Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the death of James Kenneth Slavens (Jim), James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens, Tanner Slavens, Twin G Holdings, LLC, and Jim’s Estate (Respondents) sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties’ rights in Twin G Holdings, LLC (Twin G), which Jim formed before he died. The district court determined that Jim's wife (and administrator of his estate) Melanie Slavens had no rights in Twin G and entered judgment that: (1) Jim’s three oldest children, James Adam, Alexa, and Tanner, each owned 33% of Twin G; (2) the Eldest Children were Twin G’s sole members; (3) James Adam was Twin G’s sole manager; and (4) Melanie was never a member or manager of Twin G. Melanie, both personally and as administrator, appealed. The trial court found that Jim formed Twin G for asset protection purposes. Twin G’s Articles of Organization listed Jim as Twin G’s managing member. Twin G’s Operating Agreement designated Jim and Johnny Slavens, Jim’s brother, as members, with Jim owning 1% and Johnny owning the remaining 99%. Johnny held a largely passive role in Twin G and testified he held the 99% ownership interest in Twin G for Jim’s benefit until Jim’s death and then for the Eldest Children’s benefit. Jim’s relationship with Johnny soured when real property recorded in Johnny’s name became involved in a lawsuit in spring 2011. Jim took efforts to remove Johnny from Twin G. Jim first sent to Johnny an “Addendum” to Twin G in 2011. If signed, the Addendum purported to transfer Johnny’s ownership interest. The Addendum recited that Johnny “desires to have no interest in Twin G” and, therefore, “has agreed to convey his entire interest to James K. Slavens and Melanie Slavens in such a way that they will share an equal interest in the property.” Johnny never signed the Addendum. After Jim died, Melanie opened a probate proceeding in Utah, where Jim was domiciled, and was appointed special administrator of Jim’s estate. Melanie then asserted rights in Twin G and filed the Amended Certificate with the Idaho Secretary of State. Johnny maintained he still had membership and ownership rights in Twin G, despite having executed the Amended Certificate. As Johnny explained, delivery of the Amended Certificate to Jim was conditional on Jim filing it with the Idaho Secretary of State, which Jim never did. Thus, in August 2013, Johnny executed transfer documents purporting to transfer and assign membership, management, and ownership rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children. With regard to the declaratory judgment action, Melanie moved to dismiss, which the district court denied. Respondents then moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court granted. Melanie filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnny's affidavit at trial under the Deadman Statutes, but that the trial court properly denied Melanie's motion to dismiss. View "Slavens v. Slavens" on Justia Law

This case concerned a Mother’s parental rights to her two children, M.S. and I.P. Jane Doe I and John Doe I (Respondents) were the paternal great-grandparents of M.S. and I.P. Respondents started caring for M.S. and I.P. in late 2010. At that time, Respondents witnessed Mother unable to hold steady employment and a permanent residence, which forced Mother to “leav[e] [M.S. and I.P.] with people all the time.” Additionally, Father (Respondents’ grandson) had recently moved out-of-state and largely severed contact with M.S. and I.P. Respondents became concerned about the well-being of M.S and I.P. Consequently, Respondents began hosting M.S. and I.P at their home, offered to let Mother move in with them, and regularly gave Mother money to buy groceries. For reasons unclear, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) took M.S. and I.P. from Mother in January 2011 and placed M.S. and I.P. with Respondents. Respondents were awarded guardianship in April 2011 and have since cared full-time for M.S. and I.P. Mother was awarded supervised visitation in 2012, but after missing approximately 14 visits, Mother’s supervised visitation rights were terminated in 2014. A year later, her parental rights to the children were terminated. She appealed the termination, contending that the magistrate court erred in concluding she: (1) abandoned M.S. and I.P. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship; and (2) neglected M.S. and I.P. by failing to provide proper parental care. Finding the decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

Jessica Barr appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (Commission) decision finding her ineligible for unemployment benefits and affirming the decision of an Appeals Examiner for the Idaho Department of Labor’s (IDOL) Appeals Bureau. The Commission found that Barr was discharged by her employer, Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. USA (Citicorp), for misconduct in connection with employment and determined that Barr was not eligible for benefits pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-1366(5). Barr argued that Citicorp representatives provided false information to the Appeals Examiner and her unemployment benefits should have been restored. Finding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the IDOL Appeals Examiner's decision. View "Barr v. CitiCorp Credit Svc" on Justia Law

