Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sarah Chitwood was friends with Marjorie Ellmaker. In 2003, Chitwood contacted an attorney to draft a durable power of attorney, naming Ellmaker as her attorney-in-fact. She later had the attorney draft a will. At that time, Chitwood was 85 years old and a widow with no living children. She executed the will, which left a cake plate and glass horse to a married couple who were her friends, her cats to another friend, and the remainder of her estate to Ellmaker. In 2005, Chitwood wanted to sell part of the real property she owned in McCall. She was introduced to Calvin Tabor, a member in A1 Real Estate, LLC which was in the business of flipping houses and buying land to resell. He found a group of investors willing to purchase Chitwood's property. Chitwood entered into a written real estate contract to sell her property to "A1 REAL ESTATE LLC AND/OR AS ASSIGNED." An addendum to the real estate contract stated that Chitwood would finance $227,000 of the purchase price by two promissory notes from A1 Real Estate, LLC, one for $150,000 and the other for $77,000. The addendum also stated that the notes would be secured by A1 Real Estate, LLC and that upon default liens could be placed on the assets of that company. The original note listed "A1 Real Estate LLC" as the borrower, and Tabor signed it "as member of A1 Real Estate." Chitwood died in 2007. The attorney who had drafted her will prepared two affidavits of "Non-Probate" for Ellmaker to sign. In one affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood died leaving a last will and testament; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that upon her death Chitwood owned real property, which was described; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring the real property to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded that affidavit. In the other affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood had died; that she left a will which was not probated; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring Chitwood's interest in the real estate contract with A1 Real Estate LLC, the promissory note dated May 9, 2005, and "the Agreement dated 2007" to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded this affidavit too. Then in 2010, Ellmaker filed this action against Tabor and A1 Real Estate LLC. alleging that Tabor breached an oral contract to pay the note and that all defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, failed to pay the promissory note when due, and had been unjustly enriched. Tabor moved for summary judgment on the ground that he signed the promissory note as a member of A1 Real Estate, LLC and that he was not personally liable on the notes and did not guarantee payment of the note. On the same date, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ellmaker lacked standing to bring this action because the estate of Chitwood had not been probated, no personal representative had been appointed, and the three-year statute of limitations for instituting probate proceedings had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court refused to admit Chitwood's will into evidence and therefore held that Ellmaker had no legal basis for enforcing the promissory note. The court also granted Tabor's motion for summary judgment on all of the claims asserted against him. Ellmaker appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ellmaker v. Calvin Tabor" on Justia Law

In 2010, Duane Mueller filed this action against Carolyn Hill, Kevin Thompson, Philomena Keys, and Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC (a company owned by Kevin Thompson and Philomena Keys), to recover damages for trespass after construction debris landed on his property from his neighbor Kevin Thompson's adjoining property. Kevin Thompson had caused cap rock to be installed on the portion of a driveway that was adjacent to the common boundary, replaced an existing culvert, and added a rock catch basin in order to address the problem of water runoff flowing onto the Mueller property. In an attempt to return the Mueller property to its pre-2008 condition, he also hired a company to remove material that had been dumped onto the Mueller property when building a roadway in 2008. In March 2013, the matter was tried to the district court without a jury, and it awarded Mr. Mueller damages for trespass plus court costs and attorney fees. The Defendants then timely appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment except for $1,000 of the damages awarded, and remanded the case for the entry of an amended judgment. View "Mueller v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Board of Tax Appeals' (the BTA) denied appellant Jayo Development, Inc.'s application for a business inventory property tax exemption. In 2012, Jayo Development applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-602W(4), claiming that the property qualified as site improvements held by a land developer. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied the application. Subsequently, the BTA and the district court both affirmed the denial. On appeal, Jayo Development argued: (1) that the plain language of the statute entitled it to the exemption;, (2) that the district court erred in relying on IDAPA 35.01.03.620 in denying Jayo Development the tax exemption; and (3) that the 2013 amendment of Idaho Code section 63-602W(4) clarified the legislature's intent and supports its interpretation of the statute. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

