Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2012, Junior Hillbroom was charged with attempted strangulation and domestic violence in Case No. CR-2012-2908. Several days later, the magistrate court issued a no contact order, which prohibited Hillbroom from contacting the victim. The expiration date of the no contact order was left blank. In July, the district court heard oral argument on the victim’s motion to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. In August 2012, at the preliminary hearing on Case No. CR-2012-2908, the magistrate court heard a second request by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The magistrate court denied the motion to dismiss the no contact order, but it modified the order to allow certain third party contact. This order to modify also left the expiration date blank. It stated in relevant part: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the No Contact Order previously issued herein be: Modified as follows, and will be in effect until 11:59 p.m. on , 20__ , or upon dismissal of the case.” In September, the district court heard oral argument on another motion by the victim to dismiss the no contact order. Hillbroom was present with counsel. The district court denied the motion. The reason for this appeal to the Supreme Court was that Hillbroom was charged with a misdemeanor for violating the no contact order. He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the no contact order was invalid and therefore the State could not prove an essential element of the crime. The magistrate court denied his motion, and the jury convicted Hillbroom as charged. Hillbroom appealed. The district court sitting in its capacity as an intermediate appellate court affirmed the magistrate court’s order denying the motion. Hillbroom appealed again, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order. Hillbroom then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Finding no reversible error in the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hilbroom" on Justia Law

John Doe, a Washington resident and registered sex offender in Washington, sought a declaratory judgment in Idaho as to whether he could be required to register with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry because of his Washington offenses. Doe’s work opportunities required him to spend more than 30 days a year in Idaho, but he had been spending less time than that in Idaho so as not to trigger a registration requirement. Doe was contemplating relocating to Idaho. Doe sought the court’s determination of whether his Washington offenses were “substantially equivalent” to an Idaho sex offense that required registration when an out-of-state offender moves to or is employed in Idaho. The district court, following a hearing, dismissed the Petition, finding that Doe did not have standing, as he demonstrated no injury in fact and his claim was based on hypothetical facts because he did not yet live here. Additionally, the court found there was also no injury because Doe had not been required to register, nor was there any threatened harm because Doe had not been threatened with prosecution for failing to register. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing Doe's case for lack of standing. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Washington statutes were "substantially equivalent." View "Doe v. Idaho Sex Offender Registry" on Justia Law

John Doe has a long history of drug use, and a somewhat troubled family history. He started using methamphetamine in his early teens and has continued using methamphetamine consistently for the past twenty-plus years. Doe's his parents placed him in an inpatient drug treatment facility. In his later teens, he went to another treatment as part of a juvenile proceeding. When the second treatment center wanted to send Doe to a treatment facility in Salt Lake City, he ran away. When Doe was approximately 27 years old, he moved to California and, around 2005, served a year in prison for making terrorist threats. He participated in more drug treatment while in prison. After successfully completing his parole, he moved back to Idaho. Doe and L.E.’s mother had been together about a year and a half when L.E. was born in December 2011. The following month, Doe was arrested for possession of methamphetamine, spent several months in jail before being released on bond, and was later convicted. Doe was also charged with several misdemeanor offenses arising from the same incident; under a plea agreement, he was convicted of two. Doe then entered his third drug treatment program, as he was sentenced to a CAPP Rider, a three-month program that includes drug treatment. He completed that program successfully. He was serving the Rider when L.E. came into the care of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) through an emergency removal. The State filed a petition under the Child Protective Act. L.E.’s mother had left her with family members, then disappeared. L.E. was placed in temporary shelter care until a hearing at which the parties stipulated that L.E. lacked a stable home environment and stipulated to placement in IDHW’s custody. After a hearing, the magistrate entered a case plan, notifying the parents that failure to comply with the plan could result in termination of parental rights. Doe would enter treatment programs two more times before the magistrate overseeing L.E.'s case changed the permanency plan to a goal of termination of parental rights and adoption. Doe appealed the ultimate decision terminating his rights as to L.E. But the Supreme Court found substantial evidence entered in the trial court record to support termination. The Court affirmed the termination. View "Termination of Parental Rights of John Doe (2015-01)" on Justia Law

An information was filed charging Marvin Orellana-Castro with unlawful sexual contact with his two stepdaughters. He was charged with two counts of lewd conduct and two counts of sexual abuse regarding the older girl, who was thirteen and fourteen years old at the time of the alleged crimes, and he was charged with two counts of sexual abuse with respect to the younger girl, who was eleven and twelve years of age at the time of the alleged crimes. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to sever the charges regarding the younger girl from the charges regarding the older girl on the grounds that they occurred at different times and places, were totally unrelated, and were not part of a common scheme or plan. The district court held that there was sufficient evidence to show that the alleged sex abuse crimes regarding the two girls were all part of a common scheme or plan because the two girls were very close in age, both girls alleged abuse that occurred in the family home, and the alleged abuse all occurred during the period of 2010 to 2011. The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of the older girl and of two counts of sexual abuse of the younger girl. It was unable to reach a verdict on the two counts of lewd conduct regarding the older girl. The district court sentenced Defendant on the four counts of which he was convicted, and Defendant timely appealed. Because the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion to try the charges regarding each stepdaughter separately and because the State failed to show that such error was harmless, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Orellana-Castro" on Justia Law

