Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Glenn Mosell was a commercial real estate broker in investment sales and a land developer who owned about 290 acres of property in Canyon County. He planned to develop this property and other land that he had an option to purchase into a destination resort which would include, among other things, resort-based residences; a state-of-the-art winery; a luxury 4-star boutique hotel; a world class day spa; a gourmet restaurant; an event and business conference center; polo fields; an equestrian center; a sporting and athletic club; and an amphitheater for music events and concerts. He contacted restaurateur John Berryhill to see if he would be interested in building the restaurant in the development. Berryhill was the owner and president of Berryhill & Company, which operated a restaurant and catering business. Berryhill agreed to participate in the proposed development, but not to build the restaurant. In 2007, Berryhill & Company signed a lease of space in downtown Boise in order to move his restaurant from a strip mall to that space. Mosell and Berryhill both signed a personal guaranty of Berryhill & Company's obligations under the lease. Berryhill & Company then began making tenant improvements to the leased property. Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company by check. The word "loan" was written on the memo line of the check. Over the next ten months, Mosell Equities issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each had the word "loan" written on the memo line except for two. The restaurant opened in August 2007. Because of the economic downturn, Mosell decided not to proceed with the polo project and did not launch the intended sales effort in 2008. Later that year, Mosell Equities stopped paying the rent on additional space, and Mosell and Berryhill ended their relationship. In 2009, Mosell Equities filed suit against Berryhill & Company on multiple claims: (1) breach of an express contract; (2) breach of an implied contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) conversion; (5) fraud; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. The case was tried to a jury, and the verdict was in favor of Berryhill. Mosell moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict citing insufficient evidence, and the district court granted that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and that the district court erred in granting the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mosell Equities v. Berryhill & Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Woodrow John Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery; he successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction and was placed on probation. In 2009, Grant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, domestic battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Grant's appointed counsel moved to withdraw, stating that Grant had reneged on an agreed-upon plea bargain and that communications between them had broken down. The district court denied the motion. Later, Grant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery, and admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The district court considered a letter and live testimony from the victim of Grant's domestic battery, in which the victim expressed her opinions on Grant's crime, character, and the sentence that would be proper for him. Thereafter, the district court sentenced Grant to five years fixed and five years indeterminate for domestic battery, to be served concurrently with a sentence of two years fixed and three years indeterminate for possession of methamphetamine. The district court revoked Grant's probation and executed his previously suspended sentence of four years fixed and six years indeterminate. The two new sentences were to be served consecutively to the reinstated 2006 sentence. Grant requested leniency in three I.C.R. 35 motions, which the district court denied. Grant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to withdraw, by considering the victim's impact statements in their entirety, and by refusing his requests for leniency. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects. View "Idaho v. Grant" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiff Martin Bettwieser brought a breach of contract action against the New York Irrigation District and its directors (collectively, the District). Bettwieser alleged that the District breached an oral contract by not timely providing him with a legal opinion regarding whether he could be excluded from the irrigation district without paying statutory exclusion and filing fees. Following a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, ruling that Bettwieser had failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief. Bettwieser appealed, alleging the district court made errors of fact and law during the trial and in its decisions regarding Bettwieser's pre- and post-trial motions. As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court noted that Bettwieser's briefing was, "at best, difficult to follow. In some cases, it is unclear what issue Bettwieser is attempting to raise. And, even where an issue is identifiable, argument, authority, and legal reasoning are often absent." The Court concluded that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by substantial competent evidence. Bettwieser failed to satisfy the requirements for certification of a class action. The district court was not obligated to consider claims not raised by the pleadings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bettwieser's motion to disqualify counsel. Bettwieser was not entitled to declaratory judgment because he failed to demonstrate the existence of an actual or justiciable controversy. View "Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Boise Baseball, LLC, Boise Hawks Baseball Club, LLC, and Home Plate Food Services, LLC, (collectively "Boise Baseball") sought, and the Supreme Court granted, a permissive appeal of a district court's order. Plaintiff-Respondent Bud Roundtree Rountree was a Boise Hawks season ticket holder. In 2008, he took his wife and two grandchildren to a Boise Hawks game at Memorial Stadium in Garden City. "Most" portions of the stadium are protected by vertical mesh netting approximately 30 feet high, and several areas are protected from above by horizontal netting. Rountree's tickets were in the "Viper" section, which is protected by netting. The stadium also has an area known as the "Hawks Nest," which is a dining area along the third base line covered by both vertical and horizontal netting. Adjacent to the Hawks Nest, at the "very end of the third base line," is the "Executive Club." The Executive Club, while covered