Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant DeAnne Muchow began working for Varsity Contractors, Inc in 2011 as a human resources assistant. During her employment, the claimant had an ongoing conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor with the director of the department. In an effort to resolve the conflict, the director held a meeting with claimant and her supervisor. The claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had documentation outlining their complaints. The director told them to get their documentation and bring it back to his office. The claimant asked if they could do so the following day because she wanted time to look over her documentation, but the director denied that request because he was leaving the next day on a business trip. He did give the claimant a few minutes to look over her documentation. She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documentation. She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office. The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder. He told her not to shred them, but she continued to the shredder and shredded them. The director then discharged her for insubordination. The claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. She appealed, and an appeals examiner reversed the ruling that the claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination. The basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents belonged to the claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was having with a coworker. The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner. However, the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner. The commission concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Commission's decision and affirmed. View "Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Joseph Pierce filed this action against Steven McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC, seeking damages for various violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and for breach of contract, all based upon an alleged scam in which defendants represented that they could protect Pierce from losing his equity in real property that was facing foreclosure. He alleged that the defendants obtained title to his real property pursuant to a promise to assume the loans secured by the property, to market and sell the property, and to pay him at least $50,000 or more from the sale proceeds, depending upon the sale price. He claimed that he deeded the property to defendants, they failed to make the payments on the loans, and that the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The complaint also alleged that Highland Financial was the alter ego of McMullen. Only McMullen appeared in the action, but he did not deny the allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint. When McMullen failed to appear at the trial, the district court ordered that he was in default, that Pierce prevailed on his complaint, and that he could present evidence of his damages. Pierce did so, but the district court later dismissed the action on the ground that Mr. Pierce had failed to prove liability. Finding that decision was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pierce v. McMullen" on Justia Law

Camp Easton Forever, Inc., (“CEF”) and Daniel and Matthew Edwards appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Inland Northwest Council Endowment Properties, LLC, and Inland Northwest Council of the Boy Scouts of America (collectively “INWC”). CEF and the Edwardses filed an action to declare the parties’ rights to property INWC owned on Lake Coeur d’Alene that had been used as a Boy Scout camp since 1929. The district court held CEF and the Edwardses lacked standing because CEF lacked a legally recognizable interest and the Edwardses were not certified as class representatives. The district court also held no trust existed because all prior agreements merged into an unambiguous deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to INWC on grounds that the deed was an unambiguous fee simple transfer. View "Camp Easton Forever, Inc v. Inland NW Council Boy Scouts of Amierica" on Justia Law

This case arose from Agrisource’s breach of contract claim against Robert Johnson (Johnson). Johnson argued that he was not liable on the contract because he was an agent for a disclosed principal named “Johnson Grain Inc.” which was owned by Neil Brown. Agrisource leased a grain elevator in Ririe from Johnson’s father, Wydell. For several years prior to 2006, Johnson was Agrisource’s employee and managed the elevator. Agrisource terminated its elevator lease in summer 2006, and Johnson was then unemployed. Brown purchased the grain elevator in August 2006 from Wydell. Brown was Johnson Grain Inc.’s majority shareholder from August 2006 through December 2007. Johnson and Brown opened a business checking account under Johnson Grain Inc.’s name with both men as signatories. Johnson entered into two contracts to sell durum wheat to Agrisource. Agrisource did not receive 15,527.87 bushels of wheat promised by Johnson Grain. Agrisource contacted both Johnson and Brown for two years about the undelivered wheat. Neither party delivered the wheat, so in 2009 Agrisource purchased wheat elsewhere. This resulted in $51,241.97 in damages. In 2010, Agrisource filed a claim alleging breach of the 2007 contract against Brown, Brown’s wife, and Neil Brown, Inc., Johnson, Johnson’s wife, and Johnson’s corporation as defendants. Agrisource alleged that Johnson was an individual doing business as Johnson Grain when he entered into the contract. Johnson appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Agrisource, Inc. The district court held that there was no genuine disputed issue of material fact as to Johnson’s lack of disclosure of his agency and alleged principal. Johnson argued on appeal that Agrisource had notice that Johnson was the principal’s agent because Agrisource should have known Johnson was an agent and disputed issues of fact existed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Agrisource and the denial of Johnson’s third motion to reconsider. However, the Court vacated the district court’s denial of Johnson’s request for I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief and remanded for the district court to analyze Johnson’s third affidavit in the context of Johnson’s request for I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief. View "Agrisource, Inc v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.formed a general partnership named MRI Associates. The parties executed a written partnership agreement for the purpose acquiring and operating diagnostic and therapeutic devices, equipment, and accessories, beginning with a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. MRI Associates formed two limited partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership (which owned and operated an MRI scanner located on Saint Alphonsus' campus) (“MRI Center”); and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (which owned and operated mobile MRI scanners) (“MRI Mobile”). For decades, a group of radiologists known as Gem State Radiologists had interpreted medical images pursuant to a contract that gave them the exclusive right to serve the radiological needs of patients of Saint Alphonsus. After the formation of MRI Associates, they interpreted MRI scans performed at MRI Center. In 1998, the Radiologists began planning to construct and operate an outpatient facility in Boise that was located away from the hospital. The proposed facility would provide a full range of medical imaging services, including MRI imaging. There were negotiations among the Radiologists, Saint Alphonsus, and MRI Associates to have one medical imaging entity, but those negotiations were unsuccessful. There was evidence that Saint Alphonsus was negotiating against MRI Associates with the Radiologists. In 1999, the Radiologists formed Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, (“IMI”), and on September 1, 1999, they opened their facility. Saint Alphonsus began negotiating with the Radiologists to partner with them in the imaging center. In 2001, Saint Alphonsus became a member of IMI. IMI opened another facility in Meridian. In 2004, Saint Alphonsus gave notice to MRI Associates that it would dissociate from the partnership. Under the partnership agreement, upon dissociation Saint Alphonsus could not compete with MRI Associates for a period of one year. Saint Alphonsus then filed this action seeking to recover the value of its partnership interest from MRI Associates, and MRI Associates responded by filing a multi-count counterclaim and claims against third parties. The third-party claims were ultimately dismissed. The jury found Saint Alphonsus liable on all causes of action, and MRI Associates was awarded a judgment in the sum of $36.3 million. That judgment was vacated on appeal, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The case was again tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of the MRI Entities on each of the claims. Under the judgment entered by the district court, the awards under each claim for relief were in the alternative. The highest award to each of the MRI Entities was: $3,906,338 to MRI Associates; $25,828,208 to MRI Center; and $22,349,967 to MRI Mobile, which totaled $52,084,513. On its complaint, Saint Alphonsus was awarded $4.6 million against MRI Associates. Saint Alphonsus appealed, and the MRI Entities cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "St. Alphonsus Diversified Care v. MRI Associates, LLP" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a contract dispute when Robert Coleman, Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC (“Profits Plus”), and Dollars and Sense Growth Fund Limited Partnership (“Dollars and Sense”) filed a claim for declaratory judgment against Jeffrey Podesta and Street Search, LLC. Coleman, Profits Plus, and Dollars and Sense sought a judgment declaring that they did not have a contract with either Podesta or Street Search. Podesta and Street Search then counterclaimed seeking damages for breach of contract, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties. Ultimately, only Podesta and Street Search’s breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims went to the jury, which decided those claims in favor of Coleman, Profits Plus, and Dollars and Sense. Podesta and Street Search now appeal a number of the district court’s decisions made before, during, and after trial. We affirm the district court’s decisions. View "Profits Plus Capital Mgmt. v. Podesta" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of Portneuf Medical Center on plaintiff-appellee Mark Van's complaint that he was fired from his job there in violation of the Idaho "Whistleblower's Act" (the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act). The jury determined that Van engaged in activity protected by the Act, but that the termination of his employment was not the result of his protected activity. On appeal, Van raised multiple issues of alleged error at trial. After careful review of them all, the Supreme Court concluded there was no reversible error. As such, the district court was affirmed. View "Van v. Portneuf Medical Center" on Justia Law

