Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a condemnation action brought by the Idaho Transportation Board (ITB) against HI Boise, LLC. ITB sought to acquire a strip of land as part of a project to improve the I-84/Vista Avenue Interchange in Boise. ITB offered HI Boise the condemned property's appraised value of $38,177, but HI Boise filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, claiming damages of $7.5 million for additional lost rights of access and visibility. HI Boise appeals the district court's summary dismissal of those claims. Because the Supreme Court found that neither claim involved a compensable taking, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a products liability action brought by Jesus Hurtado and John Reitsma, d/b/a J & J Calf Ranch (J & J), against Land O'Lakes, Inc. (Land O'Lakes). J & J alleged that the Land O'Lakes milk replacer it used to feed its dairy calves was defective and caused the death of more than one hundred calves. A jury found in favor of J & J and awarded damages. Land O'Lakes appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony and that J & J failed to prove both liability and damages. Land O'Lakes petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and enter judgment in its favor or, alternatively, to vacate the judgment and order a new trial. J & J cross-appealed the district court's award of attorney fees, arguing that the court abused its discretion by excluding fees incurred before and during previous litigation in this matter. J & J petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the award of attorney fees and remand with instructions to include attorney fees accrued in the first trial in its calculation of reasonable attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Land O'Lakes waived issues regarding expert testimony. The Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was supported by substantial competent evidence and affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees because it properly exercised its discretion. View "Jesus Hurtado v. Land O' Lakes, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was the third appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a 2002 real estate transaction between Thomas and Colleen Birch-Maile and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. Attorney and Real Estate Broker Thomas Maile advised the Trust to reject an offer to sell certain trust property. Months later, Mr. Maile submitted an earnest money agreement for the same property. The prospective buyers, collectively the Taylors, sued the Mailes and Berkshire Investments, LLC (the company that the Mailes formed and to whom they assigned rights to the property) for professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties. The Mailes filed suit seeking to set aside a 2006 judgment against them, which the Court affirmed in the second appeal. The district court determined on summary judgment that the 2006 judgment was res judicata with regard to the issues raised in the Mailes' complaint. At trial the jury awarded damages against the Mailes on the Taylors' counterclaim. The Mailes appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed: the district court was correct in summarily dismissing the Mailes' lawsuit and denying their motion for JNOV. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney to two of the prospective buyers. View "Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the approval of a permit application for a Livestock Confinement Operation (LCO), also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners. The Board approved the application after a remand by the district court of the Board's decision previously denying the permit. Several individuals and organizations opposed to the LCO because of the potential harms to the neighboring farms and to the Minidoka National Historic Site petitioned the district court for review of the Board's decision. The district court affirmed the Board's approval of the permit, finding in the process that four of the organizations concerned with the effects on the Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the district court's decision, asking the Supreme Court to find that these parties had standing to challenge the permit approval, that the Board's procedure for presenting evidence before the Board violated procedural due process rights, and that the Board failed to follow all of the county's relevant zoning ordinances when it approved the application. The issue central to the Court's opinion pertained to standing of all the appellant-organizations, the Board's procedure for presenting evidence throughout the LCO permit application process, the constitutionality of the "one mile rule" of Idaho Code section 67-6529, and the application of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinances. The Court concluded that the Board properly applied its zoning ordinance to the LCO permit application process, that I.C. 67-6529 was not unconstitutional, and that the public was afforded appropriate due process prior to, and during the LCO permit application hearing. View "Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County" on Justia Law

