Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was brought under the Idaho Tort Claims Act asserting negligence by a public university in allowing a student-athlete to return to competition after sustaining a head injury. Plaintiff Samuel Zylstra was a student and wrestler at Boise State University (BSU). Zylstra brought suit against BSU and the State of Idaho alleging BSU employees negligently allowed him to continue wrestling after he was injured during a tournament. On motion by BSU, the district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation, but denied summary judgment as to BSU's statute of limitations arguments. Notwithstanding the denial in part, the partial grant of summary judgment provided adequate grounds to dismiss Zylstra's action. Zylstra appealed the district court's decision to strike two expert affidavits offered in opposition to BSU's summary judgment motion and also alleged judicial bias. BSU cross-appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Zylstra v. Boise State University" on Justia Law

Margaret Butcher and her former husband purchased property in 2005 with a loan secured by the property from Home Federal Bank. Butcher received the property in their divorce in 2009, and she subsequently defaulted on the loan. Wells Fargo Bank, the indorsee of the loan, foreclosed on the property. At the foreclosure sale, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) purchased the property with a credit bid. FHLMC then filed a post-foreclosure eviction complaint for ejectment and restitution of the property. The magistrate court granted FHLMC's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in favor of FHLMC. Butcher appealed. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Butcher appealed again, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher" on Justia Law

In 2005, Herbert and Julie Thomas opened a $2,000,000.00 home equity line of credit (the HELOC) with U.S. Bank. To secure the obligation, the Thomases executed a deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank to their property in Sun Valley. A few months later, the Thomases approached Citimortgage, Inc. seeking refinancing. Blaine County Title Associates (BCT) issued a Commitment for Title Insurance under which Stewart Title Guarantee Company agreed to issue a policy to CitiMortgage so long as all prior deeds of trust, including the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust, were released so that CitiMortgage would be in first lien position with regard to the Thomas Property. To that end, BCT contacted the local branch of U.S. Bank in Ketchum to determine the HELOC payoff amount. In response, U.S. Bank faxed BCT a screen shot of an account inquiry reflecting the balance owed on the HELOC. The Thomases closed with Citimortgage a few weeks later, and the Citimortgage loan was secured by a deed of trust on their property. The Citimortgage deed of trust was recorded days later. This appeal arose from a lien priority dispute between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage. The district court concluded that U.S. Bank lost its first priority position on the Thomas property after finding that CitiMortgage delivered a demand for reconveyance and U.S. Bank failed to release its deed of trust as required by Idaho Code section 45-1514. U.S. Bank appealed, contending that the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that testimony offered by CitiMortgage was inadmissible, and that CitiMortgage failed to prove delivery of the demand for reconveyance. CitiMortgage cross-appealed the district court's decision that CitiMortgage was not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that the district court did not err in admitting Citimortgage's proffered testimony, and that it could not determine whether the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial and competent evidence because the court failed to evaluate certain evidence. As such, the Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "U.S. Bank National Association N.D. v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Bryce Fuller walked into a gas station/convenience store owned and operated by Stinker Stores, Inc., with his golden retriever Darma. The dog had on a collar and leash, but Fuller was not holding the leash while he was at the counter making a purchase. At first, Fuller was standing facing the counter with the dog at his left side, but during the transaction, Fuller turned so that his right side was next to the counter. When he did so, the dog remained, sitting in front of Fuller and facing the counter. When Fuller went to complete his purchase, the dog raised up and put her front paws on the counter, and the cashier gave her a dog treat. The entire transaction took about two minutes, and during that time the dog, while sitting in front of Fuller, raised up and put her front paws on the counter six other times, apparently wanting more treats. While Fuller was putting his change into his pocket and preparing to leave, Richard Braese walked into the store. The front door of the store was to Fuller's front, but he had his head turned to his right facing the cashier. Braese walked past Fuller and around to his rear and then reached with his right hand toward the cashier to pay for a lottery ticket. When he did so, Darma quickly moved around the left side of Fuller, jumped up and hit Braese in the chest with her front paws. Braese filed suit seeking to recover damages against Stinker Stores, and he later amended the complaint to add Fuller as a defendant. Stinker Stores filed a motion for summary judgment, and, after briefing and argument, the district court granted the motion, holding that under the facts of this case Stinker Stores did not have a duty to protect Braese from Fuller's dog. The court entered a partial judgment dismissing with prejudice the claims against Stinker Stores. Fuller did not appear, and Braese obtained a default judgment against him for damages in the sum of $25,101.20. Braese then timely appealed the judgment in favor of Stinker Stores. Finding that Stinker Stores did not have a duty to protect Braese from Darma, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Braese, Jr. v. Stinker Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Cable One, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. In 2005, Cable One received business income from four types of activities in Idaho: cable television services, internet access services, advertising services, and cable modem leasing. In its Idaho income tax return for that year, it included revenues earned from all of those activities except revenues from providing internet access services to Idaho customers. It excluded those revenues on the ground that providing such services to customers in Idaho constituted Arizona sales, although it also excluded such revenues from its 2005 Arizona income tax return on the ground that they came from Idaho sales. In 2008, the Idaho Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency determination asserting a tax and interest deficiency on Cable One for the 2005 tax year. Cable One petitioned for redetermination, which the Tax Commission denied. Cable One then filed a complaint in the district court, which tried the matter de novo, and ruled in favor of the Tax Commission. Cable One then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cable One, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

