injuring his right knee in the process. Henrie asserted that “[a]t the very least, Defendant had a duty not to supply Plaintiff with gear or clothing that would put him or his bodily safety in danger or ultimately harm him . . . Defendant breached this duty of care.” He further asserted that “Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in nominating, training, and supervising any and all of the clean-up organizers and volunteers, including those who spoke with and directed Plaintiff.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Church. View "Henrie v. Church of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Jimmy Christy, Jr. appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission that found him ineligible for unemployment benefits based upon a willful underreporting of earnings to the Idaho Department of Labor. The appeals examiner heard testimony during a hearing, including Christy’s testimony that despite attending high school, he had problems with numbers and did not read well. The Industrial Commission found that Christy’s explanations resolved only part of the discrepancies revealed by a cross-match audit. The Industrial Commission entered its decision finding that Christy had willfully misstated material facts in his weekly earnings reports to IDOL and found him ineligible for unemployment benefits for each of the weeks that earnings were willfully misrepresented. The Industrial Commission also imposed civil penalties and interest. Christy filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Finding no reversible error in the Industrial Commission's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christy v. Grasmick Produce" on Justia Law

In a parental rights termination and adoption case, John Doe I (“Father”) was incarcerated for second degree murder. He was given a minimum fifteen year sentence, with a subsequent indeterminate period not to exceed life. While Father was in jail awaiting trial, Mother and Jane Doe III ("Child") visited him frequently. After sentencing, Father was transferred to the Idaho State Correctional Institute in Boise. Mother and Child visited him there once in September 2012. This was the last physical contact Child had with Father. Shortly after this visit, Father was transferred to a prison in Colorado. In early 2016, he returned to the Correctional Institute in Boise. Father made frequent phone calls to Child until 2013 when Mother, out of concern for Child, began restricting calls to Child. Thereafter, Father sent a few letters to Child, but has essentially had no contact with Child since then. In 2013, Mother began dating Stepfather. In May 2015, Mother and Stepfather were married. Mother and Stepfather have two children together, and they, Child and their two children live as a family in Nampa. Mother and Stepfather operate two daycare centers in Nampa. Stepfather has acted as a father figure to Child since he began dating Mother, and has had the care, custody and control of Child since he married Mother in 2015. A magistrate court held that it was in the best interest of Child that Father’s rights be terminated so that Stepfather (John Doe II) could adopt her. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doe II v. Doe I" on Justia Law

Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain language mandates credit for “any period of incarceration” where “such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” The statute “does not limit that credit in any way.” In this consolidated appeal, Sterling Brand and Joshua Nall each pled guilty to their respective charges while they were already incarcerated due to unrelated charges. Brand and Nall then moved for credit for time served under section 18-309, requesting credit for the time spent incarcerated after being served with the arrest warrants until judgments of conviction were entered, even though they were already incarcerated due to unrelated charges. The district court denied both motions, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. In Brand’s case, the district court stated that “if you are in custody on separate charges and then unrelated charges are filed and you’re in custody, you don’t get credit for that time because you’re not being held on the new charges, you’re being held on the original charges.” And in Nall’s case, the district court similarly stated “when [Nall] was served with the Ada County arrest warrant in this case, [Nall] was already being detained as a consequence of charges in the federal case. . . . [T]he Ada County warrant had no effect upon [Nall’s] liberty when he was already subject to confinement for the federal charges.” The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court erred in calculating Brand’s and Nall’s credit for time served, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Brand" on Justia Law