This case was brought before a magistrate court as a request for modification of the child custody arrangement of the parties' four children. Hilary Firmage (formerly, Snow) sought sole custody and permission to relocate. The parties orally stipulated to resolve the custody matter in favor of the future recommendations that would result from a child custody evaluation that was ongoing at that time. When the evaluation was made available, the magistrate court ordered a custody modification conforming to the evaluator's recommendations. Howard Snow appealed the modification order. Finding no abuse of discretion in the modification order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Firmage v. Snow" on Justia Law

Thomas and Rebecca Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Stanley. In 2012, the City provided notice to the Arnolds (and other interested parties) of the date and time for three public hearings and a regular city council meeting, all scheduled to take place on August 9, 2012. The first of the three public hearings was noticed to begin at 5:00 p.m. and was for the purpose of receiving public comment on proposed Ordinance 189, the ordinance that the Arnolds alleged affected their property rights. The second and third hearings were noticed to begin at 5:15 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., respectively (and were for the purpose of public comment on matters not at issue here). The regular city council meeting was noticed to begin at 6:00 p.m. The first two meetings were held at their scheduled times. The third meeting began five minutes early, at 5:25 p.m., and concluded at 5:29 p.m. The regular city council meeting, scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m., commenced at 5:31 p.m. and adjourned at 6:55 p.m. Prior to the start of the 6:00 p.m. meeting, the City did not amend the notices it had provided or otherwise notify the public that the meetings would begin earlier than scheduled. The early start time of the 6:00 p.m. meeting and the City's failure to provide amended notice of the earlier start time were the issues presented in this appeal to the Supreme Court: it was at the 6:00 p.m. meeting that the mayor and city council deliberated toward a decision on Ordinance 189, eventually voting to adopt the ordinance. Although the Arnolds were fully aware of the agenda items to be discussed at the various meetings, at no time from the outset of the first meeting at 5:03 p.m. until the final meeting adjourned at 6:55 p.m. did they attend the meeting; the Arnolds conceded at oral argument that they had no intention of attending the meeting. Following adoption of Ordinance 189, the Arnolds filed an action against the City under Idaho Code section 67-2347(6), seeking to have the ordinance declared null and void because the City held the 6:00 p.m. meeting in violation of Idaho's open meeting law by starting the meeting early and failing to provide notice of the earlier start time. The district court held the Arnolds lacked standing to bring an enforcement action because the plain language of Section 67-2347(6) allows standing for such an action only to one who is actually affected by a violation of the open meeting law, instead of being affected only by a substantive action taken at the meeting. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on this basis. The Arnolds appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: because a plain reading of the statute contradicted the Arnolds' argument, and because they did not even claim to have been actually harmed by the 6:00 p.m. meeting's early start time, the Court found that their appeal was brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "Arnold v. City of Stanley" on Justia Law

The Nampa Education Association was the local education organization representing teachers within Nampa School District No. 131 for the 2012-13 school year. The Association and the School District attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate the terms of a master employment contract for teachers in the School District. As a result, each teacher was given a contract in a form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, which stated an amount of compensation for the teacher's services that was the last best offer by the School District. The teachers signed their contracts and began teaching pursuant to them in the fall of 2012. The School District later faced a budget shortfall. The District offered an addendum to the standard teachers' contract by which a teacher could agree to contribute one to four specified furlough days to the District. The addendum also provided that no reduction would be made for any benefits available or accruing for or on behalf of the teacher. Approximately 500 certified teachers signed an addendum to his or her standard contract, volunteering to donate one or more furlough days. After the addenda were signed, about 24 of those teachers later modified his or her respective addendum to increase or reduce the number of days being donated. On March 25, 2013, the Association filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the addendum contracts were unlawful and unenforceable. The District moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Association lacked standing, the issues were moot, and they were not ripe for adjudication. The Association also moved for summary judgment on the ground that the addenda to the teachers' contracts were illegal because they had not been approved by the state superintendent of public instruction as required by Idaho Code section 33-513 and IDAPA 08.02.01.150. The district court granted the Association's motion for summary judgment and denied the School District's motion for summary judgment. The court held that the Association had standing and the issue was not moot. On the merits, the court held that the addenda modified the terms of the teachers' contracts in violation of Idaho Code section 33-513 because the addenda had not been approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. The court also held that the School District negotiating directly with the teachers to modify the terms of their contracts violated the statutory procedures for negotiating the teachers' compensation. The court entered a judgment declaring that the addenda were unlawful and unenforceable, and the School District appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nampa Education Association v. Nampa School District No. 131" on Justia Law