April Fano and Right Way Publishing, LLC, appealed a district court's judgment following a bench trial in which found Fano liable for breaching a Release Agreement. Judgment was entered in favor of respondent Vianna Stibal for damages, punitive damages and attorney fees and costs. While Fano and Stibal were involved in prior litigation, they reached a settlement through mediation and signed a Release Agreement, which mutually released Stibal and Fano from liability to each other for their acts prior to the agreement. The Release Agreement prohibited the parties from making any future negative or disparaging comments about the other. Prior to executing the Release Agreement, Fano had provided negative information about Stibal to a book author. Fano also formed a limited liability company and paid to print 500 books about Stibal. The books were printed before the Release Agreement was executed. Stibal subsequently brought the present action, alleging that Fano had breached the Release Agreement. The district court ruled that Fano was responsible for the comments and documents contained in the book, "Shady Healing," which it determined were obtained from the previous litigation. The district court also found: (1) Fano was substantially involved in bringing "Shady Healing" to market, including providing the book's author with information Fano obtained from the previous litigation with Stibal; (2) paying to print 500 copies of the book; and (3) being a manager of Right Way Publishing, LLC. The district court ruled that "Shady Healing" would not have been published but for Fano's involvement, and that this action coupled with Fano's failure to disclose the existence of the book constituted a breach of the Release Agreement. Fano argued on appeal that the district court erred when it ruled that she breached the Release Agreement because all of the activity complained of occurred before the Release Agreement was executed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Fano was correct: the uncontroverted evidence was that Fano did not sell, promote or distribute the book. Without evidence of a breach, the district court's finding of a breach of the Release Agreement was clearly erroneous. It followed that Fano was not liable to Stibal for any damages, and accordingly, the Court did not address the other issues raised on appeal with respect to damages. The judgment entered by the district court against Fano was reversed. View "Stibal v. Fano" on Justia Law

Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC appealed a judgment entered in favor of Franklin County dismissing Spirit Ridge's complaint which had requested abatement of a private nuisance and for an injunction against a gun range operated by Franklin County adjacent to its property. In a bench trial, the district court ruled that Spirit Ridge had failed to demonstrate that there was an ongoing and continuing nuisance at the time of the trial. Spirit Ridge appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: the district court record reflected a lack evidence to show that a nuisance existed after 2008. View "Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Gary Schall was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He had two prior convictions for driving under the influence within the previous ten years, one of which stemmed from a 2004 arrest in Wyoming. As a result of his prior convictions, the State enhanced his DUI charge to a felony. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that there was probable cause to bind the case over to district court. Schall filed a motion to dismiss in the district court, arguing that the State had the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide probable cause to believe his Wyoming DUI conviction was for a "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation," that the State failed to meet that burden, and that the Wyoming conviction was not in fact a substantially conforming violation. The district court denied Schall's motion, finding that the State met its burden at the preliminary hearing and that the Wyoming statute substantially conformed to Idaho's DUI statute. Schall appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The State appealed, and now the Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court correctly denied Schall's motion to dismiss. View "Idaho v. Schall" on Justia Law

Jonathan Ellington was convicted of second-degree murder and two counts of aggravated battery. He moved for a new trial, arguing that he discovered new material evidence that could not have been produced at trial through reasonable diligence. The evidence consisted of statements in a textbook authored by the State's accident reconstruction expert that, according to Ellington, directly conflicted with the expert's trial testimony. The district court denied Ellington's motion. Upon review of Ellington's arguments on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellington's motion for a new trial. View "Idaho v. Ellington" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court's grant of Micah Wulff's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless blood draw. The draw took place after Wulff was in custody for driving under the influence. The district court held that the United States Supreme Court's holding in "Missouri v. McNeely," suggested that warrantless blood draws are not always permitted under Idaho's implied consent statute. The State argued that McNeely was limited to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and Idaho's implied consent statute is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Idaho v. Wulff" on Justia Law