Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case consolidated several individual cases dealing with claims for nonpayment against the developer of the Summer Wind at Orchard Hills residential and golf course development in Canyon County. Stanley Consulting, Inc. appealed the district court’s decision as to the priority date for Stanley’s engineer’s lien. Integrated Financial Associates, Inc. (“IFA”) cross-appealed the district court’s decision granting Knife River’s summary judgment motion based on the court’s decision that Knife River had a valid priority lien for paving work it did on roadways and golf cart paths without having to designate the lien between the two projects. After its review of the claims, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it determined an engineer’s priority under Idaho Code section 45-506 for rendering professional services dates back to when the first on-site professional services were rendered. Furthermore, the Court held the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Knife River on its lien claim priority. Accordingly, the district court’s judgments were vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. View "Stanley Consultants v. Integrated Financial Associates" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a custody dispute between Jeffrey Biggers and Emily Suter over their two children. Emily remarried, and her husband worked in McCall. Emily made several attempts to modify custody, and each time she was unsuccessful. At trial, a magistrate judge held that last attempt, a permanent move to McCall, would have been a "material, permanent, and significant change" for the children and denied the request for modification. Neither party appealed this finding. At the conclusion of trial, the court found that it would be in the boys’ best interests to remain in the Emmett area. Consistent with this finding, the court ordered that Jeff and Emily have joint physical and legal custody, that Jeff have primary custody of the boys, and that Emily have visitation rights throughout the year and over the summer break. Emily appealed that ruling, but finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Suter v. Biggers" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Su Warren sought worker’s compensation benefits from her employer, Williams & Parsons, PC, CPAS, and Idaho State Insurance Fund (ISIF), for injuries received in 2007, during the course of her employment. The Idaho Industrial Commission concluded that Warren had a permanent partial impairment (PPI) of five percent of the whole person and was entitled to temporary total disability and temporary partial disability during the period of recovery through December 23, 2008, the date of maximum medical improvement. The Commission also concluded that Warren failed to establish entitlement to medical care in the form of a pain management program, permanent disability in excess of PPI, retraining benefits, or attorney fees. The Commission denied Warren’s motion for reconsideration. Warren appealed the Commission's decision, but finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Su Warren v. Williams & Parsons PC" on Justia Law

The Kootenai County Prosecutor filed a two-count information against Jesse Elias alleging that he committed forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object (to a minor child), and burglary. The matter proceeded to trial and the jury found Elias guilty of both counts. Elias was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment, with ten years fixed for the first charge; for burglary, Elias received a concurrent ten year fixed sentence. The district court retained jurisdiction for one year. At the completion of the retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentences and placed Elias on probation for fourteen years. Elias appealed, and the Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence of use of force to sustain Elias’ conviction for forcible penetration by a foreign object. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the State produced sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that Elias was guilty of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. The outcome of this appeal turned upon what the Legislature intended when it used the word “force” in Idaho Code section 18-6608. Upon review, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction for forcible penetration by a foreign object and remanded for further proceedings to modify the length of Elias’ probation. View "Idaho v. Elias" on Justia Law

Idaho's Bureau of Occupational Licenses (Bureau) investigated and initiated disciplinary proceedings against petitioner-appellant Timothy Williams after it received complaints that he had engaged in various forms of professional misconduct as a licensed real estate appraiser. Ultimately, Idaho's Board of Real Estate Appraisers (Board) revoked Williams' license, imposed $4,000 in fines, and required Williams to pay the Board's attorney fees and costs. The district court, acting in an appellate capacity, affirmed the Board's decision to revoke Williams' license and to impose fines, but reversed the Board's order that Williams pay its attorney fees and costs. Williams appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Williams v. Idaho State Board of Real Estate Appraisers" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice case arising out of the treatment of Rosamond Mattox at Life Care of Lewiston (LCL). The plaintiff-appellant, Rosamond's son Gene Mattox, claimed that LCL's sub-standard care caused his mother's death. The district court excluded Gene's experts' affidavits after concluding that they failed to demonstrate actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of LCL. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment: "[t]he affidavits here were clearly admissible. Both affidavits establish actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice and the means by which [the experts] became familiar with that standard. The affidavits should have been admitted and, had they been, they present[ed] genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment." View "Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America" on Justia Law