Chevy Chase Bank foreclosed on property recorded in Melissa Kempton-Baughman’s name. Plaintiff and her husband apparently tried to work out a plan to cure the default in payments. The deed of trust identified the note, and it defined the bank as the lender, the Plaintiffs as the borrowers, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as the beneficiary. MERS executed an “Assignment of Deed of Trust,” transferring to UBS Investment Bank the promissory note and the beneficial interest in the deed of trust. Pioneer Lenders Trustee Services, LLC, as successor trustee, recorded a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust.” The notice stated, “The beneficial interest under said deed of trust and the obligations secured thereby is currently held by UBS Investment Bank.” Plaintiffs filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. In their petition, they listed Chevy Chase Bank as a secured creditor, and they stated that it had a lien on the property, that the lien was in foreclosure, that the secured debt exceeded the value of the property by $550,000, and that the property would be surrendered. On September 9, 2009, they received a discharge. They did not list UBS Investment Bank as a creditor. MERS executed an “Assignment of Deed of Trust,” transferring to UBS Investment Bank the promissory note and the beneficial interest in the deed of trust. The property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to UBS Investment Bank, and the trustee’s deed was recorded on January 27, 2010. A year later, MERS executed an “Assignment of Deed of Trust” transferring to U.S. Bank, N.A., as trustee for the Trustee for Master Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, all beneficial interest in the deed of trust. Pioneer Title Company, as successor trustee, recorded a notice of rescission, stating that the trustee had “been informed by the Beneficiary that the beneficiary wanted to rescind the Trustee’s Deed recorded upon the foreclosure sale which was conducted in error due to a failure to communicate timely, notice of conditions which would have warranted a cancellation of the foreclosure. US Bank contended that the sale was void because UBS Investment Bank was a nonentity. Plaintiffs then filed this action seeking quiet title to the real property and an injunction against any further attempts to foreclose on the deed of trust. Finding that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that the foreclosure was barred on a statute of limitations defense, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Baughman v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s action to recover under an insurance policy for the loss of her house caused when a renter (who had an option to purchase) demolished it. The trial court determined the insurance policy at issue excluded for such a loss. Within two months of renting the property, plaintiff learned the renter demolished the house. The renter agreed to rebuild a house on the remaining foundation. The renter started, but did not finish, rebuilding the house. Plaintiff thereafter made a claim on her insurance policy. The Idaho Supreme Court found after review of this matter, that the words in an insurance policy were to be given the meaning applied by lay people in daily usage. One such clause implicated the intentional destruction of the house as compared to accidental loss or inadequate remodeling. The renter’s actions in demolishing plaintiff’s house down to the foundation would not be considered by lay people as the “remodeling” of the house. He did not make alterations to an existing structure; he demolished that structure. There was no house left to remodel. Plaintiff had authorized the renter to perform some remodeling, such as installing new flooring, countertops, light fixtures, paint and other cosmetic improvements, but there was no evidence in the record that he did any remodeling at all, much less that the direct cause of the loss of the Plaintiff’s house was caused by any remodeling that had been done. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Fisher v. Garrison Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This consolidated action began as four separate lawsuits arising from transactions involving a dairy operation. This appeal focused on the claims asserted by Jack McCall against Max Silva personally. Max Silva appeals from the judgment of the district court in Twin Falls County finding him personally liable for the purchase of 116 dairy cows. After a bench trial, the district court found Silva personally liable for the purchase of the cows and dismissed the other claims against him. Silva contended that the district court erred when it found him personally liable for the purchase. Silva also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to award him attorney fees proportionate to the claims on which he prevailed at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCall v. Silva" on Justia Law

Steven Andrews filed for workers’ compensation benefits after he fell from a ladder in 2009 while working for the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church). Andrews sought to establish that the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable pursuant to Idaho Code section 72- 332. The referee concluded that Andrews failed to show that ISIF was liable because the evidence showed that any pre-existing physical impairments did not constitute a subjective hindrance and that Andrews failed to show that his pre-existing impairments combined with the industrial accident to cause his total and permanent disability. The Commission adopted the recommendation. Andrews timely appealed, arguing that the Commission’s order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Not persuaded by Andrews’ arguments, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrews v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jaimi Charboneau was granted a new trial, and the State appealed. Charboneau murdered his ex-wife, Marilyn Arbaugh, in 1984. Her two daughters, Tiffnie and Tira, witnessed the crime, and they both testified during his trial. The State moved for summary judgment to dismiss this petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that it was barred by Charboneau’s third petition for post-conviction relief, and the district court denied that motion. It ultimately granted Charboneau a new trial. It held that a letter written by Tira was admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest (she admitted testifying falsely at Charboneau’s trial) and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24), the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. The court also ruled that another statement was admissible. The State timely appealed, and Charboneau cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting a new trial: the issues raised in this case were raised and rejected in Charboneau’s third petition for post-conviction relief, and he could not raise them in this subsequent petition in a different form. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded this case to the district court with directions to dismiss the petition with prejudice. View "Charboneau v. Idaho" on Justia Law