Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Lori Ann Wilson was divorced from respondent David King in Colorado in 2003. The divorce decree specified that Wilson was entitled to part of King’s military pension. King began receiving military pension payments in 2013 but has not paid Wilson her decreed share of those payments. Wilson sued King in Idaho, seeking an order establishing the sum certain owed to her from King’s military pension. King, did not live in Idaho, and opposed Wilson’s motion by asserting that Idaho courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The magistrate court held that it had personal jurisdiction over King and entered an order establishing the sum certain owed. King appealed, and the district court reversed. Wilson appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding King was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. View "Wilson v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Daniel Leary appealed a district court’s order revoking probation and imposing his sentence. He argued the district court erred in calculating his credit for time served. He contended that the 2015 amendments to Idaho Code sections 18-309 and 19-2603 (the "Credit Statutes") should have been given retroactive effect, requiring the district court to give him credit for all time served on previous drug court bench warrants, which were a condition of his probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding "an express declaration of retroactive effect is absent from the plain language of the Credit Statutes. The Legislature clearly knows how to expressly declare retroactive effect when drafting a statute, and such a declaration is absent in the Credit Statutes." View "Idaho v. Leary" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a permit application to obtain a water right filed by the respondents, North Snake Ground Water District, Magic Valley Ground Water District and Southwest Irrigation District (“the Districts”), to appropriate water from Billingsley Creek on real property owned by appellant Rangen, Inc. After the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources denied the application in a final order, the Districts petitioned for judicial review. The district court set aside the Director’s final order. Rangen appealed. Rangen historically diverted water from Billingsley Creek. Before the Department ruled on the Districts’ April 2013 application, Rangen filed a competing application on February 3, 2014. Rangen’s application sought to divert 59 cfs from Billingsley Creek for fish propagation, with the same source and point of diversion elements as the Districts had requested. On January 2, 2015, Rangen’s application was approved for 28.1 cfs for fish propagation with a priority date of February 3, 2014. This permit had apparently not been challenged. Department employee James Cefalo presided over a hearing on the Districts’ application and subsequently issued a Preliminary Order Issuing Permit in which he found that the application was made in good faith, did not conflict with the local public interest, and otherwise satisfied the necessary requirements. Therefore, he approved a conditional permit authorizing the Districts to appropriate 12 cfs from Billingsley Creek for mitigation purposes with a priority date of April 3, 2013. Rangen filed a protest of the hearing officer’s preliminary order with the Director. After the parties briefed the issues, the Director subsequently issued a final order overturning the hearing officer’s decision and denying the application. The Director concluded that the Districts’ application was made in bad faith and that the application was not in the local public interest. The Districts petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Director abused his discretion and exceeded his authority in denying their application. On judicial review, the district court set aside the Director’s final order, concluding that the application was neither made in bad faith nor counter to the local public interest. The district court also rejected Rangen’s arguments that the Districts’ application was incomplete or speculative and that mitigation is not a recognized beneficial use of water under Idaho law. Rangen appealed again. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in its judgment and affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc v. North Snake Ground Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 2008, Joseph Gerdon was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment. He was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by a coworker, who drove off the road. The Industrial Commission awarded Gerdon benefits. Gerdon requested a hearing to determine whether he was also entitled to benefits for a compensable psychological injury. That issue was heard before a referee, who issued proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation that Gerdon had failed to prove that he was entitled to additional psychological care. The Commission adopted the referee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an order. Gerdon appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Because the Commission’s decision was based upon its constitutional right to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of conflicting expert opinions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Gerdon v. Con Paulos, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Dale Shackelford was sentenced to death after being convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and other crimes. He appealed and sought post-conviction relief, and his death sentence was set aside. At resentencing, Shackelford was sentenced to two consecutive fixed life sentences. Shackelford petitioned for post-conviction relief based on the resentencing proceeding. He also petitioned again for post-conviction relief based on the original criminal trial. The district court summarily dismissed both petitions and Shackelford appealed each. The appeals were consolidated in this case, and presented the following issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Shackelford's amended successive petition; (2) whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Shakelford's resentencing petition; and (3) whether the district court erred in denying Shackelford's motion for appointment of counsel related to the amended successive petition. Finding no reversible error as to any of Shackelford's issues raised on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shackelford v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Appellant Troy Svelmoe was convicted by jury of felony driving under the influence (DUI). Svelmoe was pulled over in Post Falls for vehicle equipment violations. The officer suspected that Svelmoe was driving under the influence and asked Svelmoe to perform three field sobriety tests. Svelmoe failed two of the tests and was placed under arrest. At the preliminary hearing, the State did not present the results of the breath tests, and the magistrate judge dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause to support the charge. The prosecution then refiled the criminal complaint and introduced the results of the breath tests at a second preliminary hearing. The judge concluded that the prosecution presented substantial evidence to support the charge. At the district court, Svelmoe filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charge, a motion to suppress the breath test results, and a motion in limine to exclude the breath test results. The district court denied all three of Svelmoe’s motions, and the matter proceeded to trial. Svelmoe appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his pretrial motions. Finding that the district court erred in denying Svelmoe's motion in limine and in admitting the breath test result, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Svelmoe" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Dakota Lee Villafuerte was placed on probation for the felony crime of battery with the intent to commit lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under sixteen years of age. The conviction for that crime required that he register as a sex offender. Before being released on probation, he completed a sex offender registration form listing his intended address as his parents’ residence. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was ordered to serve seven days of discretionary jail time. He was released from jail on November 13, 2013. On November 27, the State filed a complaint charging Defendant with the crime of failing to update his sex offender registration. The supporting affidavit stated that Defendant’s probation officer stopped at the home of Defendant’s parents on November 18, 2013; that they stated that they had not seen Defendant for just over one and one-half weeks; that since Defendant was released from jail his location was unknown; and that Defendant had not updated his current address in his sex offender registration. Based upon the affidavit, the court issued a warrant for Defendant’s arrest. On May 26, 2014, Defendant was arrested in Utah. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the State lacked jurisdiction over the crime charged. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which he would plead guilty to the charge, reserve the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, and have the right to withdraw his guilty plea if he prevails on appeal. The district court sentenced him to six years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction to run consecutively to the sentence for which he had been on probation. His probation was apparently revoked, and he was required to serve his suspended sentence. The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in finding jurisdiction over the charge. Based on its review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Idaho v. Villafuerte" on Justia Law

