Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Mosell Equities filed this action against Berryhill & Company and Mr. and Mrs. Berryhill (collectively "Berryhill"). The complaint alleged that Mosell Equities had loaned money to Berryhill and that it had failed to repay the loans. The case was tried to a jury in September 2009. During the trial, Messrs. Mosell and Berryhill provided widely divergent testimony regarding their relationship, whether the checks were actually loans, and what had transpired. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Berryhill on the claims regarding the alleged loans. Mosell Equities filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to part of a claim for relief, and the Supreme Court reversed that order on appeal. On remand, the district court granted Mosell Equities a new trial, and Berryhill appealed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed: by granting the motion for a new trial in order to enable Mosell Equities to try the case on a theory it did not raise in the first trial, the district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the applicable legal standards. The district court was directed to enter judgment consistent with the original jury verdict. View "Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc" on Justia Law

Jane Doe’s three-year-old son was found wandering in a truck stop parking lot, where trucks were entering and leaving. He had walked from a recreational vehicle 1.9 miles away, where Jane Doe and her boyfriend were living. When the police went to the recreational vehicle, they observed that there was insufficient food appropriate for a child. Jane Doe gave conflicting accounts as to why the child had been unsupervised. The police declared the child in imminent danger and took him into shelter care. The following day, proceedings involving the child were commenced under the Child Protective Act. The Department of Health and Welfare filed a case plan which set forth tasks to be accomplished by Jane Doe for the purpose of reuniting Jane Doe with her son. The attempt at reunification was not successful, and the Department filed a petition to terminate Jane Doe’s parental rights in her son. Finding that Jane Doe failed to show that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights, the Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "Dept of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2014-22)" on Justia Law

Husband and wife Walter and A.K. Lienhart Minnick sued the law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP (Hawley Troxell), alleging negligence in rendering services in connection with a real estate development project. On motion of Hawley Troxell for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the action as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Minnicks argued that the district court erred in calculating accrual of their action under the statute, Idaho Code section 5-219(4). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the attempted foreclosure of two mechanic's liens on property encumbered by deeds of trust. In "ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson," 302 P.3d 18 (2013) (ParkWest II), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on property encumbered by a deed of trust must "name the trustee who holds legal title to the property" within the six-month statutory limitation to lien enforcement. Appellant ACI Northwest Inc. challenged the holding from ParkWest II after the district court determined that ACI lost its mechanic's liens for failing to name the trustees in its foreclosure action against Respondents Monument Heights LLC, Dan Jacobson, Sage Holdings LLC, Steven Lazar, the Mitchell Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust dated August 9, 2005, Devon Chapman, HLT Real Estate LLC, Anthony St. Louis, Andrea Stevens, and Lilly Properties Inc. (collectively "the Monuments Heights group"). Due to this determination, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Monuments Heights group. ACI appeals to this Court. Finding no reason to disturb the holding in ParkWest II, and finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "ACI Northwest, Inc. v. Monument Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Terri Boyd-Davis filed for unemployment compensation on January 27, 2013, and began receiving benefits. IDOL claims to have mailed an "online review letter" to Boyd-Davis' listed address on March 6, 2013. The Online Review Letter indicated that Boyd-Davis had been selected to provide additional information concerning her unemployment insurance claim for the week of March 2, 2013. The Online Review Letter instructed Boyd-Davis that she would need to complete work search documentation online. The letter also indicated that failure to complete the online eligibility review by 5:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013, would result in the denial of her benefits. Boyd-Davis claimed she did not receive the Online Review Letter. When Boyd-Davis had not provided the requested information by the deadline, IDOL issued an Eligibility Determination on March 19, 2013, indicating that Boyd-Davis had failed to complete the online eligibility review and as a result was ineligible for benefits effective March 10, 2013. Boyd-Davis filed a protest. A telephonic hearing was scheduled for April 18, 2013. On April 1, 2013, Boyd-Davis provided the information IDOL had requested in the Online Review Letter. As soon as the requested information was provided, Boyd-Davis' benefits were reinstated for the week beginning March 31, 2013. However, benefits were not reinstated for the period of March 10 through March 30, 2013. Boyd-Davis proceeded with the April 18, 2013, hearing seeking restoration of her benefits for the period of March 10 through March 30, 2013. Following the hearing, an IDOL Appeals Examiner affirmed the original eligibility determination and concluded that Boyd-Davis' benefits had been properly denied. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, finding that Boyd-Davis presented evidence that "would permit reasonable minds to conclude that the Online Review Letter was not received." The Court concluded that the Commission erred in its application of the presumption of delivery articulated in Idaho Code section 72-1368(5) of the online letter. Furthermore, the Commission abused its discretion in determining that Boyd-Davis was ineligible for unemployment benefits for the period from March 10, 2013, through March 30, 2013. View "Boyd-Davis v. Macomber Law, PLLC" on Justia Law

