Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Larry Severson was convicted in 2004 of one count of first-degree murder and one count of poisoning food or medicine. Those convictions were upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal. In this post-conviction proceeding, Severson appealed the district court’s summary dismissal on res judicata grounds of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to allegedly improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument. The appeal was heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which reversed the holding that res judicata applied. The State petitioned for review, arguing that the summary dismissal should have been affirmed because Severson failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance. The State argued at the district court that Severson failed to meet his burden of proof, but the court did not consider whether Severson adequately raised a genuine issue of material fact. Although the Supreme Court could have taken it upon itself to decide that matter on the record presented, it concluded the better course of action was to remand for the district court to consider this question. "This approach also gives the district court the opportunity to address any claims Severson may present regarding appellate counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal those statements which the dissent noted but which the majority did not address." The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s summary dismissal of Severson’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded for further proceedings. View "Severson v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Hasan Icanovic appealed a district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief brought on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Icanovic argued that his attorney’s advice offered in connection with his consideration and acceptance of a plea bargain was deficient and that but for this advice he would not have pled guilty to felony domestic battery. At issue was his attorney’s advice regarding the immigration-related consequences of his guilty plea. Finding that Icanovic did not meet his burden of proof for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Icanovic’s petition for post-conviction relief. View "Icanovic v. Idaho" on Justia Law

John Wickel appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims for medical malpractice against Dr. David Chamberlain. Wickel sought treatment from Dr. Chamberlain for internal and external hemorrhoids. After Wickel was anesthetized, Dr. Chamberlain discovered an anal fissure. Dr. Chamberlain believed, based upon his discussions with Wickel prior to surgery, that the best course was to treat the anal fissure while Wickel was under anesthesia in order to address all issues in one operation. Dr. Chamberlain performed a fissurectomy and an internal lateral sphincterotomy. Following surgery, Wickel experienced significant pain and developed a perianal abscess. Wickel had several post-operation appointments with Dr. Chamberlain to address ongoing pain. At Wickel’s March 3, 2010, appointment, Dr. Chamberlain noted that the abscess appeared healed and released Wickel from his care. The pain continued, and Wickel returned to Dr. Chamberlain’s office on March 17, 2010, at which time Dr. Chamberlain diagnosed Wickel with a chronic anal fistula and recommended colorectal surgery. Wickel then saw Drs. William Peche and Peter Bossart in Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Peche performed a procedure in June of 2010 and noted that the staple line from the PPH procedure was too close to the dentate line which resulted in physical damage to Wickel’s sphincter. After minimal improvement, Wickel saw Dr. Bossart. Dr. Bossart performed an anal fistulectomy in August of 2010. By 2012, Wickel still suffered discomfort and incontinence. An independent medical exam opined that Wickel’s pain following the surgery by Dr. Chamberlain was attributable to improper placement of the staple line within the anal canal. After the district court granted Dr. Chamberlain’s motion for summary judgment, Wickel moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Wickel appealed and Dr. Chamberlain cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for entry of a final judgment conforming to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(a), and Wickel filed a second motion for reconsideration. The district court denied Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion. Following entry of a final judgment, both parties amended their notices of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide the second motion for reconsideration; as a result, the district court did not reach the merits of Wickel's motion or Dr. Chamberlain's cross-appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wickel v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Roger Gordon brought an action against Shannon Hedrick to establish custody and a parenting time schedule for M.H., a minor child. Gordon and Hedrick were in a relationship that began sometime in early 2010 and lasted approximately three years. The two were never married. Hedrick became pregnant around the time that the relationship began. In November of 2010, Hedrick gave birth to M.H. The following day Gordon signed a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (VAP) affidavit attesting that he was the biological father of M.H. Hedrick also signed the VAP, which stated Gordon “is the biological father of this child” and “I acknowledge that the man named above is the biological father of my child. I consent to the recording of his name, date, and place of birth on the birth certificate of the above-described child.” Following M.H.’s birth, Gordon, Hedrick, and M.H. lived together until Gordon and Hedrick’s relationship ended on February 28, 2013; the next day Gordon filed a complaint to establish custody of M.H. and a parenting time schedule. Hedrick answered and counterclaimed for legal and physical custody of M.H. As part of her counterclaim, Hedrick alleged Gordon “frequently stated he doubts he is the child’s parent. Genetic testing of the parties and child should be done to confirm parentage before entry of further orders.” Gordon denied this allegation. The magistrate court granted Hedrick’s motion and ordered genetic testing, the results of which showed there was a 0.00% probability that Gordon was M.H.’s biological father. Based on the test results, Hedrick moved for summary judgment, asking the magistrate court to dismiss Gordon’s complaint and strike his name from M.H.’s birth certificate. At a hearing on the motion, Gordon argued that he was a de facto custodian under the De Facto Custodian Act. Hedrick responded that Gordon could not be a de facto custodian because he was not related to M.H. within the third degree of blood relation. The magistrate court entered its order dismissing the action, changing M.H.’s name, and directing that Gordon’s name be removed from the birth certificate. Gordon moved for reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that Hedrick could not demonstrate a “mutual mistake of fact” which the district court found was required to rescind a VAP under Idaho Code section 7-1106(2). Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gordon v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On October 23, 2012, the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. On September 3, 2013, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the Criminal Case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel in the Criminal Case advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court in this case dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the Criminal Case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, the only issue he raised relating to the denial of post-conviction relief was whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and so it affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Ryan Rawlings went into a Wal-Mart store to steal various items. He selected a large tote, placed it in a shopping cart, filled the tote with small items of merchandise, and covered them with the tote’s lid. He also selected a combination floor lamp and table and placed it in a cart. He then pushed the cart through the self-checkout line without paying for the merchandise, hoping that a cart containing two items that were too large to bag would not attract attention. However, a loss prevention officer had observed Rawlings’s actions. The loss prevention officer called law enforcement. When a sheriff’s deputy arrived, he talked with Rawlings after giving him Miranda rights. The Deputy asked Rawlings whether he had previously committed thefts like this, and Rawlings answered that he had back in Ohio. He stated that he had always been able to take items from Wal-Mart stores in the past without getting caught. Rawlings was charged with petit theft, a misdemeanor, and burglary, a felony. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony, and he was bound over to answer in the district court. Prior to trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the grounds that the statute, as applied to Rawlings, violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The motion was denied. Prior to trial, the Prosecutor served and filed a notice of the State’s intent to present evidence of Rawlings’s statement regarding his prior thefts, and Rawlings filed and served a motion in limine seeking to exclude that evidence. The evidence was ruled admissible. During a conference in chambers on the morning of the trial, Mr. Logsdon unsuccessfully re-argued the motion in limine. Then the Prosecutor orally moved to dismiss the petit theft charge, and the district court granted the motion. The burglary charge was tried to the jury, which found Rawlings guilty of burglary. He then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

In January of 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two counts of robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his previous involvement with various government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred when it did not “sua sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . .” The Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins’ judgment of conviction and remanded the case so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing in late 2010. Two experts had evaluated Hawkins and determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of 2008. Hawkins appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court’s 2010 retroactive determination that he was competent to stand trial in 2008 violated his due process rights. He also argued that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself pro se. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Kelli Sevy sustained a work-related injury on October 31, 2006, and contended that she was totally and permanently disabled. The Industrial Commission found that Sevy failed to meet her burden of establishing total and permanent disability. Although the Commission found that Sevy was “profoundly disabled,” the Commission held that Sevy had failed to demonstrate that the accident contributed to her disability beyond a 2% permanent partial impairment (PPI). Sevy argued on appeal that the Commission’s decision that she did not suffer disability in excess of her impairment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kelli Sevy v. SVL Analytical, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. A year later, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this civil action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the underlying case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, challenging whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Huber brought this action against his former employer, Lightforce USA, Inc. (“LFUSA”), for breach of contract and failure to pay wages. Huber’s claims centered on two employment agreements: a Company Share Offer (“CSO”), and a Deed of Non-Disclosure, Non-Competition and Assignment (“NDA”). Huber claimed that upon his termination LFUSA was obligated to pay him the value of 30% of the goodwill of LFUSA under the CSO and twelve months’ pay under the NDA. The parties agreed that the CSO was a deferred compensation plan and was, therefore, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). At a bench trial, Huber succeeded only on his breach of contract claim under the NDA. Huber timely appealed the district court’s rulings on summary judgment: (1) holding that the amount owed under the NDA was not wages under the Idaho Wage Claims Act, (2) dismissing his wrongful termination claim, and (3) holding that the CSO was a “top hat” plan under ERISA and, therefore, exempt from ERISA’s vesting and anti-forfeiture provisions. Huber also appealed the district court’s ruling at trial that Huber forfeited the benefit under the CSO, and the district court’s rulings on post-trial motions: (1) denying his claim for equitable relief, (2) calculating Huber’s award of prejudgment interest, and (3) awarding attorney fees and costs to LFUSA. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part, finding: (1) the CSO was a top hat plan under ERISA and that Huber forfeited the benefit under the CSO; (2) it was proper to deny Huber’s claim for equitable relief and denying Huber’s motion to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence; (3) the district court erred by ruling that the amount owed under the NDA was not "wages" under the Idaho Wage Claims Act; (4) the district court erred with respect to prejudgment interest and costs and fees to LFUSA. The case was remanded back to the district court to treble the $180,000 judgment. Post-judgment interest shall accrue on the trebled amount of $540,000 from December 10, 2013, the date of entry of the judgment. View "Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc." on Justia Law