Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Brian Hollis pleaded guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and four counts of sexual exploitation of a child. He also admitted to being a repeat sexual offender, which mandates a fifteen-year minimum term of confinement. The district court imposed an indeterminate life sentence with twenty-five years determinate on the lewd conduct charge and concurrent determinate sentences of fifteen years for each of the sexual exploitation charges. Hollis appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed them.Hollis then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender to represent him. However, Hollis' conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that he was no longer able to "ethically or effectively represent" Hollis due to statements made by the district court judge against conflict counsel in a similar post-conviction case. The district court denied the motion to withdraw and the motion to continue the summary disposition hearing. The district court subsequently granted the State’s motion for summary disposition, holding that Hollis had not supported any of his claims with any admissible evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated the judgment of the district court, reversed the decisions on the motion to continue and motion to withdraw, vacated the decision granting summary disposition to the State, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw and the motion to continue. The court also ordered the assignment of a new district court judge on remand. View "Hollis v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Thomas E. Hennig, Jr., who was discharged from his job at Money Metals Exchange, L.L.C. after making a controversial comment on the company's instant messaging system. Hennig referred to himself as his employer’s “good little Nazi” in a joke about enforcing the company’s time clock rules. After his termination, Hennig applied for unemployment benefits, but his application was denied by the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) on the grounds that he was discharged for misconduct connected with his employment. Hennig appealed this decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which upheld the IDOL's decision.Hennig then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, arguing that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by competent and substantial evidence. He contended that his use of the term "Nazi" was not objectively unprofessional and that the company had tolerated racist remarks from another employee. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the Commission had failed to properly analyze whether the company's expectations of Hennig's behavior were objectively reasonable, given evidence that it had tolerated racist comments from another co-worker and then promoted him to a supervisory position. The court also found that the Commission had failed to consider Hennig's claim that the company had encouraged his unorthodox humor. View "Hennig v. Money Metals Exchange" on Justia Law

This case involves an insurance dispute following a fatal car accident. Jay Lanningham was killed in a car accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Lanningham had an insurance policy with Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho that included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. However, Farm Bureau denied the UIM claims made by Lanningham's adult children, Jeremy and Jamie, for their father's wrongful death. The insurance company argued that the siblings did not qualify as insured persons under the policy since they did not reside with Lanningham.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance company rightfully denied payment to Jamie and Jeremy as they did not qualify as insured persons under the policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. The court found that the plain language of Lanningham’s insurance policy precluded non-insureds from recovering UIM benefits. The court also held that the policy did not violate Idaho Code section 49-1212(12), which prohibits reduced liability coverage for family or household members. Furthermore, the court found that the case law precedent, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v. Eisenman, was applicable and remains good law. The court concluded that neither Jamie nor Jeremy, as non-insured heirs, could recover UIM benefits under the plain language of the policy and Idaho Code section 41-2502. View "Lanningham v. Farm Bureau" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between siblings Elizabeth and Jason Carter, who are both licensed dentists and co-owners of Carter Dental. In 2020, Jason accused Elizabeth of misusing the practice’s funds for her personal benefit. The parties agreed to mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement that included a noncompete clause. Elizabeth later refused to sign a written mutual release, leading Jason to move to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court found the settlement agreement and noncompete clause enforceable and dismissed the case with prejudice. Elizabeth appealed, arguing that the noncompete clause and the settlement agreement were unenforceable.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgments. The court found that Elizabeth was estopped from arguing that the settlement agreement was unenforceable because she had not appealed the district court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to Jason and Carter Dental. The court concluded that Jason and Carter Dental were entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Carter Dental v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two neighboring landowners, David W. Axelrod, as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust, and Reid Limited Partnership (RLP) and Michael Reid, an individual. The dispute arose from a settlement agreement concerning the real property and easement rights of the two parties. Axelrod purchased a property in Teton County in 2003, which was not accessible by road. Reid, who owned and operated an organic dairy farm nearby, preferred Axelrod to build onto an existing dirt road on Reid's property rather than using two easements provided in Axelrod's deed. In 2004, Axelrod built onto the existing dirt road, referred to as the "RLP Easement." However, the relationship between Axelrod and Reid began to sour in 2011, leading to a series of disputes and legal actions.The district court initially concluded that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. The parties then executed a settlement agreement and stipulated to dismiss the suit. However, disagreements over the implementation of the settlement agreement led to further litigation. The district court granted Axelrod's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Reid had failed to properly support any assertion of fact or address the assertions of fact in Axelrod's motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Reid individually and affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing RLP's counterclaims for conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court also affirmed the judgment of the district court on Axelrod's breach of contract claim and the judgment of the district court refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to add RFLP as a party. However, the court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing RLP's trespass claim. The court also vacated the attorney fee award as against RLP and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