Defendant Charlynda Goggin was convicted for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance; conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia; delivery of a controlled substance; and delivery of drug paraphernalia. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Goggin filed a motion to acquit and a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion to acquit but granted the motion for a new trial on the conspiracy charges, holding that the jury should have been instructed that mistake of law is a defense to conspiracy. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Goggin’s motion to acquit and to deny Goggin’s motion for a new trial on the delivery charges. The Court reversed the district court’s decision to grant Goggin a new trial on the conspiracy charges. View "Idaho v. Goggin" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Taylor was convicted for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance; conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia; and delivery of a controlled substance. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Taylor filed a motion to acquit and a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion to acquit, and for a new trial on the delivery charge, but granted the motion for a new trial on the conspiracy charges, holding that the jury should have been instructed that mistake of law is a defense to conspiracy. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Taylor’s motion to acquit and to deny Taylor’s motion for a new trial on the delivery charge, and reversed the district court’s decision to grant Taylor a new trial on the conspiracy charges. View "Idaho v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Krystal Easley appealed the revocation of her probation, and the Supreme Court's partial denial of her request to augment the record with various transcripts (to be created at the public's expense). Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. She entered an "Alford" plea to possession of a controlled substance in late 2005. The district court imposed a sentence of four years with two years fixed but suspended the sentence and placed Easley on probation. In early 2007, the State alleged that Easley violated various terms of her probation. Later that year, Easley admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failure to stay in contact with her probation officer, absconding, failing to maintain employment, and failing to pay the costs of her supervision. The district court revoked Easley’s probation and reinstated her original probation. In 2010, the State moved to revoke probation, alleging that Easley again violated various terms of her probation. The State also charged Easley by Information with possession of a controlled substance. Easley pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in the second case. She also admitted to violating the terms of her probation by changing her residence without permission, consuming methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine, having contact with a prohibited person, and failing the pay the costs of her supervision. The district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed on the new charge, but the court retained jurisdiction. On review of Easley’s period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Easley’s sentences in both cases and placed her on probation. In 2011, the State filed a motion to revoke probation in both cases. Easley admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failing to obtain a substance use evaluation, failing to provide a drug test, changing her residence without permission, failing to make herself available for supervision, failing to report to her probation officer, and failing to complete community service. Easley was in contact with the Twin Falls mental health court coordinator; the mental health court coordinator determined that she would be a good candidate for mental health court. The prosecutor did not agree with the recommendation. The district court ruled that it did not possess the authority to place Easley into the mental health court program. The district court then revoked probation in both cases and executed the underlying sentences. However, the district court sua sponte reduced Easley’s sentence in the second case to a unified sentence of seven years with two years and six months fixed. Easley filed a motion to augment the record with various transcripts. The State objected. The Supreme Court entered an order granting Easley’s request for two transcripts, but it denied her request for transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, a October, 200, disposition hearing, and a February 2011 rider review hearing. "The flaw in this process [was] that the district court did not consider the alternative of mental health court in sentencing. It precluded itself from considering what may or may not have been a preferred alternative." The Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to consider all alternatives available to the sentencing court. View "Idaho v. Easley" on Justia Law