Scott Ostler was convicted of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. This appeal related only to a single count of lewd conduct: Ostler claimed that the State violated his right to due process by adding an additional lewd conduct charge following a mistrial. The Court of Appeals vacated Ostler’s conviction for the additional felony, agreeing that the State violated Ostler’s right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction: "The proper avenue for Ostler to seek relief is in post-conviction proceedings." The Court ruled that Ostler “may still file a petition for post-conviction relief proceedings in order to ascertain whether defense counsel’s failure to object to the alleged error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ostler’s claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness required further factual development as to why the State added an additional lewd conduct charge. View "Idaho v. Ostler" on Justia Law

Appellant Miguel Cosio-Nava pled guilty in 2014 to the felony offense of domestic battery with traumatic injury, in violation of Idaho Code sections 18-903 and 18-918(2). Cosio was a Mexican citizen who had been in the United States since 1992 as a Legal Permanent Resident (“LPR”). At his sentencing hearing, the court discussed immigration issues with Cosio and his trial counsel. Cosio appealed the district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that trial counsel provided him ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found no error in the dismissal of Cosio's petition for relief and affirmed. View "Cosio-Nava v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence, contract, and fraud claims brought by Path to Health, LLP (“Path”) against Daren Long and ALL-IN INC. d/b/a RE/MAX ALL-IN REALTORS (collectively “Realtors”). Path’s claims were based on the allegation that Long misrepresented that property Path purchased was zoned for commercial use when it was actually zoned for residential use. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in dismissing Path's breach of contract claim because Idaho Code section 54-2087 was incorporated into the Buyer Representation Agreement at issue in this case. Further, the Court found the district court erred in dismissing Path's fraud claim because it found issues of fact as to whether Path justifiably relied upon Long's representations. The Court reversed on those two issues, but affirmed as to all others. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Path to Health, LLP v. Long" on Justia Law

Counsel for appellant Martin Frantz hired attorney Merlyn Clark as an expert witness in an unrelated matter in 2009. Clark was a partner with respondent law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP (“Hawley Troxell”). In 2010, Frantz’ creditor, Idaho Independent Bank, hired Hawley Troxell to represent it in a contract action against Frantz. In 2011, while that matter was pending, Frantz filed for bankruptcy. Hawley Troxell continued to represent the Bank as a creditor in the bankruptcy, including in an adversary proceeding the Bank filed against Frantz in 2013. Frantz alleged in the adversary proceeding that Clark’s interactions with Frantz in the 2009 matter created an attorney-client relationship and that it was therefore a conflict of interest for Clark’s firm to represent the Bank against Frantz. Frantz also alleged that Hawley Troxell improperly used confidential information Clark acquired in the 2009 matter. The bankruptcy court concluded that there was no attorney-client relationship between Clark (or Hawley Troxell) and Frantz. The adversary proceeding was later dismissed as moot. Frantz subsequently sued Hawley Troxell in Idaho district court, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court denied pro hac vice admission to attorney Jeffrey Katz, Frantz’ chosen counsel. The district court also dismissed the complaint on the grounds of judicial estoppel, lack of standing, and abatement. Finally, it awarded Hawley Troxell attorney fees under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. Frantz appealed the denial of pro hac vice admission, the dismissal of his complaint, and the award of attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Frantz v. Troxell" on Justia Law

John Doe (Father) appealed a magistrate court’s order which modified the custody arrangement between Father and Jane Doe (Mother) that was outlined in the court’s Judgment and Order Modifying Prior Court Orders. Father argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it modified the custody schedule three separate times despite the fact that no evidentiary hearing was held and the court’s prior findings of fact and conclusions of law remained unchanged. Mother cross-appealed, arguing that the magistrate court erred as a matter of law in the findings of fact and conclusions of law it entered in relation to the Order Modifying Prior Court Orders. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the magistrate abused its discretion when it changes the initial custody arrangement, and therefore did not reach Father's other arguments on appeal. The Court reversed the magistrate court’s change of custody in its Order Modifying Prior Court Orders, and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Jane Doe I v. John Doe II" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Thomas Millard appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s (Commission) ruling that certain medical payments made by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah on behalf of Millard were payable at the statutorily scheduled fee amounts rather than the full invoiced amounts. Millard argued that the Commission incorrectly applied the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in "Neel v. Western Construction, Inc.," (206 P.3d 852 (2009)), by ruling that a surety may deny a claim then still be allowed to pay the medical fee schedule rate so long as the surety makes payment before the Commission issues a decision on compensability. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Millard v. ABCO Construction" on Justia Law

Marcelino Baeza appealed his conviction for one count of lewd conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen involving his five-year-old niece, J.C. Baeza argued that allowing J.C. to testify at trial through closed-circuit television violated his due process right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence and that the district court failed to adequately consider the relative rights of the parties under Idaho Code section 9-1806 when it ordered the alternative method for presenting J.C.’s testimony. Finding no due process violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Idaho v. Baeza" on Justia Law