Jane Doe I was the paternal grandmother of a minor child whose natural parents were unable to provide a stable home environment. Her husband, John Doe I, was the child's paternal step-grandfather. In 2014, they filed a petition seeking to be appointed as co-guardians and co-conservators for the minor child, and on the following day the court granted their petition. Jane Doe II and John Doe II were the maternal great-aunt and great-uncle of the minor child. They also filed a petition seeking to be appointed as co-guardians of the minor child. The issues raised by the competing petitions were tried to the magistrate, and he found that it was in the best interests of the child to grant both petitions in part. The issue regarding the magistrate court’s action in granting part-time co-guardianships was solely one of law. Because the Idaho guardianship statutes did not permit the appointment of part-time co-guardians, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for entry of a new judgment. View "Does I v. Does II - Re Conservatorship of Minor Child" on Justia Law

An information was filed charging Gerald Umphenour with possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and with resisting and obstructing an officer and having an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, both misdemeanors. On appeal, he contended that the district court failed to secure an express waiver from the defendant of his right to a jury trial before proceeding with a court trial. The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which vacated Umphenour’s conviction on the ground that the district court had conducted a court trial without first obtaining Umphenour’s personal, express waiver of his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review. "Because the aberrant procedure used by the district court was, in essence, a guilty plea and not a court trial," the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Idaho v. Umphenour" on Justia Law

H. Peter Doble II appealed a district court’s order awarding Interstate Amusements, Inc. (Interstate) attorney fees. Interstate owned and operated a number of movie theaters throughout Magic Valley. As part of its business, Interstate marketed and sold vouchers known as “Cinema Cash:” vouchers purchased in $1.00 increments and could be redeemed for movie tickets and concessions sold at Interstate’s various theater locations. Each voucher was clearly marked with an expiration date after which the voucher was no longer redeemable. Doble attempted to redeem an expired Cinema Cash voucher at one of Interstate’s movie theaters in Twin Falls. Doble filed a Complaint against Interstate in which he alleged that the issuance of Cinema Cash violated Idaho’s Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Interstate. With regard to fees, the court found that Doble brought his action “frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation” and awarded Interstate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The district court then entered an amended judgment stating: “The defendant, Interstate Amusement, Inc., shall recover from the plaintiff costs in the amount of $320.44 and attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,972.50, for a total of $8,292.94.” Finding no reversible error in the district court's fee award, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc." on Justia Law