Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a medical malpractice claim brought by Scott and Meri Bybee against Dr. Patrick Gorman. The district court granted Dr. Gorman's motion for summary judgment after concluding that the Bybees' medical expert had failed to show adequate familiarity with the applicable standard of health care practice in the relevant community as required by Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, rendering his opinion inadmissible. Finding that the trial court erred by that decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bybee v. Gorman" on Justia Law

Roger and Barbara Stephens owned a parcel of real property consisting of about 270 acres on the west side of the highway and another parcel consisting of about 83 acres on the east side of the highway. They hired a realtor to sell the parcel on the west side of the highway. The realtor asked Northern Title Company of Idaho, Inc., to begin the initial title work for a sale of the property, including preparing a legal description for the sale of the parcel on the west side of the highway. Stephen Cummings noticed a "For Sale" sign on the Stephenses' property. Cummings negotiated to purchase the Stephens' property. He was faxed a copy of the commitment for title insurance issued in connection with the transaction. The legal description in the document included the Stephenses' property on both sides of the highway and two additional parcels they did not own. Based upon the legal description in those documents, Cummings believed that the property being sold included both parcels of the Stephenses' property. Northern Title discovered that the legal description it had prepared for use in the real estate contract and its title commitment for that transaction erroneously included the Stephenses' real property located east of the highway and two parcels of land they did not own. The legal description consisted of five paragraphs, each describing a separate parcel of real property. In an effort to correct that error, Northern Title created a revised legal description by inserting between the first and second paragraphs the words, "Except all of that portion of the following described land lying easterly of U.S. Highway 30." That change excluded the two parcels of property not owned by the Stephenses, but it did not exclude their land lying east of the highway because it was described in the first paragraph. On the date of closing, Northern Title recorded a warranty deed (Original Deed) granting to Cummings the real property described in the revised legal description, which was attached to the deed as Exhibit A. The legal description included the Stephenses' property on the east side of the highway. Mr. Stephens went to the county courthouse to pay the real estate taxes on the 83 acres of land east of the highway and was informed that he no longer owned that property. Cummings filed this action against Mr. Stephens over the erroneous deed. Stephens answered, denying Cummings's claims, and filed a third-party claim against Northern Title. He later dropped his third-party claim in exchange for Northern Title agreeing to indemnify him from any losses. Stephens then filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there was a mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake in the legal description of the real property being sold. The district court held that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding mutual mistake, but it granted the motion on the ground that the undisputed evidence showed a unilateral mistake. One of the realtors had filed an affidavit stating that prior to the sale he had told Mr. Cummings that only the land west of the highway was being sold, and Mr. Cummings did not deny that fact. Cummings successfully moved for reconsideration, with the district court finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to what Cummings had been told about what property he was purchasing. Cummings then amended his complaint, adding Northern Title as a defendant and alleging that by recording the Correction Deed, Stephens and Northern Title breached the warranties of title in the Original Deed, converted the 83 acres lying east of the highway, and slandered Cummings's title to the real property. The district court granted Stephens's motion for involuntary dismissal as to all of the claims against him. And in its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court denied all of Cummings's claims against Northern Title except one. It found that Northern Title acted negligently as a title and abstract company, and it awarded Cummings damages in the sum of $50,000, which was the sum he had paid to obtain an assignment of its contract to purchase the Stephenses' property. The court awarded Mr. Stephens costs and attorney fees against Cummings, and it awarded Mr. Cummings costs and attorney fees against Northern Title. Mr. Cummings appealed and Northern Title cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Cummings' claims against Stephens, and reversed claims against Northern Title on the ground that it assumed the duty of being an abstractor of title. View "Cummings v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Appellant Irina Shea brought a negligence suit against Respondent Kevic Corporation (Kevic), d/b/a Lett’s Downtown Car Wash. Shea claimed that she was injured when she slipped and fell on ice near the exit of the car wash due to Kevic’s negligence in allowing ice to build up near the car wash exit or in failing to warn of the danger of ice buildup. The district court granted Kevic’s motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Shea’s attorney Henry Madsen and also granted Kevic’s motion for summary judgment. Shea appealed these rulings. In addition, Shea appealed the district court’s denial of her two motions for reconsideration. Kevic cross-appealed the district court’s order denying its motion to strike portions of Shea’s affidavit, which Shea filed in support of her first motion for reconsideration. Finding only that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Kevic because Shea showed genuine issues of material fact, the Supreme Court reversed on this issue, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Shea v. Kevic Corporation" on Justia Law

This was an expedited appeal by John Doe (“Father”) from an order terminating his parental rights over his minor child and granting Child’s stepfather’s (John Doe II) (“Stepfather”) Petition to Adopt Child. The magistrate court found that Father had abandoned Child and failed to maintain regular contact with and support the minor child without just cause. Father stopped having contact with Child in April 2007, after Mother changed her contact information. In 2012, Father brought a motion to modify child custody. In response, Mother and her new husband, Stepfather, sought termination of the Father’s parental rights, and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption of the minor child. The magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted Stepfather’s petition. Father appealed. The Supreme Court held after review that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it found that Father abandoned Child. Termination of Father’s parental rights was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Based on the facts of this case, termination of Father’s parental rights was premature. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights (father)" on Justia Law

