Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

AgStar Financial Services, ACA (AgStar) appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., Gordon Paving Company, Inc., and Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, Gordon Paving), following a deficiency proceeding. Gordon Paving’s cross-appeal asserted that the district court erred in three respects: (1) by permitting AgStar to sell personal property serving as collateral for Gordon Paving’s debt to AgStar after the district court determined that AgStar was not entitled to a deficiency judgment; (2) by awarding AgStar post-judgment attorney fees; and (3) allowing AgStar’s claim of exemption to a royalty check. AgStar moved the district court for an order directing Gordon Paving to transfer the titles of various vehicles that Gordon Paving had pledged as collateral for certain bond obligations to AgStar, and for a comfort order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral at auction. Gordon Paving opposed AgStar’s motion, arguing that because the district court had already determined that AgStar had received real property worth more than the debt owed under the foreclosure judgment and denied AgStar a deficiency judgment, AgStar was estopped from selling any further collateral because Gordon Paving’s debt was extinguished. Gordon Paving moved for an award of attorney fees, asserting that, as the prevailing party in the deficiency proceeding, it was entitled to attorney fees. AgStar opposed Gordon Paving’s request for attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney fees without first determining the prevailing party in the entire action; (2) the district court did not err when it held a bond agreement did not bar Gordon Paving from being awarded attorney fees; (3) the district court erred when it allowed AgStar to continue to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment. The Court did not reach the issue of the district court’s award of post-judgment attorney fees to AgStar because Gordon Paving did not support its claim with sufficient argument or authority. As such, the Court reversed the district court’s order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment; vacated the judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to Gordon Paving; and remanded for the district court to determine attorney fee and cost issues and for further proceedings. View "Agstar Financial v. NW Sand & Gravel" on Justia Law

The Watkins Company, LLC appealed the award of attorney fees to the Estate of Michael Storms (Storms) and Brownstone Companies, Inc. (Brownstone). Watkins brought this action in 2010 seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages resulting from a breach of contract. Watkins was granted a TRO which was secured by a $10,000 bond. Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed, seeking damages resulting from the TRO. After a seven day bench trial, Watkins was awarded $699.64 and Storms and Brownstone were awarded $17,015.88; however, Storms and Brownstone’s award was limited to the bond amount of $10,000. Storms and Brownstone requested that they be awarded attorney fees of $80,126.50. Following a hearing, the district court awarded Storms and Brownstone 90% of their requested attorney fees, finding that 10% of their attorney fees were incurred pursuing their counterclaim and were unrecoverable. Watkins argued on appeal that the district court’s finding that 90% of Storms and Brownstone’s attorney fees were attributable to defending the breach of contract claim was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Watkins Co. v. Estate of Michael Storms" on Justia Law

Auto Alley, LLC, Calvin Visser, and Vicki Visser appealed a district court order granting a writ of possession and quieting title to certain real property in Douglas Visser. Douglas was awarded the property in his divorce from Vicki in 2005. A dispute subsequently arose and in February of 2014, the parties entered into a stipulation that resulted in Vicki being permitted to continue to occupy part of the property known as “Lot 2.” A stipulated judgment was entered which provided that Douglas would convey Lot 2 to Vicki if she completely performed a number of specific obligations within specified time frames. When Vicki failed to completely perform those obligations, Douglas brought the instant motion to enforce the judgment and the district court granted his motion. Vicki appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed and awarded Douglas attorney fees on appeal. View "Visser v. Auto Alley, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a judgment: (1) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to grant the Plaintiffs a right of first refusal with respect to a parcel of real property they were leasing; (2) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to purchase the Plaintiffs’ buildings that were located on that property; and (3) finding that the Plaintiffs were guilty of unlawful detainer. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp" on Justia Law

Claimant Gary Davis, employer Hammack Management, Inc., surety the Idaho State Insurance Fund, and the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (“ISIF”) entered into a compensation agreement (“Stipulation”). The parties agreed that Claimant became totally and permanently disabled based on the combined effects of preexisting impairments and a workplace injury that occurred in 2004. The Stipulation outlined each party’s financial obligations to Claimant, including a credit to Employer for permanent partial impairment benefits previously paid. The Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) approved the Stipulation. Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in “Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc.,” (335 P.3d 1150 (2014)), prohibiting such a credit. Claimant then sought a declaratory ruling that the credit in the Stipulation was void. The Commission issued an order stating that the Stipulation was binding as written and subsequently denied Claimant’s motion for reconsideration. Claimant appealed. The Supreme Court concluded the credit in the Stipulation was invalid and the Commission’s order approving the Stipulation was void. The Court affirmed the Industrial Commission’s holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Claimant’s petition for declaratory ruling but reversed its order upholding the Stipulation and the credit. View "Davis v. Hammack Mgmt." on Justia Law