Joan Thrall appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission decision denying her unemployment benefits. The Commission concluded that Thrall was not entitled to benefits because she voluntarily resigned from St. Luke's Regional Medical Center without good cause. Thrall timely appealed, arguing that she was discharged and that St. Luke's failed to show the discharge was for misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. Because the Commission's factual findings demonstrate that Thrall satisfied her burden to show that she was discharged, Thrall was entitled to benefits unless the discharge was for misconduct in connection with her employment, with St. Luke's carrying the burden to show the discharge was for misconduct. When the Commission mistakenly concluded that Thrall voluntarily resigned, it improperly placed the burden on Thrall to show that she was not discharged for misconduct. "Though the Commission's order includes a variety of statements regarding misconduct and Thrall's errors in the performance of her job duties, it is unclear to what extent those statements were a consequence of its misallocation of the burden of proof." View "Thrall v. St. Luke's Regional Med Cntr" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County's efforts to prepare an official county road map that complied with Idaho Code section 40-202. The Board adopted an Official Fremont County Road Map. The Map depicted the North Road as a county road. Property owners along the North Road petitioned for judicial review. The district court determined the Board lacked substantial and competent evidence to designate the North Road as a county road and vacated the Board's decision. The Board appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Flying "A" Ranch v. County Commissioners of Fremont County" on Justia Law

This case concerned three small, adjacent parcels of land in Bear Lake County which lined up in a north to south direction and are bordered by State Highway 89 on the west and Bear Lake on the east. In 1998, the northern parcel was owned by Peggy and David Everton; the middle parcel was owned by Annette and Sterling Wallentine; and the southern parcel was owned by Jeanne Macvicar. Historically, Macvicar had accessed her property by a driveway that went through the Everton and Wallentine properties. The driveway left State Highway 89 at the northwestern edge of the Everton parcel, traveled along the western edge of the Everton and Wallentine parcels, and terminated at Macvicar's property. in 1998, Macvicar filed a complaint against the Evertons and Wallentines, requesting that the district court declare an easement existed along the western edge of their parcels. In 2000, the parties filed a Stipulation for Settlement. The district court accepted the stipulation and entered its Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title (the 2000 Judgment). The Evertons, the Wallentines, and Macvicar subsequently sold their parcels to the parties to this appeal. Macvicar sold her property to Jim and Maryann Plane, who transferred the property to the Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust (the Trust). The Planes had actual knowledge of the 2000 Judgment and the Stipulation when they purchased Macvicar's property. Jason and Janae Skinner purchased the parcels owned by the Evertons and Wallentines. This controversy arose after September 27, 2012, when the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) wrote the Skinners a letter demanding that the Skinners remove their "illegal" driveway. However, the letter also enclosed a permit application for the Skinners to submit which would "allow for the continued use of this currently illegal access." On April 1, 2013, the Trust filed a motion, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), requesting that the district court void three sentences of the 2000 Judgment. The Trust argued these provisions were void because the district court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction to address the State's right-of-way because the State was not a party to the litigation. The effect of eliminating these three sentences would be to expand the width of the easement over the Skinners' parcels from a maximum of five feet to ten feet. On April 18, 2013, the Skinners filed an application with ITD, seeking permission to continue to access the State right-of-way for purposes of a driveway. ITD issued a permit authorizing the Skinners and the Planes to use up to five feet of the State right-of-way. The district court denied the Trust's motion, and the Trust appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed it. View "Plane Family Trust v. Skinner" on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed an order terminating her parental rights to her son, TSD. Because TSD was an "Indian child" as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act, the magistrate court was required to make findings in addition to those required by Idaho law. Among other findings, the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) was required to satisfy the court that it made "active efforts" to "prevent the breakup of the Indian family." On appeal, Doe argued that the magistrate court erred in finding that DHW made such efforts and erred in failing to make that finding by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision terminating Doe's parental rights. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2014-23) Doe" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Joseph Thomas, Jr. guilty of first degree murder for the strangulation death of his ex-wife, Beth Irby Thomas in 2011. A friend of Defendant testified that at about 12:30 a.m. the following day, Defendant came to the friend’s home and stated that he had strangled the decedent. After Defendant left, the friend called 911. The first police officer to arrive at the decedent’s home found her with a leather belt cinched tightly around her neck. The belt was Defendant’s, and he was standing outside her house when the police arrived. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that because the district court erroneously excluded evidence that could have corroborated the defendant’s version of what had occurred and the State did not show that such error was harmless, the Court vacated the jury verdict and the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Thomas" on Justia Law