Judy and Dennis Charney were divorced in March 2012. In May, Dennis commenced proceedings against Judy alleging multiple counts of contempt for allegedly violating provisions of the property settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce judgment. Judy denied the allegations and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing to commence on April 11, 2013. On March 28, 2013, Dennis filed a motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings, which was heard April 9, 2013. The magistrate court asked Judy's attorney whether there was any objection to the motion, and he stated that there was not, but it should be dismissed with prejudice. The court stated that the dismissal would be without prejudice unless the parties agreed that it was with prejudice. Dennis's attorney stated that he did not anticipate the contempt proceedings being refiled, but did not have the authority to agree to a dismissal with prejudice. The court then stated that the dismissal would be without prejudice. The court entered an order dismissing the contempt proceedings the following day. Several days later, Judy moved for attorney fees and costs. Dennis objected, and the matter was argued in July. The magistrate court entered a judgment finding that Judy was the prevailing party in the contempt proceedings and awarded her attorney fees. Dennis challenged the award of attorney fees. The district court ultimately affirmed the award of attorney fees. Approximately two years after Dennis first brought proceedings against Judy, he appealed the affirmance of fees to the Supreme Court. Finding no abuse of discretion in the award of fees, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Charney v. Charney" on Justia Law

TracFone Wireless, Inc. was a non-facilities-based commercial mobile radio service provider (a pure wireless reseller) that provided prepaid wireless telecommunications services. It desired to be designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC), which would permit TracFone to provide wireless telecommunications services to qualified low-income consumers and to receive money from the Universal Service Fund to subsidize such services. In 2004, TracFone filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission asking that it forbear from the statutory requirement that an ETC must provide services, at least in part, over its own facilities. The Commission granted the forbearance, subject to specific conditions, including the requirement that TracFone "must have direct contact with the customer." In 2010, TracFone filed a petition with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC) seeking designation as an ETC, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 214(e)(2). The PUC initially denied the petition on the ground that it would not serve the public interest because TracFone was not paying the fees required by the Idaho Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and the Idaho Emergency Communications Act. TracFone appealed to the Supreme Court. But while that appeal was pending, the PUC staff and TracFone agreed to a settlement under which TracFone would pay the fee required by the Telecommunications Service Assistance Program and it would file a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether it was required to pay the fee required by the Emergency Communications Act. The PUC accepted the stipulation and issued an order approving it on May 18, 2012. In June of that same year, TracFone filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho Emergency Communications Commission (collectively "State") seeking a determination that TracFone was not required to remit an emergency communication fee. The district court's judgment simply stated who prevailed. In its memorandum decision, the court stated, "Section 31-4802(13)(d) applies to Tracfone [sic], making it a ‘telecommunications provider' and thus subject to the Act's fee-collection duty." Assuming that was its intended declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. View "Tracfone Wireless v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Richard Pines, D.O. appealed the district court’s decision on a disciplinary order of the Idaho Board of Medicine. The Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Pines following reports that he had induced young men into sexual contact by saying he was required to give full-body massages to naked practice patients in order to be relicensed as a doctor of osteopathy. Following a hearing, the Board found Pines committed four counts of professional misconduct. It revoked Pines’ license and ordered that he pay costs and attorney fees. The district court affirmed the four counts of misconduct but vacated the award of costs and attorney fees. Pines appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Before the Supreme Court, Pines argued: (1) that he was disciplined for uncharged conduct, resulting in a violation of his due process rights; (2) that evidence in the record was insufficient to support certain alleged violations made against him; (3) that as applied, his due process rights were violated by the Board's conclusion that four individuals were Pines' patients. The Board argued that the district court erred in vacating the Board's order on attorney fees and costs. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that two of the "patients" were not, indeed, Pines' patients, and that Pines' due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the Board's decision on Counts I and II, but vacated the district court's decision on Counts III and V (which pertained to the two "patients"). The case was remanded for further proceedings, including additional consideration of the issue of costs and fees. View "Pines v. Idaho Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) purchased Russell Hafer’s home at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. FNMA filed an eviction suit when Russell and his wife, Sandra, refused to vacate. The Hafers claimed that the foreclosure sale was invalid because their loan servicer, American Home Mortgage Services, Inc.(now known as Homeward Residential, Inc.), agreed to modify the terms of Russell’s loan just prior to instituting foreclosure proceedings. They claimed that Russell was therefore not in default at the time of the sale. The Hafers filed a third-party complaint against Homeward, stating eleven causes of action and asking the district court to quiet title in Russell. FNMA and Homeward filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no agreement to modify the loan terms because Russell did not sign and return a permanent loan modification agreement to Homeward by the specified deadline. The district court granted the motion in favor of FNMA and partially granted the motion in favor of Homeward, holding that there was no agreement between Homeward and Russell modifying Russell’s loan because no Homeward representative signed an agreement. The Hafers appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in considering the question whether an agreement had to be signed by a Homeward representative when that issue was not raised in the joint motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the district court erred substantively in concluding that there was no agreement to modify Russell’s loan absent a signature from a Homeward representative. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the Hafers' first, third, and fourth causes of action against Homeward, as well as granting FNMA's claim for possession. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Hafer" on Justia Law

Virgil Adams appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Association, Inc. Adams purchased a townhouse, subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (1980 Declaration) that did not specifically restrict an owner’s ability to lease his or her unit. Subsequently, the Association amended the 1980 Declaration to provide that an owner could not rent a unit for a period of less than six months. Adams argued the amendment constituted an invalid restraint on the free use of his land and that he did not have notice of the possibility of such a restriction under the general provision allowing “amendment” in the 1980 Declaration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The State of Idaho appealed a district court judgment denying its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case stemmed from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law