by horizontal netting, "is one of the only areas in the whole stadium not covered by vertical netting." At some point during the game, Rountree and his family went to the Hawks Nest to eat. After eating, they went to the Executive Club. While in the Executive Club, Rountree started talking to someone and stopped paying attention to the game. Approximately ten minutes later, Rountree heard the roar of the crowd and turned his head back to the game. He was struck by a foul ball and, as a result, lost an eye. Rountree brought suit alleging that their negligence caused the loss of his eye. Boise Baseball moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court should adopt the Baseball Rule, which limits the duty of stadium operators to spectators hit by foul balls, and find that Boise Baseball complied with it. Alternatively, Boise Baseball argued that Rountree impliedly "consented to the risk of being hit by a foul ball." The district court denied the motion on both grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no compelling public policy requiring it to adopt the "Baseball Rule." Based on that analysis, the Court was not persuaded that primary implied assumption of the risk should be treated any differently. "Allowing assumption of risk as an absolute bar is inconsistent with our comparative negligence system, whether the risks are inherent in an activity, or not. We decline to adopt the Baseball Rule. We further hold that, apart from express written and oral consent, assumption of the risk, whether primary or secondary, is not a valid defense in Idaho." View "Rountree v. Boise Baseball" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) initiated this action to terminate the parental rights of John Doe. The matter proceeded to trial where the magistrate court found that Doe had neglected and abandoned his minor child, D.C., and that it was in the best interest of the child that Doe's parental rights be terminated. Doe appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed: Doe failed to show that the magistrate erred in finding that he had abandoned D.C. "Even if the Department failed to implement the case plan in an appropriate fashion, the magistrate's finding of neglect was supported on a prong of neglect essentially independent of case plan performance. Doe has made no effort to show that it is not in the best interest of D.C. to terminate Doe's parental rights. There are no grounds to reverse the termination order." View "Health & Welfare v. Doe" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal to challenge the administrative rule adopted by the Industrial Commission in 1994 that regulates the amount of attorney fees allowable for attorneys representing claimants in worker's compensation proceedings. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the rule. View "Seiniger Law v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Michelle Anderson appealed the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss kidnapping charges brought against her for keeping the child she had with Ricky Anderson away. Michelle was obligated to deliver the child to Ricky under a parenting plan issued by a Montana court, but never completed the exchange. In her motion to dismiss, Michelle argued that Ricky is not a custodial parent under I.C. 18-4501 and therefore Michelle could not have committed kidnapping. The district court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ricky was a custodial parent for the purposes of IC 18-4501(2), and that Michelle could be charged with kidnapping based on Ricky's visitation rights that granted him lawful care and control of the child. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Idaho v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Justin S. Reynolds, Kristine Reynolds, and their construction company, Sunrise Development, LLC (Reynolds) brought a malpractice action against their law firm, Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., and its attorney-employee, David T. Krueck. Reynolds alleged professional negligence in both the drafting of a real estate agreement between Reynolds and Quasar Development, LLC, and in the subsequent handling of the litigation regarding that agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Trout Jones, holding that the two-year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) applied to bar the action and Reynolds timely appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute in district court over two liens on real property: a deed of trust and a mortgage. Appellants (Insight, LLC and several other companies) are assignees of a mortgage secured by 160 acres of real property owned by Summitt, Inc., which included an 18-acre parcel Summitt purchased from Respondents Patrick and Monica Gunter. The Respondents held a deed of trust on the 18-acre parcel. Summitt defaulted on its obligations to both Insight and the Gunters. Insight filed suit naming Summitt's principals and the Gunters as defendants. The Gunters denied that their deed of trust was junior to the Insight-Summitt mortgage. The district court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment because there was an issue as to who was the initial encumbrancer. After trial, the district court found that the closing of the Gunter-Summitt deed of trust was separate and independent from the Insight-Summitt mortgage. Furthermore, the court found that the Gunters' deed of trust effectively encumbered the Gunter property at the time the transaction between Summitt and the Gunters closed. However, it found that the Insight mortgage on the combined 160-acre parcel did not create an encumbrance on the Gunter property until the Gunter-Summitt transaction closed. On appeal, Insight argued that the mortgage had priority as a matter of law because it was a purchase money mortgage that was first recorded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding that Insight had notice of the Gunters' deed of trust was clearly erroneous. Further, the Insight-Summitt mortgage was a purchase money mortgage , and that the court erred in concluding the deed of trust took priority. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Insight LLC v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Appellant Habib Sadid, a former tenured professor of civil engineering at Idaho State University, appealed an Industrial Commission Order that reversed the Department of Labor Appeals Examiner's grant of unemployment benefits to Appellant after he was terminated by Idaho State University. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's finding of misconduct was supported by substantial and competent evidence. As such, the Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's order. View "Sadid v. Idaho State University" on Justia Law