Appellants, Consolidated Farms LLC, dba Elk Mountain Farms (“Employer”), and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission’s finding that Respondent Rodrigo Rodriguez was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. In addition to his work for the Employer’s farm in irrigation, Rodriguez also helped operate and maintain the machinery used in the harvesting process. Rodriguez, who was right handed, was attempting to clear dirt and other debris from a conveyor belt using a cutting hook. As Rodriguez reached into the machine, the conveyor belt sped up, catching his arm. The machine crushed Rodriguez’s right hand and forearm, breaking numerous bones and causing extensive damage to his nerves and tendons. Following his injury, Rodriguez underwent six surgeries and extensive physical therapy in order to regain limited use of his arm. Rodriguez’s employment was seasonal. Each year he was required to sign a waiver acknowledging that his employment was “Temporary” rather than “Permanent” and that his employment would end at the conclusion of the growing season. For 21 years Rodriguez was rehired by Employer at the beginning of each season. For many of these seasons he was part of the “Core Group” of employees. Rodriguez filed a disability/medical benefits workers compensation complaint with the Idaho Industrial Commission. The Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. It concluded that Rodriguez had suffered a disability of 57% whole person and was permanently disabled under the futility prong of the odd-lot doctrine. The Employer appealed. Finding no reversible error in the Commission’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rodriguez v. Consolidated Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

Washington resident and appellant Douglas Meyer appealed his felony conviction for possession of over three ounces of marijuana. Meyer argued the district court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the necessity defense. Meyer had a prescription for medical marijuana and was the designated medical marijuana provider for Tammy Rose. He was arrested while driving through Idaho on his way to California with over three ounces of marijuana in his vehicle. He argued that the district court was required to provide a necessity defense jury instruction because he had made a prima facie showing of each of the elements of that defense. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in its reasoning for the denial, but not in its conclusion. “Without a prima facie showing that Meyer did not have any legal alternative to manage his pain for a short period of time, including through the procurement of medications which [were] legal in the State of Idaho, Meyer cannot show that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to necessity.” View "Idaho v. Meyer" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to quiet title in a strip of land that was 34.56 feet wide and 314.70 feet long. They alleged that they had satisfied the requirements for acquiring title to the property by adverse possession, which were set forth in Idaho Code section 5-210. At the time that the Plaintiffs went into possession of the strip of property, the required time for occupying adversely possessed property was five years. In 2006, an amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 increased the statutory time period for adverse possession to twenty years. When that amendment became effective, the Plaintiffs had possessed the strip of land for four years and eight months. Guild Mortgage Company held a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust in the strip of land; Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc., was the trustee on the deed of trust; and Terry Lankford was the owner of the strip of land (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 2006 amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 applied, so the Plaintiffs had not possessed the property for the required statutory period. The district court agreed, and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schoorl v. Guild Mortgage Co" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Laura Smith appealed her conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of psilocybin mushrooms to an undercover detective. She contended the district court erred in overruling an objection to an out-of-court statement made by the person from whom they purchased the mushrooms about his supplier on the grounds that it was hearsay and violated the Defendant’s right to cross-examine the declarant. Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Smith" on Justia Law

North Idaho Resorts (NIR) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Union Bank, N.A. (Union Bank) in a mortgage priority dispute. The district court held that NIR did not possess a vendor’s lien because NIR was not the owner of record and that any lien NIR might have possessed had no value. The district court further held that if NIR possessed a valid lien, NIR released any such lien as part of a recorded agreement and that Union Bank was a good faith encumbrancer with no actual or constructive knowledge of the lien. On appeal, NIR argued: (1) the district court misconstrued Idaho Code section 45-801 and that the statute did not require the seller to be the owner of record; (2) the remaining conditional purchase price constituted an unpaid and unsecured value; (3) Union Bank knew NIR was still owed money under the contract; and (4) Union Bank did not qualify as a good faith encumbrancer. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Union Bank, N.A. v. North Idaho Resorts" on Justia Law