William Wolfe appealed the Idaho County district court’s decisions denying: (1) his motion for a hearing on his motion for reconsideration of his I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence; and (2) his successive Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Specifically, Wolfe argued the district court denied his motions based on two erroneous conclusions: that the subject matter jurisdiction issue had been previously adjudicated and that Wolfe could not file a successive Rule 35 motion. Wolfe argued that if the district court had properly considered the merits of his motions, the district court would have found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Wolfe’s original criminal proceedings. Accordingly, Wolfe petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence, or alternatively, to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. After careful consideration of the district court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible errors, and affirmed the district court’s decisions denying Wolfe’s motion for a hearing and his successive Rule 35 motion. View "Idaho v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

HJ Grathol ("Grathol") appealed a district court judgment awarding Grathol $675,000 in just compensation from the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"). ITD acted to condemn 16.314 acres to improve U.S. Highway 95. Those 16.314 acres were part of 56.8 acres that Grathol owned in Athol. After a bench trial, the district court held that just compensation would be based on the value of the 56.8 acre parcel. The court also held the property remaining after the condemnation suffered no severance damages. Grathol argued on appeal that the district court applied the wrong law and should have instead based just compensation on a 30 acre parcel. Grathol also argued that the district court ignored Grathol's severance damage evidence and improperly excluded testimony about damages from a proposed frontage road. Furthermore, Grathol appealed the district court's award of costs and discretionary fees to ITD, arguing that condemnors were not entitled to costs and that the court did not find ITD's discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found only that the district court erred in its award of attorney fees. The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for recalculation. View "Dept of Transportation v. HJ Grathol" on Justia Law

917 Lusk, LLC appealed the Boise City Council's decision to grant a conditional use permit to Royal Boulevard Associates, LP to build an apartment complex. Royal's predecessor in interest applied for permission to build a 352,000 square foot, five-story, multi-family apartment complex called River Edge Apartments. The site of the proposed construction was near Boise State University, adjacent to the Boise River, east of Ann Morrison Park, and west of property owned by Lusk. The site was zoned Residential Office with a Design Review Overlay (R-OD). Multi-family housing was an allowed use for this location. However, the Boise City Code (BCC) required a conditional use permit (CUP) in order to construct a building more than 35 feet tall in an R-OD zone. If constructed as planned, River Edge will have been between 59 and 63 feet tall. Lusk appealed the Boise Planning and Zoning Commission's decision to the City Council, contending that the Commission's decision failed to address the requirements for a CUP. The district court affirmed the City Council's decision and Lusk appealed. Lusk argued that because the Commission did not follow the correct procedure for granting a CUP, the City Council erred in affirming the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed the district court's affirmance of the City Council's approval of the Commission's decision to grant the CUP to Royal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "917 LUSK, LLC v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a district court’s denial of Dameniel Owens’s motion for credit for time served. The district court specified that Owens would only receive credit for his prejudgment time served in a county jail on one of his eight counts of issuing a check without funds. Owens argued that Idaho Code section 18-309 plainly and unambiguously required the district court to credit his prejudgment time served to each of his eight counts. Owens further argued that the Supreme Court should have overruled "Idaho v. Hoch," (630 P.2d 143 (1981)), because in that case the Court improperly went beyond the statute’s plain meaning to hold that the legislature intended a defendant could not receive credit for each separate crime. The Supreme Court indeed overruled "Hoch," vacated the district court’s order denying Owens’s motion for credit for time served, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Owens" on Justia Law