The State charged Kyle Richardson with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. After a preliminary hearing in which a confidential informant testified for the State, the State filed a motion requesting that the district court allow the State to admit into evidence at trial a transcript of the confidential informant’s preliminary hearing testimony. The State sought admission of the confidential informant’s testimony because the confidential informant had died and thus was unavailable as a witness for trial. The district court issued an opinion and order denying the State’s motion. The State filed a motion for a permissive appeal of the district court’s order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Richardson's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the admission of the informant's preliminary hearing testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Idaho law governing the admission of preliminary hearing transcripts permitted the admission of the testimony at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Joseph Talbot worked at Desert View Care Center as a nurse and was discharged due to a Facebook post that Desert View found violated its Social and Electronic Media Conduct Policy. Talbot applied for unemployment benefits, and an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner awarded him benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that Talbot engaged in employment-related misconduct. Talbot appealed, arguing that Desert View never communicated its Social Media Policy to him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Talbot v. Desert View Care Center" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Jones appealed his conviction for grand theft by extortion. Defendant argued the district court erred when it denied his mid-trial request to question a juror after the juror informed the court that he was suffering from anxiety and was unsure if he could continue participating on the jury. Defendant also argued that the district court made errors in evidentiary rulings and that the prosecutor engaged in various forms of misconduct during closing argument. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed the appellate court's judgment. It is reasonable to assume that after the trial resumed, the court, defense counsel, and bailiff may have continued to observe Juror 69 for any outward signs of anxiety. Because no further concerns were raised by anyone, including Juror 69, this Court is not in a position to second guess the district court’s handling of the matter. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dealing with the matter. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Idaho v. Moses" on Justia Law

Appellants-plaintiffs Wandering Trails, LLC and Liquid Realty, Inc. appealed the district court’s entry of summary judgment and denial of their veil-piercing claims against defendants Big Bite Excavation, Inc., Piper Ranch, LLC, and Tim and Julie Schelhorn in their individual capacity. Big Bite and Piper Ranch were both wholly owned by the Schelhorns. Wandering Trails was created for the purposes of obtaining and developing property. Wandering Trails entered into an agreement with Piper Ranch under which Piper Ranch agreed to pave the roadways for the development in exchange for a 25% interest in Wandering Trails. Piper Ranch did not do any work on the development. Wandering Trails and Liquid Realty brought suit and alleged an alter ego claim against Big Bite, Piper Ranch, and the Schelhorns. The district court granted summary judgment to Big Bite and the Schelhorns and refused the Plaintiffs’ veil-piercing claims. Wandering Trails and Liquid Realty appealed, and the Schelhorns cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error after careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wandering Trails v. Big Bite Excavation" on Justia Law

Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., an automobile dealership, hired Tina Venable as an Internet Manager in 2011. Venable stated that after she began working for Internet Auto, she observed violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA) and the federal Truth in Lending Act. Venable said she reported her concerns to the General Sales Manager and other members of the management team but was first told that she should mind my own business and was later told that "this is how ‘we do business’ and to get on board or words to that affect." Venable claimed that “[s]hortly after reporting the deceptive acts and practices to [the General Sales Manager],” she “discovered” that her “access to key programs used by the dealership had been denied which made it more difficult” for her “to complete sales transactions on behalf of Internet Auto.” A little over a month after hiring Venable, Internet Auto discharged her. After her termination, Venable filed a complaint against Internet Auto alleging breach of contract claims, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She later filed an amended complaint to additionally allege slander. Internet Auto was granted summary judgment on all of Venable’s claims except for slander and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Venable filed a motion for reconsideration of the wrongful discharge claim, which was denied. At trial, the jury found for Internet Auto on both of her remaining claims. Following the jury verdict, Venable filed a second motion for reconsideration of the wrongful discharge claim, which was denied. Venable timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Internet Auto. View "Venable v. Internet Auto" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a fraud, breach of contract, and breach of warranty action brought by April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) against defendants Kenneth Rammell, the estate of Christa Beguesse, and Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI), and a breach of contract counterclaim brought by CBI against ABI. The parties went to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of ABI on all claims. Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or in the alternative a new trial. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for JNOV on the finding of fraud by Christa’s estate and dismissed that claim. The district court also granted Defendants a new trial on the issue of damages unless ABI accepted a remittitur for damages assessed against CBI only. The district court denied Defendants’ motion on the remaining claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. ABI accepted the remittitur. Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion. Defendants also sought reversal of the district court’s judgment or in the alternative a new trial on their counterclaim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell" on Justia Law