After moving from the address that he reported to the Idaho State Police Sex Offender Registry pursuant to the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. 18-8309 (2001) and having been extradited from Belize, Defendant David Leroy Lee was convicted of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender in 2009. Defendant asserted on appeal that the plain language of I.C. 18-8309 did not require sex offenders to register or update their address information with either the Registry or the sheriff of the county where the offender was required to register after moving to another country. In the alternative, he contended that the State failed to provide evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he moved from his last known address to a definite new address or actual residence thereby triggering his duty to notify the Registry or the sheriff. Furthermore, Defendant claimed that I.C. 18-8309 was unconstitutionally vague and that his due process rights were violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant changed his address or actual residence. The Court therefore vacated the district court's Amended Judgment of Conviction, and remanded this case with instructions for the entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "Idaho v. Lee" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute regarding the sewer system serving Sunnyside Industrial Park, LLC. Sunnyside Park Utilities (SPU) provides water and sewer services to the industrial park and Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf are, respectively, the Secretary and President of SPU. Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft) is a printing business that occupies a building in the industrial park. In 2004, Printcraft entered a ten-year lease for property in the industrial park. The dispute in this case centered on the failure of Beck, Woolf, and SPU to disclose limitations on the sewage system, including the amount of sewage the system could handle and its lack of suitability to dispose of some chemicals used in the printing business. After Printcraft started using the sewage system, SPU disconnected Printcraft from the system in December 2006. Printcraft sued SPU, Beck, and Woolf (collectively, defendants) for breach of contract, fraudulent nondisclosure, and fraud. At trial, the jury found that the defendants owed Printcraft a duty to disclose the limitations of the system and failed to do so. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and entered judgment in favor of Printcraft. Defendants timely appealed and Printcraft cross-appealed. However, in 2009, SPU filed a renewed motion for relief from judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), asserting newly discovered evidence regarding whether Printcraft's damages claim was affected by its subsequent connection to the Idaho Falls city sewer system. The district court found that the newly discovered evidence satisfied the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b) and granted a new trial on the issue of damages. On appeal, the defendants argued that they had no duty to disclose, that any failure to disclose did not lead Printcraft to believe any fact that was false, that the refusal to give SPU's requested jury instructions was improper, and that the district court erred in denying their motion for JNOV because there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination of damages. In turn, Printcraft's cross-appeal argued that the district court erred in limiting the potential bases for defendants' duty to disclose, that Printcraft's breach of contract claim was improperly dismissed, that the subsequent Rule 60(b) motion was improperly granted, that the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury, and that the judge erred in denying Printcraft's request for attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of SPU's motion under 60(b)(2). The Court affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for JNOV as to the existence and breach of a duty to disclose and as to the amount of damages. The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the jury instructions. And the Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny Printcraft's request to put the question of punitive damages to the jury. View "Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Hector Almaraz appealed his conviction for first-degree murder based on several evidentiary grounds, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible character evidence that gang members commit crimes and other violent acts and by admitting improper testimony from a police officer and an expert witness interpreting the security video from the scene of the crime. Defendant also argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress an eyewitness identification due to suggestive procedures, and by precluding an expert from opining to the suggestiveness of a specific eyewitness’ identification. Furthermore, Defendant asserted that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial, warranting the Supreme Court to remand his case to district court for a new trial. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in failing to suppress the identification of Defendant as the shooter, and abused its discretion by limiting a defense expert from testifying about the suggestiveness of the specific procedures employed by the police during the eyewitness' interview with police. Nevertheless, the Court found those two errors to be harmless. There was no other abuse of discretion committed by the district court on the remaining evidentiary issues raised by Defendant on appeal and that Court held that his Motion for a New Trial was properly denied. Thus, the Court upheld Defendant's conviction. View "Idaho v. Almaraz, Jr." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a negligence claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Appellant Joseph Gerdon was a passenger in an automobile, traveling with Respondent Joshua Rydalch when the vehicle veered off the road and went down an embankment. At the time of the accident, both Gerdon and Rydalch were employees of Con Paulos Chevrolet, Inc., and were transporting a vehicle for their employer. Gerdon and Rydalch were injured during the accident, and both parties received workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. Gerdon also filed a Complaint against Rydalch for negligent driving. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rydalch, finding that both Gerdon and Rydalch were acting in the course and scope of their employment during the accident. As a result, the district court held that Gerdon's claim of negligence was barred by the exclusive remedy rule under Idaho’s Workers' Compensation statutes. Gerdon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erred in holding that Rydalch was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and that the court abused its discretion by striking a portion of Gerdon's affidavit. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rydalch because the Court found he was acting in the course of employment when the accident occurred, and therefore, Gerdon's claim of negligence was indeed barred by the exclusive remedy rule. Furthermore, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking a portion of Gerdon's affidavit. View "Gerdon v. Rydalch" on Justia Law

This appeal involed a medical malpractice claim brought against a chiropractor for negligently causing a patient to suffer a stroke after treatment. In 2007, Appellant Martha Arregui sought treatment for her neck and back pain from Respondent Dr. Rosalinda Gallegos-Main. Arregui originally alleged that Dr. Gallegos-Main owed her a duty to treat her in a medically competent manner under Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, and failed to do so when Arregui was diagnosed several weeks later as having suffered a stroke after a neck manipulation by Dr. Gallegos-Main. Arregui filed suit against the chiropractor and the facility, Full Life Chiropractic, in 2009. Dr. Gallegos-Main deposed Arregui's expert witness and discovered that she had no knowledge of the local standard of care. Consequently, Dr. Gallegos-Main moved for summary judgment, arguing that Arregui failed to meet the requirements for establishing a claim for medical malpractice which requires expert testimony regarding the local standard of care. Three days after the deadline, Arregui filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and included an affidavit from her expert with a sworn statement that she consulted a local chiropractor and was now familiar with the local standard of care. Dr. Gallegos-Main filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit as untimely and as a sham affidavit. Arregui unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing the court erred in striking her expert's affidavit and presented a new argument in the alternative that the court improperly granted summary judgment because the Medical Malpractice Act did not apply to chiropractors. The district court entered a final order denying the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Arregui v. Gallegos-Main" on Justia Law

John Doe (Father) is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. In mid-2007, he married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Father was arrested in Ontario, Oregon, when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a jail in Portland to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents’ home in Salamanca, Guanajuato, Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In March, 2009, Mother was living in Middleton, Idaho, with her boyfriend, who had a son who was about seven years old. Mother and her boyfriend took his son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boy was injured, the medical personnel notified law enforcement. The investigation disclosed Mother’s son had struck her boyfriend’s son several times with a hairbrush. Daughter and the boyfriend’s son were taken into custody by law enforcement, and on the same day the county prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act with respect to those children. The petition alleged that the name of Daughter’s father was unknown and that he was in Mexico at an unknown address. Father spoke by telephone from Mexico with the Department’s caseworker that he would like to be involved in Daughter’s life and to be reunited with Mother and her son. He also said he would like Mother to begin the process that would allow him to come into the United States lawfully. In August, the Department’s caseworker told Father she would present a home study to the court if it was received in time. On September 15, 2010, the Mexican consulate emailed the report to the caseworker. The termination hearing was held on September 29. At that hearing, the Department did not present the study to the court. The caseworker testified that she disregarded the report because the Department had decided to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thus, default was entered against Father, even though he had clearly not been properly served with process regarding the termination proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded this case with instructions for the court to order the Department to take all reasonable steps to promptly place Daughter with Father in Mexico. View "RE: Termination of Parental Rights of John (2011-23) Doe" on Justia Law