Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from Defendant Dean Clay Miller, Jr.'s conviction for burglary, assault with intent to commit robbery, possession of methamphetamine, and being a persistent violator. The Supreme Court reduced this case to two issues: (1) whether a persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the information to give a court subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether Defendant's sentence was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. Defendant pled guilty to to the charges against him, but on appeal argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State did not allege the persistent violator enhancement in the information. He also argued that if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction, the sentence was excessive in light of his mental health condition and other mitigating factors. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Defendant, and did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced him. View "Idaho v. Miller" on Justia Law

At the center of this case was a permissive appeal from the district court's interlocutory entry of a protective order, which held certain documents related to the suspension of Appellant Paul J. Montalbano’s privileges at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) were not discoverable by Montalbano. The interlocutory order came from Dr. Montalbano’s lawsuit filed against SARMC in district court with ten causes of action including breach of fiduciary duties and defamation; this appeal dealt solely with the protective order. In 2009, Appellant filed suit and sought to discover an extensive list of documents "related to the processes, activities, and decisions that ultimately led to the suspension of his privileges." When SARMC asserted a peer review privilege, Appellant filed a motion to compel. SARMC then moved for a protective order. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel. The district court concluded that the materials related to the peer review process were protected: "[t]here can be no discovery of the peer review records nor can any witness be questioned about any information provided to the peer review committees nor the interpretation nor analysis of any evidence submitted as part of this process." Appellant thereafter moved for leave to file a permissive appeal of the court’s interlocutory order. The Supreme Court granted the permissive appeal to review the applicability of I.C. 39-1392b in physician disciplinary proceedings because it posed a question of first impression. The Court found that the applicable peer review statute " cannot be reasonably construed to state that if a physician brings a lawsuit, the privilege is waived in order to permit the physician to use otherwise privileged records. … The physician cannot waive the right of the hospital or anyone else who is entitled to assert it." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's ruling to deny Appellant discovery of the records. View "Montalbano v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr. " on Justia Law

At the heart of this case laid the existence of two disputed roadways or easements over the Appellants Chris and Dana Belstlers’ property benefitting Respondents Karen and Howard Conines. Since purchasing the property in 1998, the Conines have used two roads to cross the Belstler property and access their property. In the summer of 2006, the Belstlers requested that the Conines cease using the roads. The Conines ceased using the lower of the two roads, which had been cabled and locked by the Belstlers, but refused to cease using the upper road. The parties held discussions but were unsuccessful in resolving the dispute. At district court, an express easement was found over both roads, and a prescriptive easement was found over the upper road. The case was appealed, and on remand, a different district court judge held that there were no express easements. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred on reconsideration in finding there were no express easements over the Belstler property. The Court reinstated the first district court opinion. View "Belstler v. Sheler (Conine)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kepler-Fleenor and several other property owners in Division III of the Sawtelle Mountain Subdivision challenged a district court's decision that an unnamed road in their subdivision was public by common law dedication. Although the road did not intrude on any lots in the subdivision, it straddled two lots, one of which belongs to Plaintiffs Joni Kepler-Fleenor and Kistin Fleenor, and the other of which belongs to Blue Sky Management, LLC. According to Plaintiffs, heavy construction traffic heading into and out of an adjoining subdivision was bothersome and was damaging the unnamed road. Plaintiffs installed a berm and a gate to block traffic on the road, but the County removed it believing the disputed road to be public. After the County removed the road obstructions, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a judgment to declare the road as private. The district court granted the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that the plat unambiguously showed the disputed road to be dedicated to public use. Because the subdivision plat unambiguously dedicated the road, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County " on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was an order of the district court which held that the statute making peer review records privileged applied to a lawsuit brought by a doctor who claimed that a hospital acted in bad faith by refusing to renew a his attending privileges. After a series of reviews of Physician Petitioner Joseph Verska, M.D.'s (Physician) practice initiated in 2004 by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) and again in 2006 and 2007, Physician requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel in 2008. In 2009, Physician and the Spine Institute of Idaho (a professional corporation he created) sued the Hospital and two of its doctors (Defendants) alleging that Defendants conspired to wrongfully harm them, intentionally and/or negligently interfered with their economic advantage, interfered with Physician’s prospective contractual relations and business expectations, defamed them, and intentionally and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon Physician. In addition to damages, Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Hospital to restore Physician’s privileges. During this litigation, Plaintiffs initiated discovery related to the process, activities, and decisions that led to Hospital’s decision to deny Physician’s application to be reappointed to the medical staff and to have his privileges renewed. Hospital objected on the ground that such information was protected by the peer review privilege. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to compel discovery, and Defendants sought a motion for a protective order. The district court denied the motion to compel and granted the protective order. The Supreme Court found the peer review statute unambiguous: "the statute states that 'all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged'" not subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Physician's motion to compel the records' discovery. View "Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Brian Sopatyk sought judicial review of the Lemhi County Board of Commissioners' decision to validate Anderson Creek Road, which ran the length of his property. He contended the road never became public and, if so, was abandoned. He also maintained that the validation was an unconstitutional taking, that it was error for the road easement to be validated at fifty-feet wide, that one of the commissioners was biased against him, that the road illegally invades federal public lands, and that the Board of Commissioners failed to explain why the validation is in the public interest. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the validation decision, finding the road became public by legislative declaration in the late 1800s and was never abandoned. View "Sopatyk v. Lemhi County " on Justia Law