The case revolves around John Thomas Bujak, who pleaded guilty to grand theft and was placed on probation with the condition of serving thirty days in jail. Bujak scheduled his jail time on weekends to maintain his employment during the week. After serving his first jail stay from Friday morning to Sunday morning, Bujak learned that he would receive credit for two days of jail time. He then moved the district court for credit for time served, arguing that he should receive three days credit because he served time over the course of three calendar days.The district court denied Bujak’s motion, interpreting that the terms of its probation order required Bujak to serve thirty, twenty-four-hour periods in jail. Bujak appealed this decision, arguing that Idaho Code section 18-309 required the district court to award him one day of credit for each partial day of jail time he served.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that neither section 18-309 nor section 19-2603 applies to the calculation of Bujak’s time served. Instead, the court found that Idaho Code section 19-2601(3) controls, which allows a district court to withhold judgment and impose probation terms it deems necessary and appropriate. The court agreed with the district court's interpretation that Bujak was required to serve thirty, twenty-four-hour days in jail as a term of his probation. View "State v. Bujak" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott and Natalie Pinkham, who contracted with Three Peaks Homes, LLC, for the construction of a custom home. The construction did not go as planned and the contract was terminated before the home was completed. Three Peaks subsequently filed two $600,000 mechanics’ liens against the Pinkhams’ home. The Pinkhams then filed a complaint against David Plate, Rebeccah Jensen, Three Peaks, Rebel Crew Construction, LLC, and Legacy Management Enterprises, LLC, asserting several causes of action.The district court denied the Pinkhams’ motion for summary judgment. Later, the Pinkhams’ attorney, Lance Schuster, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plate, Jensen, Three Peaks, and Legacy, which the court granted. The court ordered Appellants to appoint another attorney or appear in person within twenty-one days of service of the order, failing which, the court may enter default judgment against them. The court clerk served a copy of the withdrawal order on Appellants via first class mail.The Pinkhams moved for the entry of default and default judgment against Appellants and for dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaims with prejudice. The district court granted the Pinkhams’ motion without a hearing. Appellants later secured new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied Appellants’ motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry of default. The court also held that Appellants have failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b). The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Pinkham v. Plate" on Justia Law

Martin Edmo Ish was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2017 and sentenced to 15 years, with 10 years fixed and five years indeterminate. However, his original conviction was later vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2020. After the court's decision became final, Ish's bail was reinstated. Unable to post a bond, he was returned to jail to await his retrial. His second trial was postponed several times due to public safety concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ish repeatedly moved for dismissal of his case citing speedy trial concerns, but his requests were denied. He also moved for a change of venue, which was also denied. His second trial commenced in July 2021, and he was again convicted of voluntary manslaughter. This time, he was sentenced to a fifteen-year unified sentence, with the first 14 years fixed and one year indeterminate, resulting in a fixed sentence four years longer than his original sentence. Ish appealed his conviction and sentence.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Ish's judgment of conviction and sentence. The court found that Ish's right to a speedy trial was not violated, as the delays were either neutral or justifiable. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Ish's motion for a change of venue, as Ish failed to demonstrate that the jury pool was tainted by media coverage. The court further found that Ish did not demonstrate that a juror should have been excused for bias. The court also found that the district court did not err in imposing an unduly harsh sentence, and that the court did not err in denying Ish's Rule 35 motion for leniency following his second sentence. View "State v. Ish" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over water rights between James Whittaker and Whittaker Two Dot Ranch LLC (collectively "Whittaker") and Bruce and Glenda McConnell. The McConnells own seven water rights associated with their property adjacent to Lee Creek, which they historically diverted from two points: the Upper Diversion and the Lower Diversion. However, after a 2014 enforcement action by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR), the McConnells lost their ability to divert water via the Lower Diversion because they failed to claim it in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). The McConnells subsequently filed an application to add the Lower Diversion as an authorized point of diversion to their seven water rights. Whittaker, the McConnells’ upstream neighbor, protested the application, fearing that the additional diversion point would injure his junior water rights.The IDWR hearing officer approved the McConnells’ application, determining that the transfer would not injure Whittaker’s water rights. The officer used the historic confluence of Stroud Creek and Porcupine Creek, located upstream of the Upper Diversion, for the injury analysis. Whittaker appealed to the Director of IDWR, who affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Whittaker then sought judicial review from the district court.The district court reversed the Director's decision, holding that the modern confluence, located downstream of the Upper Diversion, should be used for the injury analysis. The court found that the West Springs Ditch, which diverts water from Stroud Creek through Whittaker’s property, was an alteration of the stream flow and not an unauthorized diversion. The court concluded that approving the McConnells’ application would injure Whittaker’s water rights and held that the application could be approved subject to a condition subordinating the use of the McConnells’ Lower Diversion to Whittaker’s water right. The McConnells appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the West Springs Ditch is a diversion, not an alteration, of Stroud Creek. The court also found that the West Springs Ditch is an unauthorized diversion because it was not claimed as a point of diversion in the SRBA. Therefore, the court concluded that the Director of IDWR correctly used the historic confluence for the injury analysis. The court held that the district court erred in using the modern confluence for the injury analysis and reversed the district court’s decision. View "Whittaker v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Benny Dean Campbell was detained by law enforcement while they were investigating a stolen motorcycle. During the detention, a police trooper discovered heroin and methamphetamine in Campbell's backpack. Campbell was charged with two felony counts for drug trafficking and possession of a controlled substance, and two misdemeanor counts for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Campbell filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that by initially placing him in handcuffs, the trooper converted his detention into an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.The district court agreed that Campbell’s detention was a de facto arrest; however, the court also determined that the evidence was admissible under the attenuation doctrine. After the court denied his motion, Campbell entered into a conditional plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denied motion. On appeal, he asked the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho to reject the federal attenuation doctrine because Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution affords him greater protections than the federal standard and is incompatible with Idaho’s more expansive exclusionary rule.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the order of the district court. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the State failed to establish that the use of handcuffs on Campbell was a reasonable precaution for the trooper’s safety. However, the court concluded that while the seizure of Campbell was unreasonable, the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment makes suppression improper. The court found that even if handcuffs had never been used, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered whether the trooper had followed either parallel path once the trooper walked into the convenience store. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Campbell’s suppression motion on the alternate theory of inevitable discovery. View "State v. Campbell" on Justia Law