Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of statements made to a call-in radio show by Steve Murdock about his neighbor Candace Elliott. The show’s hosts were discussing a Bonneville County case that involved allegations of horse abuse and neglect. Elliott called in to comment. Several callers later, Murdock called in, questioning the veracity of Elliott’s statements, and making various claims about the horse meat market and (referring to Elliott) “Andi’s humane society.” Elliott filed suit, alleging that seven of Murdock’s statements defamed her individually and her foundation, For The Love Of Pets, Inc. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Murdock. Elliott appealed, limiting her appeal to the statement, “Andi’s humane society puts .02% of the money they hit everybody up [sic] back into the care of animals,” which she alleged defames both her and her foundation. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment in favor of Murdock, and affirmed in all respects. View "Elliott v. Murdock" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was a contract dispute between Silver Creek Seed, LLC and Sunrain Varieties, LLC, arising from the development of Bacterial Ring Rot (“BRR”) in two of the potato varieties grown by Silver Creek for Sunrain. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to Silver Creek. Sunrain appealed: (1) the district court’s denial of a motion to reconsider an order granting partial summary judgment to Silver Creek; (2) the exclusion of the back side of the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (“ICIA”) blue tag from evidence; (3) the admission of testimony relating to the source of the BRR; (4) alleged errors in jury instructions; (5) the award of prejudgment interest to Silver Creek and (6) the award of attorney fees and costs to Silver Creek. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Silver Creek Seed v. Sunrain Varieties" on Justia Law

This case arose from an allegedly improper reconveyance of a junior deed of trust (the “EEF Deed of Trust”) held by Appellant, Eagle Equity Fund, LLC (“EEF”). The reconveyance, which was executed by Respondent, TitleOne Corporation, had the effect of divesting EEF of its security interest in the collateral property. Because EEF was divested of its security interest, it did not receive notice when the Property was later sold to DAS Investments, LLC. Being unaware of the sale, EEF had no opportunity to participate in the sale process. Shortly thereafter, DAS resold the Property to Corey Barton Homes, Inc. (“CBH”), for a profit. On discovering the sale and resale of the Property, EEF sued TitleOne, DAS, and CBH, among others, on a litany of counts including tortious interference and negligent reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust. On appeal, EEF argued that: (1) the reconveyance damaged EEF by depriving it of the opportunity to insert itself into the sale of the Property; (2) the statute of limitations had not run on EEF’s negligent reconveyance claim under Idaho Code section 45-1205 because it should have been calculated from the date of the sale rather than from the date of the reconveyance; and (3) DAS and CBH were not bona fide purchasers because they had inquiry notice of EEF’s interest. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) EEF had no claim against TitleOne for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, so the district court did not err in dismissing EEF's claims against TitleOne on summary judgment; (2) because the district court did not err in so granting summary judgment, the Supreme Court did not reach EEF's contention that the district court miscalculated the statute of limitations; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing t allow EEF to amend its complaint to add a quiet title claim against CBH. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Eagle Equity Fund v. TitleOne Corp" on Justia Law

Appellants Shawn and Heather Montee, Shawn Montee, Inc., and ABCO Wood Recycling, LLC appealed, among other things, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Robert Wolford. Appellants argued the district court erred in ruling that certain promissory notes granted to Wolford by Appellants were clear and unambiguous and that under the terms of those notes Appellants were in default and Wolford was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellants also contended that several of their motions were erroneously denied, including a motion to continue, a motion for examination of Wolford, a motion to amend or alter judgment, and various motions to quash. Furthermore, Appellants appealed the district court’s order of contempt entered against them. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment as to some notes over others; vacated summary judgment with respect to those notes, and remanded for the district court to determine when payments were due, when interest was to accrue, and whether the interest rate was per month or per annum. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Wolford v. Montee" on Justia Law

Dennis Sallaz owned a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado that he had purchased in 1964. In 1991, Sallaz granted Eugene “Roy” Rice a lien on the Cadillac, and a new certificate of title was issued in 1991, showing that Roy Rice had a lien on the car. Sallaz had a duplicate of that certificate of title issued to himself. Sallaz was counsel for Rice, and they were close friends and business associates for many years. Their relationship soured, in early 2011, Rice had his son Michael Rice repossess the Cadillac. Michael Rice, on behalf of his father, presented an Affidavit of Repossession to the Idaho Transportation Department, and the Department issued a new certificate of title showing that the owner of the Cadillac was Eugene LeRoy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice, who was his wife. Rice later sold the Cadillac for $25,000. Sallaz filed this action against Rice, his wife, and his son seeking to recover possession of the Cadillac or, if he could not do so, damages for conversion in the sum of $75,000. Sallaz sought a writ of possession to gain possession of the Cadillac, but the district court denied the writ because “Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient probability that he is the official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and that he is entitled to possession of the vehicle.” There were other claims filed between the parties, and all of the various claims were tried to a jury from June 30 through July 21, 2014 (the other claims are not relevant to this appeal). After Defendants rested, Sallaz moved for a directed verdict. The district court denied the motion, and the jury returned a special verdict finding that Sallaz had failed to prove his claim against Defendants for conversion of the Cadillac. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a directed verdict. View "Sallaz v. Rice" on Justia Law