The City of Lewiston (City) enacted "Ordinance No. 4512" that created a stormwater utility and fee for the operation and maintenance of the its stormwater system. Five government entities (Entities) subject to the stormwater fee brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the fee was an unconstitutional tax requiring authorization by the Legislature. The Entities thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. The City filed its cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that the stormwater fee was authorized pursuant to the City’s police powers, the Revenue Bond Act, the Local Improvement District Code, and various other provisions of the Idaho Code. Relying primarily on "Brewster v. City of Pocatello," (768 P.2d 765 (1988)), and finding no legislative authorization for the stormwater fee, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Entities, holding that the stormwater fee was an unconstitutional tax. The City filed an appeal of the district court's decision. Because the Supreme Court concluded that stormwater fee was an unauthorized tax, it held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Entities. View "Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. #1 v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law

Idaho Development, LLC (Idaho Development) advanced $1,100,000.00 to Teton View Golf Estates, LLC (Teton View), a joint venture made up of Idaho Development as a 33.3% owner and Rothchild Properties, LLC as a 66.7% owner. Teton View granted Idaho Development a promissory note secured by a deed of trust that specified a set monthly payment and stated that the entire amount was to be paid off in ninety days. Idaho Development filed an action to foreclose on the deed of trust after Teton View failed to satisfy the promissory note. DePatco, Inc., another lienholder on the property, filed a motion for summary judgment to recharacterize Idaho Development’s advance as a capital contribution, which was granted. Idaho Development appealed, arguing that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the entire $1,100,000 advance was intended to be a capital contribution. Idaho Development also appealed a subsequent summary judgment brought by ZBS, LLC, which relied on the recharacterization determination in holding that ZBS' lien on the property had priority over Idaho Development's lien. Because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the entire $1,100,000 was intended to be a capital contribution, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. Therefore, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC " on Justia Law

Appellant Two Jinn, Inc. appealed a district court's decision that affirmed a magistrate's denial of its motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. Two Jinn argued that it demonstrated a defense of impossibility of performance based on the deportation of Rosendo Arriago Navarro (Navarro). Two Jinn also argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that justice did not require enforcement of the forfeiture in this case under former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e)(4). Navarro was arrested for driving without privileges. Navarro was released from custody when Two Jinn dba Aladdin Bail Bonds/Anytime Bail Bonds posted his $500 bail. After pleading guilty, Navarro was ordered to appear in court for sentencing. Navarro failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, the bond was ordered forfeited, and a bench warrant was issued for Navarro’s arrest. 175 days after the bond had been forfeited, Two Jinn filed a motion to set aside that forfeiture and exonerate it from its liability on the bond, arguing that Navarro had been deported to Mexico and that it was, therefore, entitled to relief under the contract law doctrine of impossibility of performance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn’s requested bond exoneration. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court decision upholding the magistrate court decision. View "Idaho v. Two Jinn, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant William Rigoli appealed an Industrial Commission's decision that found him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment. Claimant worked as a toy department manager for Respondent Wal-Mart, and was fired for using foul language and leaving before his assigned shift was completed. Initially, Claimant was determined by the Department of Labor to be eligible for unemployment benefits, but his employer appealed his eligibility. The Department ultimately concluded that Claimant was ineligible, and he appealed to the Industrial Commission. The Commission upheld the Department's conclusion and denied benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was substantial and competent evidence the Commission relied upon to conclude that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct, and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Rigoli v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law