This case was brought under the Idaho Tort Claims Act asserting negligence by a public university in allowing a student-athlete to return to competition after sustaining a head injury. Plaintiff Samuel Zylstra was a student and wrestler at Boise State University (BSU). Zylstra brought suit against BSU and the State of Idaho alleging BSU employees negligently allowed him to continue wrestling after he was injured during a tournament. On motion by BSU, the district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation, but denied summary judgment as to BSU's statute of limitations arguments. Notwithstanding the denial in part, the partial grant of summary judgment provided adequate grounds to dismiss Zylstra's action. Zylstra appealed the district court's decision to strike two expert affidavits offered in opposition to BSU's summary judgment motion and also alleged judicial bias. BSU cross-appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Zylstra v. Boise State University" on Justia Law

Margaret Butcher and her former husband purchased property in 2005 with a loan secured by the property from Home Federal Bank. Butcher received the property in their divorce in 2009, and she subsequently defaulted on the loan. Wells Fargo Bank, the indorsee of the loan, foreclosed on the property. At the foreclosure sale, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) purchased the property with a credit bid. FHLMC then filed a post-foreclosure eviction complaint for ejectment and restitution of the property. The magistrate court granted FHLMC's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in favor of FHLMC. Butcher appealed. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Butcher appealed again, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher" on Justia Law

In 2005, Herbert and Julie Thomas opened a $2,000,000.00 home equity line of credit (the HELOC) with U.S. Bank. To secure the obligation, the Thomases executed a deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank to their property in Sun Valley. A few months later, the Thomases approached Citimortgage, Inc. seeking refinancing. Blaine County Title Associates (BCT) issued a Commitment for Title Insurance under which Stewart Title Guarantee Company agreed to issue a policy to CitiMortgage so long as all prior deeds of trust, including the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust, were released so that CitiMortgage would be in first lien position with regard to the Thomas Property. To that end, BCT contacted the local branch of U.S. Bank in Ketchum to determine the HELOC payoff amount. In response, U.S. Bank faxed BCT a screen shot of an account inquiry reflecting the balance owed on the HELOC. The Thomases closed with Citimortgage a few weeks later, and the Citimortgage loan was secured by a deed of trust on their property. The Citimortgage deed of trust was recorded days later. This appeal arose from a lien priority dispute between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage. The district court concluded that U.S. Bank lost its first priority position on the Thomas property after finding that CitiMortgage delivered a demand for reconveyance and U.S. Bank failed to release its deed of trust as required by Idaho Code section 45-1514. U.S. Bank appealed, contending that the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that testimony offered by CitiMortgage was inadmissible, and that CitiMortgage failed to prove delivery of the demand for reconveyance. CitiMortgage cross-appealed the district court's decision that CitiMortgage was not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that the district court did not err in admitting Citimortgage's proffered testimony, and that it could not determine whether the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial and competent evidence because the court failed to evaluate certain evidence. As such, the Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "U.S. Bank National Association N.D. v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Bryce Fuller walked into a gas station/convenience store owned and operated by Stinker Stores, Inc., with his golden retriever Darma. The dog had on a collar and leash, but Fuller was not holding the leash while he was at the counter making a purchase. At first, Fuller was standing facing the counter with the dog at his left side, but during the transaction, Fuller turned so that his right side was next to the counter. When he did so, the dog remained, sitting in front of Fuller and facing the counter. When Fuller went to complete his purchase, the dog raised up and put her front paws on the counter, and the cashier gave her a dog treat. The entire transaction took about two minutes, and during that time the dog, while sitting in front of Fuller, raised up and put her front paws on the counter six other times, apparently wanting more treats. While Fuller was putting his change into his pocket and preparing to leave, Richard Braese walked into the store. The front door of the store was to Fuller's front, but he had his head turned to his right facing the cashier. Braese walked past Fuller and around to his rear and then reached with his right hand toward the cashier to pay for a lottery ticket. When he did so, Darma quickly moved around the left side of Fuller, jumped up and hit Braese in the chest with her front paws. Braese filed suit seeking to recover damages against Stinker Stores, and he later amended the complaint to add Fuller as a defendant. Stinker Stores filed a motion for summary judgment, and, after briefing and argument, the district court granted the motion, holding that under the facts of this case Stinker Stores did not have a duty to protect Braese from Fuller's dog. The court entered a partial judgment dismissing with prejudice the claims against Stinker Stores. Fuller did not appear, and Braese obtained a default judgment against him for damages in the sum of $25,101.20. Braese then timely appealed the judgment in favor of Stinker Stores. Finding that Stinker Stores did not have a duty to protect Braese from Darma, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Braese, Jr. v. Stinker Stores, Inc." on Justia Law