Inclusion, Inc., Inclusion North, Inc., and Inclusion South, Inc., (collectively Inclusion) provided residential rehabilitation support services to Idahoans eligible for Medicaid. In September 2012, Inclusion filed a complaint against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW), alleging IDHW breached binding Medicaid Provider Agreements by failing to adequately reimburse Inclusion for its services. In June 2013, Inclusion amended its complaint with unjust enrichment and quasi-estoppel claims. The district court granted summary judgment for IDHW, concluding no triable issue of fact supported Inclusion’s claims. IDHW then moved for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and requested $74,925.00 in fees. The district court found that IDHW’s requested award was based on a reasonable amount of hours and a reasonable hourly rate, as determined by the Boise market. As the district court acknowledged, “the hourly rate requested is reasonable and certainly well within the rate in the marketplace in the Fourth District in Ada County, in particular.” Even so, the district court took issue with how IDHW’s requested award was not based on the actual hourly rate billed during litigation. As the district court explained, “[e]xcept where the award of attorney fees is paid to the lawyer, fees awarded to a party should not exceed the amount the client actually paid for the lawyer.” To that end, the district court multiplied 599.4 hours of work by $54.00 per hour1 to award a total of $30,857.11. IDHW moved to reconsider, but the district court upheld the award for $30,857.11. IDHW timely appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion by basing the award on the amount billed by the Attorney General. The Supreme Court agreed, vacated the judgment and granted IDHW its requested award. View "Inclusion, Inc v. Id. Dept. of Health & Welfare" on Justia Law

Alik Takhsilov appealed the district court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation prior to his entry of guilty pleas. During the pendency of his underlying criminal case, Takhsilov was deemed incompetent to proceed and was transferred to Idaho State Hospital South pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-212. Three months later, he was found to have regained competency, and he was returned to the district court. Takhsilov then entered guilty pleas to one count of robbery under Idaho Code section 18-6501 and one count of burglary under Idaho Code section 18-1404. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Takhsilov v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Jonathan Hill was convicted for felony driving under the influence (DUI). He raised one issue on appeal. Over an unsuccessful hearsay objection, the deputy sheriff who conducted field sobriety tests (FSTs) of Hill was permitted to testify as to what he had been taught regarding the presence of vertical nystagmus. Hill’s appeal challenged that evidentiary ruling. The Supreme Court found that even if the testimony was relied upon for the basis of an expert opinion, it was improper to disclose the facts upon which Deputy Smith based his opinion. This error was not harmless, and as such, the Supreme Court vacated Hill's conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Idaho v. Hill" on Justia Law

Appellants Ronnel Barrett, Gregg Hammerberg, Eric Tester, and Matthew Williams were injured in a rock burst in 2011, and sued Hecla Mining Company, owner and operator of the Lucky Friday Mine. Appellants contended that Hecla knew the mine was unsafe and knowingly placed Appellants in danger of harm. Appellants claimed that such behavior constituted an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” that was not exclusively covered by the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act (IWCA). On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that because there was no evidence that Hecla specifically intended to harm Appellants, the claims were controlled exclusively by the IWCA. On that ground, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Hecla. On appeal, Appellants argued that the district court erred in its determination that the IWCA exclusively governed their claims. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co" on Justia Law

Patricia Marek, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Larry "Pete" Marek, and Pete's surviving children Michael, Jodie and Hayley, all appealed when the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hecla Mining Company (and its related companies) and several former co-workers. The Mareks sued the company when Pete died after being injured in 2011 at a rock fall at the Lucky Friday Mine operated by Hecla. The Mareks argued that Hecla's decision to remove a pillar from the mining area was sufficiently egregious enough to allow them to pursue their claims outside of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. In its judgment in favor of Hecla, the district court concluded the Act applied because the company's conduct did not amount to "willful or unprovoked physical aggression," and claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marek v. Hecla, Limited" on Justia Law